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THE METROPOLITAN POLICE AND GOVERNMENT 
1860-1920 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation explores the experience of the Metropolitan police in the period of 
its Victorian maturation with a focus on the relations between the operational force 
and its political sponsors. It is demonstrated that, when more relaxed budgetary 
policies became feasible in the later nineteenth century, initial parsimony gave way 
to indulgence of police officer demands in a situation where, despite the legal 
appearance of full control by the Home Secretary, there were in fact no effective 
local or even national Parliamentary counterbalances. The sponsoring department, 
the Home Office, was in practice outgrown by its own creation and later 
Commissioners struggled also to exert control of a force which developed strong, 
and sometimes deviant, cultures of its own. Except for resort to the Receiver of the 
Metropolitan Police District in ways initially unplanned, the Home Office settled for 
the appearance rather than the reality of effective control. In crisis, on the other 
hand, ultimate political control could not be challenged when it operated to restore 
public confidence in the force. However, it has also to be understood that the extent 
to which that control was exerted in the public interest was dependent in turn on the 
extent to which political citizenship comprehended the whole population. A 
restricted electorate meant that the political sponsors could afford to have limited 
ambitions for the exercise of their own responsibilities. Ultimately, "municipal isation" 
(that is, local authority control) of the force in 2000 was less an effect of a more 
"democratic! ' state than the product of changes in the way executive government 
managed the police service and local government as a whole. 
R. M. Monis 
June 2004 
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HMG Her/His Majesty's Government 
ICS Indian Civil Service 
LCC London County Council 
MBW Metropolitan Board of Works 
MPO Metropolitan Police Office (i. e. the headquarters office only) 
Parly USofS Parliamentary Under Secretary of Sate 
PCO Public Carriage Office 
PUS Permanent Under Secretary of State 
RIC Royal Irish Constabulary 
Sofs Secretary of State 
INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the place of the Metropolitan police in the political 
system of the United Kingdom during the pedod 1860-1920, the capital's - 
and, by definition, the force's - greatest period of growth. In particular it 
seeks to explore areas relating to senior appointments, financial policy and 
governance largely ignored or glossed over by earlier writers but which are 
nonetheless crucial to an understanding of how the force functioned. 
Amongst other things, what follows demonstrates that, although the 
executive (in the shape of the Home Secretary) had legally extensive 
controlling powers in relation to the force, it lacked in practice any 
commensurate and continuous capacity for exercising those powers. An 
appearance of political accountability was dependent on tranquillity. Whilst 
events involving the force were capable at times of galvanising the whole of 
the centre of government, political attention wandered after the crisis was 
past. In a situation where engaging continuous political attention was not 
feasible and the Commissioner acquired a public role directly challengeable 
only by the Home Secretary himself, Home Office officials settled initially for 
the appearances of control rather than the substance but, in a period of 
greater self-confidence from the 1880s, employed the official known as the 
Receiver as their proxy. 
From this approach, it follows that the study is primarily an administrative 
and political account. It therefore does not dwell on the operational 
experience of the force, or seek to chronicle the period on the lines of a 
regimental history. The facts of the force's public life have been recorded 
and celebrated elsewhere, even if in ways not always acceptable to modern, 
especially academic, tastes. ' The aim of this study is to go behind what 
occurred in order to place the force in the context of the state's 
contemporary form and capacity. 
Apart from the chroniclers, much modern historiography has been concerned 
with the analysis of the events leading up to the creation of the force in 1829 
2 
or of particular policy areas. In addition, specialist compendia directed 
principally at current criminal justice policy issues have offered scene-setting 
1 For example, Ascoli, D., The Queen's Peace, Hamish Hamilton, 1979, and Browne, D. G., 
The Rise of Scotland Yard, Harrap, 1956. Much condescended to nowadays are the works 
of Charles Reith which, though heavily teleological and, in the Butterfield sense, "Whiggish,, 
nonetheless ploughed new furrows. Those that are not mere wartime and/or dotty 
propagandising still deserve attention e. g. The Police Idea, Oxford University Press, 1938; A 
New Study of Police History, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1956: and even British Police and 
the Democratic Ideal, Oxford University Press, 1943. Tom Critchley, who had served as 
secretary to the Willink Royal Commission on the Police 1960-1962 (Final Report, Cmd 
1728,1962), dwelt mostly on the provincial forces in his history. See Critchley, T. A., A 
History of Police in England and Wales, Constable, 1967. 2 Goodway, D., London Chartism, 1838-1848, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1982; Mather, F. C., Public Order in the Age of the Chartists, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1959; Miller, W. R., Cops and Bobbies., Police Authority in New York and 
London 1830-1870, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1977; Petrow, S., Policing Morals., 
The Metropolitan Police and the Home Office 1870-1914, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambfidge, 1994; Porter, B., The Origins of the Vigilant State. The London Metropolitan 
Police Special Branch before the First World War, Weidenfeld, 1987; Reynolds, EA., Before 
the Bobbies: The Night Watch and Police Reform in Metropolitan London, 1720-1830, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford (California), 1998; Smith, P. T., Policing Victorian 
London: Political Policing, Public Order and the London Metropolitan Police, Greenwood, 
Westport (Connecticut), 1985; Kamm, R., 'The Home Office, Public Order and Civil 
Liberties', Ph. D. Thesis, Cambridge, 1986; Paley, R., 'The Middlesex Justices Act of 1792: 
Its Origins and Effects', Ph. D. Thesis, Reading, 1983. 
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synoptic historical accountS. 3 What is novel about the approach in the 
present case is that it adopts an entirely new perspective viz. how the force 
is to be located within contemporary political and administrative (including 
financial) structures. Whilst there has been a study on something like such 
lines of the early establishment and growth of the provincial forces, there has 
been no such study of the Metropolitan police. In relation to these issues, it 
could be said that the force has been taken for granted, even though not 
every recent commentator would perhaps agree. ' 
It follows also from pursuing this point of view that the study does not seek to 
engage in other areas that have been of interest to historians or social 
scientists. For example, it does not seek to investigate the effect of the force 
on crime levels or its impact on social behaviour in the wider senses. 5 Nor 
3 For example, Maguire, M., Morgan, R., Reiner, R., (eds. ), The Oxford Handbook of 
Criminology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 3rd edn., 2002; Newbum, T., (ed. ), Handbook 
of Policing, Willan, Cullompton, 2003. 
4. The establishment of the Metropolitan Police in 1829 has transfixed historians of the 
police. * Rawlings, P., Policing: a Short History, Willan, Cullompton, 2002, p. 1. To an extent 
that is true also of a study which sought to integrate and demonstrate the interconnections 
between the Irish and English experiences: Palmer, S. H., Police and Protest in England and 
Ireland 1780-1850, Cambridge University Press, 1988. But it is certainly not the case with 
Emsley, C., The English Police: A Political and Social History, Longman, 2nd edition, 1996, 
which explains London exceptionalism whilst integrating London developments in the 
context of police service developments as a whole. It is the very fact that that study does not 
concentrate on the Metropolitan force that leaves room for the attempt of the present study 
to explore further detail. 5 For example, V. A. C. Gattrell's eloquent if depressed reflections on lower class experiences 
of policing in "Crime, authority and the policeman-state" in Thompson, F. M. L., ed., The 
Cambridge Social Histofy of Britain 1750-1950, Vol. 3, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 243-310; and 
the high energy account of 'revisionism' in Reiner, R., The Politics of the Police, 
Wheatsheaf, Brighton, 1985. The writer has, however, attempted separately to approach 
some of these issues in Morris, R. M., O' Lies, damned lies and criminal statistics': 
Reinterpreting the criminal statistics in England and Wales", Crime, History and Societies, 
Vol. 5, No 1,200 1, pp. 111-127. 
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does it concentrate on the experience of policemen, whether individually or 
as a groUp. 6 
On the other hand, to be intelligible, the study has to show some elasticity 
towards the time boundaries 1860-1920. Thus, where it is necessary to 
explain either pre-1 860 developments or what eventuated in particular cases 
after 1920, it moves to do so. 
1860 - Background 
By 1860, Richard Mayne - appointed jointly with Charles Rowan in 1829 - 
had been sole Commissioner in practice since 1855 and by law since the Act 
of 18567. The same Act authorised the appointment of two Assistant 
Commissioners, one of whom had been the Inspecting Superintendent of the 
force since 1850, and the other with service as Chief Constable of 
Hampshire. There was a Chief Clerk heading a civilian establishment, and a 
nascent police staff function in what became known as the Executive 
Department. (This Department had grown out of the functions originally 
undertaken in A Division where the first Superintendent of the Division, John 
May, had acted in effect as a staff officer to the Commissioners. ) The chief 
financial officer, the Receiver, was answerable not to the Commissioner but 
6 This is the focus, of course, of an excellent recent study - see Shpayer-Makov, H., The Making of a Policeman: A social history of a labour force in metropolitan London, 1829- 
1914, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2002. 
7 19 & 20 Vict. c. 2, section 1. 
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to the Home Secretary. All were accommodated in a jumble of buildings in 
Scotland Yard, a cul de sac off the top of Whitehall. 
Further down Whitehall was the Home Office. Although responsible still for a 
very wide range of functions, its human resources were modest both in 
number and often in ability. 8 Throughout the period there were but two 
ministers, that is the Home Secretary (formally, the Secretary of State for the 
Home Department) and a Parliamentary Under Secretary of State. The small 
number of permanent officials was headed by the Permanent Under 
Secretary of State, at this time an official appointed directly from the Bar. 
Metropolitan police business was undertaken for the most part in what 
became the Criminal Department. That is, it received no unique specialist 
attention but was lumped together not only with the Home Office's 
responsibilities for the provincial police forces but also with the entirety of its 
responsibilities for the criminal justice system. Available In 1870 for all the 
Home Office's responsibilities including those for criminal justice were at 
most 12 officials arguably equivalent to today's Senior Civil Service. 9 
8 The definitive account of the Department in the pedod is Pellew, Jill, The Home Office 
1848-1914: From Clerks to Bureaucrats, Heinemann, 1982. Also relevant is her article *Law 
and order expertise and the Victodan Home Office' in MacLeod, R., (ed. ), Govemment and 
Expertise: Specialists, administrators and professionals, 1860-1919, CUP, Cambddge, 
1988, pp. 59-72. 9 lbid, Table 2, p. 23. 
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Development of the Force 
Strength 
By 1860 the Force was nearly 5,000 strong. The outline organisation charts 
at Figures 1-5 show the evolution particularly of the upper structure. By 1920 
the authorised strength of the Force consisted of just over 21,500 officers of 
all ranks supported by more than 300 civil staff working for the 
Commissioner and the Receiver. Both the latter maintained separate staffs 
throughout the period (and beyond). 
The growth in the size of the Force was related to the growth in the size of 
London's population, though the rate of growth was not necessarily directly 
proportional to the rate of population growth. This was because, aside from 
any question of affordability, the exact maximum number of the police and 
civil staffs was controlled by the Home Office. It became customary to 
express the size of the Force as a ratio to the Metropolitan Police District Is 
population, for example as 1/450. It also became increasingly explicit in the 
Home Office towards the end of the nineteenth century that that ratio should 
not be permitted to fall to much more than about 1/500. The maintenance of 
manning levels was not, however, an exact or entirely consistent science in 
normal times, nor did the actual number invariably correspond with the 
maximum allowed - or the "establishment" as it was known. This was 
6 
because of recruiting lags or, for example during the First World War, 
absolute recruiting difficulties at a time when the wars demand for able 
bodied men was insatiable. 10 With the exception of the First World War, 
employment market conditions rarely affected the Force's ability to recruit, 
though up until the 1880s they could greatly influence wastage rates. In 
common with the experience of forces outside London, there were high rates 
of turnover up until that period. 
The nature of the growth in the Force may be seen in the Chart below. What 
this shows is that the normal pattern throughout the period was incremental 
growth roughly proportional to the increase of London's own growth - in 
terms of the built environment" as well as population. The exceptions were 
the special additions authorised as a result of the Fenian bombing of 
Clerkenwell Prison in 1867, the public order and crime perturbations of 1887- 
9, and the phased introduction of the weekly rest day before the First World 
War. 
Organisation 
The outline organograms at Figures 1-5 summarise the main developments 
in the Force's management structure. By 1860, the original diarchy of two 
10 Thus, for example, although the authorized strength of the Force In 1920 was 21,546, its 
actual strength on 10 February, 1920, was 19,564. (See Metropolitan Police Accounts 1919- 
1920, House of Commons, 28 April, 1920. ) The existence of any margin gave some 
financial leeway to the Receiver in a situation where the rate was struck on the basis of 
authorized as opposed to actual strength. 11 CommissionersAnnual Reports (which commenced only from 1869) invariably listed the 
number of new roads and dwellings brought into existence each year as evidence of 
increases in the patrolling and traffic management requirements. 
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Commissioners had ended, but only to be replaced by diarchy in respect of 
the two Assistant Commissioners. Stable functional specialisation between 
them did not emerge until the 1880s, during which a third Assistant 
Commissioner was added in 1884. The Home Office seems to have taken 
no continuing interest in how the headquarters functioned. Despite 
complaints voiced in the course of their own formal inquiries in the 1860s 
and 1870s and making other changes as a result of these inquiries, the 
Home Office took no final steps to deal with the situation until the opportunity 
was forced upon them in the early 1880s by the impending retirements of the 
two original Assistant Commissioners. 
The civil staff were present from the very beginning and filled significant 
roles in both the Commissioners' and the Receivers' offices. Over time, 
however, and with the exception of the Receivers office, they became 
eclipsed by police staff. The reasons for this - and other changes in their 
status - are explored in the relevant chapter below. 
There appear to be no records of contemporaneous theorising about 
organisational issues. In that respect as in so many others, attitudes were 
intensely pragmatic and, in the Home Office, usually entirely reactive. The 
only extended treatment of such issues was in a pseudonymous pamphlet 
8 
published at the time it was known a confidential departmental committee 
was examining organisational questions in 1868.12 
Study outline 
The strategy adopted is to commence in Part I with an account of 
appointment practices in relation to the senior police officers and the civil 
staffs. This starting point functions also as a way of introducing the principal 
personalities engaged in the higher functioning of the force. It demonstrates 
that, although many of the police appointees came from military 
backgrounds, it would be mistaken to assume - as has often been the case 
- that this fact alone represented a policy of, or uncontrolled tendency 
towards, militaftation. On the contrary, it is maintained that appointment 
practice is better understood as a demonstration of the reinforcement of elite 
political control in times before the emergence of credible and acceptable 
police professionalism. 
In Part 11, attention moves to how financial control was operated, explaining 
the largely neglected role of the Receiver and the nature of financial policy 
and practice. This is a subject that has been almost universally ignored but 
which is vital to the understanding of the functioning both of government and 
of the force. Important changes in public policy were prefigured in changes 
12 a Custos" : The Police Force of the Metropolis in 1868, Ridgwayj 868. 
9 
first applied to the Metropolitan police, and financial practice is located in the 
context of national policy over the period. 
Part III examines the politics of control - governance - both at the 
operational (complaints against officers) level, and at the level of 
Parliamentary control. The latter includes a chapter on the personal role of 
the Home Secretary and the Cabinet. A separate chapter on why municipal 
control never supplanted Parliamentary control in the period approaches the 
issues from another perspective to help round out the character of political 
concerns and the view of policing in the capital that those concerns 
constructed. 
By way of conclusion, Part IV consists of a retrospective consideration of the 














































































































































































FORMS OF PATRONAGE 
This Part consists of two chapters. Chapter 1 examines the nature of appointments 
to the most senior ranks. For the purposes of this study, those ranks are 
Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner and District Superintendent/Chief 
Constable. Throughout the period of the study these were patronage 
appointments, and it is contended that they were not made on a basis which 
consistently recognized any concept of a freestanding, distinct police 
professionalism. 
Chapter 2 discusses the functions and status of the civilian clerks in the 
Commissioners and the Receivers offices. It discloses that their status declined 
over the period, and that limited competition survived for more than twenty-five 
years after it had been brought to an end in the Home Office. 
17 
CHAPTER1 
SENIOR OFFICER APPOINTMENTS 
This chapter considers appointment practice in respect of the most senior officers. 
It examines what happened, why particular practices were adopted, and what the 
appointments reveal about contemporary political and social preoccupations during 
a period when the police occupation was becoming increasingly self-conscious and 
professionalised. It argues that, although hypotheses of "militarization" have been 
derived from the fact that so many of the senior officers bore military rank, closer 
examination of career histories demonstrates greater nuancing than simplistically 
supposed. 
Examining police occupational backgrounds is not new. However, with the 
exception of the relevant parts of Griffin's study of the Royal Irish Constabulary', it 
could be said that most early work has concentrated on the makeup and fortunes 
of the ranks below those of chief officers and their principal assistants. The senior 
officers have appeared, if at all, as a gentrified counterpoint, especially in the 
county forces, and relegated to the margins of vision as primarily of military origin 
2 
and occupationally of no great interest. This imbalance has more recently been 
redressed by an exhaustive study of chief constables in England and Wales from 
1835. 
1 Griffin, B., 'The Irish Police 1836-1914: A Social History', Ph D, Loyola College, Chicago, 1990. 
2 E. g. Steedman, C., Policing the Victorian Community, Routledge, 1984; Shpayer-Makov H., "The 
Making of a Police Labour Force", Criminal Justice History, 12,1991, p. 139; Emsley, C. and 
Clapson, M., "Recruiting the English Policeman", Policing and Society, 1994, Vol. 3, pp. 269-286. 
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3 However, the study is effectively confined to provincial forces. In Great Britain, the 
fact that outside London all appointments were made by local police authorities 
rather than by central government has meant, too, that provincial appointments 
could not be studied for evidence of government appointment pol I CY. 4 
The range of posts 
The offices with which this section is concerned are those of the Commissioner 
and Assistant Commissioners which were Crown appointments, and the tier 
introduced from 1869 below Assistant Commissioner and known during the period 
variously as District Superintendents and, from 1886, as Chief Constables. 
Whereas it remained a central doctrine that promotion to Superintendent should be 
available solely to officers who had joined as constables, all the posts under 
consideration were (with some few significant exceptions) filled from outside the 
force, and throughout the period were not ranks to which men who had joined as 
constables could aspire. 
3 Wall, D. S., The Chief Constables of England and Wales, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1998. Where it does 
refer to the Metropolitan police, it is not always accurate, e. g misunderstanding the fate of the 
Inspecting Superintendent post on p. 24, and drawing the wrong conclusions about the appointment 
of Harold Scott in 1945. A useful work of reference is Stallion, M. and Wall, D. S., The British Police 
: Police Forces and Chief Officers 1829-2000, Police History Society, 1999 - which includes 
Scottish forces 
4 In the counties, it is true that appointments were subject from 1839 to regulations made by the 
Home Secretary and to his individual approval. However, the stipulations were minimal and actual 
interference rare. See Wall, D. S., op. cit., Ch. 4. 
19 
The Crown appointments were made on the recommendation of the Home 
Secretary, and the tier below were appointed by the Commissioner as members of 
the force with the approbation of the Home Secretary. The position of the 
Commissioner and Assistant Commissioners was covered explicitly in primary 
legislation where the Metropolitan Police Act 1856 allowed for a single 
Commissioner (as opposed to the two magistrates provided for in the original 1829 
Act) and for two Assistant Commissioners, simultaneously abolishing the role of 
Inspecting Superintendent created by the Act of 1839. (The numbers of Assistant 
Commissioners were increased first to three and then to four by Acts of 1884 and 
1909.5) 
The statutory officers were all ex-officio magistrates and remained so until the 
Administration of Justice Act 1972 abolished the then remaining ex officio 
magistrates, for example Lord Mayors. Although they customarily administered the 
constable's oath to new recruits, this magisterial status was never exercised by the 
Metropolitan officers in the sense of sitting on the Bench and acting judicially. 
Indeed, the separation of judicial and executive functions in the London magistracy 
had been accomplished statutorily by the Metropolitan Police Act of 1839 which 
absorbed the constables of the Police Offices (for example, Bow Street, 
Marlborough Street and Thames) into the Metropolitan force but left alone the 
stipendiary magistrates in the Police Offices. Magisterial status was not merely a 
5 Respectively by section 2 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1884 (47 & 48 Vict. c. 17), and section 3 
of the Police Act 1909 (9 Edw. 7 c. 40). 
20 
long and accidental vestigial trace of the Commissioners' and Assistant 
Commissioners' conceptual origins in the stipendiary magistracy of the Public 
Offices created by the 1792 Act, but also reflected the fact that that Act signified - 
in 1792 for the first time - the directness with which the executive intervened in the 
provision and control of law enforcement in the Metropolis. 
The lowest tier posts - District Superintendents/Chief Constables - had no special 
statutory position. In law, though of exalted rank, they were constables just like the 
Superintendents and the other ranks over whom they were placed. This tier 
experienced some turbulence during 1869-90. 
For the rest, what follows seeks, first, to study appointments practice thematically 
by reference to the occupational background of the appointees, including a closer 
look at appointments made direct from Home Off Ice staff; then - secondly - 
considers some contemporary views on class and authority evident from the 
inquiries of 1868 to 1886 and which lay behind appointments practice, and - thirdly 
- examines appointment practices in relation to appointments at District 
Superintendent/Chief Constable level. 
Military officers 
Much was made from time to time of the extent to which military officers were 
appointed, and it was alleged that this was part of a deliberate policy to militarize 
the force. Many such people were, indeed, appointed and this fact remained in one 
21 
way or another a source for comment throughout the period. A retired 
Superintendent, Kittle, giving evidence to the 1878 Committee said of one of them 
"... it has always been well known that Captain Harris is a nonentity, and that he 
never had an idea except a wrong one, which would get everybody Into trouble. ,6 
As if to emphasize his military provenance, it is necessary to note that Captain 
Harris was also the author of a police drill book. 7 However, although the proclivities 
and qualities of one particular Assistant Commissioner may seem to confirm a 
certain stereotype in particular, they do not necessarily support the militarization 
thesis in general which will now be explored further. 
Former military service was undoubtedly the predominant apparent occupational 
background of appointees. It was, of course, a common feature of 
state employment in the period .8 
Of all the Commissioners 1829 -1920, only 
Mayne, Monro and Henry (a barrister and two Indian Civil Service (ICS) officials 
respectively) had not held military commissions. Moreover, Mayne did not succeed 
to sole headship of the force until in effect 1855 (1856 in law) after being the junior 
party In a duumvirate with Rowan (who retired in 1850) and the senior of a 
continuing (unhappy) partnership with Hay (another army officer) up to the latter's 
6 The reports of the Departmental Committees of 1868,1878 (Detectives), 1879 (Uniform) may be 
found at HO 347/1, and are hereafter referred to as "'1868 Report" etc. in the manner explained in 
the Bibliography. Records of evidence also appear at HO 347/1; and will be referred to, for 
example, as "l 868 Report, Evidence, p. V &c. In this instance the reference is to the 1879 Report, 
Evidence, Q 3015. 
7A Manual of Drill for County and District Constables, 1862. 
8 Gash, N., "After Waterloo : British Society and the Legacy of the Napoleonic War", Transactions of 
the Royal Historical Society, 28,1978, pp. 145-157. 
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death in 1855.9 Henderson and his successor, Warren, were both Engineer 
officers. Monro's brief span was succeeded by the thirteen years of Bradford, a 
cavalryman in the Indian as opposed to the British Army, and Henry's fifteen years 
by the serving Major General, Macready, and he by Horwood, a Brigadier. 
In seeking a replacement for Henderson in 1886, the Home Secretary, Childers, 
was explicit that he sought an officer of high public reputation. 10 Both Redvers 
Buller and Beresford (a naval hero) turned him down and he selected a serving 
Major General, Warren, instead. 
The position in relation to the Assistant Commissioners was very similar. The first 
two, Harris and Labalmondiere, were both soldiers and their successors variously 
soldiers (Pearson), members of the ICS (Monro, Howard, Henry), a barrister 
(Bruce)", former prison administrators (Anderson, Thomson) or, in one case, a 
main grade Home Office civil servant (Elliot). Throughout the period, the sole 
person appointed without such a background was Macnaghten, though he had 
served beforehand as a Chief Constable in the force. 
At first sight, these seem wildly disparate backgrounds. Home Secretaries seem to 
have appointed almost randomly. An examination of the first tranche of District 
9 Even Mayne did not escape being tarred with a military brush when abused as man incompetent 
martinet' in the Times: letter by NA bardsterm, 12 Octoberj 868. 10 U Col Spencer Childers, Life and Correspondence of the Rt Hon Hugh C. E Childers, Murray. 
11 901. Letter of 18 March, 1886 to his son, Francis. 18... according to common report he was never overwhelmed with bdefs ... Uke his colleague, 
Col 
Pearson, he is neither an administrator nor a policeman ... 0 PaH Mag Gazeffe, 12 February, 
1886. 
23 
Superintendent appointments shows a similar collection of backgrounds with the 
sole exception of Robert Walker, formerly a constable who had reached the rank of 
Chief Superintendent, and who was among the four first four appointed in 1869. 
The other three were, respectively, a soldier (Lieutenant Colonel Pearson), a 
prison governor (Captain Baynes, albeit carrying military rank) and an ICS official 
(Howard). 
Beneath appearances 
David Wall's study found a similar military theme: 
The most common denominator in the occupational profiles of chief constables was their 
military experience.... Not only was it an important indicator of their skill to command, but it 
was also an important indicator of their social background. 12 
There is, therefore, a clear similarity between Metropolitan and other senior police 
appointments in that respect. With that established, it might be thought sufficient to 
pass on and regard the Metropolitan appointees simply as military carpet-baggers 
like the insouciant Henry Smith. 13 
However, it would be a mistake to take this correspondence at face value. In 
addition, it is almost certainly the case that allegations of "militarism", that is of the 
style and bearing of the force, have confused the discussion. The mere fact that 
" Wall, D. S., op. cit., p. 272. 13 Smith, H., From Constable to Commissioner, Chafto, 1910. Wall, D. S., op. cit., summadses 
Smith's ascent at pp. 113-117. 
24 
senior roles were held by men bearing military rank did not by that fact alone mean 
that the Metropolitan police became automatically some kind of military force. 14 On 
the contrary, looking below the surface of apparent occupational background, the 
situation is transformed. Examining actual careers discloses a much greater 
degree of consistency of approach and of acquired qualification than a mere 
preponderance of a titular military background by itself suggests. 
Closer investigation in that vein suggests that a more informative typology would 
be as follows: 
Civil servants - Henderson, Bradford, Anderson, Thomson and (most 
obviously of all) Elliot, all fall into this category. Though originally an 
Engineer officer, by 1868\'Henderson had been a senior colonial and prisons 
administrator since 1850 and, as Chairman of the Directors of Convict 
Prisons from 1863, actually a Home Office civil servant. Such was his public 
service reputation that it was said that he could not walk down the street 
without being offered a job. 15 Similarly, Bradford had by 1890 long been 
employed in the Indian political service. 16 On learning of the intention to 
appoint him Commissioner, Queen Victoda regretted the move on the 
14 Peel perhaps said what should have been the last word on this subject as long ago as 1830: T it 
were desirable to improve the system, the men must be disciplined; but as to calling them a military 
force beyond that, it was absurd. " Hansard, Commons, 15 June, 1830, col. 357. 15 Vanity Fair, 6 March, 1875 
16 See Lawrence, Walter R., The India We Served, Cassell, 1928, pp. 60-64 and 71 for descriptions 
by a younger, admiring contemporary in the ICS of Bradford in action in India in the 1880s. 
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grounds that he would be such a loss at the India Office. 17 In defending his 
appointment in the House of Commons, the Home Secretary maintained: 
"He is a man whose civil services and whose civilian achievements far 
exceed and outweigh the military portion of his career. "18 A few years later, 
Gladstone's private secretary, Algy West, recommended running him as a 
potential Viceroy, which Gladstone thought, according to West, was "a most 
brilliant suggestion". 19 Both Anderson and Thomson were civil servants in 
the Prison Commission, though Anderson (originally a practising barrister, 
whose father was the Crown Solicitor in Dublin and whose brother, Samuel 
Lee Anderson, was also a lawyer and was knighted for Crown services in 
Ireland) had long been involved in counter-Fenian intelligence and had 
originally entered the Home Office for that purpose in 1868. Elliot was an 
Open Competition entrant of 1898 into the civil service. 
Police administrators - Harris, Howard, Monro, Henry, Wodehouse and 
Horwood (with Bradford in one of his earlier roles) all qualify in this category. 
Harris had been a soldier for only a limited period of 8 years viz. in the 68th 
Regt 1830-8. He was selected because of his experience as chief constable 
of Hampshire 1843 -1856. Although Howard, Monro and Henry had been 
17 Buckle, G. E. (ed. ), Letters of Queen Victoria, 1886-1901, Vol 1, Murray, 1926 - Journal extract for 
20 Junej 890. 
18 Hansard, Commons, 20 June, 1890, col. 1531. An unspoken, additional credential may have 
been the fact that Bradford was a cousin of an active, senior Conservative MP - Matthew White 
Ridley - who had been Parliamentary Under Secretary at the Home Office 1878-1880, and who became Home Secretary 1895-1900. 
19 Hutchinson, H. H., (ed. ), Private Diaries of SirAlgemon West, Murray, 1922, p. 188, entry for 8 
August, 1893 
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members of the ICS, their principal activities had been in Indian police 
administration, Henry distinguishing himself through devising a workable 
system for classifying fingerprints. At the time of his appointment as an 
Assistant Commissioner in 1901, he was the Inspector General of Police in 
Bengal and acting head of the civil police in Johannesburg. Wodehouse, 
although for 20 years an officer in the Royal Artillery, was unusual in that he 
was appointed Assistant Commissioner in 1902 having previously held the 
same rank in the City police. Horwood, although a serving officer when 
originally recruited to the Metropolitan force by Macready, had not only 
military police experience but had been chief constable of the London and 
North Eastern Railway Company police 1911-14.20 
Even Macnaghten, recommended by Monro for an Assistant Chief 
Constable post in the CID essentially on the basis of acquaintance in India, 
had arguably shown some previous policing acumen. 21 Initially baulked by 
Warren, Monro returned to the recommendation when himself 
Commissioner. Initially, he was unable to claim relevant expertise and relied 
effectively on Macnaghten's social status: "He is a gentleman of the highest 
20 A brief account of Horwood's work there may be found in Whitbread, J. R., 77ie Railway 
Policeman, Harrap, 1961, pp. 58-8. 21 Macnaghten, an Etonian, describes the incident (an 1881 dot in Bengal in which he was injured 
and when Monro was the Bengal Inspector General of Police) in his autobiography - Macnaghten, 
M. L.., Days of My Years, Arnold, 1914, pp. 50-53. Warren, Commissioner when Monro first 
proposed Macnaghten's candidature as an Assistant Chief Constable in the CID, objected not so 
much on the grounds of Macnaghten's want of policing experience as on the basis that he had lost 
face because beaten by black men - see MEPO 1/55, letter of 11 April, 1888. Macnaghten's social 
connexions no doubt assisted his candidature and subsequent tenure - see, for example, his letter 
("My dear Gladstonel of 25 June, 1907, to the then Home Secretary, an old school friend, thanking 
him for recommending his knighthood - BL Add Mss 46066 f. 221. 
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character... he is a man of ability and education, and is in my opinion 
specially qualified for the post. "22 Eight months later, Monro was able to say 
something about Macnaghten's performance when recommending him for 
promotion to Chief Constable following the death of Williamson: ".. he has 
shown an aptitude for dealing with Criminal administration, and a power of 
managing and dealing with men, for which I was not prepared. "23 
Curiously, there is no evidence that Irish Constabulary officers were ever 
considered. The only force in the UK to possess an entry at "officer" level, 
no member of that force ever entered the Metropolitan ranks under 
consideration, although a number became distinguished in non-Metropolitan 
forces and the son of one of them (Nott-Bower) became Commissioner (in 
1953) having served originally in the Indian police. 
Military staff officers - Being a soldier was one thing but becoming a staff 
officer was something else. 24 The former was a clue to social status, but the 
latter a mark of the acquisition of a degree of political sophistication as well 
as superior drafting and presentational skills. Rowan, 47 years old on 
appointment, was a very experienced Peninsula officer who had also 
undertaken magisterial duties and mastered a mature, persuasive and 
22 MEPO 2/37, letter of 30 April, 1889. 23 MEPO 2/37, letter of 16 December, 1889, However bizarre the process of appointment, MonrO's 
claim seems justified if so experienced a detective as Wensley is to be believed - see Wensley, F. P., Detective Days, Cassell, 1931, pp. 32-34. 24 Labalmondiere pointed out in 1869 that not every officer was fifted for an adjutancy: 1868 Report, 
Evidence, p 153. 
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tactful manner. Hay, selected originally as the first Inspecting 
Superintendent in 1839, had had seven years' staff experience in America 
as well as substantial operational experience in the Peninsula. His 
successor, Labalmondiere, similarly had had staff experience during the 
Canadian rebellion 1837-8 and administrative experience in poor law 
administration in Ireland during the famine. Educated at Eton, he had 
passed out of Sandhurst with exceptional honours. Bradford, already 
mentioned as a civil servant, had begun acting in a political capacity in India 
as early as 1860 when only 24, subsequently assumed responsibility for 
relations with the Rajput chiefs in 1878, and had been knighted for Indian 
service when 49 in 1885. Macready had in 1884 become Staff Lieutenant of 
the Miltary Police in Egypt responsible for the policing of Cairo and 
Alexandria. He had subsequently had the experience of commanding the 
troops sent to South Wales to support the police during the industrial 
troubles of 1910. It was these experiences, and his performance in the 
overwhelmingly administrative role of Adjutant General, that made him so 
eligible a candidate for the post of Commissioner following the 1918 police 
strike. Horwood, originally a cavalry officer, had served on the War Office 
Staff 1902-10, including as one of Macready's staff officers in South Wales. 
As mentioned above, during 1911-14 he had been Chief Constable of the 
London and North Eastern Railway, and Provost Marshall (that is, head of 
the Military Police) for the British Expeditionary Force 1915-18. His long 
acquaintance with Horwood and the latter's experience made it 
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understandable both why Macready should have sought him out for the 
Metropolitan police and why the Home Secretary accepted him as 
Macready's successor. 25 (Horwood's rise through the ranks was swift viz, 
three days as a Chief Constable, and less than eighteen months as an 
Assistant Commissioner before succeeding Macready. ) 
Appointments from within the Home Office 
This dimension requires closer examination. Discounting Henderson, there were 
three appointments made from within the Home Office and a fourth contemplated. 
The case of Anderson has already been discussed above. The others involved 
were Thomson, Elliot and Ruggles Brise. 
Basil Thomson actively lobbied for an appointment. He wrote in 1912 to the 
Commissioner to express an interest in any forthcoming Assistant Commissioner 
vacancy, and in fact succeeded Macnaghten in 1913 as Assistant Commissioner 
(Crime). 26 Son of an Archbishop of York, Thomson had, after a period in the 
Colonial Service, entered the Prison Service and, after governing four prisons 
including Dartmoor and Wormwood Scrubs, had become - like Anderson before 
25 In much the same way, it also no doubt helped Moylan's appointment as Receiver in 1919 that he 
was already acquainted with both Macready and Horwood since he had been the Home Office 
official sent down to South Wales to report from the spot during the 1910 disturbances to which 
both the soldiers had been deployed - HO 347/23, printed memorandum "Colliery Strike Disturbances in South Wales: Correspondence November 1910". 
26 MEPO 2/166, Thomson to Henry, 15 July, 1912. 
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him - Secretary to the Prison Commission in 1908. He had become a barrister in 
1896 and could therefore be said to be legally qualified though with no real 
experience as a practitioner. Nonetheless, his background made him credible 
enough to Henry and the Home Secretary even though the appointment was much 
criticised in the police and press. 27 
F. L. D. Elliot (1874-1939) was appointed an Assistant Commissioner on 1 April 
1914 on the retirement of Bruce, a barrister appointed in 1884 principally to 
oversee the force's licensing and road traffic functions. The son of a Lieutenant 
Governor of Bengal, Elliot was educated at Harrow and Cambridge, joining the 
Home Office from the Open Competition in 1898. By 1914 he had been an 
Assistant Secretary for a year only, and the appointment as Assistant 
Commissioner represented amongst other things a 50% increase in salary. He 
27 . Mr Thomson has no previous police experience and no training in detective work, and yet he is 
promoted over the heads of men who have spent all their lives in the practice of one or both ... To appoint such a man is a slight to the 20,000 men who form our magnificent Metropolitan Police 
Force, and more especially to the highly trained detective staff, and the thirty superintendents, who 
know every detail of police work, as they have had a life's experience of it. ' J. F. Little, Urnes, 13 
July, 1913. Kempster, the police journalist, wrote direct to the Home Secretary in similar terms: 
"... previous experience in the difficult work of criminal detection ought to be an essential 
qualification ... ; the imposition of an outsider at the very head of a department necessitating so much technical skill and experience is a disparagement to the entire Criminal Detection 
Profession 
... * Letter of 3 July, 1913, as from the Police and Citizens Friendly Association on HO 144/21176/163976. The claims for a police professional status are notable, and typical of the 
arguments generally advanced by the Police Review. 
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retired in 1931. There appears to be no surviving record of how or why exactly he 
secured nomination. 
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Evelyn Ruggles Brise (1857-1935) was the nominee contemplated by a Home 
Secretary but not in the event appointed. The younger son of an Essex Baronet 
and MP, Ruggles Brise was educated at Eton and Balliol College, Oxford, entering 
the Home Office as the second of all Open Competition entrants in 1881. He was 
rescued from departmental drudgery when he became Private Secretary to the 
Home Secretary, Harcourt, an old acquaintance of his father if from a different 
party. He was successful in winning the confidence of successive Home 
Secretaries but unsuccessful in finding further preferment, unlike his predecessor 
as Private Secretary, R. S. Mitford, who had been made a Prison Commissioner in 
1882. A chance to go to India with a new Viceroy in 1888 - Lansdowne - came, 
after some anxious delay, to nothing. No Prison Service vacancies materialized 
and it is clear that Henry Matthews, the Home Secretary whom Ruggles Brise had 
28 What evidence there is suggests that he went out of his way to make himself agreeable to those 
who mattered. See, for example, his oleaginous letters of 14 August and 21 October, 1907, 
respectively to Beatrice Samuel and her husband, Herbert, when the latter was Parliamentary 
Under Secretary at the Home Office and Elliot his private secretary. (Wasserstein, B., Herbert 
Samuel: A Political Life, Clarendon, 1992, pp. 87 and 102. ) Even the limited and grudging Horwood 
admitted Elliot's amiability: Wr Elliot was I understand selected for his appointment in 1913 entirely 
by patronage. He also has no knowledge of the handling of men, and little but superficial knowledge 
of the duties of his appointment. He is quite nice to deal with ... " Horwood to Anderson (Home Office) 15. June, 1925, on MEPO 10/5. But for Elliot see also Chapter 5 below and his 
determination to root out corruption in the Public Carriage Office after Horwood's departure when 
the latter had forbade him to act earlier. 
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served since 1886, was actively concerned as time wore on to promote his Private 
Secretary's interests if he could. 29 
What Matthews came to have in mind was appointing Ruggles Brise to the 
vacancy that arose on the death of R. L. O. Pearson, one of the original District 
Commissioners and in 1881 the first of them to be made an Assistant 
Commissioner. Monro, the Commissioner, had his own candidate -A. C. Howard, 
the former ICS member who had been a District Superintendent/Chief Constable 
since 1869. Matthews was not, to put it mildly3O , on good terms with Monro and 
knowledge of Matthews' intention fanned an already goodly blaze. 
In the Parliamentary exchanges that followed Monro's resignation in June 1890, 
Matthews defended himself, especially during the six hour debate on an Opposition 
Supply motion that took place on 20 June, 1890. Monro's resignation letter of 10 
June had mentioned three matters: dissatisfaction with Matthews' plans for police 
superannuation, unspecified differences on police administration, and that 
Pearson's duties were to be entrusted to "a gentleman who, however estimable 
personally, has no police, military or legal training. n31 Matthews explained that up to 
the point of Monro's resignation he had made no decision about who should be 
appointed Assistant Commissioner. He had discussed candidates with Monro. 
Amongst those was Ruggles Brise, of whom Matthews maintained "... I found that 
29.1 should be very glad if, before I leave office, I could give you a permanent berth. " Matthews to 
Ruggles Brise, 28 May, 1890, Box 6, Ruggles Brise Papers, Essex County Record office. 30 1 bid, for the whole text of the four page letter. 31 Hansard, Commons, 13 June, 1890, col. 846. 
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his ability, character, and capacity for business were such that I considered him a 
perfectly fit candidate... " Whilst it was true that Ruggles Brise did not have actual 
experience of administration of the force, he did have "knowledge of all the 
principles of policy which have guided successive Secretaries of State in dealing 
with the Police Force; and that in my judgement eminently fitted him for the office 
of Assistant Commissioner. "32 In the event, however, he had appointed Howard 
instead 
I felt the moment Mr Monro's resignation was in my hands on June 10 that the want of 
experience in Mr Ruggles-Brise, which, under Mr Monro's own guidance, would have been 
of comparatively small importance, now assumed, on the contrary, the gravest importance. 
Whilst the scale might have been very evenly balanced between the two candidates up to 
that time, yet, after Mr Monro's resignation, the claims of the candidate who had had daily 
experience of the police decidedly preponderated. 33 
Class and authority 
My experience through life teaches me that all men like to be commanded by gentlemen. A 
man who has risen from the ranks in the Army and obtained his Company is never thought 
of so much by the men as one who on first joining was appointed an Ensign, nor do they 
value the judgement or decision of a man risen from the ranks so much as that of another 
officer. 
(Harris, 1868 Report, Evidence, p. 123. ) 
32 Hansard, Commons, 20 June, 1890, col. 1523. 33 lbid, cols. 1523-4. 
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Sir Charles Rowan (himself a distinguished officer) used to say that an officer entering the 
Police had as much to unlearn as he had to learn, and I believe he was quite right. 
(Labalmondiere, 1868 Report, Evidence, p. 151. ) 
We ourselves are strong advocates of all situations in the police being filled by officers 
skilled in their profession, and eventually this may be wholly the case, but the police force is 
even now in its infancy 
(Police Service Advertiser, 20 February 1869. ) 
These contrasting views separately and distinctively encapsulate an unreflecting 
view of how authority was to be sustained in a Victorian bureaucracy on the one 
hand and, on the other, an emerging consciousness of police professionalism. 
Typically, the two Assistant Commissioners who were at variance about most 
significant policy issues differed also on how the exercise of authority was to be 
understood. For Harris it was predominantly a question of social status, but for 
Labalmondiere authority derived from knowledge and developed skill intelligently 
applied. The Police Service Advertiser rested on staking out territory it judged 
unattainable at the time. 
These contrasting positions are well illustrated in the debates that occurred in the 
evidence to the 1868,1878 and 1879 Departmental Committees. These were 
closed, private inquiries - like all inquiries except for the 1886 Committees and 
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Royal Commissions up to Desborough - and the oral evidence they received was 
often of great frankness laced (as private inquiries tend to be) with spite. All were 
chaired by the then junior minister in the Home Office and took place as a direct 
result of major public failures, respectively the Clerkenwell outrage in 1867 and the 
trial of the detectives in 1877. 
The chairman of the 1868 Committee was James Fergusson, who had himself 
served in the Foot Guards during the Crimean War and been wounded at 
Inkerman. He appears to have decided at the outset that there was an insufficient 
number of superior, directing officers in the force. 34 He pressed Mayn 635 and other 
witnesses repeatedly on the lines that a senior rank structure originally designed 
for a regiment (i. e. the force's original size) was no longer appropriate for the much 
larger unit (nearly 8,000) that the Metropolitan police had become. Mayne loyally 
agreed. Now in his early 70s and, following the Clerkenwell fiasco, conscious of the 
weakness of his position, he had no practical alternative, especially since he had 
himself asked for the old Inspecting Superintendent level to be revived but in the 
shape of four as opposed to the former single post. A similar but more radical 
recommendation was made by the pseudonymous but well-informed pamphleteer 
"Custos" who urged, while the Committee was still sitting, that there should be 
34 He was but echoing the view of the Secretary of State: With a force of 7 to 8 thousand men it 
seems absurd to me to have but three educated officers. At present the step from them is to men of 
the same position as non-commissioned officers in the army, who cannot have the requisite 
influence wh (sic) a gentleman wd (sic) secure. I have reason to know that this is felt by the better 
class of police Superintendents & Inspectors themselves. ' Gathome-Hardy, E., (ed. ), Gathome 
Hardy, First Earl of Cranbrook. A Memoir with Extracts from his Diary and Correspondence, 
Longmans, 1910, p. 221. 35 See 1868 Report, Evidence, p 37. 
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established between the Assistant Commissioners and the Superintendents Ua 
class of superior officers - men who would be qualified ... to conduct 
the duties of a 
Metropolitan police division, and whose social standing, attainments, and 
education would be such as to entitle them to look forward to the highest positions 
in the police department. "36 So much did this become the received wisdom that, 
before the Committee actually reported, the Queen enquired when the 
appointments were to be made. 37 
Of the witnesses, Labalmondiere alone expressed reservations, defending the 
importance of the Superintendents and drawing a distinction between the 
administration of the force (i. e. the higher directing duties) on the one hand and its 
superintendence (i. e. operational control) on the other. He added that any 
gentlemen who were appointed, though they could acquire policing knowledge, 
would "have to go through their apprenticeship in the position to which you appoint 
them, during the very time they ought to be able to teach other men n. 38 He was not 
listened to, and it may have been his scrupulous failure to row in with the 
ministerial consensus that, although he became acting Commissioner on Mayne's 
death shortly afterwards, cost him the permanent appointment. 39 
36., Custos" , The Police Force of the Metropolis in 1868, Ridgway, 1868, p. 29. 37 Buckle, G. E. (ed. ), Letters of Queen Victoria 1862-1874, Vol. 1, Murray, 1926-8 - General Grey to 
Bruce 28 December, 1868. 
38 1868 Report, Evidence, pp. 153-4. 39 uHow it happened that Col Labalmondiere did not succeed Sir Richard in the Commissionership I 
never heard. I only know that the whole of the force were disappointed by his non-appointment. " 
Cavanagh TA., Scotland Yard Past and Present, 1892, p. 80. 
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It has, of course, to be asked - and it was asked - why such persons could not 
be 
found from within the existing ranks. There were several answers given. Some 
doubts were cast on the educational attainments of existing Superintendents and 
the strength of the candidate fields for promotion to the rank. Mayne noted also the 
need to refuse promotion to men otherwise well qualified because of inadequate 
educational attainments. 40 The discussion oscillated between the pole positions of 
Harris and Labalmondiere. That is, some thought social status was as good as an 
infallible indicator of education and command suitability (Fergusson, Mayne, Harris 
and Walker), whereas others - Labalmondiere and all the other Superintendents 
(save for Walker) who gave evidence and whose self-interest in the 
Superintendents' case was evident - maintained that suitability was a matter of 
experience and acquired skill. 
What everyone agreed was that gentlemen were not then to be found in the ranks. 
As the C Division Supe(intendant, Hannant, put it: ".. in my whole experience [he 
had joined the force himself in 1835] 1 never knew a man of superior education join 
unless there was screw loose somewhere; that is, he joined from force of 
40 1868 Report, Evidence p 23. Also Kittle, p. 184 : "Every man feels that he ought to be a 
Superintendent, but it is a question whether proper men, in my opinion, could be found from 
Inspectors to fill the posts. ' See also evidence of the retired Inspector, Byron, p. 41 B. 
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circumstances and not from choice. n4l 
The District Superintendents/Chief Constables 1869-1920 
1869-1886 
As already noted above, this tier introduced in 1869 experienced mixed fortunes 
during 1869-86. Recommended by the Departmental Committee of 1868 and 
authorised by a Home Office letter of 25 February, 1869, the first appointees were 
evidently selected for the different backgrounds that they brought, and possibly as 
a deliberate experiment in the sense that, by definition, they could not be 
graduates of the Metropolitan police itself. Pearson was a Grenadier Lieutenant 
Colonel of 21 years' service (including in the Crimea) aged 38. Howard had seen 
military service during the Mutiny and been a Superintendent of the Bengal 
Constabulary. Baynes, a former army Captain of 32 years' experience, had been 
governor of Winchester Prison and not apparently previously known to Henderson 
whose responsibilities for the convict prison system had not extended to local 
prisons. Indeed, he later claimed that Baynes had been recommended to him by 
Lords Carnarvon and Northbrook (utwo personal friends of mine"). 42Walker, the 
Chief Superintendent of the force since 1866, was the sole insider appointment 
and clearly intended to be a gesture, or to signal sensitivity, towards the aspirations 
of the Superintendents. A Scot who had attended Edinburgh High School, and with 
some legal training, he had joined the force in 1838. He had evidently prospered 
under the favour of Mayne and been used by him to some extent for inspectorial 
41 1868 Report, Evidence, p. 269. Mayne concurred : 60f course, a gentleman must be damaged in 
some way who enters the force as a constable. 0 lbid, p. 69. 
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functions after the death in 1855 of John May, the first Superintendent of A 
Division. Before the 1868 Committee he had given rather unctuous and deferential 
evidence, dismissive also of the intellectual horizons of the other Superintendents - 
upractical men with great police knowledge but their ideas do not range very far 
beyond police matters"43 
By the time of the next Departmental Committee in 1879, there was a chorus of 
dissatisfaction: the Commissioner regretted their appointment; the Assistant 
Commissioners concurred in that view; the District Superintendents themselves 
complained about the organisation of their duties, their lack of proper authority and 
their status; and the ranks below them universally excoriated their attainments and 
usefulness - and were especially barbed about Walker. Henderson put it that, 
although the best possible appointments had been sought, he had immediately 
found that they had been "totally contrary to the views, ideas, and wishes, I may 
say, of the whole body of police.... The fact is that it has taken all these years to 
break these gentlemen into the ideas, habits and ways of the Metropolitan police 
and that is one of the great difficulties of the appointment". 440f the two who had 
had previous police service, Howard's management of the native population and 
catching thugs (i. e. in India) was a very different thing from dealing with the 
population of London; and, as to Walker, he would never select from the inside 
again -"With great respect to Mr Walker, he does not carry the authority with him 
42 1879 Report, Evidence Q 5206. 
43 1888 Report, Evidence p. 202. 44 1879 Report, Evidence Q 5205-8. 
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which a man of superior social status would do". 45 Gernon, Superintendent A 
Division and 21 years in the rank, claimed that Walker had never been a practical 
man even though he had risen from the ranks: "He was for years attached to office 
work and you might say he was more a man of theory than of practice "- 46 
Although they expressed the point in rather different language, the District 
Superintendents and their critics essentially agreed that their role was ill-defined 
and marginal so far as police duties were concerned. Gernon thought they were 
redundant. Labalmondiere judged that they did not have enough to do and got 
through their work by 1.30 p. m. each day. No more than two were required. Kittle, 
who had been in charge of the Executive Branch in 1868 but who was retired when 
he gave evidence in 1879, claimed they did not superintend but were merely 
ornamental; and Dunlap, Superintendent C Division, said flatly of them "I never 
experienced any advantage". An Inspector, Young, challenged the whole theory 
that the men preferred to be under gentlemen since the police service was 
emphatically not like the army. 47 
Although these statements were self-interested since the Superintendents (and 
those who aspired to that rank) could be expected to reject the tier that had been 
set above them, the District Superintendents themselves made no bones about 
their position. Pearson claimed they had no responsibility, and Baynes, who had on 
45 lbid, Q 5211 
46 lbid, Q 3173. 
47 1 bid, QQ 2985,373, and 2583. 
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appointment expected his position to be that of a chief constable in a county force, 
alleged that the important part of the force's work was done over their heads by the 
Assistant Commissioners in direct communication with the Divisional 
Superintendents - "I am nobody". The most eloquent testimony was Pearson's: 
uThere are four of us getting a very fair salary, E800 a year, and if you ask me, 
honestly, I think we are utterly useless in the position in which we are employed". 48 
That was not, however, quite the end of the story. Although Pearson also alluded 
to the importance of facilitating ascription in terms very similar to Harris, Henderson 
did admit grudgingly that the District Superintendents had their uses: "... I must say 
their appointment has given a better tone to the force. I am sure it pleases a great 
many people to be waited upon by a gentleman rather than by an officer in 
uniform". 49 In other words, their utility was to be judged from the point of view. of 
external rather than internal relations. 
The recommendations addressed the status and role of the District 
Superintendents but failed entirely to respond to the points made by the 
Commissioner and others about their lack of technical expertise and professional 
authority. In future they should be called "district commissioners" and, though 
residing in their districts, should have offices at Scotland Yard. Further, they should 
be "gentlemen of good social standing, and should, as a general rule, be officers 
who have seen service in the army or navy. " Although the Committee rejected the 
48 lbid, QQ 1216 and 936. 49 1 bid, Q 5227. 
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1868 recommendations which had been in favour of operational decentralisation 
based on four districts, it did speak of giving the four district posts "increased 
powers and responsibilities. " However, it failed to itemise the degree of variation in 
their responsibilities beyond a vague wish that they "could be advantageously 
entrusted by the assistant commissioners, subject to the sanction of the Chief 
Commissioner, with other responsible work in connexion with the duties either of 
the uniform or detective Force. "50 
Although the recommendations were made in May 1879, no reorganisation 
occurred until the Police Order of 16 December, 1881. This was because, apart 
from a change of government, consideration of the recommendations was 
complicated, on the one hand, by the death of Baynes and the retirement (in his 
71 st year) of Harris in February 1880 and, on the other hand, by protracted 
argument between the Home Office and the Commissioner (with a significant 
intervention by the Director of Criminal Investigations) about the details of the 
changes. The outcome (said to have been cleared with the Prime Ministerý) was a 
structure which rejected a change of title, and reduced the number of District 
Superintendents from four to two. However, it did virtually nothing to increase their 
responsibilities, for example they were to see morning divisional reports and 
morning reports of crime but only after those reports had been seen by the 
Assistant Commissioner and the Director. Pearson was promoted vice Harris, and 
Howard and Walker were appointed to serve under Pearson and Labalmondiere 
50 1879 Report, pp. 88-9. 51 HO 144/A5573, Home Secretary to the Treasury, 24 May, 1881. 
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respectively in a structure which divided the 21 Divisions into two groups. The 
District Superintendents remained with entirely administrative (including minor 
disciplinary) as opposed to operational responsibilities. The Parliamentary 
Secretary, Courtney, observed in July of a draft arrangement not much changed 
subsequently that "I cannot think that this organisation has in it a promise of 
working satisfactorily. "52 
The 1886 Committee emphatically agreed. It recorded that the Disturbances 
Committee of February 1886 (set up in the immediate wake of the Pall Mail riot) 
had identified as one of the prime defects an insufficient number of officers of 
superior rank and education, and that the 1881 reorganisation had failed to carry 
out the recommendations of the 1879 Committee. 53The Commons debate on 22 
February 1886 had also surfaced criticisms of the senior direction of the force. The 
motion's mover, James Stuart -a proponent of municipal control of the 
Metropolitan police - "considered that among the superior officials of the 
Metropolitan Force there had long been and still was a grievous want of 
organisation and of attention to duty, as well as ability to know how to fulfil the 
duties imposed upon them. "54 
The outcome was recommendations which re-endorsed those of 1879 in favour of 
servicemen of good social standing in four posts outstationed in districts and who 
52 lbid, Memorandum of 11 July, 1881. 53 Report of the Committee to Inquire into the Administration and Organisation of the Metropolitan 
Police Force, C 4894, published 19 June, 1886. 54 Hansard, Commons, 26 February, 1886, col. 1396. 
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were henceforward to be known as Chief Constables. The Committee stopped 
short, however, of prescribing their duties, leaving this to the new Commissioner, 
Warren, whilst leaving open the possibility of also appointing a new grade of 
Assistant Chief Constable with various staff functions at headquarters. All these 
changes took place, including as to the Assistant posts, and all the appointees 
were soldiers -a point which renewed comments about "militarization". The 
principle of the new Chief and Assistant Chief Constable grades was also applied 
to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), though there neither of the 
appointees (that is, Williamson - the only senior survivor of the 1877 Turf Fraud 
scandal - and Macnaghten) had any military background. This structure, with minor 
modifications, remained the one that obtained throughout the rest of the period 
under study. 
There was, however, a subtle change of emphasis, in a way illustrated by the 
appointment of Frederick Williamson. Born in 1831,. he was the son of the first 
Superintendent of T (Hammersmith) Division, David Williamson, a former Sergeant 
Major of Artillery, born in Perthshire and who had been present at Waterloo. After 
a short period as a War Office clerk, Adolphus had joined the force in 1850 and 
quickly became a member of the Detective Department formed in 1842 and in 
which he remained for the rest of his life, dying in harness in 1889.55 His 
appointment signalled the recognition that then existed of the special character of 
CID work. Though he had no military background, and was not to be described as 
55 Times 10,13 and 23 December, 1889. 
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a gentleman, he was a most experienced as well as adequately educated man with 
some linguistic abilities. It was these competencies that the appointment 
recognised. 
Moreover, although none of the Committees had taken the point made by 
Labalmondiere that incomers needed more than social position and a habit of 
command to be fitted for senior appointment, it was evident that Henderson had 
declined to give the new caste forced upon him in 1869 any real operational 
responsibility. Whilst the crisis of 1886 and the concomitant appointment of the 
headstrong Warren had seemed to reverse the position, this effect was temporary 
only and over the next decade a recognised system of pre-qualification developed. 
(b) 1886-1920 
This section examines how the appointments system operated in respect of the 19 
men appointed as Chief Constables 1886-1920, and whose records are outlined in 
Appendix B. 
The system of appointment that developed from the late 1880s was not peculiar to 
the Metropolitan police. Henry Smith, for example, described it as it operated in the 
case of the City police in 1880s, and other provincial examples have been 
discovered. 56Broadly, aspirant gentry advertised their interest and set about 
obtaining police experience by way of informal apprenticeship in forces where the 
56 Smith, H., op. cit., Ch 9. See also Wall, D. S., op. cit., Ch. 4. 
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chief constable was prepared to take them in. Smith was 50 on his first permanent 
appointment as a police officer (Chief Superintendent in the City) in 1885, and was 
subsequently Commissioner 1890-1901. 
Such a system seems to have developed in the Metropolitan police from Warren's 
time, possibly as a result of the recruitment at Chief Constable level which took 
place after he became Commissioner in 1886. Whilst there is no apparent 
reference to any moment of decision in the surviving papers, there is a reference to 
a list in 1888 in the correspondence over Macnaghten's proposed appointment. 57 
Although none of the personal papers of Chief Constables have routinely survived, 
they have in respect of Major Maurice Tomlin, who became an Assistant 
Commissioner in 1932. When recommending him for appointment to the Home 
Office inl 912, Henry referred to a list of candidates who had registered their 
interest. Tomlin's file contains a printed folder with front page headings for age, 
qualifications and recommendations which suggests a fully institutionalized system 
in operation. 58Tomlin had had some experience of police type work in Southern 
Nigeria and, when putting Tomlin's name forward, Henry explained that Tomlin had 
uspent time in a county chief constable's office learning details of police working. "59 
A Mr Begg was also on the list but, Henry observed, had been there for a shorter 
57 MEPO 41487, Warren to Lushington, 27 March, 1888. 
58 The folder contained a testimonial of 8 June, 1910, from the Chief Constable of Berkshire; "He is 
anxious to get a Chief Constableship and I have during the past five or six years allowed him to 
come to my office and learn the work. He is a very keen man and has excellent qualifications for 
such a post. " Henry endorsed the lefter directing that the name should be put on *the list". MEPO 
3/2770. 
59 HO 45/24637/230985, Henry to Home Office, 21 December, 1912. Henry omitted to mention that 
Tomlin was the brother-in-law of Bigham who had been appointed a chief Constable in 1909. It was 
also not perhaps irrelevant that Tomlin was 6'4* tall. 
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time. Tomlin, although eventually promoted - briefly - to Assistant Commissioner 
was later to object to the unqualified appointees brought into the force by 
Macready and Trenchard. They were essentially former staff officers with whom 
the two Commissioners were already familiar and with whom they sought to re- 
surround themselves. 60 
Appointees brought in on the coat-tails of others did not presumably have to lobby 
on their own behalf, but others without such patronage certainly did. In that sense, 
the list can be seen as a handy defensive tool against solicitation. Aspirants and, 
more importantly, their patrons could be told that applicants' names would be 
placed on the list for further consideration. In that way, no outright refusal was 
necessary and, therefore, no personal capital used up. Granted that appointments 
were made by patronage at Chief Constable and Assistant Chief Constable level, it 
can be imagined that knowledgeable aspirants would seek ways into the system 
wherever possible. When Home Secretary, for example, Churchill was approached 
by a Captain FitzClarence who numbered Dame Nellie Melba amongst his 
supporters. Churchill would have been familiar with the system because he had 
himself approached his predecessor, Herbert Gladstone, in 1909 on behalf of an 
60 Tomlin, M., Police and Public, Long, 1936, Ch. X1 I, pp. 224-282. 
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Edgar Lafone. FitzClarence was not appointed but Lafone was. r" 
Appendix B reveals that Chief Constable appointments up until 1918 largely 
followed the 1879 Committee recommendations that the posts should be occupied 
by ugentlemen of good social standing, and should, as a rule, be officers who have 
seen service in the army or navy". Up until 1918, apart from the already discussed 
cases of Williamson and of Macnaghten, the sole exceptions were Bullock and 
Bigham. The former, most likely an acquaintance of Henry and appointed only two 
weeks after Henry had become Commissioner, had had a significant Indian judicial 
career, culminating in appointment as a Judicial Commissioner. 2 Bigham was, at 
34, a youngish but well-connected barrister. He was appointed to fill the role 
formerly undertaken by Bruce, also a barrister with no police experience appointed 
in 1884 to deal with licensing, traffic and similar functions, and to be a source of 
61 WSC, 12/2179, letter of 22 August, 1910; Churchill to Gladstone 28 January, 1909, BL Add Mss 
45986. He was, however, appointed by Churchill rather than Gladstone - and at that only two 
weeks after Churchill became Home Secretary. It is not known whether Lafone was already on *the 
list". It is known, on the other hand, that he and Churchill had served together in the 0 Hussars, 
and that the Lafones were personal friends: both the husband and the wife wrote separately 
congratulating Churchill on his engagement to Clementine Hozier - see the letters of 20 and 21 August 1908 in the Churchill College archive (CHAR 11`74/55 and 56). It is possible that it was 
Lafone who was the Chief Constable of whom Macready recorded "In one case an unsuitable 
officer had been forced on the Commissioner by a Cabinet Minister for purely personal reasons. " 
Macready, N., Annals of An Active Life, Hutchison, 1924, p. 314. Horwood, with untypical generosity 
but with some condescension, characterized Lafone as "A good fellow and liked by all ranks. " 
Horwood to Anderson (Home Office) 15 June, 1925, MEPO 19/5. Lafone's father, Alfred, sat as 
Conservative MP for Bermondsey 1886-1892 and 1895-1900. (He voted against the amendment to 
the County Council Bill of 1888 that would have given London police functions to the LCC. See 
Hansard, Commons, 12 July, 1888, col. 1155. ) 6 '2 When successfully recommending Bullock for promotion to Assistant Commissioner in 1909, 
Henry stressed the extent of Bullock's judicial experience and the fact that, as Judicial 
Commissioner, Bullock decided capital cases at a level reviewable only by the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council. See Henry's memorandum of 20 February, 1909, in BL Add Mss 46066. 
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general legal advice for the Commissioner. 63 
After 1918 there is a distinct and deliberate change of practice: except for 
Horwood, all the other appointments up to 1920 were made from within the force. 
Whereas the first - James OliveP4 - was almost certainly conceived at least in part 
as a deliberate counterweight to the introduction and swift elevation of Horwood - 
much as Robert Walker had been included in the first tranche of District 
Superintendent appointments in 1869 - the same is not true of Morgan and 
Billings. Macready made quite clear that their promotion was part of a new, 
deliberate policy: 
... I can see no reason why the post of Chief Constable should not always be filled within 
the force. For the higher appointments, especially that of Commissioner, experience is 
desirable wider than can be obtained by a lifetime in London, and I doubt whether, saving in 
63 He was another of the senior officers to whom Horwood did not warm. Remarking in 1925 that 
Bigharn had by then got over his objections to Horwood's rapid prefennent in 1918, Horwood 
concluded: "Personally I cannot understand what his qualities were for his appointment as an officer 
of the Metropolitan Police. He is very definitely unfitted to fill the post of ACA [Assistant 
Commissioner, Administration] as he has no conception or experience of handling men. ' Horwood 
to Anderson (Home Office) 15 June, 1925, MEPO 10/5. Nonetheless, Bigharn became Deputy 
Commissioner in 1931. 
64 See Appendix B for Olive's career. Macready claimed that he appointed Olive "to assist in the 
difficult duty of reorganizing the Metropolitan police" (MEPO 2/2772, letter to Home Office, 8 
December, 1919) but he would have also been mindful of Olive's position in the force as a 
legendary fundraiser for force charities, amongst other things as the leader of the Police Minstrels. 
The new Representative Board resolved - not quite unanimously - on 21 Novemberl 918, UThat this Board thanks the Commissioner for his action in promoting Superintendent Olive to the rank of 
Chief Constable, and trusts that this is only the first step towards placing the Metropolitan Police 
Force on a really democratic basis". (See copy on MEPO 3/2772. ) The Police Review (11 October, 
1918) reported both Macready's comments that the move would 'indicate to all ranks the possibility 
of attaining the higher ranks in the Force* and his remarks to the Starthat it did not mean "we are 
going to draw all our Chief Constables from the ranks of the Force. " 
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exceptional cases, promotion above the rank of Chief Constable should be looked upon as 
a monopoly of the force. 65 
Overview 
What does this narrative reveal about how Home Office Ministers behaved in this 
aspect of carrying out the police authority function? First, it is evident that policing 
expertise by itself was held in low esteem. Officers of long experience generally 
were regarded as having no claim on appointments above Divisional level. The 
only exceptions until 1918 were Walker and Williamson, and in both cases there 
were special factors in their favour. Secondly, for the District Superintendent/Chief 
Constable tier the norm throughout was the preference voiced by the 1879 
Committee for gentlemen with service backgrounds. Whilst this specification was 
undoubtedly influential for Commissioners and Assistant Commissioners, it was 
never dominant, and most of these appointments went to men who, whatever their 
occupational origins, had become socialised into civil service behavioural norms. It 
was, in its way, the triumph of the clerks though not in quite the same way as noted 
in respect of the Home Office clerks over Du Cane and the prison administrators. 66 
Only in crisis was the civil service background discarded, for example in 1886 with 
65 Macready, N., op. cit., p. 315. If Olive's appointment was a crowd pleaser, Macready's promotion 
to Chief Constable of H. D. Morgan, the youngest of the Superintendents, was clearly a wake-up call 
to that comfortable body. (See Appendix B. ) There is also the point that Macready's successors did 
not slavishly follow his vaunted policy. For example, a Home Office review of appointments between October 1920 and September 1931 indicated that a number of subsequent appointees continued to 
come from outside the force though a proportion had previously spent time studying work in 
Pfovincial forces and, in one case, the Metropolitan police itself. HO 144/20637/525492/6. w McConville S., English Local PHsons 1860-1900, Routledge, 1995, Ch 12 - wTdumph of the Clerks". Sean McConville's proposition was that the permanent officials in the Home Office were in 
a position always to insist on their views prevailing against those of the professional head of the Prison Service. Undoubtedly true in the particular instance of differences with Du Cane, the 
question is how far the proposition could hold good in different circumstances. 
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Warren and in 1918 with Macready. Neither stayed for very long, and Warren's 
departure was undoubtedly a clerkly triumph in much the same vein as McConville 
has noted in the prisons case. 
Thirdly, there is an important political dimension to appointment practice in the non- 
party sense that military careers gave admission to a pool of potential appointees 
peculiarly serviceable to governments engaged in expanding state activity at a time 
of restricted educational opportunity and limited democratic mandate. It has been 
observed of the 1830s and 1840s that government had the advantage of being 
able to draw on 
a sufficient number of men well-ensconced within the existing ruling groups, who were 
willing to take on new administrative roles and forward the expansion of government 
activity.... In that kind of society a man who was a civil servant and not much else might 
find it very difficult to implement new methods in the face of local vested interests. 67 
From this perspective, many of the appointees were doubly qualified: they had 
made the transition from purely military roles and they had, in such cases as 
Henderson and Bradford, worked also directly with Ministers. Despite the military 
trappings, they had in fact become what would subsequently be recognised as 
67 McCord N., "Some limitations of the Age of Reform", pp. 187-201 in Mish Govemment and 
Administration: Studies presented to S. B. Chrimes, H. Hearder and H. R. Loyn, (eds. ), 1974, 
University of Wales Press, Cardiff. 
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career civil servants. They could be appointed to exposed roles because they knew 
the rules and were unlikely to be political risks. 
Prominent though he became, none of these things was true of Captain Eyre 
Massey Shaw who in 1869 showed interest in succeeding Richard Mayne. His 
letter was a considered description of what he thought was needed but it evidently 
made no progress. 68 Although he possessed some police experience as chief 
officer of the Belfast force, that experience - June 1860-August 1861 - was brief, 
in relation to a force that never exceeded about 160 men, and took place in 
lreland. 69He had taken over the London Fire Brigade in 1861, and this had no 
doubt given him a vantage point from which to view the Metropolitan police. His 
career remained, however, with the fire service: an energetic and effective 
modernizer, he had no government or political experience, and at that stage 
probably little significant political acquaintance. 
It was a similar absence of like characteristics which probably told in the end 
against Labalmondiere, admired as he was by the lower ranks, clearly superior to 
Harris despite the latter's police command experience, and thoughtful and shrewd 
as he now appears. Appointed at 35 as Inspecting Superintendent vice Hay in 
1850 by Sir George Grey, following the intercession apparently of a sisters 
husband, he claimed in his acceptance letter from Bombay to be "one who is a 
68 MEPO 2/39, letter of 11 January, 1869, to Home Secretary. 69 See Stallion, M. and Wall, D. S., op. cit., p. 48. See also Griffin, B., The Bulkies, Irish Acadernical 
Press, Dublin, 1997. 
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total stranger to you and devoid of official interest. n 70 Promoted Assistant 
Commissioner in 1856, his appointment letter made it clear- as it was made clear 
simultaneously to Harris - that neither of them was to consider that they would 
have any special claim on the Commissionership when it became vacant. 
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Although Labalmondiere became acting Commissioner on Mayne's death in 
December 1868, he was not appointed. There were perhaps two reasons for this: 
the fact that he had shown some independence of mind in responding to the 
opinionated FergUSSon72 ; and that he was the internal candidate when Ministers 
had concluded that bringing in reliable fresh blood at the top was inevitable granted 
the nature of the public dismay at the Clerkenwell incident. The management of 
appearances, in other words, was thought crucial to the political response. 
Right through the period, appointments were made within what remained very 
much a patronage universe. In the absence of agreed objective, professional 
policing criteria, appointment turned on a number of distinct if largely unarticulated 
assumptions. Most clearly perceived of all for the middle tier District 
Superintendent/Chief Constable rank was a theory of attraction. That is, military or 
naval experience could be relied upon as sufficient qualification for directing the 
operational staff work involved, and undertaking that vague but desirable function 
characterized in its boldest form by Horwood as the "handling of men". As the 
70 HO 45/3322, letter of 2 March, 1850, to Grey. It is couched in the kind of flattering gratitude that 
had to be the fluent stock In trade of aspirant placemen. 71 HO 45/6093, see draft letter of February 1856. 72 The deathless "I have heard many arguments which have influenced my opinion but never one 
which influenced my vote" is attributed to Fergusson - see headquote in Tivey, L., OConstitutional Reform :A Modest Proposal% Political Quarterty, 1995, p. 278. 
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importance of the CID increased, this view was tempered to some extent as can be 
seen with the promotion of Williamson. Even so, Macnaghten - perhaps the least 
initially qualified on any criteria - could emerge as a credible head of the CID after 
13 years in a situation where impeccable gentlemanly credentials could still count. 
In such an environment propinquity scored heavily. Thus, Henderson, Bradford, 
Macready, Horwood, Anderson, Wodehouse, Thomson and Elliot were known 
quantities and could be appointed with reasonable confidence. Significantly, 
Warren and Monro were not really known in the same way when appointed: 
although Matthews and Lushington have been customarily blamed for the events 
that led both Commissioners to resign, neither Commissioner can in retrospect be 
seen as a victim however unattractive and maladroit Matthews might seem. 73 
There was also indirect propinquity. Even in the case of the Chief Constable posts, 
few of the applicants seem to have come entirely unannounced out of the blue. 
Gilbert, for example, had become Chief Constable of Hull in the January of the 
year he was appointed Chief Constable in the Metropolitan police - 1886.74 A 
surprising number had political connexions, if not necessarily of the most august or 
direct kind. Lafone, Craik and Bigham were the sons of MPs; Monsell was related 
to a Cabinet Minister; and Knollys was the son of someone who had not only been 
73 It must, for example, stand to the Conservative Matthews' credit that he was defended in the 
1890 debate by the idiosyncratic Radical Uberal, Atherley-Jones, who had led the Padiamentary 
upset over Miss Cass in 1886. For the latter, see Chapter 5 below. For the 1890 intervention, see 
Hansard, Commons, 20 June, 1890, col. 1559. 74 Police Guardian, 5 February, 1886. See also Stallion, M., and Wall, D. S., The British Police: 
Police Forces and Chief Officers 1829-2000, Police History Society, Bramshill, 1999, p. 104. The 
move also doubled Gilbert's salary. 
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Black Rod but also Treasurer and Comptroller of Edward VII's household when 
Prince of Wales. Lafone was also an old friend of the Cabinet Minister who 
appointed him and, interestingly, did not suffer in the clearout Macready conducted 
on his arrival in 1918. The Cabinet Minister was, after all, still a Cabinet Minister 
even if no longer Home Secretary. Macnaghten, Bullock and Horwood were the 
prot6g6s of Monro, Henry and Macready respectively. 
Although the absence of consensus on a professional status for policing was an 
important factor in leading to the forms of patronage that may be observed, there 
was another predisposing factor, albeit working in remoter fashion. This was the 
fact that politics were for the most part during 1860 to 1920 not conducted in what 
would subsequently be regarded as a fully democratic form. The franchise, except 
from 1918, was confined to one gender, and even there remained incomplete for 
much the larger part. Policemen themselves received the right to vote only from 
75 1887. The potentially active political class was much smaller than that currently 
possible. This situation not only fostered networks of acquaintance but also 
facilitated dependence upon them for the promotion and perpetuation of the forms 
of political control enjoyed by the dominant groups. As the evidence demonstrates, 
in the mantra of the 1879 and 1886 Committees that appointees should be 
ugentlemen of good social standing" was at least as important as that they "should, 
as a general rule, be officers who have seen service in the army and navy". 
75 The Police Disabilities Removal Act 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 9). 
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Taking risks 
A senior post so far unmentioned is that of the Director of Criminal Investigations 
appointed as part of the response to the scandalous corruption in the CID revealed 
at the Turf Fraud trials in 1877. The first holder was Howard Vincent. He was 29 
years of age, and had behind him five years as a junior officer in the infantry and 
two years at the Bar. He was able to call himself "Colonel" because he had 
acquired appointment as Lt Col of a Volunteer battalion. Famously, scenting that a 
new senior post would be created, he submitted (after researching the subject on 
the spot) a memorandum on the Paris detective police to the Detective 
Committee. 76 Vincent had travelled quite widely, had good French, and had 
qualified at the Facult6 de Droit in Paris in 1877. He had also begun to develop a 
certain facility for lightweight journalism. However, much more to the point was 
that, in addition to ingratiating himself with the Committee and its chairman, the 
Home Office Parliamentary Under Secretary, he assembled a formidable set of 
testimonials - crucially, including one from the Attorney General. 77 No-one, not 
even his at times remarkably candid biographers, 78 could call Vincent well-qualified 
76 The 1878 Report records receiving the memorandum but neither it nor any of the other written 
evidence received by the Committee appears to have survived. 77 Jeyes S. H. and How F. D., The Life of Sir Howard Vincent, George Allen, 1912, Ch. V (which 
includes a version of the memorandum). 78 lbid : Vincent 6 ... loved approbation and needed it.. " (p. 13); * ... there was in his nature a tendency, never quite eradicated, towards being a rolling stone". (p. 31) The candour surpdses since the 
biography was commissioned by the widow. 
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by reason of intellect, professional or civil service experience. 79 What he did have, 
however, was energetic opportunism and a certain persuasive charm - persuasive 
enough at least for Ministers anxious to be seen to be putting a reformed detective 
system in place. 
In comparison with other senior appointees throughout the period, Vincent had only 
a smattering of military or legal experience and absolutely no police operational 
experience whatsoever. Nor did he have Macnaghten's social maturity and more 
august social background. In Vincent's case, however, the exceptional 
circumstances of a major public scandal encouraged Ministers to take a risk. 
Acting in such a way illustrates the extent to which the police function at this level 
was not then perceived - perhaps could not be perceived as the Police Service 
Advertiser rather accepted in 1869 - as having any established form. Without in 
any way seeking to compare the talents of the two men, there is here something 
reminiscent of the despatch of Macaulay to India 40 years before: "Only in a 
peculiarly acute internal crisis of her history was England prepared ... to send out as 
a legislator a man so inexperienced in the law as Macaulay. "80 
79 The absence of an understanding of public service norms showed through painfully in his 
enterprising - in all its meanings - efforts 1882-3 to reform the Police Gazette. See HO 45/9618/AI4252. 
80 Stokes E., 7he English Utifitarians and India, Clarendon, Oxford, 1959, p. 242. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METROPOLITAN POLICE CIVIL STAFF 
This chapter examines the role of the civil staff, charts important changes in their 
status - both absolutely and in comparison with police officers - and considers the 
persistence of degrees of patronage which continued into the Edwardian period. 
Inception 
Far from being a late afterthought, civilian, non-police staff known as "civil service 
clerks" were present from the beginning and in senior roles. If the Receiver and his 
staff owed their being to the fact that the resources of an appropriate local authority 
were absent in the metropolis and had therefore to be invented, the 
Commissioners' Chief Clerk was in 1829 essentially the administrative functionary 
next in seniority to them. However, as the force and its responsibilities grew, the 
priorities of operational staff work became more dominant and threatened to 
eclipse, though they did not eradicate, the Chief Clerk's position in what became 
known as the Metropolitan Police Office (MPO) as distinct from the Office of the 
Receiver of the Metropolitan Police. The process was gradual and not uncontested 
as the Commissioners clerks felt the challenges to their status that such 
movements implied. The Receiver's staff faced no similar challenges to their quite 
separate establishment although, as recounted in Chapter 3, on several occasions 
Commissioners attempted to amalgamate the Receiver's functions with their own, 
and that threat - never entirely removed throughout the period - must have been a 
constant though not perhaps an oppressive factor in their functioning. It certainly 
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impelled Receivers to emphasise their own indispensability to Home Secretaries at 
every feasible opportunity. 
The position of the Home Office in relation to these staffs was all of a part with its 
general attitude to the force: exacting, detailed control in all small things, and 
passivity in relation to everything else. Every change in establishment and salary 
required Home Office approval, but none occurred except on the initiative of the 
Commissioner or the Receiver. The reviews of the staffs of the Commissioner and 
Receiver in 1860 were the only ones commissioned by the Home Office in the 
nineteenth century until that of the Receivers staff in 1899 - itself a defensive 
reaction to a bid from the Receiver. The Departmental Committees of 1868,1878, 
1879, and 1886 were predominantly concerned with operational questions, and 
although evidence was taken from clerks, none of the Committees made any 
recommendations in regard to them. 
The legal status of the staffs was not clarified until 1875 even though they had 
been included in the 1870 Order in Council. Although the various qualifying 
examinations were modernised gradually, the system of nomination had an 
exceptionally long life. In retrospect, one of the most interesting features of these 
staffs is the extent to which certain employment practices persisted some time after 
their extinction elsewhere in the public service. Further, just as the original status of 
the force's clerks declined for internal reasons, so was their status challenged at 
the turn of the century by the consequences of larger social changes. Clerical work 
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multiplied mightily and this increased demand was matched with an increased 
supply of recruits from hitherto less exalted social strata who had nonetheless 
gained access to the educated levels necessary to discharge the duties required. 
In other words, the quasi occupational monopoly which supported their status in 
1829 crumbled as general levels of educational attainment rose. 
At the same time, police clerks (that is police officers in fact undertaking clerical 
duties), who had been cheap and flexible labour in the force's early years, became 
progressively more expensive as their pay and conditions improved. By the turn of 
the century, the Home Office was beginning on grounds of cost alone to develop 
policies of what subsequently became known as "civilianisation". 
Metropolitan Police Office (MPO) 
The first Chief Clerk was Charles Yardley appointed at the age of 35 and on a 
salary of E500, only E300 less than the Commissioners and more than twice the 
salary of a Superintendent. ' He had been recommended to Mayne by one of the 
latter's barrister acquaintances, and the Home Office put him first on one month's 
t2 rial. Initially, the Chief ClerWs staff were responsible for all correspondence and 
for keeping the Commissioners' accounts in a situation where the Receiver was 
1 MEPO 2/1, letters of 16,19 and 21 October, 1829. He had been on the Commissariat staff in 
France during the Waterloo campaign forjust over a year in 1815-16. He was said subsequently to 
have gone into business on his own account but to have sustained a severe loss following the 
explosion of a steam boiler. He had apparently spent a year in chambers reading law immediately 
before his appointment. He and his sponsor had evidently concluded that he would have difficulty in 
establishing himself at the bar. 2 David Dundas (1799-1877), called 1823, practised on Northern Circuit (as did Mayne), later MP 
1840-52, Solicitor General 1846-8. 
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responsible for the Metropolitan Police Fund as a whole. The correspondence 
duties were at the beginning heavily weighted towards recruitment and managing 
the regular returns to the Home Office concerned with the management of the 
personnel of the force. 
The work -a good deal of it needing to be carried out in confidence - required 
educated skills at the time in relatively short supply in British society. In addition, it 
was believed that, because it needed to be carried out in confidence, it was 
necessary for it to be carried out by men (women were never considered until the 
First World War) of a certain social background - who were, in any case, those 
most likely to possess the educated skills required. The same circular logic 
produced the inescapable, and convenient, conclusion that those appointed 
needed a salary commensurate with, and capable of permitting them to maintain, 
their social position. 
The challenge to clerkly status 
The expansion of the force from 1839 led both to an intensification of these duties 
and the addition of new ones as the force was found to be a convenient - until 
1855 and the creation of the Metropolitan Board of Works, the only - instrument for 
metropolis wide regulatory functions beyond the crime control and public order 
core functions. Thus in 1843, under the London Hackney Carriage Act, the force 
began to take on hackney carriage regulation, and in 1850 had transferred to it the 
duties of the Registrar of Metropolitan Carriages. It also acquired duties under the 
See generally HO 61 for the period 1829-39. 
62 
Common Lodging Houses Act, 1851, the Smoke Abatement Acts from 1853 and 
even dangerous structures under the Metropolis Buildings Act, 1855. (Similarly, the 
Receiver took on the servicing of London Magistrates' Courts in 1839 and the new 
County Courts from 1846. ) Whilst the reasons for selecting the force were rather 
different, its taking on in 1860 all the naval dockyards as well as the War Office 
establishments at Portsmouth, Devonport and Chatham (and subsequently the 
Contagious Diseases Acts duties associated with the military areas) required both 
a considerable addition of strength and associated administration and inspectorial 
duties. 
Not all these new duties fell to the Chief Clerk. Traffic regulation, for example, was 
in 1853 put together in a new Public Carriage Branch (PCO) under a specially 
recruited ex-soldier, Colonel Paschal. More significantly, however, the unique 
position of the Chief Clerk and the civilian clerks was eroded in two ways. First, the 
easiest and the cheapest way for the Commissioners to respond to the growth in 
demand was to use constables as additional clerks. Secondly, it became 
convenient for some administrative work to be undertaken in what became known 
as the Executive Branch or Department. 
As already explained, this Branch grew out of the A (the Whitehall) Division, and 
the reliance the Commissioners came to place on its Superintendent, John May. 
Operational imperatives meant that the Commissioners could not rest entirely on 
the Chief Clerk for administrative support. Gradually, a staff function directly 
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answerable to the Commissioners began to separate out from more informal 
expedients. Moreover, it began to assume more continuing administrative 
responsibilities. By 1878, for example, what was by then known as the Executive 
Department had become responsible for the smoke abatement, lodging houses 
and contagious diseases legislation. The Chief Clerk retained the correspondence, 
personnel and accounts functions, and in addition had by then acquired the PCO 
and lost property. There was no clear rationale for this division and, indeed, this 
fact reflected the reality that administrative work did not require unique skills nor 
were the skills that were needed ones that only the civilian clerks possessed. 
Amongst the snapshots that permit these processes to be observed is the 1860 
repore of the staff inspection of the Commissioners office undertaken by Anderson 
(Treasury) and Redgrave (recently then retired from the Home Office and formerly 
long connected with police issues). This found not only that the establishment of 
four civil clerks authorised in 1840 had been augmented by 3 Sergeants and a 
constable, but that there were also a further Inspector, 3 Sergeants and 4 
constables undertaking work relating to the "internal organisation" of the force. The 
PCO, then still under Colonel Paschal, consisted on 1 c7ivil clerk, 5 Inspectors, 3 
Sergeants and 5 constables. 
4 MEPO 2/82. Appointed on 8 May, 1860, by the Home Secretarylo inquire and report to him as to 
the salaries of the Clerks in the Establishment in the Office of the Commissioner of Police', they 
reported on 18 October, 1860. This was a response to the Commissioners request in March that 
his Clerks should receive the same emoluments as the Receivers. Although the term ostaff 
inspection' is anachronistic, that is in modem parlance what it was. Treasury staff inspectors and 
similar functionaries continued to be employed by the Home Office for identical purposes in relation 
to the force's civil staff for more than a century afterwards. 
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Anderson and Redgrave particularly deprecated the employment of police officers 
under the Chief Clerk. This was primarily because they gained full knowledge of 
the confidential correspondence, including the complaints made against their 
comrades. Moreover, their source of extra pay was inimical to the efficient 
discharge of their duties viz. on alternate nights, after an office day from 10 a. m. to 
5 p. m., they were stationed to keep order in theatres and other places of public 
amusement, a duty for which they received the considerable addition of at least 
E25 a year to their pay. 5 Their presence, and on such terms, were much resented 
by the civil clerks though Mayne continued to support the arrangement and 
obtained Home Office agreemene with the proviso that he should not also resort to 
supplemental civil clerks who, although paid less than the regular clerks, were still 
more expensive than policemen. 
The civil clerks continued to press their view. The report of an inspection 
undertaken five years later by Yardley (whose salary was E650 on retirement in 
1863 and who received a pension of E433.6.8d) again recommended against the 
arrangement: 
The late hours and exposure to the weather at night tempt them to the use of stimulants to 
keep up their energies; they occasionally have charges, and the attendance on the 
following day is a necessary interruption to their duty. 
5 Cavanagh, posted to A Division as a police clerk first did theatre duty in 1856. He claimed that it 
doubled his pay. "It was not only necessary to be responsible for good order but to make oneself 
useful generally ... " Cavanagh, T. A., Scotland Yard Past and Present, Chatto, 1892, p. 1 41. 6 MEPO 2/82, letter of 22 February, 1861. 7 lbid, report of II January, 1866. 
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Mayne remained unmoved. It was not until 1870 that Yardley's successor, Edward 
May, was able to persuade Mayne's successor, Henderson, that the (ight course 
was to dispense with police officers altogether and replace them with 6 
supplemental clerks at F-80 a year. 
The clerks' satisfaction at this outcome did not end their anxieties. In 1879 the 
three most senior clerks under the Chief Clerk (still Edward May) put together a 
round robin for submission to the Departmental Committee then looking at the non- 
CID parts of the force: 
We venture to say that there does not exist at the present time in the Public Service a 
Department so thoroughly disorganised as our own. For some time past, the Chief 
Inspector in charge of the Executive Branch has been encroaching more and more on the 
functions of the Chief Clerk of the Commissioners office, till today it has practically come 
about that there are two Chief Clerks in the office instead of one ... 
8 
It is not clear whether the memorandum was seen by the Committee, though its 
burden was put to them orally when May and the most senior of the other clerks, 
Fry, gave oral evidence. May, who had been originally appointed in 1841 and had 
by 1879 been Chief Clerk for 15 years, claimed that the gradual growth of the 
Executive Branch had confused responsibilities and estimating routines, and that 
H045/33350, memorandum dated 30 January, 1879. 
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the head of the Branch had too much influence with the Commissioner. His remedy 
was to restore the original position of the Chief Clerk: 
Always from the time of the commencement of the service the executive branch was 
considered subordinate to the chief clerk, but they have gradually assumed such a position 
with the increase of duties and a large increase of numbers that they have almost become 
an independent branch of the office, and they are treated accordingly by the Commissioner 
almost as independent. 9 
Lewis Frylo, probably the main author of the round robin, backed up May and 
spoke of the "duality of authority'- mentioning also that Mayne had had a 
preference for police clerks who, however, had not cut the mustard. 
That the situation had given rise to much ill-feeling was mentioned by Howard 
Vincent: 
There is undoubtedly an enormous rivalry between the civil service and the police. I have 
great respect for him personally as a most useful officer, but the present chief clerk has 
always used very strong terms as regards the police, and this has circulated amongst the 
9 1879 Report, Evidence, Q 3799. 
10 Lewis Fry, originally appointed in 1862, and father of C. B. Fry (1872-1956) the athlete, had his 
own anxieties. A diary entry for 18 March, 1881 records his visit to Harcourt's Private Secretary, 
Mitford, at the Home Office `who promised to speak with Sir W. Harcourt about my promotion - he suggested that nothing should be done by me in the matter. 0 CF 65.84. He was in fact promoted in 
August 1880 to succeed May the day before the latter's death following his ill health retirement at 
the end of July, aged 59. Fry was subsequently plagued with ill health himself, and reverted in 
1884. 
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police, and the most cordial hatred exists between them, and they do their best to oppose 
each other, which of course is very undesirable indeed. " 
Legal status 
Both the Commissioner's and the Receiver's clerks were commonly described as 
"civil servants". On that basis they had been without any significant analysis 
included in the 1870 Order in Council though exempted - as were Home Office 
clerkships - from open as opposed to limited competition. 12 Similarly, the clerks 
had been assumed to be superannuated under the legislation intended to apply to 
all civil servants. 
These assumptions became challenged, however, when the Receiver (Drummond) 
in 1873 raised the issue of principle that he thought arose, that is, if his staff were 
to be included in the Order, then it followed that he should be relieved of his 
obligation to provide a bond. Although the 1861 Act had made the Receiver a 
corporation sole, the 1829 Act provision (section 10) requiring him to be bonded for 
security of his responsibility for public funds remained. Both Drummond and his 
predecessor had argued that the existence of the bond 13 entitled them to the 
11 1879 Report, Evidence, Q 5205. The implied criticism also, of course, of Henderson though it has 
to be said at the same time that May was regarded as something of an ogre by his own staff: see 
MEPO 2/82 for round robin remonstrance of 6 November, 1875, to the Commissioner claiming that 
May's "personal treatment of some of us has been of a most extraordinary and unjustifiable 
character, and it is very galling to us to feel that we can never enter the chief clerk's room on official 
business without running the risk of something disagreeable occurring. " 12 Limited competition had been required in the MPO since the Home Secretary (Sir George Grey) 
had so decreed in 1866 - see HO 45/33350, letter of 26 June, 1866. 13 The requirement for the bond was not repealed until the Police Act 1890 - section 29. 
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nomination of candidates for appointment since they needed to have a personal 
assurance of probity as well as evidence of qualification. 
However, when the Legal Under Secretary at the Home Office (Lushington) looked 
into the matter, the core issue that he identified was not what were the 
consequences for the Receiver or anyone else of inclusion in the Order but, rather, 
whether the clerks should have been included in the Order at all. 14 Becausethe 
operative definition of membership of the civil service in the 1859 Superannuation 
Act turned on whether the costs of the staff concerned were defrayed wholly from 
monies voted by Parliament, it was evident that none of the Metropolitan police 
clerks (that is irrespective of whether they were Commissioners or Receivers 
staff) could be regarded as civil servants. This was because the force was 
supported both by Parliamentary and locally raised monies. It followed, too, 
therefore, that the clerks were devoid of any certain pension provision since, 
although hitherto they had been pensioned under the 1834 Act, they were not 
included in the civil service pension Acts and the only superannuation legislation 
that applied to the force was confined to the officers of the force itself. 
Fraught exchanges with the Treasury and the Civil Service Commissioners 
followed and the position accordingly rectified in two ways. First, all Metropolitan 
police civil staff were removed from the Order in Council but a role for the Civil 
Service Commissioners maintained so that, although they would examine on 
14 See HO 45/9373/3914, lefter of 16 November, 1874, and Opinion of 24 November, 1874. 
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subjects specified by the Home Office, it was on the basis that the Civil staffs were 
not civil servants, that the posts were not open competition posts, and that the 
Commissioners would not issue certificates of qualification. 15 Secondly, the 
Metropolitan Police Staff (Superannuation) Act 1875 tidied up the situation both by 
giving new prospective powers to the Home Secretary to make pension schemes 
and by retrospectively validating pensions granted under the now doubted authority 
of the 1834 Act. In practice, the Home Secretary was authorised to make pension 
schemes which put the civil staffs on the same basis as civil servants even though 
they were not civil servants for all other purposes. This commenced a process 
which ultimately resulted in the civil staffs being assimilated for pay and grading 
purposes at the end of the period to civil service norms when those norms were 
themselves established. 
Pay and grading 
As already indicated, this was another area where the Home Office expected the 
initiative for change to come from within the force itself. Treating the Receivers 
and the Commissioners offices as distinct throughout, and acting on the view that 
the Treasury had no role in relation to staff who were not civil servants, the Home 
Office dealt with applications from them entirely separately and without great effort 
after 1860 to compare situations in the sense of aiming at consistency. In part, this 
could be understood: the offices were very different places and it did not follow 
from their mere existence that the structures and emoluments should be identical. 
15 Open competition had already, however, been introduced into the Home Office in 1873. For the 
circumstances, see Pellew, J., op. cit., pp. 21-22. 
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On the other hand, the staffs themselves were keenly aware of their relative 
positions, and any advance secured by one was bound to be demanded by the 
other. And it was not only that they were aware of each others situation: they were 
also highly sensitive to the salary levels of other posts outside the force that they 
judged analogous. 16 
Above all, perhaps, it has to be borne in mind that the civil staffing like the police 
staffing responded to the dynamics of population growth, legislative initiative and 
changing social conditions and expectations. 17 Successive discussions about pay 
were inseparably united with considerations of grading as work expanded. For 
most of the period, it would be true to say that the Receiver tended to have the 
larger number of senior staff. This was both because of the significant accounting 
responsibilities for money and stores, and the fact that his staff was at no time 
diluted by the diversion of duties to police clerks. 18 In that sense the Receiver's 
little empire was inviolate. 
In both offices, however, the salaries of established clerks were, in comparison 
with their present day values, certainly high, if no higher than salaries in the civil 
service proper. For example, whereas Principal Clerks in the Home Office received 
16 The Receivers Chief Clerk applied to be put on a par with Senior Clerks in the Pay Office - see 
HO 45/57299, letter of 4 Februaryj 868. 17 The Commissioner singled out amongst other things the spread of education 6which enables 
every person who has anything to write about, whether a grievance or otherwise, to express himself 
in more or less intelligible language" - HO 45/10534/151572, letter of IS April, 1907. 18 By 1874, for example, although there were no longer police clerks in the Chief Clerk's branch, 
that branch had but 8 established and 6 supplemental clerks whereas there were 36 police clerks in 
the Executive Branch - see HO 45/33350, statement of MPO staff on 24 November, 1874. In 1870 the Home Office establishment for all officials was a total of 33 - Pellew, J., op. cit., p. 23. 
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E900-El 000 p. a. in 1876, the maxima for the Commissioners Chief Clerk and the 
Receivers Chief Clerk were respectively E700 in 1880 and E800 in 1881. On the 
other hand, the very smallness of the offices could lead to stagnation and very slow 
prospects of promotion19 which, in a situation where salaries - even with limited 
incremental scales - were aligned strictly to grade, was the only means of securing 
enhancement other than by the rare general salary reviews. Indeed, it was when 
clerks hit the top of the incremental scales that pay reviews were most likely to be 
requested. 20 The supplemental clerks were, on the other hand, very much at the 
bottom of the heap with distinctly lower salaries than the established clerks and no 
certainty of their positionS. 21 As the Commissioner remarked, this made them a 
restless crew, ever in search of more permanent posts. 
The Home Office was aware of the defects of its own situation. When in 1876 the 
Commissioner asked his clerks to be given the same increase as recently awarded 
to the Receivers clerks, the Home Secretary (Cross) asked uAre there more of 
Banquo's ghosts and if so how many? " His Parliamentary Under Secretary 
(Ibbetson) gave a less than emphatic reassurance: uNo, I think every ghost is or 
will be by this put to rest at least for a period. I will not venture to say for all time. 42 
They also later became aware of the way in which overtime - the classic response 
19 The Commissioner pointed out in 1892 that in the previous 17 years there had been only 2 
promotions to I st Class Clerk and where one promotee had been in the previous class for 14 years 
and the other for 16 - HO 45/9733/A53680, letter of 16 February, 1892. By 1907,12 of his 20 clerks 
were on their maxima - HO 45/10534/151572, letter of 15 April, 1907. 20 See memorial of 28 July, 1876, from the Receiver's clerks on HO 45/57299. 21 It transpired in 1881, for example, that one of the Receiver's clerks had been "temporary"for 9 
years - HO 45/57299. 
'2 HO 45/33350, minutes on Commissioner's letter of 8 December, 1876. 
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of workers in otherwise immoveable salary situations - had become 
institutional ised in some areas of the Commissioner's functions. 23 
The slow death of "Old Corruption" 
As already hinted above, there were features of the civil staffs which suggest the 
persistence of practices somewhat beyond the period when they have been 
commonly thought to have been discontinued elsewhere in the public service. It 
has already been pointed out that, whereas the Home Office clerkships were made 
eligible for open competition in 1873, there was no simultaneous incorporation of 
the civil staffs in the Metropolitan police. The question is when and how did the 
change come about in their case, and what does the process reveal about the way 
in which such changes came about in the public service. As has been pointed out, 
older forms of patronage appointment were not instantly eradicated by the reform 
movements of the 1780s, or after the 1832 Reform Act, or following the later 
Northcote-Trevelyan Report-24 
The fact is that in the Metropolitan police systems of nomination, mitigated by 
qualifying examination, persisted into the twentieth century. Whereas appointment 
records have not survived, traces of the effects of the processes have. Thus, in the 
Receivers Department, three generations of the Golden family can be discerned. 
The first was the Receiver's original Chief Clerk and he was succeeded by a son. 
23 See, for example, the protracted correspondence (HO 45/14521/101211) between 1893 and 
1920 about the force's Statistical Branch. 24 Rubenstein, W. D.: uThe End of 'Old Corruption'in Britain 1780-1860", Past and Present, No 101, 
November 1983, pp. 55-86. 
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This meant that there was a Golden in the post between 1829 andl 886. The last 
Golden was succeeded by Edward Mills who had been brought from the Treasury 
as a personal appointment by the second Receiver, Drummond. The first Receiver, 
Wray, claimed to cast a wide net in the sense that by 1860 he had found the then 
junior clerk, Sandars, by writing to tutors of a Cambridge college. 25 
Neither Wray nor any of his immediate successors would surrender the Receivers' 
prerogative to nominate their own staff. Drummond claimed in 1870 that this was 
because his office stood "in a peculiar position as a money office - nearly El 
million of money passing through my hands in a year - for the due application of 
which the Receiver has to give personal security and to find surety for a large 
amount. " This was accepted by the Home Office: "Sir Robert Peel is said to have 
given the patronage of these appointments to the Receiver because of his personal 
responsibility; & the Receiver still nominates the Clerks in his office. "26 Twenty-one 
years later, the then Receiver (Pennefather, appointed in 1883), wrote to seek re- 
confirmation - which he obtained - that he alone was responsible for appointments 
and conditions of service. 27 
The situation was to some extent different in the Commissioner's office. There, as 
recorded above, it had been the requirement since 1866 that there should be at 
25 HO 45/9545/57200, Wray's letter of 23 March, 1860. Sandars, he said, had 'taken his degree 
with some distinction". 
26 HO 45/9373, Drummond's letter of 16 August, 1870, and undated note by Home Office official 
a parently following discussion with the Receiver. 2T HO 45/9731, letter of 18 August, 1891. It is not dear what prompted this approach, but it may 
have been related to the Police Act 1890's removal of the requirement for the Receiver to be 
bonded for his office. 
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least three nominations in limited competition for any vacancy. Nonetheless. in 
whatever exact form, the arrangements in both offices fell well short of open 
competition, and the question remains why? 
There seem to be two answers. First, the very small staff in the Home Office 
throughout most of the period had to struggle hard to keep its head above water. It 
was not apt to disturb longstanding arrangements if there was no active reason for 
doing so. Although open competition had arrived in the Home Office in 1873, the 
first appointment under the system was not made until a vacancy occurred in 1880. 
The new appointees that followed were not for some time in a position to throw 
their weight around, if that is what they wanted to do. And they were certainly not in 
a position to take on the Receiver or the Commissioner. Similarly, Ministers had so 
many calls on their attention that the precise terms of service of remote clerks was 
unlikely to press upon them. 
However, such explanations do not seem entirely convincing. The senior staff were 
well aware of the situation and, after 1880 at least, would have been alive, too, to 
the discrepancy between the Home Office and the Metropolitan police. Still they did 
not move. Why? 
There is some evidence to give grounds for a second explanation. It is that the 
Home Office clerks themselves took advantage of the nomination systems for their 
own benefit, and therefore had an interest in their continuing. It was one thing for 
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Wray to favour the Golden family, but it was another for G. H. Tripp to secure a 
nomination for his son, Alker Tripp, to a Commissioner clerkship. The elder Tripp 
had been appointed to the Home Office in 1878, and his son's appointment was in 
1902. One of the Receivers clerks who eventually became the Chief Clerk in 1886 
was H. A. Everest, the son of George Everest (1805-1885), a long serving Home 
Office clerk on the criminal side and specifically involved in police business. 213 It is 
possible that there were other cases it has not been possible to identify. It is a fact 
of life after all that, where there is an opportunity to take advantage of a situation, 
then advantage will be taken. Relative to the great sinecures of the past, these 
clerkships were small beer, but the point is that they were not without benefit for 
small men. 
These relationships could not have passed without notice and the Tripp 
relationship led to some wary, internal navigation. When the Commissioner in 1911 
proposed amongst other changes that the younger Tripp should receive a special 
increment of E50 to his salary for his traffic work, an anonymous Home Office 
marginal comment was uA sop to Cerberus? " By 1911 Tripp senior was Receiver, 
and the implication was that the Commissioner was attempting to make his assent 
28 On the younger Everest's retirement in 1914, Troup recorded that the Secretary of State "notes 
with much interest that your own and your father's connexion with the Home Office have extended 
over a continuous period of 93 years. ' Letter of 20 June, 1914, on HO 82/27. 
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to the proposals more likely. 29 
In the end, the initiative for change came not from the Home Office but from the 
Commissioner, Edward Henry. In 1907 in a cogent 29 page letter he reviewed the 
whole of his civil staffing, mordantly characterising the response to the kind of 
Home Office control that had been practised since 1829 as follows: 
The policy generally adopted seems to have been to defer asking for an augmentation of 
staff until the last moment, when the risk of breakdown was imminent, and then to make 
provision barely sufficient for the current needs, the same process being repeated from time 
to time as the volume of work increased or was added to. 30 
In other words, the Home Office had settled for a policy of delayed incrementalism. 
Characterising the entry examinations of the limited competition system as failing 
short of what was then required or available, he mounted a lethal, unanswerable 
attack on the nomination system. Reminding the Home Office that open 
competition had been in existence since 1870, that Departments not formally 
subject to it had in fact accepted it, and that the Indian Public Service Commission 
(he was himself, of course, a graduate of the Indian Civil Service) judged it had 
29 HO 45/10534/151572, Commissioner's letter of 4 July, 1911. Alker Tripp prospered though not as 
he had hoped. Expecting to be made Secretary (as the post of Chief Clerk became designated in 
1915) in 1924. he was passed over in favour of an importee from the Inland Revenue. The Home 
Office's rationale in insisting on the appointment was ostensibly to bring in fresh blood to an inward looking organisation, and the official papers do not record the schadenfreud probably current in 
some circles as a result. He was consoled by being appointed an Assistant Commissioner in 1932, 
the first to be appointed with his background. Traffic remained his speciality until he retired in 1947. 30 lbid, letter of 15 April, 1907. 
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produced officers "many of whom have earned a high reputation for administrative 
capacity of a high order", he concluded - 
The nomination system is an anachronism which should not be allowed to continue to exist 
in the Head Office of what we hope is the most up to date Police Force in the whole world. 
He recommended that his staff should in effect be assimilated to the appointment 
systems and qualification standards prevalent within the civil service proper. 
Henry's Home Office interlocutor was Troup, the first open competition entrant to 
the Home Office, and the first to be promoted Permanent Under Secretary - in fact 
in the following year. Troup had no hesitation in recommending acceptance of 
Henry's proposals, and it seems impossible to believe that they had not been the 
subject of prior discussion between the two men. (By this time, only the width of 
Whitehall separated their offices. ) 
This still, however, left the position unchanged in the Receiver's office where the 
long serving Pennefather had been in office since 1883. An opportunity to review 
the situation there presented itself when in late 1908 Pennefather submitted 
generous proposals in respect of his staff. The response was to set up an inquiry 
undertaken by Byrne, a senior Home Office official and the elder Tripp, then still 
the head of Home Office finance. They lost no time in recommending against the 
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continuation of limited competition, and the same regime therefore became applied 
to the Receiv&s staff as to the CommissioneeS. 31 
But there was a further sting in the tail of the Byrne/Tripp report. In addition to 
majoring on the open competition issue, they argued for employing people of 
lesser status in a number of areas at lower cost. In their view, some people were 
receiving fancy salaries for not very much in return: 
These considerations clearly indicate the desirableness of entrusting as large a proportion 
as possible of the routine work of the clerks of a subordinate class and in a different station 
in life, who would regard as ample provision a maximum salary which to a man of different 
social standing and expectations would be a pittance; and we greatly regret that we have 
not seen our way to suggest this substitution on a more extended scale? 2 
For those who had not already worked out correctly for themselves the likely 
cumulative consequences of preceding social changes, Byrne and Tripp put the 
writing on the wall for all to read. Moreover, in the Commissioners office, status 
reversal was on the cards. When the Superintendent in charge of the Statistical 
Branch retired in 1919, the Commissioner (Macready) proposed the appointment of 
a civil clerk in his place. Even though Macready proposed also to augment the 
clerWs salary for the grade otherwise accepted as appropriate, the Receiver 
31 It follows that it was not the case, as maintained in Reynolds, J., The Receiver for the 
Metropolitan Police District, Metropolitan Police, 2000, p. 4, that the Receiver's office adopted open 
competition before the Commissioners Office and that it had immediately adopted the 1870 Order 
in Council in 1870. 
32 HO 45/10564/172681, report of 5 November, 1909. 
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pointed out that the new head of the Branch would have more highly paid Chief 
Inspectors working under him. This did not prevent the change taking place. 33 
On the other hand, none of this eradicated hyper-sensitivity to social nuance. In 
1915, Henry applied for permission to employ female clerks for the first time. Of his 
male clerks of eligible age, 66% had volunteered for military service. Henry thought 
the he would need 4 women to replace every 3 men. He added: 
In the case of this Office it will be essential to have women of good education and still more 
essential to secure women of good class. 34 
Class still mattered alright, but the going rate had declined. 




This part consists of two chapters. The first considers the role of the Receiver of 
the Metropolitan police, and the second examines how the force was funded. The 
latter cannot be understood without an understanding of the functions of the 
former. Indeed, the crucial role of the Receiver has been relatively neglected by 
historians of the force' , and one of the objects of what 
follows will be to restore the 
Receiver to his more proper position in the scheme of things. 
1 For example, the Office of the Receiver receives only six mentions in Browne, D. G., The Rise of 
Scotland Yard, Harrap, 1956, and five in Ascoli, D., The Queen's Peace, Hamish Hamilton, 1979. 
Both were inclined to scapegoat the Receiver for the outcomes of policies he had no choice but to 
administer. Moylan, being the Receiver when he contributed his centenary volume to the Whitehall 
Series, not surprisingly gave the role more its due but from a contemporary rather than an historical 




THE OFFICE OF THE RECEIVER 
This chapter describes the functions of the Receiver, explains their context, 
examines the background of the officials who held the office up to the 1920s, and 
explores how the triangle of relationships involving the office, Commissioners and 
Home Office developed over that period. 
Functions 
The 1829 Act created three officials appointed by the Crown, that is two justices 
(known by law from 1839 as "Commissioners" but in practice so designated from 
the earliest times) and a Receiver (contemporary usage for an accountant or 
treasurer) who was responsible for accounting for all moneys, and for holding and 
managing property. Their difference in status was initially signified by the fact that 
their salaries were not only at different levels but also funded differently - that of the 
Commissioners being paid from the Consolidated Fund but the Receivers coming 
from the rate income for the Force. (Some years later all these salaries were 
funded by Parliamentary Votes, that is, none was dependent on local taxation. ) 
It is possible that Peel had at one time thought of putting the three posts together 
2 Some of this material is contained in Morris, R. M., "The Metropolitan Police Receiver in the XlXth 
Century", Police Joumal, Vol. XLVI 1,1974, pp. 65-74. 
82 
into a single board directing the Force. 3 However, in the event, the 1829 Act not 
only distinguished the functions but Peel approved distinct office establishments for 
the Commissioners and the Receiver respectively. 
Peel attached high importance to the Receiver's functions: "I really believe that no 
man who has not had a legal education, and has not also had some practical 
experience as an accountant, will be able to discharge the duties of the office with 
any comfort or safety to himself. " To another correspondent, Peel said: uThe 
success of the Bill mainly turns on the office of Receiver. The Receiver will have to 
fight the battle with all the parishes, to collect the rates from each of them. He will 
have the whole police property, watch-boxes, watch-houses, arms, etc., vested in 
"4 him, and the making of all legal contracts for the purchase of land and buildings. 
These remarks did not overstate the case. During a few months in the summer of 
1829, the Receiver had to take charge of old watch houses and new premises to 
accommodate as well as station the men for working purposes, and let and 
supervise contracts to clothe and provision the large battalion size of the initial 
force which quickly expanded to 3,000 men. Weekly pay and accounting systems 
had also to be devised and put in place, together with banking systems which had 
3 Hansard, Commons, 15 April, 1829, cols 876-7, where Peel during his Second Reading speech 
appeared to envisage a board of three equals. However, by the time the Bill was debated in the 
Lords, Wellington quoted from what became section 1 of the 1829 Act and referred, therefore, to 
only two not three justices - Official Report, Lords, 5 June, 1829, col. 1751. For the question of boards generally, see Willson, F. M. G., "Ministries and Boards: Aspects of Administrative 
Development since 1832", Public Administration, Vol. XXXI I I, Spring 1955, pp. 43-58. 4 Letters respectively Peel to Goulbum, July 1829, quoted in Parker, C. S., Sir Robert Peel, 
Murray, I 899, Vol. 2, pp. 114-5, and Peel to Lord Chandos, June 1829, quoted in Gash, N., Mr 
Secretary Peel. The Life of SirRobert Peel to 1830, Longmans, 1961, p. 500. In the latter case, 
Peel was resisting the demands of his correspondent (son and heir to the Duke of Buckingham, a 
government supporter) in favour of one of his friends, a Mr. Wyndham. 
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to handle considerable sums, all then in coin. In addition, a system for precepting 
the 90 parish and other authorities in London and the counties of Middlesex, Kent 
and Surrey had to be established and enforced. 
Context 
In retrospect it may seem curious that it was thought necessary to create a free- 
standing functionary like the Receiver. Although the Middlesex and Surrey Justices 
Act of 1792 had established a similar post, that had been in relation to the judicial 
offices of stipendiary magistrates created by the Act and continued in its various 
subsequent extensions. In that case, it would not have been appropriate to look to 
an official of local government, say the treasurer of one of the Quarter Sessions 
administrations of a county authority, since it was clear that the responsibility for 
funding the Police Offices created was that of central government. The 1829 Act, 
on the other hand, created a police force entirely funded from local rates and, in 
the normal way, some locally accountable official could have been expected to 
assume the Receivers duties. After all, that was the solution adopted in the 1839 
Acts which created temporary forces in Birmingham, Bolton and Manchester. In 
each case, although they were explicitly modelled on the Metropolitan police and 
each had a Receiver with identical functions, the explicit statutory expectation was 
that the Receiver should in fact be the Treasurer of the borough authority 
concerned. 5 
5 See section 6 in each case of the Acts for Manchester (2&3 Vict. c. 87), Birmingham (c. 88) and 
Bolton (c. 95). 
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There were in fact two main reasons - technical and political - why the post was 
established in London in its particular form. The technical reason is that there was 
no local authority coterminous with the Metropolitan Police District (MPD). Except 
for limited shire or local act purposes, the largest local authority was the parish or 
like precinct, and the MPD from the beginning cut across county boundaries even 
before its extensions from 1839. This was an England which, it has been observed, 
was ushort of agency". 6 It followed that, if there were no suitable local agency to 
hand, then one would have to be created. 
The political reason marched hand in hand with, and reinforced, the technical 
reason. The point here was that the 1792 Act was the precedent of answerability to 
7 the executive that ministers had uppermost in their minds. Even if they were 
not prepared to fund it from central revenues, what they wanted was a force 
directly answerable to them. That was what the 1792 Act had created in the small 
constabulary forces attached to the Police Offices, and what was at the root of the 
experiments from the early 1800s with the Horse and Foot Patroles appointed by 
the Home Secretary and commanded by a Home Office official who acted as 
Conductor. 8 Whilst, as the next chapter will show, attempts were made to mask 
this fact, amongst other things by police division boundaries which cut across 
parish boundaries and thus made before and after cost audit comparison 
6 Prest op. cit., p. 4. 7 See generally Paley, R., 'The Middlesex Justices Act: Its Origins and Effects'. Ph D. Thesis, 
University of Reading, 1983. 8 HO 61/1, folio 101 describes their history up to January 1822. The Conductorwas William Day, 
Keeper of the Criminal Register 1800-1841 - see also Sainty, J. C., Home Office Officials, 1782- 1870, Athlone, 1975, pp. 27-28. 
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impossible, the aspiration was clear enough to contemporaries. In other words, the 
existence of the Receiver was as much proof of the government's intentions as 
section 5 of the 1829 Act which gave the Home Secretary control over the size and 
direction of the force. It is true, of course, that the government had to underwrite 
the cost from 1833 and that for four years only was it dependent entirely on rate 
borne expenditure - but that fact reflected merely the success of the initial 
presentational strategy which represented to ratepayer and Treasury alike that the 
new force would be no more expensive than the arrangements it replaced. 
Background of officials 
Over the period 1829-1920, there were only five Receivers, the last of whom 
(Moylan) was appointed in 1919. His predecessors, and their length in post from 
1829, were as follows: 
John Wray (1829-1860) 
Maurice Drummond (1860-1883) 
Alfred Pennefather (1883-1909) 
George Tripp (1909-1919) 
John Moylan (1919-1945) 
The background and behaviour of successive Receivers is a paradigm of 
developments in public office during the nineteenth century. Their history shows a 
transformation from a concept of office that was personal and to an extent 
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proprietorial to one that followed a service model of impartial, if politically aware, 
conduct. This transformation was not, however, the product of some automatic 
improving process but one which reflected the politics of the times. As has been 
pointed out, politics has to be inserted to make "Economical Reform" intelligible: 
"... thorough retrenchment and administrative reforms were central to the 
legitimation of elite political authority throughout the industrialising age, and 
Parliament, under the leadership of mostly Pittite and Conservative ministries, was 
able to provide them. "9 
John Wray was 47 on appointment. He came from an established family in 
Collingham, Yorkshire, and his father, Colonel Wray, had been Chairman of the 
Waterloo Fund. Graduating from Trinity, Cambridge, in 1804, he was admitted to 
Lincoln's Inn only in 1823 at the age of 41 and following a period when he may 
have functioned in legal and financial milieux1o, and during which he published in 
1819 a pamphlet on banking policy. In 1825 he founded the University Life 
Assurance Society (with whom a young Irish barrister, Richard Mayne, took out a 
policy in 1828). He was both chief actuary and chief executive of the Society, and 
his houses respectively in Sussex Street and in Sussex Place (both to the north- 
west of what is now Trafalgar Square) were provided to him at the Society's 
9 Harling, P., The Waning of Old CorTuption: The Politics of Economical Reform in Britain, 1779- 
1846, Clarendon, Oxford, 1996, pp. 8-9. The extent to which police and civil officials subscribed to a 
0 
political rhetoric of retrenchment will become apparent, especially in the next chapter. ( Gash, N., op. cit., describes him as a solicitor on appointment (p. 500). Since the call to the Bar 
seems to have been relatively late, it is possible that Wray served first in that branch of the 
profession, although Wray makes no reference to such a history in the surviving papers and spoke 
of himself as qualifying only as a banister. 
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expense. " As a barrister he practised - and continued after 1829 to practise as he 
claimed he was permitted - at the Parliamentary bar, especially later in relation to 
private bills concerning railways. 
The 1829 Act treated his role as entirely personal. Appointed at the Sovereign's 
pleasure, he was similarly removable. He had to put up a bond in a sum fixed by 
the Treasury (in fact E9000, or more than a 10 year multiple of his salary), and 
there were detailed, statutory provisions not only about his rendering account but 
also about what should happen on departure from office, including on death. His 
successor was given a statutory right to sue (on death, to sue the estate of the 
deceased) for outstanding monies on the basis that, on appointment, the 
successor was automatically vested with the monies and the properties, leases 
and so on vested in his predecessor. In other words, because the concept of office 
was personal rather than corporate and enduring, provision had to be made 
specifically to ensure continuity with the responsibility for ensuring continuity being 
placed on the successor. 
There was no expectation that Wray should be a fulltime official. The fact of his 
connection with University Life must have been known. The insurance link with 
Mayne may possibly have been the route through which he came to Peel's 
attention in the first place. Similarly, that he continued to practice at the Bar must 
11 University Ufe Assurance (ULA) Minute Books, seriatim 1825-1866 when Wray retired - see 
minute of 21 June, 1866, recording Wray's retirement as Resident Director and Chairrnan with 
effect from 16 May, 1866. Policy No. 375 on the life of Richard Mayne was taken out on 17 
November, 1828. 
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equally have been understood in the relatively small and close professional life of 
his time. The fact that the Home Office would have had to sanction the mortgages 
Wray took as Receiver with the Society in 1840 12 demonstrates that 
the connection would have been known at least to officials. His regularly journeying 
between his successive homes in Suffolk Street and Suffolk Place to and from 
Scotland Yard (walks then of about half a mile) would have made him a familiar 
figure at the top end of Whitehall, including as he stopped off to deposit monies at 
Drummond's bank then, as now, located (though today only as a branch of the 
Bank of Scotland) at the north west tip of Whitehall. 
Initially, Wray's administration was well regarded. The 1834 Select Committee 
Report 13 praised his stewardship and economy, just as it damned the competence 
of Thomas Venables, the Receiver for the Police Offices. On the latter's death in 
1837, Wray was asked to amalgamate Venables' duties with his own and this 
arrangement was subsequently made permanent in the Metropolitan Police Courts 
Act 183914. When examined by the Committee, it had emerged that Venables was 
an official pluralist holding offices which brought in EI 600 a year. A former Private 
Secretary to Peel, Venables, in addition to being simultaneously a clerk in the 
Home Office and Receiver for the Police Offices, was Receiver of Tenths, Receiver 
of Queen Anne's Bounty, and Deputy Clerk of the Signet. At a time when the 
12 ULA, Minute Book C, Directors Court, 23 September, 1840. The mortgages for F-20-25,000 were 
to be taken out by Wray as Receiver to the Police Courts (i. e. as opposed to Receiver to the 
Metropolitan police) won leasehold property on which a number of Police Offices and other Buildings 
are to be erected. " The rates were 6'1/4-6'1/2% for leases 60-80 years and 6% for leases over 80 
years. 3 Select Committee on Metropolitan Police Offices, PP 1834, Vol. XVI, (1834 Report), p. 6. 14 Section 7,2&3 Vict., c. 71. 
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character and expectations of government were changing, Venables' accumulation 
of offices - partly as compensation, he said, for his exertions as Private Secretary 
15 
- was evidently regarded as a phenomenon which looked backwards rather 
than 
forwards. In comparison, Wray shone. 
This situation changed, however, during Peel's administration of 1841-5 when the 
Home Secretary was Sir James Graham. Throughout the period, Graham - "the 
greatest administrator, but the least of statesmen"'6- pursued Wray relentlessly 
over the condition and timeliness of his accounts, the efficiency of his office, and 
his own attendance to duty. Graham's chief agent for this harrying was not the 
Permanent Under-Secretary, Philipps, but William Anderson, the Deputy 
Paymaster General and a Treasury official first encountered by Graham in his 
reforming days in the early 1830s at the Admiralty. Anderson was unleashed to 
undertake what was in practice one of the very early examples of what became the 
Treasury committee of inquiry. 17 
There was both an overt and an unspoken rationale to this pursuit. As to the 
former, Graham was entirely genuine in his desire to instil high standards of 
15 Venables had been appointed Receiver to the Police Offices by the retiring Home Secretary, 
Sidmouth, mas a Reward for the faithful and diligent discharge of his duty as His Lordship's Private 
Secretary and in consideration of his having been deprived, without remuneration, of the 
Receivership of the Thames Police. ' HO 61 /1 f. 252, undated memorandum of 1822. 
16 Hutchinson op. cit., p. 323 - Algernon West reporting Gladstone's opinion of Graham in 1896. Lord Welby reported the same view: I often had opportunities of talking with Mr Gladstone of Sir 
James, and I am sure I report him correctly when I say he placed him among the very first of our 
administrative statesmen". Parker, C. S., Life and Letters of SirJames Graham, Murray, 1907, letter 
of 27 September, 1905, p. 166. 17 Wright, M. Treasury Control of the Civil Service 1854-1874, Clarendon, Oxford, 1969, for which 
generally see Chapter 8, pp. 194-224. 
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personal conduct and of efficiency into public administration. That was, after all, 
one of the enduring legacies of the Peelites to British government. The results of 
one of the earliest recorded staff inspections of its type undertaken by Anderson 
had no difficulty in detecting things amiss, for example, accounts kept extra- 
statutorily in the wrong banks, and claimed delegations from the Home Office both 
insufficiently precise and insufficiently recorded. Wray defended himself and 
explained the practical reasons behind the informal diversions from strictly required 
practice. In the end he had to be peremptorily ordered to close the accounts he 
had held in two separate clearing banks for, respectively, Metropolitan police and 
Metropolitan courts monies. 18 One of the outcomes was the drawing up for the first 
time of consolidated "Financial Regulations" which listed the extent of approved 
delegations and procedures. 
However, it was the unspoken rationale that was probably behind the vehemence 
with which Wray was so relentlessly pursued. The fact was that, at a time when 
Parliament had been culpably slow to reform the pursuit of private interest in the 
promotion of private, especially railway, Bills, Wray's activities in his practice at the 
Parliamentary bar had come to unflattering attention. A scandal surfaced in 1845 
concerning the South Eastern Railway where the fact that an Ordnance clerk had 
sought to use influence corruptly led to a Select Committee inquiry which 
summoned Wray to give evidence on his part in the affair. Although the affair came 
18 MEPO 5/109/1, HO letter of 12 October, 1841; MEPO 5/109/6, Anderson's report of 25 April, 
1843, and Wray's riposte 29 May, 1843; MEPO 5/103/1, Home Office letter 4 March, 1844. One of 
Anderson's points about the irregular private accounts was that, in the event of Wray's death, they 
would become part of his personal estate. 
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to formal notice in 1845, veiled references to the practices of intermediaries like 
Wray had been made in the Commons in 1839. During the 1845 Select Committee 
investigation, it emerged that Wray had been active in the solicitation of MPs from 
the time he had been engaged as a paid agent of the South Eastern Railway in 
1836 but had probably not been responsible for actual bribery. Graham had 
responded by issuing a sharp reprimand to Wray requiring him to confine himself to 
his official duties on pain of dismissal. The Opposition pressed for Wray's dismissal 
in a debate in August 1845 but Graham (who, incidentally, said that he had in four 
years never actually met Wray) refused to increase the punishment. Peel himself 
intervened at one point to support Graham and say that Wray's punishment was 
severe for one of his age. (Wray was then 63. ) The government prevailed when 
matters were pressed to a division. 19 
What the debate revealed - apart, that is, from a certain amount of Opposition 
hypocrisy - was the emergence of a new dominant model of what was expected of 
public officials. As Graham's letter of reprimand put it, 
I do not think it necessary, on the present occasion, to express any opinion whether the due 
performance of the Receiver General of Police might or might not have been, in the first 
instance, compatible with private practice as a barrister, but I can entertain no doubt that 
your interference, especially as a paid agent in canvassing Members must tend to weaken 
the confidence of the public in the impartiality of the Government, whose officer you are, 
19 Hansard, Commons, 28 February, 1839, col 978; and 4 August, 1845, cols 1377-141 B. 
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and materially to impair your efficiency in the performance of the official duties which are 
entrusted to yoU. 20 
Interestingly, part of Wray's defence against Anderson's onslaught had been that 
he was being required to undertake duties unsuitable for his social status: 
I confess I am much annoyed by that part which proposes that I should take upon myself 
the duties of Cashier. If such a condition had been imposed upon me when offered the 
appointment I could not have accepted the office ... I think a Cashier under the Queen's 
Sign 
Manual is hardly known in a public department. 21 
No similar threats to Wray's successor appeared to materialise. On the news of 
Wray's imminent retirement in 1860 (at the age of 78), his erstwhile tormentor, 
Anderson, wrote from the Treasury to the Home Secretary, Sir George Cornewall 
Lewis, recommending the appointment of Maurice Drummond. He submitted the 
papers relating to the events of the 1840s and stressed that it would be "wise to 
ff 1 "22 appoint as his [Wray's] successor a person already trained to o 1cia business. 
The recommendation assumed both that the Home Secretary retained under the 
1829 Act an entirely open power of patronage and that that power would be 
exercised according to a model that gave preference to a serving official. It is not 
2() Hansard, Commons, letter of 19 July, 1845, col. 1389. 21 MEPO 5/109 private letter to Philipps, Home Office, 29 May, 1843. 22 HO 45/6881 Anderson to Lewis 29 December, 1859. It appears that Maurice Drummond owed 
his Treasury clerkship in the first place as an act of consideration to the Drummond family following 
the murder by the lunatic M'Naughten of Edward Drummond, Private Secretary to the Prime 
Minister, Peel, in 1843. 
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known what, if any, consideration Lewis gave to other candidates, and whether 
these included officials in the Home Office. 
Lewis appointed Drummond. This may not have been entirely a surprise. Not only 
had Drummond been his Private Secretary at the Treasury (in which he had 
been a clerk since 1843) and had moved, after serving a while with Lewis's 
successor, to join Lewis after the latter had become Home Secretary in 1859, but 
he was also related to Lewis by the latter's marriage to his wife's aunt. Moreover, 
his wife's affectionate step-father was Lord John Russell, a former - and future - 
Prime Minister. These were not disadvantages. However, there is also the point 
that, as Lewis's wife put it in a letter to her niece "no doubt, Maurice owed his 
appointment first rather to private than to official feelings; but now he has won his 
spurs. "23As Drummond's wife put it: "it was easier then to obtain Government 
appointments by interest than it is now, and it was not then thought infra dig. to ask 
fortheM. "24 In turn, one month after he arrived as Receiver, Drummond himself 
proposed the appointment of Edwin Mills of the Treasury as one of his clerks, on 
the grounds that he was an experienced book-keeper. 25 
23 Champneys, B., Adelaide Drummond, Smith, Elder, 1915, p. 249. 24 lbid, p. 257. She evidently did not think it beyond dignity fifty years later when she was no doubt 
the moving spirit behind the 4th Lord Ribblesdale's 1906 approach to Herbert Gladstone asking that 
her - his aunt's - only son and his cousin, Lister Drummond, should receive the next Police Court 
stipendiary vacancy - letter of 7 February, 1906, BL Add Mss 46066. Lister Drummond (1856-1916) 
was appointed but only in 1913. 25 HO 45/7046, Drummond to Waddington I June, 1860. Mills eventually became Chief Clerk in the 
Receivers office, retiring in 1895. 
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Interestingly, despite Graham's chastisement of Wray, Drummond seems to have 
had no hesitation in accepting other simultaneous occupation, his wife's biographer 
explaining that "His appointment of Receiver to the Metropolitan Police was only 
onerous as regards responsibility, and left him plenty of leisure. "26 This he used 
amongst other things to write for the Pall Mall Gazefte in its Tory phase up to 1880 
under Greenwood's editorship. If known, or noticed, it seems to have excited no 
recorded comment. 27 On the other hand, his writings were - like all the other 
contributions - anonymous and in his case of a sardonic, humorous kind which 
were not overtly party political. His wife and a daughter also contributed, his wife to 
a number of journals. Greenwood was recorded as saying that "The Pall Mall owed 
a great deal to Maurice Drummond. P, 28 
However, although Drummond owed his appointment to family patronage, he 
arrived equipped with a Treasury perspective and 17 years' departmental service, 
and in that sense undoubtedly did possess relevant experience. Moreover, he 
pressed - in a joint letter with Mayne - for a change in the Receiver's legal status. 
This was achieved by means of the Metropolitan Police (Receiver) Act 1861 which 
made the Receiver a "corporation sole" -a step recommended by the Receiver's 
26 Champneys, op. cit., p. 19. 
27 Even, for example, when the Pall Mall Gazette ran a campaign in 1878/9 about alleged declining 
police efficiency in dealing with crime. it was a Tory administration (and the Gazette at the time still 
a Tory paper) but the attacks were all against the police staff when (see below) Drummond was in 
dispute with the Commissioner. It is difficult to believe that the Gazette did not draw on Drummond's 
knowledge even if he did not initiate the attacks. In commenting on the articles, Henderson claimed 
as much in general terms and hinted that the Receivers office was involved, but did not name 
names. See HO 45/9755/A60557, Henderson memorandum 18 June, 1879. 28 Scoff, J. W. R., The Story of the Pall Mall Gazette, Oxford University Press, 1950, p. 138. For the 
Victorian political press generally, see Koss, S. The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain, 
Vol. 1, Hamilton, 1981. 
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solicitors as long before as 1846.29 That is, the office was no longer to be 
perceived as one inhering in a particular appointee but, rather, one that retained a 
continuous life regardless of the office holder. It followed that monies and property 
were no longer vested in the Receiver personally but in the function. There 
remained a personal responsibility, of course, and the Receiver was still bonded 
against default, 30 but the concept of the office was now a professional one, and the 
change signalled a step change in the public administration context. 
Drummond retired at 68 in 1883 to be succeeded by Richard Pennefatheý', the 
Home Office Clerk in charge of Accounts, and who had joined the Home Office in 
1868 as the Accountant specifically to discharge the new duties created by the 
Exchequer and Audit Act, 1866. In turn, he was succeeded in 1909 by George 
Tripp, the Finance Officer. In both cases, their experience of government 
accounting and familiarity with the financing systems for the Metropolitan police 
must have been strongly in their favour. Neither treated the role, as Drummond 
had, as a virtual sinecure. On the contrary, Pennefather was a vigorous innovator 
who promoted legislation for long-term funding and generally established the 
financial and physical infrastructure necessary for a greatly increased force. Both 
he and Tripp had also been nurtured in a Home Office which itself had grown 
29 HO 45/6881 letter Mayne/Drummond to Home Office 6 March, 1861; MEPO 5/305, Lyon, Bame 
and Ellis to Receiver 18 July, 1846. 
30 Drummond was to argue that this fact meant that it would be inappropriate for the Receivers 
office to be included in those to which open competition should apply - see HO 45/9373/39164/1, 
Drummond to Uddell, 16 August, 1870. 
31 See biographical note at Appendix C. 
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significantly from its still modest size and abilities of 1860. Neither man had had a 
university education: indeed, Pennefather was coy about his schooling. 32 Both, 
however, possessed a more sophisticated understanding of financial policy than 
any of their predecessors, including the former Treasury official. 
Appointed in 1919, Moylan did not share the background of his two predecessors. 
He was the first open competition entrant to succeed to the Receivership whereas 
they had both joined the Home Office in more initially humble capacities, that is, 
below the First Division. Moreover, Moylan had not worked as they had on finance 
and in that respect was less well equipped. On the other hand, he was very familiar 
with policing policy issues. He had, for example, been the Home Secretary's 
emissary to South Wales during the industrial unrest in 1911. There, as explained 
above, he had dealt not only with the Major-General, Macready, in charge of the 
military but he had also been much in the company of a staff officer, Captain 
Horwood. In 1919 Macready was Commissioner and Horwood one of the Assistant 
Commissioners and Macready's successor a year later. 
The question arises whether Moylan's appointment represented a deliberate break 
with what appeared to be settled practice (i. e. four predecessors whose common 
feature was a degree of familiarity with financial management albeit appointed in 
different ways). If so, to what end? Was it simply - as argued in the 
32 The significance of their roles and careers in Home Office terms is dealt with in Pellew, Jill, 
op. cit., especially at pp. 101-5. 
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case of the Prison Commission -a case of the "triumph of the clerks"33; had 
financial matters become so routinised that the expertise did not have any longer 
to be supplied by the Receiver himself; or were there other considerations so far 
unidentified? 
These are not issues that can be settled by looking at biographical backgrounds 
alone. It is necessary first to try to place Receivers so far as possible within the 
totality of the relationships in which they operated, and then determine how 
concepts of their role influenced the person specifications that, however 
unconsciously, informed the choices made. There is also the fact that hindsight 
tells us that Moylan's appointment was not an exception but became the norm. 
The triangular relationship: Home Secretary, Commissioner and Receiver 
On the face of it, the 1829 Act's arrangements were clear, and they were certainly 
robust enough to last until repealed in the Greater London Authority Act 1999 when 
a police authority for London was created on the model of police authorities 
elsewhere. The Home Secretary was the ultimate dispensing power: it was on his 
advice to the Crown that Commissioners, Receivers and, from 1856, Assistant 
Commissioners were appointed; he had to approve all the general orders of the 
Commissioners, appointments and promotions, and rate precepts before issue; the 
33 McConville, S., English Local Prisons, 1869-1-900, Routledge, 1981, Chapter 12. 
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Receiver could enter into no contract without his approval, and had to submit 
regular accounts as required by him as well as at statutory intervals to Parliament. 
Although the Act did not deal explicitly with the operational powers of the 
Commissioners, they were to be inferred from their status as justices and, subject 
to any directions from the Home Secretary under section 5 of the 1829 Act, meant 
that they exercised the control and deployment of the force. They did not, however, 
exercise control over the Receiver. Although his duties made him appear in some 
respects to act as their agent for the clothing and provisioning of the force, he was 
answerable to the Home Secretary rather than to them. 
Ordinarily, these relationships did not lead to difficulty. Whatever his problems with 
one Home Secretary, Wray seems to have had good relationships with his 
Commissioners from the early heroic days onwards. When asked by the 1834 
Select Committee whether he had ever objected to proposals by the 
Commissioners, Wray replied: "I do not know that I have ever made a formal 
objection in writing; we do not carry on the business so officially. I consider the 
subject over with them. "340n the other hand, the Commissioners and the 
Receivers maintained entirely separate civilian staffs of clerks whose careers lay 
wholly within either the Commissioners' or Receivers' offices. Each office 
communicated separately with the Home Office. When Drummond arrived in 1860, 
he had none of the advantage of either Wray's long tenure or more than slight 
34 1834 Report, Evidence, 0.4958, p. 363. This situation was fondly remembered many years later 
by one of the Assistant Commissioners (Harris) - OThere were no such things as memorandums 
used in Mr Wray's time; it was all verbal communication'. Accounts Commission 1878, Evidence, Q 
171. (For the work of the Commission see below. ) 
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knowledge of Home Office officials. His rather dark and sardonic manner35 must 
also have made him an awkward person with whom to deal. On the other hand, 
Mayne supported Drummond's work when giving evidence to the 1868 inquiry: "We 
have always acted most cordially together and the business goes on most 
satisfactorily. "36 
Personalities aside, the fact was that Commissioners were dependent on a 
Receiver whom they did not control. In the crises of 1877/8 and 1886/8, 
Commissioners attacked what they saw as the overweening character of the 
Receiver's office and the unnecessary restraints it imposed on their own executive 
initiative. The latter two episodes in particular saw splenetic outbursts from the 
participants. There was a reprise of these arguments in the early 1920s. Even in 
the 1840s, Mayne had not been averse to the suggestion - made by Anderson and 
which came to nothing - to substitute the Paymaster General's Office for the 
Receiver. Anderson's bait was that this would produce staff savings, though Wray 
pointed out that the work would still have to be done somewhere. 37 The attraction 
to Mayne lay in a scheme that would have given Commissioners more direct 
control of procurement. It would be right also to bear in mind that Mayne's restraint 
before the 1868 Committee about the Receivers role may well have owed a good 
deal to the fact that the Commissioner was very much on the defensive not only 
because the Committee was set up in direct response to the Clerkenwell debacle, 
35 West, A., Recoliections 1832-1886, Nelson, 1899, p. 77. As a Treasury Clerk, Drummond had 
been an habitu6 of the Foreign Office "nursery" - p-34. 36 1868 Report, Evidence, p. 81. 37 MEPO 5/109A, letters of 7 April, 1849, and 29 May, 1849. 
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but also because that event had followed closely on the Hyde Park riots only 
shortly before. 
The crises of 187718 and 188618 
The origin of these crises was not the Commissioner/Receiver relationship as such 
but severe operational difficulties which precipitated, in the first case, major 
reviews of the force and, in the second case, a move to restore confidence by the 
appointment of a prominent serving soldier who turned out to be determined to get 
his way and impatient of what he regarded as unnecessary restraint. 
The reviews which took place in 1877/8 were precipitated by the Turf Fraud. 
Spectacular criminal trials revealed that the then Detective Department first 
established in 1842 was, in the words of the Committee appointed by the Home 
Secretary to investigate the detective system, under a system of espionage by 
thieves. "38TWo other committees were set up in the wake of the same scandal, but 
only that on the rest of the force (set up in August 1878) completed its report. The 
other committee was the Metropolitan Police Accounts Commission that took 
evidence in June and July 1878 but did not proceed further. 
The Accounts Committee was chaired by Liddell, the Permanent Under-Secretary, 
38 1878 CommiUee, Report, p. 41. 
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and its members were Ridley (Parliamentary Under-Secretary), and William Fagan, 
who had been a Director of Convict Prisons since 1865. Writing in 1888, Liddell's 
successor, Lushington, said that the committee had been set up because of 
differences between the Commissioner, Henderson, and the Receiver, Drummond. 
The record of the evidence shows that these differences were severe. At a time 
when his own record was under scrutiny, it would have been natural for Henderson 
to draw attention to what he claimed were restraints on his proper sphere. As 
explained in Chapter 1, Henderson was himself a very experienced public official 
who had in earlier posts had significant responsibilities which would have included 
finance. 
Not mincing his words, Henderson attacked the existing system: 
... there is too much autocracy in our system, In fact it is dual government: the Receiver is 
an independent body and the Commissioner is independent, and it is a system of 
government that does not exist, as far as I know, in any other departments-the theory that 
has gradually grown up is that the Receiver's office is entirely a separate and independent 
office.... The idea is, I suppose, that the Receiver is to act as a sort of check on the 
Commissioner's office; but how he can possibly check when he knows nothing except what 
the Commissioner tells him I have never been able to discover. 39 
Henderson added that the full estimating picture was concealed from him and he 
could never learn the state of the Metropolitan Police Fund at any particular time. 
39 HO 347/2, Accounts Commission 1878, Evidence, p. 5. 
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Other evidence from the Commissioner's and Receiver's staffs demonstrated the 
working gulfs and the way in which business had come to be dealt with more 
formally between them. Wray's more casual and intimate regime had become one 
where communication rested almost entirely on the exchange of written 
memoranda. The state of mind amongst the Receivers staff was illustrated by the 
Accountant, Evans, saying that, although Exchequer and Audit strictly examined 
the accounts after payment, "there are many ways in which the spirit if not the letter 
of the financial regulations would be evaded, if the Receivers office did not exist. "40 
Drummond was interviewed last in the surviving record. He laid much stress, as 
Wray had earlier, on the need to keep executive and financial responsibilities 
distinct: 
My opinion is that the Commissioner should have nothing to do with finance, and the 
Receiver should have nothing to do with administration ... if he [the Commissioner] were to 
have anything to do with it, it would simply end in the finance branch being in the state that 
the police branch is now, which is not a comfortable one... moreover it is absolutely 
necessary that there should be a check on the Commissioner equivalent to the Treasury 
check upon the departments. If the Home Secretary is left entirely to the tender mercies of 
the Commissioner, the Commissioner will, in my opinion, play ducks and drakes with the 
money he has to deal with. 
Drummond went on to say that the Home Secretary needed an independent 
adviser to help him judge the Commissioners demands since he had no means of 
40 lbid, P. 32. 
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doing so from his own resources. Moreover, Henry Bruce, Home Secretary 1868- 
73, had specifically instructed him not to let the Commissioner know the surplus in 
the Fund at any time. Finally, when asked by the chairman whether he had any last 
remarks to make, Drummond did not hold back: 
I have only to say that the fact of a department like my own which has worked like an 
admirably devised machine in the interest of the Home Office, the Treasury, and the 
ratepayers which has, as has been proved to you, saved thousands of public money, been 
called upon to justify its existence at the suggestion of the Department whose extravagance 
it controls, and which is notoriously in a state of utter disorganisation, is an incident I believe 
without parallel in the records of the public service. 41 
The surviving records do not explain why the Accounts Committee did not proceed 
to produce a report. There was no political discontinuity: Cross and Ridley 
remained at the Home Office until ousted at the 1880 election. The main 
conclusion, however, is clear - there was to be no change in the statutory 
arrangements. There is evidence, too, that Ministers did not repose full 
confidence in the probity of the Commissioner's administration. 42 
From the point of view of administrative process, the interesting thing about the 
ill-tempered exchanges is the clues they give to the way in which the statutorily 
defined roles were being carried out in practice. As an overlay to the terse and 
limited language of the 1829 Act had grown up a web of theory about the 
41 lbid, pp. 62 and 69. 42 HO 45/9755/AB0557, memorandum of 7 August, 1879, by Ridley, Parliamentary Under- 
Secretary, to Cross, Home Secretary. 
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character of the Receivers function. He was not simply a passive 
accountant/treasurer functionary acting as the Commissioners agent. Rather, he 
was the Home Office and Treasury watchdog as to the merits of expenditure. 
Whilst these issues had been implicit in some of the argument in the 1840s, thirty 
years later the issues had been made explicit and there was a more worked 
through intellectual apparatus to support the Home Office/Receiver view. 
During 1886-8 the arrival of the strong-minded Warren as Commissioner saw a 
period of even more direct challenge to the Receivers functions. As explained 
elsewhere, Warren had been selected as part of the response to the breakdown of 
order in the Pall Mall riots of 1886. Warren was highly impatient of anything he saw 
as a restraint on his operational independence. In the severe recession of the 
1880s he was called upon to cope with the public order manifestations - especially 
in working men's assemblies in Trafalgar Square - of largescale unemployment. 
Falling out with Pennefather, Warren claimed that the Surveyor and Storekeeper 
should report to him, and the Receiver be nothing more than an accountant withoul 
any real independent status. Further, Warren claimed that he could not take 
instructions from the Permanent Under-Secretary but only direct from the Home 
Secretary himself. 
Initially, every attempt seems to have been made to respond to points Warren 
raised. The Home Secretary, Matthews, told Warren that he would consider any 
scheme for modifying the existing system "to interfere as little as possible with you 
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discretion in details of the management of the Police Force; and I will consider any 
scheme you may submit with that object. "43 But as Warren widened his offensive to 
include the Estimates and take the opportunity of a revision of the Finance 
Regulations to return again to points already thought settled, patience became 
exhausted. Warren insisted on launching his queries to the Home Office direct, 
Lushington observing that Warren seemed to have made no attempt before 
commenting on the 1888/89 estimates to obtain an understanding of the estimating 
system or the requirements of Metropolitan finance. Moreover, the Commissioner 
ushould have asked for explanations from the Receiver himself - his own colleague 
having an office under the same roof. "44 But it was, of course, Warren's position 
that he should not have to submit to that burden. Indeed, he claimed that the 
Permanent Under-Secretary should clear with the Commissioner any submission 
on the Metropolitan police before putting it to the Home Secretary. 45 
The Receiver, Pennefather, had already written to Lushington in May 1887 listing 
what he regarded as interferences by the Commissioner and demanding a general 
inquiry before any of the Commissioners proposals were adopted because of the 
43 HO 144/197/A46998/34, letter of 23 April, 1887. 44 HO 45/9681/A4800OD/36, memorandum of 13 May, 1888. 45 See also HO 144/21 O/A48348 which deals with one of the casualties of this warfare between the 
Commissioner and the Receiver. One of the latter's senior clerks, H. K. Evans, the Accountant, 
whose private and apparently innocent financial difficulties led to his bankruptcy in early 1888, was 
the subject of a campaign of vilification sponsored by Warren and fed by his Executive Officer, 
Superintendent Cutbush. A QC's inquiry exonerated Evans (whom Matthews, the Home Secretary, 
had insisted against advice should be dismissed purely on the grounds of bankruptcy) and led to 
Cutbush's being reprimanded. Following his dismissal, Evans wrote (with Pennefather's assistance) 
an article defending the financial administration from Professor Stuart's attacks made originally in 
the Commons in 1888 - see Evans, H., OThe LCC, and its Police", Contemporary Review, Vol. LV, 3, 1889, pp. 445-461. 
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character of the financial system, "the efficiency of the check which is demanded 
alike by the Ratepayer and the Treasury". 4's The Home Secretary, Matthews, 
responded by setting up a committee 
To consider the relations between the Commissioner and the Receiver of the Metropolitan 
Police; and the present system of financial regulations and of accounts, and to report what 
would be the best form of regulation and accounts, consistent with the metropolitan Police 
Acts in order to secure the utmost efficiency of the force and at the same time to retain 
proper financial control. 47 
The chairman was H. C. E. Childers who, in addition to having been in charge of the 
Admiralty and the War Office, had been Chancellor of the Exchequer 1882-5 and, 
briefly, Home Secretary in 1886 - briefly enough, however, to have experienced 
the Pall Mail riots and to have accepted the resignation of the previous 
Commissioner. The other members were Stuart Wortley, Parliamentary Under- 
Secretary at the Home Office; Knox, Accountant General at the War Office; Du 
Cane, Chairman of the Prison Commission: and Richard Mills, Treasury - and, 
incidentally, the son-in-law of Anderson who had called the Receiver to account in 
the 1840s. Notably, there was no member of the Home Office at official level 
amongst the members, and indeed Lushington wrote, or had it in mind to write in 
July 1888, to Childers declining to give evidence on the grounds that he would be 
46 MEPO 5/65, Receivers lefterbook, undated May 1887 letter. 47 It is not clear when exactly the committee was set up, though it may be inferred from HO 45/9678/A47228/4 and /5 that it was in April 1888. 
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obliged to make work whatever. eventuated. He took the view that there was 
nothing wrong with the rules; rather, 
they were personal difficulties due to the action of the Commissioner ... assuming to himself 
duties of the Receiver or making it impossible for the Receiver to discharge them properly 
and doing this in an intolerably overbearing manner ... I am convinced such changes 
[i. e. 
transferring powers from the Receiver to the Commissioner] will not tend to economy, and 
that so far from securing peace will greatly increase the friction. 48 
Again, this committee did not proceed to report. Indeed, it is not clear whether it 
ever took any evidence. All that survives is copies of various papers prepared for 
submission to the committee. Chief amongst these are two memoranda from the 
Receiver. 49 The first set out Pennefather's version of recent events and his view of 
the questions of principle. He had tried to get on with Warren and he quoted from 
correspondence appearing to show his good intentions and the lack of 
reciprocation on Warren's part. He thought there were four reasons for maintaining 
the existing situation: the paramountcy of the Home Secretary depended on his 
having independent officers in charge of different departments; the interests of the 
ratepayers, having no direct control, demanded satisfactory imperial control; the 
Treasury contribution meant that the control should be of the strictest character 
and thus the Receiver should be invested with the most direct responsibility; and 
the existing division of responsibility between Commissioner and Receiver was fair. 
48 HO 144/197/A46998/34. 
49MEPO 5/306, May 1887 
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In addition, with barely concealed reference to Warren, Pennefather hypothesised: 
Supposing an officer was appointed to Commissioner who was by nature hasty beyond 
description - autocratic to a degree - and whose career was characterised by proceedings, 
which, if not strictly illegal, yet exhibited a great deal of impulsive self-will which many times 
carded him a little too far - how could the Home Office keep an efficient check on such a 
Commissioner if the Receiver did not exist as an independent officer of such a recognised 
position that his remarks would carry weight. 50 
He claimed that no less an authority than the by then very experienced Home 
Secretary, Harcourt, in 1885 had refused to hear of any changes being made. 
One of the functions which had always tended to produce friction was the office of 
the Surveyor. The post had been instituted in 1844 and had roles which required 
reporting both to the Commissioner (in respect, for example, to the Commissioner's 
responsibilities for dangerous structures and common lodging houses) and to the 
Receiver whom he advised on building maintenance, equipment, purchase and 
property management generally - all matters of great interest to the Commissioner. 
A memorandum by the Surveyor explained his duties and the fact that, since 1868, 
he had been placed under the Receiver for all general purposes though he 
reported directly to the Commissioner in respect of his exclusive responsibilities. 
The Surveyor recommended no change. 
50 lbid, Pennefather to Home Secretary, 13 July, 1887. 
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The remaining papers comment on proposals apparently made by Knox, the War 
Office Accountant General, that the relationship should in principle be assimilated 
to the War Office design set out in Orders in Council in February 1888. 
Pennefather objected' that they would reduce the Receiver to an accountant 
general and, above all, the papers gave no explanation why the change should be 
made. He pointed out the importance of the Surveyor's position, that he was 
nowhere outside London attached to the chief constable, and, anyway, the 
Commissioner had no power to enter into contract. As to handing the responsibility 
for stores over to the Commissioner, it had to be remembered that they were really 
52 
money in another form. From inside the Home Office, the Clerk in charge of 
Accounts, Tripp, supported the Receiver: 
... for no matter how thoroughly such questions might be dealt with in the Home Office no 
advice could be so valuable (other things being equal) as that of the officer who, from the 
daily routine of his duties, is conversant with all the details of expenditure and in touch with 
the actual conditions of the fund. 53 
It is almost certain that the committee did not proceed to a report because of 
Warren's resignation in November 1888. In a closely worded memorandum in the 
following month, Lushington recommended to Matthews that the arrangements be 
51 lbid, undated memorandum 52 lbid, later undated memorandum. 53 HO 144/197/46998/34, [5 May 1887] 
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left undisturbed despite the fact that the committee had apparently been minded to 
opt for the military model which he thought inapt: "in comparison with the War 
Office, the Metropolitan Polic654is a puny office cut off from public opinion. " 
Similarly, there was an inappropriate tendency to approximate the police's chronic 
duty of maintaining public order to warfare, and by analogy justifying the 
Commissioner to act as a general in the field where the normal financial disciplines 
were understandably abandoned in the interests of securing victory. Recounting 
the history of previous inquiries and the background to the recent one, he went on 
... it was doubtless in reliance of the financial administration of the Secretary of State, 
through the Receiver as his adviser, that the Treasury did not itself interfere with the 
expenditure of the Metropolitan police. The Receiver is in short a Home Office official 
located in Scotland Yard having assigned to him statutory and other duties relating to 
Finance. 
Lushington added that he could not state too emphatically that if economy in police 
administration or, what amounted to the same thing, if control by the Home 
Secretary over police expenditure was to be secured, what was required was to 
strengthen the hand of the Receiver. There was no danger of the latter fettering the 
Commissioner; he had no power to do so. The danger of the Receiver being put in 
54 Lushington Will have had in mind here the Metropolitan Police Office (i. e. the small headquarters 
organisation) rather than the force as a whole. 
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an inferior position was that the Home Office would lose all control. 55 
The exchanges of 1921-3 
No change was made. On the other hand, although Pennefather went on after 
Monro's short stay to enjoy a perfectly harmonious relationship with his longer 
serving successor, Bradford, which included the successful completion of 
rehousing the headquarters of the force in "NeW' Scotland Yard, the potentiality for 
friction was not eliminated. Describing his first encounter in 1918 with the then 
Receiver (Tripp), Macready was not impressed: 
The civil servant who held this appointment on my arTival informed me at our first meeting 
that he was my colleague and not my subordinate. I told him I was sorry it was so, because 
had he been my subordinate I should have been more considerate in my dealings with him. 
This gentleman had been many years in the post, and soon afterwards was replaced by an 
old friend of mine, Mr J. F. Moylan, C. B., CRE., who had been with me in the South Wales 
coal strike. 56 
Macready's successor, however, made the nature of the relationship more of an 
issue: Moylan, after all, was no protdg6 of his. In 1921, Horwood (now 
Commissioner) objected to the fact that the Receiver was invited by the Home 
Office to comment on the Commissioner's proposals where they were thought to 
55 HO 347/Xil, memorandum of 4 December, 1888. 56 Macready, op. cit., pp. 315-6. The inference the reader is offered to draw is that Macready got rid 
of him. On the other hand, the Police Review (10 January, 1919) mentioned ill heath. Tripp had 40 
years' service by 1918 and therefore retired on maAmum pension. Nonetheless, such facts perhaps 
merely facilitated Tripp's removal in a situation where the Home Secretary would have been 
reluctant to disoblige the very man drafted in to save a politically parlous situation. By the time 
Macready's memoirs were published Tripp was dead. A strange victory. 
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have financial implications. He revisited all the old arguments (immediately 
recollected by Home Office officials as identical with those used in Warren's time), 
pressed for an inquiry, and claimed that the Receiver should become an Assistant 
Commissioner i. e. his subordinate. 57 The Permanent Under-Secretary, Troup, 
observed: 
All Commissioners (except Sir Edward Bradford) have disliked the financial control of the 
Home Office as advised by the Receiver -just as the military side of the War Office 
blaspheme at the mention of the Accounting Officer, and most Government Departments 
think they could do much better without the Treasury. I do not think, however, that the H. 0 
could exercise any check or control over Metropolitan Police expenditure if we had not the 
Receiver as an independent adviser. It is from him that in most cases we get the facts - 
which as a rule are not given, or given imperfectly, in the Commissioners letters. 58 
The Home Secretary (Shortt) did not accept Troup's advice that an inquiry should, 
in effect, be declined, and an approach was made to the Treasury for a suitable 
person to conduct an inquiry - omitting, as the Receiver pointed out, the inclusion 
of anyone to represent the ratepayer interest which furnished half the force's cost. 
Troup did not, however, miss out in his letter to the Treasury that resort to 
legislation would be controversial "as it would give the London County Council and 
the Metropolitan Boroughs an opportunity of claiming that they should exercise 
57 HO 45/112221416057, letters of 25 February and 9 June, 1921 - in which Horwood also blamed the police strike of 1918 on "the obstruction and unsympathetic attitude of the then Receiver, a 
rewriting of history interesting for what it seems to disclose of the state of mind in the 
Commissioners office. 58 HO 45/1222/416507, Troup to Home Secretary 13 June, 1921. 
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control over Metropolitan Police expenditure, one half of which falls on the rates. "59 
This was, of course, an attempt to rule out legislation on the grounds that it could 
result in municipal control, and it was axiomatic that that - then - was not desired. 
Troup effectively assigned to the Receiver the responsibility for putting the case for 
the status quo. The resulting memorandum adduced new and old arguments, as 
well as finding a tactful way of pointing out that the Commissioners avowed 
concern with economy of administration (that is, to end duplication) masked in fact 
a wish to be freed from restraint. The new arguments rested on contemporary 
attempts to improve financial controls within the civil service. Far from the Receiver 
being an anomaly, the Commissioners proposal 
runs counter to recent measures in the civil service for strengthening financial checks and 
increasing the independence of financial officers. An independent finance and accounting 
branch distinct from the spending and administration branches and responsible to the 
Minister alone has been established in most important offices. 
The old arguments were summarised: 
If the Home Office cease to have the Receiver as a financial outpost or watchdog of their 
own in Scotland Yard, they will have to create a new officer inside the Home Office, whose 
position will not nearly be so effective as that of the Receiver who can obtain 
59 HO 45/11222/416057/3, Troup to Fisher 5 August, 1921. (This might not have cut much ice with 
Fisher who in his time referred dismissively both to Troup and the Home Office at large - see O'Halpin, E., Head of the Civil Service: A Study of Sir Warren Fisher, Routledge, 1989. pp. 72-73. ) 
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information and judge proposals in a way that an officer sifting in the Home Office could 
never do. 60 
Although Anderson replaced Troup a few months later, the latter felt so strongly 
about the issues that he sought to influence matters after retirement in March 
1922: "1 am quite convinced that it is only the independent position of the Receiver 
that has enabled the Home Office to exercise any control over Metropolitan Police 
expenditure. n6l 
Anderson, new to the Home Office, did not carry his predecessor's baggage and 
was perfectly prepared to see if some accommodation could be reached. In 
correspondence over the next 18 months, Anderson explored the room for 
compromise, giving a fair wind - to the Receivers dismay - to the Treasury 
officers recommendation that supply in its entirety should become the 
Commissioners responsibility. In the end it was the Commissioners intransigence 
that defeated his own cause, and - without making any formal 
Q changes - Anderson in effect told the parties to co-operate sensibly. 6 
60 HO 45/11222/416057/4 memorandum Moylan to Troup, 4 October, 1921. Moylan argued that his 
own and the Commissioner's separate registries could not be combined to save money because that meant the Receiver would be unable to give confidential advice to the Home Office. Nor could the Receiver become the Commissioner's accounting officer without a change in the law since 
section 12 of the 1829 Act required the Commissioner to certify the weekly pay sheets. 61 HO 45/11222/416057/5, Troup to Scoff 13 March, 1922. Troup continued to fight this comer. See Troup, E., uPolice Administration, Local and National", Police Joumal, Vol. 1,1928, pp. 5-18. '52 HO 45/11222/416057/8, Anderson to Horwood 25 July, 1923. 
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The developments reviewed 
Personalities were clearly important in the tiffs that occurred. Henderson was up 
against it in the 1870s and felt he was more confined in the job than he had been in 
others. Warren was clearly headstrong and something of a bully. On the other 
hand, he not unnaturally conceived that he had been placed in an operational role, 
and sought to act accordingly. The restraints of the law and financial control in 
England as opposed to during active service abroad were irksome and in the 
end, of course, he was not obliged to endure them since he could always, as he 
did, return to military duty. Horwood shared the natural ambition of military men to 
be in charge of their own house, even if he was hardly a very subtle performer, and 
seems to have been egged on by a member of his staff, Colonel Partridge, to 
reopen issues thought resolved. 63 
Nor were Receivers perfect. Drummond's dark character seems to have made him 
awkward and inflexible. 64 Family connection had got him his post and that, in his 
time, did not require humility. Pennefather was apt to stand on his dignity: one of 
his first official acts as Receiver was to petition for permission to wear civil uniform; 
he was careful to list what he clearly thought was a notable lineage in his Who's 
63 HO 45/11222/416057/8, for a Home Office official's comment in a note of 20 July 1923: 8He 
seems to agree verbally and then follows up with a memorandum in a contrary sense drafted by 
Paaridge. ' 
64 Even the bland Lady St Helier seems to have been at a loss to characterise him succinctly when 
she described him as 'a curious, interesting, wild-looking person, very able and very original. ' - St Helier, Memories of Fifty Years, Arnold, 1909, p. 161. 
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Who entry presumably as a bid for reflected glory; and he even complained to the 
Home Office at one stage that they were second guessing his 
recommendations. 65 Lushington was thought by one - admittedly hostile - 
contemporary to prefer to apply blisters rather than plasters in any situation. 66 
Troup and Moylan became the defenders of what had become by their time a 
settled orthodoxy about the Receiver's function. It would also be naive not to 
imagine that Home Office officials were in part motivated by a wish to preserve 
their grip on the succession to a well paid and enjoyable post. 
More can, of course, be hazarded about the role of Home Office officials. Sean 
McConville has advanced the thesis that the growing collegial character of the 
senior officials in the Home Office towards the end of the nineteenth century in a 
situation where they operated with the delegated authority of the Home Secretary 
led to their eclipsing the authority of the head of the Prison Commission, Du Cane: 
The small group of clerks who acted in the Home Secretary's name shared the social ties of 
the work-group, with its instinct to unite in the face of an outside challenge. Organisational 
logic decreed that in any conflict with the Prison Commission the clerks, as the ears, eyes 
and doorkeepers of the Secretary of State, would almost certainly prevail ... In this, the 
65 IVIEPO 5/307, letters Pennefather to Digby, 6 November. 1901, and Digby's reply of 14 November 1901. 
66 Anderson, R., 7he Lighter Side of My official Life, Hodder, 1910, p. 130. Also p. 131-"Vvah his 
many excellent qualities Godfrey Lushington's intervention and influence were generally 
Provocative, and his manner was irritating. 0 In turn, Anderson's comments - originally in a series of articles in Blackwood's Magazine and at a time when Lushington was safely dead - were described as spiteful and offensive by the Home Secretary, Churchill. in the debate they occasioned following the fury they provoked amongst Irish MPs because of what the articles purported also to reveal 
about events at the time of the Parnell tribunal in the late 1880s. See Hansard, Commons, 21 April, 
1910, cols. 2355-2360. 
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prisons were not remarkable or unusual: their story was one of many episodes In the 
growth of central government in Britain. 67 
The points about collegial behaviour are obviously well taken. This can be 
observed especially in the greater closeness between the Receiver and Home 
Office officials from Pennefather onwards. They felt, perhaps, that they were of the 
same flesh. How much closer must this feeling have been when in Moylan (and his 
successors) there was an even closer shared background of education, clerkly 
experience, and status. It was significant, for example, that Troup could assume 
automatically that Moylan would voice the uright" arguments in favour of the form of 
Home Office control that had evolved when it was challenged by Horwood. 
On the other hand, the model of what occurred in respect of the Prison 
Commission does not seem to apply in every respect to the Metropolitan police. 
No-one challenged the operational authority and autonomy of the Commissioner as 
Du Cane's authority (or, rather, his interpretation of his authority) was challenged. 
The situations were not the same. Police actions were directly subject to the 
oversight of the courts: persons arrested had to be charged or released, and if not 
released had to be brought before the courts. In comparison with the prison 
service, the police operated in a relatively open environment, and the Home 
Secretary's accountability was only indirectly operational. (There were problems 
about how that accountability should function in the case of complaints against the 
police, and that is the subject of Chapter 5 below. ) But in the case of prisons the 
67 McConville, S., op. cit, pp. 524 and 528. 
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Home Secretary was responsible and accountable for operations as well as 
funding. 
Outside London it was clear that the Home Secretary was part of a loosely 
articulated tripartite system of responsibility with chief constables and police 
authorities, and a system, moreover, where he retained considerable freedom of 
manoeuvre. Inside London, and in the absence of a local police authority, the roles 
were distributed differently'. the Home Secretary was police authority as well as the 
minister responsible to Parliament for policing in general. The Oshortage of agency, 
which had led to the invention of the Receiver meant that, since he was closer to 
the Commissioner than the Home Office itself let alone the Home Secretary could 
be, the office became a surrogate police authority, at first implicitly and then 
gradually with greater explicitness as the roles became more exactly identified and 
expressed. Personality was, of course, as important then as now. But it did not 
determine function: it merely influenced behaviour. Significantly, the two 
Commissioners who had had high level government experience - Bradford and 
Henry - never came into conflict with the Receiver's functions but, rather, found 
ways of working with them. 68 
Behind everything from the late nineteenth century was another important factor 
68 There is, of course, a sense in which no organisational structure, whatever its formal deficiencies, 
cannot be made to work. It is true, too. on the other hand that Bradford experienced some initial 
difficulty in getting on with Lushington and Matthews rather than the Receiver. See Johnson, N. E., 
op. cit., p. 776. and Buckle. G. E., op. cit, p. 623 for discussions between ministers about Bradford 
and the Prime Ministers' interview with the Queen. 
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urged by officials. This was that legislation to address the constitutional balance of 
the 1829 settlement was not going to be welcomed by Home Secretaries, 
regardless of political persuasion. The reason was that, after 1888, it would have 
meant risking the whole question of London County Council (LCC) control since it 
would have been possible to amend any Bill introduced on the subject. That was 
why in 1922-3 Anderson was prepared to consider almost any readjustment of 
roles between the Commissioner and Receiver short of legislation. But there had 
always been a predisposition against further legislation which antedated the LCC- 
The 1829 Act had been brought to life in very special circumstances, and, short of 
a deliberate decision on the part of government to concede the position the Act had 
created, there was a great reluctance to attempt to revisit the settlement. And in 
fact it was revisited only in such circumstances in the Greater London Authority Act 
1999. 
Finally, however, the conflicts that occurred showed not only the struggles and 
rivalries of strong-minded men but also the fact that the very absence of any 
settled view of their relationships was itself at the root of the conflict. The only 
model available to Peel in 1829 was that of the Police Offices and their small 
forces. Whilst this sufficed for the early years, the force itself outgrew these 
institutions, and the struggles signify the ways in which those institutions were 
gradually reinterpreted. Although it may now seem difficult to understand the 
viewpoint, throughout the period the Metropolitan police was regarded quite 
explicitly as a sub-department of the Home Office. This was asserted in such 
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formal statements as successive editions of Pbwers and Duties of the Rincipal 
Secretaty of State for the Home Department and in the printed Home Office Lists 
which included the Commissioners, Assistant Commissioners, Receivers and the 
clerks of both alongside Home Office officials-69 What required reinterpretation was 
how exactly the relationship was to operate as the force and its income grew. 
The Receiver came to occupy a place at the centre of the relationship in ways not 
originally anticipated, and that was why the post was in the end captured by Home 
Office officials. 70 Their presence ministered to a queasy Home Office realisation (at 
least at official level) that its sub-department was always in danger of getting out of 
control. The Home Office relied on persons because it possessed few techniques 
(for example, project appraisal systems) for obtaining recalcitrant Commissioner 
compliance, especially when Commissioners became major public figures and 
could always go over the head of officials to the Home Secretary. Such techniques 
as it had depended on requiring Commissioners to submit expenditure proposals, 
including of a trivial kind, to underline their ultimate dependence. Many of the 
exchanges were entirely formal and automatic. But their merits were not the point: 
69 See also Pellew, op. cit., pp. 48-49. 70 It was also why, incidentally, it was thrown open to outside recruitment in the I 990s when there had in effect been a decision to relinquish the Home Office role as police authority for London, and 
techniques of central government control over local, including police, expenditure had become more 
comprehensive. The successful applicant and the last Receiver, came from the then Department of 
the Environment, the Whitehall department responsible for the control of local government finance. 
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rather, it was that they were to be insisted upon at times almost for their own 
sake. 71 To say, as Lushington maintained in 1888 (see above), that Treasury 
forbearance depended on the existence of the Receiver who was a Home Office 
official, was to rewrite history. On the other hand, a new theology was necessary to 
give continuing life to the ancient, limited and - it was thought - unalterable 
scripture of the 1829 Act. 
71 The issue was debated from time to time. For example, Mayne tried to simplify references in 1848/9 (HO 45/9473IA48043B) and even the Receiver took initiatives in 1884/5 (HO 45/9643/A35638). However, although Lushington expressed sympathy for the latter, both it and an initiative within the Home Office in 1896 came to nothing because the form was preferred in the end to the substance. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FUNDING THE FORCE 
This chapter examines how the force was financed. It will show how initial 
subterfuge and dissimulation in 1829 became unsustainable; how the ensuing 
adjustment prefigured the larger central/local partnership established from 1856; 
how government control in London fostered low-visibility, low profile spending 
policies partly because it lacked municipal and electoral legitimacy; and how 
unsophisticated funding practices persisted beyond initial attempts to address 
them. Control by the executive meant a certain nervy authoritarianism which 
yielded more in the end to police pressure than it conceded to municipal control 
since the former pressed more effectively than the latter. 
Summary of developments to 1860 
By 1860, the position was as follows. Except for the salaries of the Commissioners 
and the Receiver together with some other small contributions paid out of the 
Consolidated Fund, what had started as an entirely rate bome service statutorily 
limited to maximum expenditure equal to a rate of 8d in the pound had, since an 
Act of 1833 (3&4 Wm. IV c. 89), benefited from annual Treasury contributions 
explicitly in support of the local rate. Between 1833 and 1857 these contributions 
had been capped at E60,000 per annum (worth roughly a 2d rate Le. 25% of the 
total) and conditional on the Receiver being able to demonstrate each quarter that 
the parochial share of 6d in the pound had been realised. In 1857 the regime 
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introduced under the 1856 Act (19&20 Vict. c. xx) which created provincial 
compulsion for policing with a state subvention of one quarter of local costs, was 
applied equally to the Metropolitan force the following year in the Metropolitan 
Police Act 1857 (20&21 Vict. c. 64). 
The sinews of funding: dependence on the rates 
Collecting the rate was no easy or smooth process, and the ultimate sanction for 
much of the period consisted of taking personal proceedings against overseers 
whose returns had fallen short. In the years immediately following the 1829 Act, 
there were many ratepayer complaints about the cost, and petitions were 
presented to Parliament both on that point and coupled with demands that some 
form of local control of policing should be returned. So far as possible, the 
government encouraged the Commissioners to obfuscate the issues by 
deliberately creating a divisional organisation that cut across parochial boundaries, 
and publicly justifying the situation where equal rates did not lead to equal 
deployment. ' There was also actual parochial resistance 
to the rate both by attempting to falsify valuations (against which eventuality 
section 28 of the 1829 Act provided strong inspection powers) and refusal, 
Mayne defended such outcomes throughout his term. In 1853, he replied to complaints from St 
James's: 'In some measure the richer Parishes contribute towards the Police of the poorer, whilst in 
return the rich Parishes have the benefit of the increased protection given to the person and 
property within them, by the observation kept by the Police on the criminal and disorderly characters 
in all parts of the District (Letter of 15 August, 1853, on HO 45/4620. ) Similarly, he maintained that 
position to Padiament in 1863: wThe number of Police actually on duty at any particular place gives 
a very imperfect and erroneous notion of the protection of the place by the Police. The advantages 
of a combined system of Police are to be estimated by the efficiency of the Police at all places from 
which the criminals may come to perpetrate crime at any other place. n Return printed 30 June, 1863, Metropolitan Police (Finsbury), PP 1863, Vol. L Speaking in 1868, his rationalization was that 
Divisions could not be made coterminous with local authority areas because the sizes of the lafter 
were too various. See 1868 Report, Evidence, p. 4. 
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delay or in some cases real difficulty in paying. 
The need for working balances in the case of a weekly paid force meant that 
shortfalls could not be carried and there was relatively early recourse to Treasury 
interest free loans to fund cash flow. When in 1832 Marylebone refused to pay over 
the final instalment of the rate and tried to encourage other parishes to act likewise, 
the Receiver sought and obtained a loan of E5000, though the Treasury reminded 
the Home Office that an earlier loan of EI 0,000 from February 1830 advanced 
purely for cash flow reasons remained outstanding. They had to remind the Home 
Office again three months later that it had not been repaid, at which point, following 
a stiff Home Office letter, the Receiver retumed E5000 to the Treasury. 3 
Although it became preoccupied with the question of Parliamentary reform, it is 
known that there was also a discussion about policing policy within the Whig 
government that came into office in November 1830. Indeed, the Kng's Speech at 
the beginning of the 1831 Session said that it was intended to reform 
2 See HO 61/2 for correspondence in Autumn 1830, especially Wray's letters of 20 September, 
1830, requesting a Treasury loan and of 14 October, 1830, welcoming the prospect of payment by instalment as opposed to Irregular payments but advising that rate warrants should issue six 
monthly in order to reduce agitation. 3 1-1061R, letters of 10 and 13 October, 1832, and 10 and 23 January, 1833. 
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municipal policing in the light of the disturbances in Bristol and elsewhere. 4 In 
an earlier debate in June 1830, London MPs had voiced the complaints of 
constituents about swingeing increases in police rates, in one case allegedly from 
5 E5000 a year to E17,000. Such complaints continued into 1832 and 1833. Inthe 
absence of evident action by the government following the undertaking in the King' 
Speech, Grey and his ministers were pursued about just what their plans were. 
Peel raised the matter at least four times in the Commons from December 1831 up 
to July 1832 when, on its becoming apparent that the government had decided not 
to legislate, he pressed for the appointment of a Select Committee. The Home 
Secretary, Melbourne, was challenged in the Lords by Lord Ellenborough in 
January 1832 alleging that the government had included a measure in the King's 
Speech about which they had not in fact made up their minds. 6 
From Melbourne's gObservations* of May 1832 on a draft policing Bi117' it is known 
that the discussion within government included consideration of what expedients 
might be available, and how the best course might be made palatable politically. 
Melbourne favoured a scheme which, like the 1829 solution in London, rested on 
the appointment of stipendiary magistrates in a scheme of discretionary 
compulsion by the government, but the results always to be funded from the rates. 
It is known that the question of government subvention was raised but rejected on 
4 Hansard, Lords, 6 December, 1831, cols 1-5. See also Phillips, D. and Storch, R. D., "Whigs and Coppers: The Grey Ministry's National Police Scheme, 1832'. Histodcal Research . 1994, pp. 75- 90. 
5 Hansard, Commons, 15 June. 1 830, cols. 355-364. Complaints in respect of St Marylebone (24 July 1832, col. 670, and Christ Church, Surrey, on 27 March, 1833, cols. 1138-1140. 6 Hansard, Commons, 9 December, 1831, col. 143; 1 February, 1832, col. 1097; 7 March, 1832, 
Col. 1234; 25 July, 1832, col. 720. Lords: 27 January, 1832, cols. 973-4. 7 Philips and Storch, op. cit, pp. 87-90. 
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grounds of principle and practicability, for example because subsidy would be a 
disincentive to ratepayers paying up in full. 
Once a national scheme had been rejected, however, London could be seen as a 
limited and discrete problem. It seems that this led Melbourne to consider what 
were the options should it be decided not to insist on using the rates alone to 
provide the statutory maximum expenditure of 8d in the pound. In March 1833, for 
example, the Receiver laid out some of the options to the Home Office against a 
background where the parishes were seeking to lower valuations in order to avoid 
the full incidence of police rate. 8 A rate of 2d in the pound raised about E51,500 
and annual expenditure ran at E206,000. A reduction to 6d in the pound would 
leave a deficiency of E60,000 though at the same time mean - according to his 
calculations - the parishes paying less than before 1829 and therefore remove all 
cause of legitimate complaint. In addition, where the statutory maximum rate was 
left at 8d in the pound, the incentive for the parishes to lower valuations would be 
removed. He concluded that the solution would be to find a permanent subvention 
of E60,000 a year. At the same time, however, he was anxious that no grant should 
be forthcoming in a way which removed incentives to pay the rates themselves. 
Matters came to a head shortly afterwards in 1833. The Receiver reported that St 
Matthev/s Parish, Bethnal Green, was in default. Under the 1829 Act, the 
8 HO 61/8, letter of 25 March, 1833. The government in fact adopted this scheme in their August Bill 
- see below. 
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next step in theory was for the Commissioners to distrain against the overseers, 
and Mayne asked the Home Office to confirm whether they wanted that step 
taken. 9 Shortly afterwards, on 12 May 1833, PC Robert Culley was 
stabbed to death at the Cold Bath Fields riot. The disorderly inquest and its 
perverse findings that followed, together with an awkward Select Committee 
examination, would have emphasized an imperative of ensuring that the force 
could continue to cope with the problems of public order which was in the first and 
the last analysis its raison d'dtre. Clearly, at that stage matters went to the political 
level and would have been discussed during the summer. 
Right at the end of that summers Session, a Bill was introduced in August to 
authorise a subsidy no greater than E60,000 a year from the Consolidated Fund 
with the effect of reducing the rate to 6d in the pound. Its apparently hasty 
introduction belied the extent to which ministers had been prepared by previous 
discussions for the policy change. The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Althorp) 
explained *.. the peace of the metropolis being of the utmost importance to the 
country at large, and the police being made available in various parts of the 
country, as well as in the metropolis, he thought it not unfair that a small proportion 
of the expense should be borne by the country at large. "o There was some 
resistance to an exclusively metropolitan subsidy - one MID remarked that one 
might as well get the Northern counties to pay towards Manchester and Liverpool. 
Other MPs, however, likened the police to the Guards or regarded 
9 HO 61/8, letter of 16 April, 1833. 10 Hansard, Commons, 8 August, 1833, col. 438. 
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the police as a national force which should therefore be paid for by the nation at 
large. Althorp's Financial Secretary, Spring-Rice, made the point that the proposal 
was precedented in the financial arrangements for the Irish Constabulary, a rather 
different case but, interestingly, one thought by Ministers to be relevant and 
indicative therefore of the government's preoccupation with public order. The 
House was divided; the government prevailed 49: 19; and the Bill became law on 
28 August. 
Just as they perhaps had tipped the balance in 1829, it was more evidently on this 
occasion the public order considerations which were decisive. If the government 
wished to perpetuate control by the executive in London, they were going to have 
to pay for it. " Even though an attempt was made to dress it up as a beneficent 
gesture, no-one seems to have been deceived at the time. For example, the Times 
reported a "numerous and highly respectable meeting of the vestrymen" of St 
George's Parish where one speaker - with perhaps a degree of conspiracy 
paranoia - referred to the subsidy: "This was a mere trick; E60,000 had been drawn 
from the consolidated fund to give it the character of a national police, and shut out 
the people, if possible, from any voice in the matter. *12 It was also evident that the 
1180 years later, the Home Office in its evidence to the Committee on Local Taxation offered a 
rather different explanation: 813eyond the words .. [in].. the preamble to the Act, there is nothing to indicate the reason for the grant, but it has been generally taken that it was conceded on the ground 
of the services of the Metropolitan Police to the Government. 2 Memorandum of April 1912 in Report 
of the Departmental Committee on Local Taxation, Cd 7315,1914. This could only mean that the 
history had not in fact been researched. It is also very likely that the Home Office preferred an 
explanation apt to protect the philosophy upon which the Olmpedal* contribution of the 1909 Act - see below - was based. 12 Times, 10 October, 1833, p. 3. 
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subsidy did not entirely remove complaints about the cost of the force. 13 What it 
certainly did do, however, was make the arrangement easier to defend. 
At the same time, the government was careful to ensure - as the Receiver had 
advised - that the form of subsidy preserved incentives rather than removed them. 
Thus, the 1833 Act had not only recognised the extent of local burdens 
at a time when there was no London equalization scheme (one was not created 
until 1894) but was also careful to cast the manner of giving help in a form which 
gave an incentive to parishes to pay up their share in full. The Receiver had to 
precept on a large number of local authorities of varying size and sophistication 
who were resistant to revaluation at a time of rapid urban growth but whose effects 
- more houses, more people, more traffic - were felt immediately by the police. 
The national significance of the 1833 Act seems to have been overlooked by 
histodanS. 14 In Great Britain a case may be made for viewing it as the first occasion 
on which what had hitherto been regarded as a local responsibility was subsidized 
from general taxation. 15 Whilst other examples followed in the criminal justice area 
from 1835 in respect of prosecution and prisoner costs and they are pointed out - 
13 See Times account of St James's meeting on 24 October,. 1 833. 14 For example, the truncated account of the genesis of the Act in Palmer, S., op., cit., p. 308. Henry 
Parris, on the other hand, noted Althorp's subsequent assertion of the principle to Melbourne in 
September 1833 but without apparently being aware that it had been implemented. (Althorp was 
aware that a precedent had been established and it was only the shortage of funds that he 
considered restrained expenditure of which he approved in a situation where the government was, 
he thought, too often constrained in targeting subjects for optimum return. ) See Parris, H., Constitutional Bureaucracy, Allen and Unwin, 1969, p. 206, quoting a letter from Althorp to 
Melbourne on 30 September, 1833. '5 It has been claimed that the government made a contribution to the cost of the Metropolitan 
Police from 1829, but that Is incorrect - see Smellie, KB., A Histoty of English Local Govemment, Allen and Unwin, 1957, p. 54. 
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rightly - as the first national subsidies, 16 1833 saw the original step change. In the 
criminal justice area at least, 1833 can in retrospect be identified as the moment at 
which the hitherto more limited post-Hanoverian state took a decisive step to insist 
on a centrally defined standard of performance. It sought to maintain its influence 
and at the same time buy off local resistance. Thereafter, national and local finance 
became intertwined and the latter became increasingly dependent on the former. 
This signified both a change in the Executive's conception of its role and fed new 
expectations of what that role should aim to achieve. Whereas formerly the state's 
principal functions were seen to rest in the conduct of foreign affairs, the 
maintenance of the currency and public credit, and last resort preserver of public 
order, this small, artfully constructed piece of legislation saw the Executive 
accepting a wider responsibility: 'For the next 30 years, police and the 
administration of justice were the main grant-aided serviceS. n17 
It did not, of course, immediately lead to extending similar funding regimes to other 
towns or to counties. Neither the Municipal Corporations Act 1835 which required 
the formation of police forces in towns or the 1839 Act which permitted their 
establishment in counties conceded any element of central funding. That 
had, however, to be conceded as the price of compulsion in the Act of 1856. 
Is OThe first substantial government grants to local authorities originated in a calculation that the 
cost of providing public services from which all benefited incalculably .... could not equitably be the unaided responsibility of a comparatively small section of society, in that instance the owners of real 
property. " Baugh, G. C., OGovemment grants in aid of the rates in England and Wales 1889-1990", Historical Rese=h, 1992, p. 216. 17 Foster, C. D., Jackman, RA, Perlman, M., Local Government Finance in a Unitary State, Allen 
and Unwin, 1980, p. 173. 
131 
Looking back we can now understand where this change of funding policy led: the 
need for local funding for expanded services to be based on new resources of 
national taxation and the consequent erosion of local autonomy. In their own way, 
the Metropolitan parishes understood the drift well enough. However, in 1833, the 
more developed effects of such changes were still a long way off, and rates 
remained until the First World War the most important taxes on personal wealth. 18 
Maximising the rate 
It was the latter fact that made Receivers and the Home Office especially vigilant 
over the rating base. To ensure a more exact correspondence between the growth 
of demand for policing in the expanding city and the taxation base, section 11 of 
the Metropolitan Police Act 1857 permitted annual revaluations for the purpose of 
police rating as opposed to remaining dependent on the normal quinquennial 
reviews; and section 12 therefore empowered the Receiver to require overseers to 
make returns of every new house and building erected in the previous twelve 
months. The process was subject to inspection by the Receiver, and made 
neglectful overseers liable to conviction and fines. 
The effects of the Act may be seen in a Parliamentary Return of 1863. This 
required information for each of the 210 parishes in terms of increased valuations 
since the last county revaluation and the consequences in terms of increases in 
police rate and Consolidated Fund contributions. 19 What it demonstrated were a 
181bid, p. 160. As late as 1913/14, rates raised E82 million and income tax only E44 million. 19 PP 1863, Vol. L, Metropolitan Rates, Return to an Address dated 22 June, 1863. 
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number of substantial growths in rateable value (for example, in Poplar, Bromley, 
Kensington, Ham and Paddington) which would not ordinarily have been captured 
for police rate purposes within quinquennia. But more important in aggregate was 
the effect of accessing regular incremental growth in police rate value across the 
whole metropolis. At a time when London was still growing rapidly, the Act 
ensured that the Metropolitan police's finances were hotwired directly into that 
growth. 
Throughout the period there was no atom of local influence, let alone control, over 
how the force was managed, and this naturally continued to be a source of local 
grievance, if still within a system that could hardly be described as democratic. This 
discontent in turn led to government being reluctant to venture on expenditure 
which could be seen as leading to rate increases lest government control became 
seriously challenged in Parliament. In the 1860s, police expenditure was a very 
visible part of total local London taxation, for example 10% of the total in 186314 
and slightly ahead of the Metropolitan Board of Works, and over 12% in 1867/8 
and 1873/4. Later, as new forms of local expenditure (especially on education) 
developed, the overall proportion fell, though even in 1899/1900 it was as much as 
6% of a very much larger total for London. In other words, far from encouraging 
profligacy, direct government control led - perversely it might now seem - to caution 
and parsimony. 
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In turn, this trend has to be understood in a context where public finance was 
regarded in a quite different way from the dominant welfarism of today. The 
connexion between parsimony and legitimacy has already been noted in Chapter 1 
in assessing the impact of Economical Reform. But those changes need also to be 
understood in the context of larger transformations of the character of the British 
state. It has been pointed out that the sharp fall in public expenditure from the very 
high levels of the Napoleonic wars -a reduction of 25% in real terms in the two 
decades after Waterloo - may be understood as representing the transition from 
the ufiscal-military" state of the eighteenth century to the very different kind of state 
that followed. Per capita spending fell from a high of E4.86 in 1811 to slightly under 
E2 in 1841 and to E2 in 1851.20 Another way of explaining the change is that there 
were no bids for the money no longer needed for an enormous defence effort. 
Central government did not have the apparatus, or local government the will or 
competence, to take on the kind of welfare expenditure that might have been 
analogous to the high levels of state spending sustained after 1945: "There was no 
effective or politically acceptable way of using the higher levels of taxation 
accepted during the [Napoleonic] wars for peaceful purposes. n2l 
The Taylor thesis 
In a series of three articles, Howard Taylor has offered an alternative reading of 
these issues. Arguing principally from the available statistics of crime, he has 
maintained that from at least the 1850s supply was deliberately manipulated by the 
20 Harting, P. and Mandler, P., "From 'Fiscal-Milftary State to Laissez- faire State, 1760-1850", 
Joumal of British Studies, January 1993, pp. 44-70. 21 Foster, Jackman and Perlman. op. cit., p. 82. 
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executive and its agencies to control the outputs of the criminal justice system and 
thus hide the true incidence of crime22. As he put it in his Economic Histoty Review 
article "the crime statistics largely reflected supply side policies. " If true, what 
appears as politically sanctioned parsimony becomes in fact something altogether 
different. 
Although Howard Taylors approach has usefully challenged some traditional 
assumptions, it has been argued in reply that not only was it beyond the resources 
of the state to encompass what was alleged but also that there are adequate 
alternative explanations for the phenomena observed. 23 Although the work of 
Professor Dauntor ?4 was not available at the time of the discussion, it offers further 
refutation in the form of a convincing policy framework for explaining why 
Metropolitan police funding practices and criminal justice expenditure generally 
took the form that they did. Moreover, as discussed below under "The Daunton 
thesis", the analysis also helps to explain the change in 
funding practices that occurred at the turn of the nineteenth century whereas the 
Taylor thesis, which assumes a constant practice, does not. Indeed, it could be 
maintained that the Taylor thesis mistakes an effect (parsimony) for the cause of 
22 Taylor, H., gRationing Crime: the political economy of the criminal statistics since the 1850s", 
Economic History Review, 1998, pp. 569-590; NThe politics of the rising crime statistics of England 
and Wales, 1914-1960", CrimeMistoire et Soci6ffislCrirne, History and Society 1998, pp. 5-28; 
; Forging the job", Wish Journal of Criminology, 1999, pp. 113-135. 3 MorTis, R. M., *'Ues, damned lies and criminal statistics: Reinterpreting the criminal statistics in 
England and Wales", Crime, Histolre et Socidt6s/Cfime, History and Society, 2001, pp. 111-127. 24 Daunton, M, Trusting Leviathan: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1799-1914, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2001. 
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financial policies much more deeply rooted in contemporary political processes 
than the thesis allows. 
The effects of financial policy 
What did all this mean for Metropolitan police financial practice? First, there were 
no borrowings and nothing in the way of a funded capital programme. All capital 
expenditure was financed directly from income. It followed that the force's 
headquarters remained no more than a series of indifferently appointed rooms in 
Whitehall Place. There was no training school or other central facilities. The 
stations were an agglomeration of old watch sites and hirings on often relatively 
short leases. Although adapted for police use, none was built specifically for police 
purposes until 1846 and then on a rudimentary basis. 25 Married quarters and 
accommodation for single men were scattered adventitiously across this random 
estate. Although it would be anachronistic to be dismissive of accommodation that 
was unlikely often to have fallen below customary standards of the day, the 
financial point was that all had been acquired from, and was paid out of, current 
monies. The result was that, because the current costs were not spread over and 
paid for during a longer period, the past ratepayer paid for what his successors 
enjoyed. 
25 a ... such stations as were erected in the first fifty years were usually rather mean and incommodious structures of the cheapest yellow brick. ' Moylan, op. cit., p. 317. An officer who 
joined in 1855 mentioned that the PCs'dormitory for 40 men was over the cells - Cavanagh, T. A., Scotland Yard Past and Present, Chatto, 1892. 
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Consciousness of this effect was another inhibiting factor in addition to the instilled 
parsimony of the political climate. Looking back in 1889, Lushington recalled "for a 
long while in the history of the force building operations were stinted: stations 
which were required were not built, and those that were built were of inferior quality 
from want of funds and other reasons. "2" 
The drawbacks of this regime were fully recognised at the time. For example, the 
Metropolitan Police Act 1857 included elaborate provisions enabling the Receiver 
to raise loans for building police stations and for obtaining advances from the 
Public Works Loan Commissioners. In practice, however, these provisions were 
never used and the Act is more significant in retrospect for what it did in connexion 
with pensions -a separate but extremely important and influential strand in the 
development of police financing. Indeed, although capital expenditure rose from a 
low of E4774 in 1857 to E10,559 in 1858, it returned to customary levels of 
between E7500 and E8500 in 1859 and 1860 - the rate which had in practice 
obtained, of course, over the two years 1857-8. The deficiency on pensions, 
however, rose from E24,000 in 1857 to nearly E40,000 in 1860 and kept on rising 
thereafter. 
In addition, the 1857 Bill proceedings, like those in the case of the 1833 Act, are 
instructive of the legislature's performance. The First and Second Readings of 
the Bill on 6 and 7 July were alike purely formal. At the Third Reading deferred 
26 MEPO 5/281, memorandum of 16 February, 1889. 
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on 7 August, an MP objected in the early hours (it was 3 a. m. ) that the House was 
still to receive any explanation of what the Bill was for. 27 Massey, the Home Office 
Parliamentary Under Secretary, thereupon offered a perfunctory summary: 
Mr Massey said, it was a mere departmental Bill to give powers to borrow money for 
building stations; and a portion of the Bill was to put a portion of the expense of the police, 
so far as it was used for general rather than mere metropolitan purposes, on the 
Consolidated Fund. A contribution of E60,000 had hitherto been made from the 
Consolidated Fund, but the present Bill was to put an additional proportion not exceeding 
one fourth of these expenses on the Consolidated Fund. A third power was to give power to 
lay rates on suburban properties as an equivalent for the protection they enjoyed, and 
provisions to make up the deficiency in the supplementary [sic] fund. 28 
There was no further debate in the Commons and none at all in the Lords before 
Royal Assent on 25 August. It was simply one of the Bills that the government had 
rushed through at the end of the session. Its merits were at no time debated, and 
the implications of the throwaway line about the supplementary fund's deficiency 
(the superannuation fund was in fact meant) seems to have been entirely 
unnoticed by a legislature which, in theory, could exercise detailed control over the 
Metropolitan police not only by calling the Home Secretary to account but also by 
the need for all changes in the funding and senior structures of the force to require 
primary legislation. 
27 Hansard, Commons, 7 August, 1857, cols. 1207-8. The objector was Acton Ayrton, MP for Tower Hamlets 1857-74. He developed a considerable interest in the reform of London government. See Appendix C for biographical note. 28 [bid, col. 1208. 
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Although the 1857 Act gave borrowing powers (up to E60,000 and for a limited 
period of 30 years) to the Receiver for the first time, they were not used. One of the 
difficulties the Act had to circumvent was that, until the office of Receiver was given 
a continuous legal personality in 1861, there could have been a reluctance both on 
his part and that of lenders to enter into agreements which depended on his 
personal position. That was because his responsibilities remained personal to the 
occupant of the office itself. An untimely demise was not an unlikely possibility 
since, in 1857, Wray was already 75 years of age. The Act dealt with this by simply 
guaranteeing that loans would be backed by the police rate. 
Whilst at first blush it might seem that it could have been the indolence of Wray's 
successor - not apparently the most energetic or resourceful of men - that led to 
inaction, the fact is that the 1857 Act's success in improving police rate outcomes 
meant that there was not thought to be any pressing case for borrowing. 29 The 
result was that funding continued for all purposes to be found from current 
expenditure for nearly another 30 years. 
Interestingly, one of the provisions of the Act was a clause which directed that the 
overseers should pay the police rate directly to the Receiver's account at 
29 oln 1860, on the suggestion of Mr Golden the Chief Clerk of the Department, I adopted, for the 
first time, the practice of revising the Police Rental annually ... looking at the elasticity of our income 
... I believe that the Money will be forthcoming to meet the outlay for new Stations, without resorting to the borrowing powers of the Act of Padiament. " HO 45/7051/7, Drummond to Home Office 25 
February, 1864. In the same letter, Drummond calculated that the resulting net addition to rateable 
value as a result of action under the 1857 Act amounted to El 54,510.17.6d. 
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the Bank of England. Formerly, the rate had to be paid to the Receiver who was 
then obliged to pay it in to the Bank. It will be recalled that Wray's failure to deposit 
sums received straight into the Bank of England account had been one of the 
reasons he had been harried in the 1840s by the Home Secretary (Graham). 
Wray's excuse had been that he received the money often in dribs and drabs via 
sometimes illiterate carters sent by overseers carrying the money in coins. That 
was why he had developed the habit of depositing the monies at least temporarily 
in an unauthorized, private account with Drummonds Bank on the corner of 
Whitehall and Trafalgar Square, from which also it was convenient to draw pay for 
distribution by the Superintendents in the exact cash quantities required. 30 For 
Wray not only was it convenient but perhaps also, although the possibility is not 
mentioned in contemporary papers, not without personal financial advantage. 
Pensions 
The question of police pensions during the nineteenth century is usually presented 
as a saga where a niggardly discretionary system which held the service in thrall 
was eventually and triumphantly transformed after heroic campaigning into a rights 
system within which the service was freed from the whims of oppressive chief 
officers and police authorities. There is, of course, some truth in that perspective, 
although it does not represent by any means the whole story. For one thing, the 
perspective s to address the fact that serious funding problems had to be faced. 
30 See Wray's letter of 19 October, 1846, and Anderson's report of 25 April, 1843, on HO 45/109. 
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Whereas section 12 of the 1829 Act had allowed vaguely for pensions, it had 
prescribed no means. Sections 22 and 23 of the 1839 Act laid down that they 
should be funded from pay deductions of not more than 2.5%, together with 
assistance from a miscellany of other sources such as sickness stoppages, the 
product of magisterial fines for drunkenness and assaults on the police, and 
monies from the sale of worn or cast police clothing. The pensions themselves 
were on a sliding scale: 50% for 15-20 years service, and 66% thereafter, provided 
in all cases under the age of 60 the Commissioner certified that the officer was 
Incapable from infirmity of mind or body to discharge the duties of his office". 
As the force grew and aged, demand upon the Superannuation Fund also grew. 
The "infirmity" rule became routinised into permitting officers to go on pension at 15 
years. The fund fell into deficit, and the significance of the final provision of the 
1857 Act to which Massey had referred so brusquely was that it legalised the 
practice of defraying the deficit from the Metropolitan Police Fund itself. The deficit 
for 1857 was F-24,366, and the cumulative deficit El 27,878 . 
31 The annual deficit 
continued to grow (it was nearly E40,000 by 1860) and the Home Secretary 
ordered a review undertaken by William Farr, the statistician, who reported in 1862. 
32The outcome was a less generous scale based on fiftieths rather than thirtieths 
31 Accounts 1856, PP 1856/7, Vol. XLVII- 
32 H045 7374, OReport on the Metropolitan Police Superannuation Fund", 31 March, 1862. 'If these 
men were wholly worn out, and their lives cut short by the service, they would remain in the Force 
only a short time; but as they break down suddenly in given years, they as suddenly recover, so 
that their rate of mortality, though higher than that of men in the country, is lower than the mortality 
of men in London at the corresponding ages. ' 
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for years of service and no guarantee of life long payment before the age of 60. 
These changes contained the deficit but did not end it. 
The subsequent development of police pensions owed as much to provincial as 
purely Metropolitan pressures and, significantly, discussion moved also into 
Parliament, though after much internal discussion in the Home Office with the 
Commissioner and the police Inspectorate. 33 There was an inconclusive Select 
Committee in 1875 and a later Select Committee of 1877 which recommended the 
general application of the Metropolitan scale. 34 Bills were introduced in successive 
years from 1881 to 1885 but made no progress. 35 
There were two reasons for the impasse - the absence of complete agreement on 
the detailed content of a pension scheme, and positive disagreement about 
funding. It has to be recalled that, throughout the period, there was great concern 
about the increasing burdens put upon local taxation and, in particular, the extent 
to which that source funded criminal justice expenditure. The Conservative 
government from 1874 had come in pledged to relieve local burdens following the 
Parliamentary concern that had developed over the way rates had doubled during 
1841-1868. It had swiftly moved (the Police Expenses Act 1874) to increase 
support for police expenditure from 25% to 50%; it made considerably more 
33 H045 9333/19774,19774D and H045 9516/19774E for discussion including on successive 
Select Committee reports and the abortive Private Member Bills up to 1885. 34 Reports respectively of 23 July, 1875, and 13 April, 1877 at PP 1875, Vol. XIII and PP 1877, Vol. 
Xv. 
35 The full history was summarised in Memorandum in Explanation of the Police Bill 1890, C. 6065, 
June 1890. 
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generous and automatic contribution to prosecution costs than hitherto; and it 
removed local prisons entirely from local charge in 1877. What prevented police 
pension measures making progress was an unresolved concern about where the 
costs should fall between local and central finance. 
So far as the Home Office was concerned, something certainly had to give. By 
1889, the proportion of officers staying on to full pension was twice that of 1862. 
Transfer into the superannuation fund was running at the level of a1d rate out of 
the maximum of the 9d then allowed. The Home Secretary appointed a committee 
under Lushington's chairmanship to examine Metropolitan pensions, but it sat for 
only two months when Monro, the Commissioner, resigned on the claimed basis 
that the Select Committee in 1877 and Harcourt in an 1881 speech at the 
Metropolitan and City Police Orphanage had promised enhanced pensions and he 
was unable, therefore, to contemplate anything less. 36 Funded schemes were by 
no means universally favoured. As the Town Clerk of Nottingham pointed out: in 
1890, "The hoarding of money for a future generation is imposing an unfair ... and a 
heavy burden upon the present ratepayers". 37 
The Police (Pensions) Act of that year was widely welcomed by the police 
service. But, in the specifically London context, one observer pointed out that 
"the remarkable feature throughout the very unsatisfactory discussions on this Bill 
was the absence of regard for the ratepayers and the pressure put upon the 
' See H045 9698/50055. The evidence taken between 28 October and 20 December, 1889, was 
? ublished as Departmental Committee on Metropolitan Police Superannuation, C. 6075, July 1890. 7 Letter, 2 July 1890, H045/9716/A51492. 
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Government to be more liberal at their expense. " The impact of enhanced pensions 
meant that the recent augmentation of 1000 men would require the Home 
Secretary to seek rate increases of 2d or 3d to meet their pension costs alone. In 
conclusion, it was argued that "the Government have obtained an unlimited power 
of rating London for police pensions; that the pensions of the police have been 
fixed on a most generous scale, at the cost of the ratepayers, by the imperial 
Parliament; and that questions of economy have not been discussed as they would 
have been if the management of the police had been really local, and if those who 
managed the police had had to find the money and pay the bill. " 38 
Moreover, although local government had benefited under the Local Government 
Act 1888 from transferred revenues of just under E3 million a year into a new Local 
Taxation Account, the Receiver pointed out that that sum was effectively inelastic 
whereas police pensions which fell to be charged against the Account most 
certainly were not. There was, therefore, a mechanism for increasing Metropolitan 
Police Fund payments from the Account but none for increasing the Account itself. 
This was bound to become a constant irritant to local authorities because they 
were unable to control an important source of their expenditure. 39 And, indeed, the 
arrangement did not even please London ratepayers. Concerned about the 
pressure on the London rates, the London Municipal Reform Society argued in 
38 Farrer, T. H., "Local Finance: The Police and Their Pensions", Contemporary Review, LVIII, 1890, 
p. 783. Thomas Farrer (1819-1899) was a former Permanent Under Secretary at the Board of Trade 
(1865-1886) and, at the time of writing this in a series of articles attacking Goschen's (the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer's) financial policy, was a member of the LCC. See also Appendix C for 
biographical note. 39 HO 395/1, Estimates letter 31 January, 1891. 
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anl 894 pamphlet that, although London had one fifth of the nation's rateable value, 
it received only one tenth of the aid given by the 1888 Act. 40 As one of the early 
academic historians of local finance pointed out, 
The extent of the victory of the rural counties in this settlement seems never to have been 
sufficiently grasped by politicians and commissions ... It would be difficult to devise a more 
atrocious jumble of finance. 41 
The rate cap 
From 1829, the maximum possible Metropolitan police expenditure had been 
specified by statute, and it followed that primary legislation was necessary to 
change it. The growth of London and, with it, the growth of the tax base gave the 
value of the rate a buoyant elasticity which allowed a fairly parsimonious regime to 
cope with ordinary growth to match the rising population. It could not cope easily, 
however, with uncovenanted leaps in cost. Although it managed for 
some years after the pension fund's insolvency had led to section 15 of the 1857 
Act allowing the pensions deficit to be a direct charge on the rate, the deficit 
continued to rise and deplete the operating margins. When it was decided in the 
wake of the Clerkenwell and initial Fenian troubles not only to raise pay in 1867 but 
also in 1868 to augment strength by 1000 men and 120 officers amongst other 
things to make a weekly rest day possible, the rate cap had to be raised. 
40 Hayter, L. H., Financial Relations between London and the Imperial Exchequer, published for the 
London Municipal Reform Society, 1894. 41 Cannan, E., The History of the Local Rates in England, King, 1912, pp. 146 and 149. 
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In his speech introducing the Metropolitan Police Funds Bill which raised the 
maximum expenditure from the product of 8d in the pound to 9d in the pound, the 
Conservative Home Secretary (Gathorne Hardy) minimised the apparent 
extravagance: despite the increase, there would be fewer police to population than 
in 1830; Metropolitan officers were still paid less than City officers; there had to be 
adequate provision for working balances to meet the cash flow demands of pay 
and pensions; the pensions deficit (MPs might have understood him to say the total 
costs of pensions) stood at nearly E60,000 and was likely to rise to El 00,000; and 
it was necessary to have extra buildings which were especially required for the 
married men. 42 
There was splenetic, but ineffective, objection from two London MPs, both Radicals 
and the Members respectively for Tower Hamlets and Marylebone. Both took a 
position of principle on the arbitrary character of the rating power, a position 
probably reinforced in the case of the Tower Hamlets constituency at least by its 
relative poverty. The first of the two, Ayrton (Tower Hamlets), thought no case had 
been made out. The second, Harvey Lewis (Marylebone)43, argued that reliance 
should be placed on the natural increase in rateable values: 
There was no rate imposed upon the Metropolis which the ratepayers so much objected to 
as the police rate, because they had no control over it, and they did not know how it was 
applied. All they had to do with it was pay it. 44 
42 Hansard, Commons, 29 June, 1868, cols. 343-5. 43 See Appendix C for biographical note. 44 Hansard, Commons, 29 June, 1868, cols. 347-9. 
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The Bill subsequently passed without further debate through all its remaining 
stages. 
Although it was the Conservatives who had increased the rate cap, on their return 
in 1874 they moved swiftly to mitigate its effects for the ratepayer. The Police 
Expenses Act 1874 (37&38 Vict. c. 58) removed the limitation on the Treasufy 
contribution which had stood effectively at 25% since 1833 in London and 
increased it to 50% of the pay and clothing for the provincial forces. How exactly 
the subvention was to be calculated for the Metropolitan police was not settled until 
1878 (at four ninths of the rate product) because, whilst the Treasury favoured 
basing their contribution on expenditure, the Home Office preferred basing it on the 
rate product -a different, more buoyant sum and one which avoided what would in 
fact have become Treasury control of the expenditure. 45 
For the remainder of the period, successive governments took pains to ensure that 
further increases of the rate were avoided if possible. Thus, in 1890, to ease the 
cost of the increased rates of pension awarded under the Police (Pensions) Act of 
that year, the government introduced (by means of the Local Taxation (Customs 
and Excise) Act 1890) a direct Exchequer contribution to superannuation funds of 
E300,000, half of it going to the Metropolitan police. This not only wiped out the 
then deficiency (E145,770, equal to a 0.99d rate) in the superannuation fund but 
also helped finance the concurrent augmentation of 1000 for which, Farrer pointed 
45 Powers and Duties of the Principal Secretary of State thr the Home Department, 1881, p. 142. 
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out, the Home Secretary had "had no funds until Mr Goschen [Chancellor of the 
Exchequer] came to his assistance with El 50,000 out of the drink duties. "r3 
The healthier balances persisted for some years to the point of criticism, but the 
measured and measurable tread of pensions got closer and closer. 47 A deficiency 
of El 2,400 in 1892, or a 0.08d rate, became El 20,800 (0.68d) in 1900, and 
F-228,300 (1.02d) in 1908. Projections showed the figures in 1910 as 
E275,000 and 1.1 9d respectively. The effect was severely to squeeze ordinary 
expenditure, most of which was unavoidable, and some of it (loan interest and 
repayment) absolutely committed. As the Receiver had foreseen, concern mounted 
in local authorities as their share of the Local Taxation Account became 
progressively diminished. 48 
The situation was examined in 1909 by a committee of officials from the Home 
Office and Scotland Yard chaired by Byrne, the Home Office Assistant Under 
Secretary responsible for police matters. It was pointed out that the Metropolitan 
Police Fund faced an overall deficit of E105,000. The closer margins exacerbated 
cash flow and increased temporary borrowings from the Bank of England. In 
addition, the rate product was becoming less buoyant - as the urbanisation of the 
police district matured, the rise in the rate product slowed. The committee 
46 Farrer, op cit , p. 783. 47 And the fact that police expenditure had first call on the Local Taxation Account, the Receiver 
pointed out, was not necessarily good news politically. Because there was no mechanism for 
increasing the money in that Account, OThe effect... will be continually to bring the subject of police 
expenditure before the various County Councils who have no voice in the management of the force 
whilst in an indirect way they contribute to its maintenance. " Estimates letter 31 January 1891 on 
HO 395/1. 
48 See LCC Memorandum to council members 2 July 1909, on MEPO 5/279. 
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examined but rejected greater resort to funded loans for building requirements on 
the basis that it was not an expedient capable of giving longer term relief. In its 
report in March 190949 it recommended a rate rise of 0.5d (estimated to produce 
about E105,000) as the only viable solution. Because raised under section 19 of 
the 1890 Act for remedying a pensions deficit, such an increase did not fall to be 
counted against the rate cap last varied in 1868, though its effect on the Local 
Taxation Account machinery of the 1888 Act was problematic. 
Whilst the case for additional funds was clear, the means of getting them was not 
necessarily cut and dried. The solution was ingenious. There was no rate increase 
but, rather, an increase in the Exchequer subvention, and in a form which was 
insulated from the need to offer similar support to provincial forces. By the Police 
Act 1909, the Home Secretary was empowered with Treasury approval to give an 
annual grant to the Metropolitan force for "imperial and national services". In the 
first year the sum was, perhaps not surprisingly, El 00,000 - at which it remained 
throughout the rest of the period. 50 Simultaneously, the 1909 Act neatly provided 
that any rate increase under the 1890 Act (to cover pensions deficiencies) was not 
to count for the purposes of the Local Taxation Account (now Exchequer 
Contribution Account) thus relieving the pressure that would otherwise arise on 
49 HO 347/23. 
50 This essentially judgemental total was reached after intense negotiations between the Home 
Office and the Treasury sought unsuccessfully to agree some objective basis for the ffiright' amount 
-see HO 45/24567/17444269A. 
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local authority expenditure supported by the Account. In this way, the collision 
foreseen by Farrer and the Receiver was averted. 51 
A rate rise was not, however, to be averted for ever. The expedients of 1909 were 
not robust. Little more than a year later, in December 1910, Byrne submitted a long 
typed minute which attempted to make a case for a new, public committee to look 
into the question of augmenting the force whose strength relative to population was 
declining: 
The grave fact is that heretofore the natural increase of the rateable value of London has 
enabled adequate augmentations to be made to the force from time to time without raising 
the rate, except quite recently for the purpose of meeting the deficiency on the Pension 
Fund. The rateable value has now ceased to rise - the next Valuation will show an actual 
reduction. 52 
Although there was some discussion between Byrne and Troup about possible 
membership of a committee, none was appointed, Byrne noting two months later 
that the papers had been seen by the Home Secretary and no further action was 
planned. 53 
51 Whilst this stratagem solved the problem of police finance, it assumed stability in funding 
elsewhere and continuing compliance amongst London local authorities - after 1899 grouped as 
boroughs. This assumption could not be sustained, it transpired, when pressures from elsewhere 
on local authority budgets effectively forced in 1921 a much more generous scheme of 
redistribution of rate revenues between London boroughs. See Chapter 7 below for the discussion 
of NPoplarism*. 
52 HO 45/10640/205459, minute of 3 December, 1910. 53 lbid, minute of 2 February, 1911. 
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Further action did, however, ensue without benefit of committee in the form of the 
Metropolitan Police Act 1912. This was wholly devoted to funding. It raised the rate 
cap from 9d to 11 d and, moreover, went through the placatory motions of requiring 
the Home Secretary to lay an explanatory Minute before Parliament, which could 
present an Address against it, if he proposed to raise the actual rate above 10d. 
Following the precedent of the 1909 Act, the local authority contribution from the 
Exchequer Contribution Account was fixed at what it had been before the 1912 Act. 
Nor was there any increase in the Exchequer subvention. 
The 1 Od limit held for a bare two years: the Home Secretary (McKenna) laid his 
Minute on 24 July 1914 attributing the cause to the need to increase pay. The rate 
was to be 10 1/8d where 6 1/8d would be due from parishes and 4d claimable from 
the Exchequer Contribution Account. Wartime inflation led to the introduction in 
January 1918 of a two clause Bill on similar lines which raised the limit to 13d and 
passed through all its Parliamentary stages in less than three weeks. 54 Finally, as 
had been originally recommended by the Royal Commission on Local Taxation, the 
Police Act 1919 abolished all caps and affirmed the practice begun in 1918 of 
providing Exchequer support equivalent to 50% of all police costs, including 
buildings. 
Borrowing 
As already explained, powers to borrow were not taken until 1857 and were then 
not used. Whilst there had in fact been temporary borrowings to cover cash flow, 
54 See HO 45/11010/310440/19. 
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there were no funded loans until powers (which included compulsory purchase 
powers) were obtained under the Metropolitan Police Act 1886. The working 
assumption had always been that capital costs should be met out of income, an 
assumption which the Report of the 1909 Committee showed as surviving well into 
the period when funded loans had been in operation for some time: 
... in the case of a Public Fund ... whose expenditure is naturally affected 
by the needs of 
newly populated and rapidly growing districts, a regular annual expense for new buildings is 
inevitable, and forms a proper charge upon the income of the Fund. 55 
That this thinWing - understandable when growth was continuous - did not hold 
perpetually was probably due to four circumstances. First, a committee's survey of 
police stations in 188156 had brought home just what a motley and unsatisfactory 
collection they were. (At Wandsworth, for example, the water supply had been 
found to be so foul that the committee had cut through the supply pipe on the spot. ) 
Secondly, the grand project of erecting purpose built headquarters was formulated, 
and no feasible surplus income could possibly fund it - the largest Whitehall 
building project of its day by far. Thirdly, the Receiver was responsible also for 
magistrates' courts buildings, and their requirements called out for longer term 
funding, too. Lastly, there was a new Receiver, Pennefather, who was diligent, 
active and resourceful. 
55 HO 347/23, Report, paragraph 38. Part of the background here was that Metropolitan police 
funding did benefit (like local authorities) from the fact that it was possible to carry balances over 
from one year to the next, unlike government departments which had to surrender balances, if any, 
each year. This fact promised a certain fle)dbility but only, of course, if there were surpluses in the 
first place. 
56 HO 45/9593/93633. 
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Appointed in 1883 on Drummond's retirement, he lost no time in pressing for a 
more flexible and extensive funding regime. He pointed out that the unused 
borrowing powers in the 1857 Act had become unusable because any loans taken 
up had to be paid off by 30 years after the Act's passage, that is, 1887. Money 
could be had at 3.5% (in fact he was able to get it for 3%) and, amongst other 
things, he particularly wanted to press on with sanitary improvements to cells. 
There remained 38 stations without telegraph communications. There were also 
still four stations in use from the original watch houses inherited in 1829.57The 
following year, Pennefather recommended ("this matter has long occupied the 
Commissioner") the erection for E5,000 of a building for "preparatory classes" in 
Kennington Lane. 58 
By the time the 1909 Committee reported, successive Acts had given the Receiver 
borrowing powers of E950,000 (of which E600,000 had been taken up) for police 
and courts purposes, together with what were essentially local authority powers of 
compulsory purchase. New Scotland Yard alone had cost E297,836.1 1.11 d and, 
the Receiver pointed out with evident pride, had come in below the estimated 
cost. 59 At that time - 1891 - he had sufficient surplus after providing for the loan 
57 Estimates letter 5 December, 1884, H0395/1. 
58 Estimates letter 16 December, 1885, HO 395/1. The resulting building in Kennington Lane later 
received ambiguous praise: min elevation it is pleasing to the eye, and even handsome, although 
there is a pretty general misconception that it is a workhouse. Workhouses in these days, however, 
are palaces. * Clarkson, C. T. and Richardson, J. H., Police!, Field and Tuer, 1889, p. 89. 59 Estimates letter 31 Januaryj 891, HO 395/1. Such expenditure also falls to be understood as part 
of the expansion of local authority capital investment in the period. A recent summary is in Wilson, 
J. F., 'The finance of municipal capital expenditure in England and Wales, 1870-1914", Finance 
History Review, 1997, pp. 31-50. 
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repayment sinking fund to build four new stations a year for the suburbs, and he 
proposed also that he should purchase the leases of others. The 1909 Committee 
reported that "The money raised on loan has been expended on the erection of 
New Scotland Yard, the purchase of sites, and the erection of Police Courts. "60 It is 
also apparent that Pennefather drove through a substantial programme of 
improvements during the period. For example, the Curtis Green extension to New 
Scotland Yard was built out of income; section house dormitories were converted 
into cubicular accommodation; and entirely new section houses (one for 94 men) 
were erected. In addition, he made use of capital investment by others through 
arrangements with contemporary housing associations to reserve accommodation 
for officers on the basis of being indemnified against rent loss by the Receiver. r3l 
There is scant evidence of any considered and settled Home Office funding policy. 
At the time of impending deficit in 1908, Tripp (still then in the Home Office) was 
reluctant to contemplate taking temporary Bank of England loans: 
It is of course in accordance with sound financial policy to pay for new buildings from 
income, and this is especially the case in regard to police buildings because of the 
increased pension charge we are bequeathing to coming generations. 62 
60 HO 347/23, Report, paragraph 23. 61 Pennefathers Estimates letters are full of sometimes extraordinary detail. For example: oThe non- 
spillable oilwell, which it is thought will keep the Greatcoats cleaner has not yet been taken into use. 
The patentees became bankrupt. The question is being gone into de novo., HO 395/2, Estimates 
letter 9 May, 1905. 
b2 Minute of 16 October 1908 on MEPO 5/279. 
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In other words, it was because of the pension charge that other bequests to the 
future should be minimized. 
But there is also a sense in which "sound policy" was whatever opinion held 
convenient sway at the moment. By 1908/09, not only were officials facing up to 
the longer term implications of the 1890 pensions settlement, but they were also 
anticipating that concessions would be made to pressure for a weekly rest day. 
Commenting on Tripp's minute, Byrne in the policy department observed: 
This provision - section 19(4) of the Police Act 1890 - enabling an increase in the rate to 
meet the Pension Fund deficiency passed without discussion: it was worded as not to 
obtrude itself on the attention of Parliament. As there really was no Pension Fund at the 
time - there being an annual deficit of nearly El 50,000 - the Police Fund has had to make 
good every year a heavy deficiency in respect of Pensions rising from practically nothing in 
1891 to E230,000 in 1908 ... Personally I think it would be right and fair that the generation 
that was responsible for the very generous terms of pension given by the Act of 1890 
should at any rate begin to rate itself more heavily to meet the growing pension charge, so 
that the Police Fund would be released from its heavy liability to the Pension Fund and 
become more adequate to meet the growing 'effective' charges. 63 
When questioned by a London MP in 1909 about borrowing policy, the Home 
Secretary (Gladstone) explained: 
63 Minute of 7 November, 1908, on MEPO 5/279. The language of mas not to obtrude" seems to be 
an early example of what Lord Armstrong of liminster notoriously rather later called being 
seconomical with the truth". 
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It has been the regular practice to charge against revenue the cost of new buildings and of 
additions and alterations to existing buildings, recourse being had to loans only in the case 
of works of an exceptional character, such as the acquisition of the freehold of those 
properties which were held on leasehold tenure &c. It has been considered desirable to 
restrict borrowing within the narrowest possible limits in view of the heavy and annually 
increasing charge for police pensions which future generations of ratepayers will have to 
bear. No exceptional expenditure is contemplated in the immediate future; the normal 
expenditure for new works and alterations Will, in accordance with established practice, be 
met from revenue ... 
64 
In other words, current and capital expenditure were not distinguished so definitely 
as they became later in public finance. Rather, accrual of capital assets was seen 
as a legitimate object for what would nowadays be regarded as current 
expenditure. Accordingly, it was a matter of judgement only about when it might be 
usound finance" to resort to borrowing, and a muddy ethic of inter-generational 
burdens was used to justify the outcome that seemed most practicable in the 
circumstances. At this juncture, the decision was, as already described, to increase 
the rate burden in a situation where officials also plainly regarded the 1890 
pensions settlement as unwontedly generous. 
The Daunton thesis 
Martin Daunton has argued that early Victorian state parsimony and taxation policy 
prepared the way for the much more adventurous expenditure of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries : 
64 Hansard, Commons, 13 July, 1909, cols. 2009-2011. 
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The success of retrenchment and the creation of a sense of equity and even-handedness 
meant that by the later nineteenth century the state was widely seen as trustworthy and 
effective in dealing with new social and economic problems. 65 
Developing the argument: 
This interpretation challenges the orthodoxy that the 'natural' form of the Victorian state was 
laissez-faire and the 'natural'fonn of the later Victorian period was state growth. Instead, it 
argues that growth was feasible as the result of the creation of legitimacy by means of 
retrenchment and, more importantly, the construction of norms of probity and transparency 
in the management of state finances. 66 
The experience of Metropolitan police finance should be a good test of these 
positions because almost uniquely it relied on both local and national funding 
sources. The record of capital expenditure clearly does support the Daunton view. 
What may be said of current expenditure? 
The example of granting a weekly rest day to the police illustrates some of the 
themes in the timeframe of Daunton's analysis. Whilst a system of fortnightly 
leave established itself early on, weekly leave was withheld on the grounds of cost. 
In 1868, at the time of the "Fenian" augmentation and the rate increase to pay for 
it, the Home Secretary told Parliament that one of the purposes to which the 
increased revenue would be put was to provide a weekly rest day. Whilst the 
65 Daunton, M., op. cit., p. 27. 66 lbid, p. 28. 
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augmentation facilitated weekly leave, the Commissioner was unable to implement 
it because he had been asked to send the greater part of the new strength to the 
outer Divisions. The result was that some of the inner Divisions received no 
increase but would have had to bear a reduction of one seventh of their effective 
strength to allow for the day's leave. The Commissioner also observed that weekly 
leave "has not increased alertness or efficiency ... The constable becomes 
unhinged by one day's leave by constant interruption of duty, and not infrequently 
unfitted by one day's leave for duty on the next. ". 67 
The case for weekly leave was taken up by the editor of the Police Review, John 
Kempster, and the House of Common set up a Select Committee to examine the 
merits in 1908. The Commissioner, Henry, claimed that the men would simply use 
the extra time to make more money, and that the Police ReviewS views were those 
of the editor not the men. 68 The Chief Surgeon to the force, T. C. Dent, opined that 
there was no medical case for weekly leave, but a better argument for increased 
annual leave. 69Kempster, claiming a circulation of 18-19,000 throughout the 
United Kingdom, argued: 
The police feel that one day in seven is only withheld from them because they are under 
disciplinary conditions which forbid their combining in protest, and that their exclusion from 
67 Report of the Commissioner of Police 1869flO, PP 1870, Vol. XXXVI, C. 150, June 1870, p. 42. 68 Report of the Select Committee on Police Forces (Weekly Rest Day) Bill, 8 December, 1908, PP 
1909. Vol. VIII, QQ 321 and 444. 69 lbid, Q 996. 
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a privilege which cannot be withheld from free citizens brands them with a badge of 
humiliating and irksome servitude. 70 
Pennefather, the Receiver, though he supported the idea in abstract, thought that 
in London the question resolved itself principally into a financial one. He thought 
also that people were being driven out of London because of the high rates and 
The moment you take away the limit which Parliament has fixed upon the rate, I feel 
convinced that there will be other demands made, and that the Home Office and the Police 
authorities will find it extremely difficult to resist those demandS. n7l 
In private, however, officials took a very different and more hostile line. When the 
Home Secretary, Gladstone, indicated to his Permanent Secretary, Troup, that he 
was inclined to accept the principle of the Private Member's Bill introduced in early 
1908 (i. e. before the Select Committee was set up), Troup forwarded a 
memorandum from the Finance Officer (Tripp) estimating the cost to the police 
service and making the point that the whole cost would fall on the rates and 
squeeze further the amount otherwise available to local authorities under the Local 
Taxation Account arrangements. In his own covering note, Troup said: 
My own view is that there is no comparison between the policeman who retires after 25 
years with a statutory pension and may have seven Sundays a week for the rest of this life, 
and the ordinary workman who has to work for 50 years and then gets no pension. 72 
70 lbid, Q 1783. 
71 lbid, Q 655. 
72 BL Add Mss 45993, lefter of 17 March, 1908. 
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This did not deter Gladstone, who was further encouraged by the reappointed 1908 
Committee concluding in its 1909 Report that some relief was absolutely essential 
in London and that, "although an important element in the matter, the figure of cost 
is not the one of primary importance". Indeed, they thought the change should be 
made in London before legislation for everyone else. The Committee reassured the 
London ratepayers that they would "receive a satisfactory return from the 
somewhat increased cost in the higher efficiency of a great body of public 
servants, who, from the temper, tact, discipline and energy with which their 
functions are discharged, have deserved well of the publiC. "73 Gladstone's 
acceptance of the principle in June hoped that the increased cost would be 
"cheerfully borne" and that assistance might be forthcoming from a new "Imperial" 
grant in aid from central government. Pennefather was not mollified by any of this: 
I am not aware that I have In any way been consulted by Mr. Secretary Gladstone as to the 
steps to be taken to provide for the very large increase in expenditure which will necessarily 
arise in consequence of this decision 
Pennefather had earlier sought to save something from the situation by arguing 
that, if weekly leave were granted, then the 1890 pension settlement should be 
75 
revisited. That suggestion was not acted upon: it was politically unthinkable and 
no doubt advanced in the first place only to emphasise the financial downside of 
73 Report, PP 1909 Vol VI, from paragraph 10. 74 HO 45/10552/163455, letter of 21 June, 1909, on . /27. Troup gave him short shrift - policy first, modalities later - minute of 6 August, 1909, also on . /27. 75 BL Add Mss 45994, note by the Private Secretary, Waller, dated 9 June, 1909, for the Cabinet 
discussion that day, adding that the suggestion would, of course, need legislation. 
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the proposed change. Implementation was started in London before legislation. It 
required 1,632 extra officers, cost El 64,000 a year, and was completed by 1 April 
1913.76 
In the context of the Daunton thesis, the crucial point of interest in this story is the 
difference of view between ministers and officials. Some police historians have 
tended to see the issues in fairly black and white terms. Ascoli, for example, 
commented: "Predictably, the opposition to what was no more than a matter of 
common justice and wise management came from the Home Office which took 
refuge behind the hackneyed barricade of 'guardianship of the public purse'. "77 
Moving away from a white hat/black hat dichotomy, however, it may be seen how 
officials shared the "powerful normative assumptions" about public expenditure that 
have been noted of Treasury officialS. 
78 These were no longer held by ministers of 
thel 906 government who were prepared to raise both rates and, as Lloyd George 
did in his 1909 budget, introduce graduation into the income tax: 
The difference was that whereas the 'direct taxers' of the 1840s had coupled direct taxation 
with retrenchment, those of the I 900s coupled it with increased expenditure, and had 
76 Police Weekly Rest Day, Return of 30 July, 1913, PP 1913. Vol. Ul. 77 Ascoli, op. cit. p. 188. A similar line has been taken more recently in Fido, M. and Skinner, K, The 
Official History of Scotland Yard, 1999 - see the entry on Henderson where government finance 
policy is attributed to the personal proclivities of Drummond, the Receiver. It is like blaming the 
weather on the TV presenter. Critchley, avoiding such misunderstandings and concentrating on the 
provincial forces, exercised his own crotchets by presenting the events as a saga instancing the 
want of leadership within the police service - Critchley, T. A., A History of Police in England and Wales, 900-1966,1967, pp. 171-5. 78 Daunton, op. cit., p. 388. 
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begun to see it as a positive agent of social change through redistribution. 79 
The Daunton thesis on this evidence holds. Moreover, that it is valid was 
anticipated by the author of Gladstone's entry in the Dictionary of National 
Biography. 
These measures [Trade Boards Act 1908, Probation of Offenders Act 1907, 
Prevention of Crime Act 1907, Children Act 1908] were not, on the whole, concerned in the 
spirit of 'Gladstonian' liberalism, which had promoted personal freedom together with 
economy and non-interference on the part of the state. They showed a growing tendency to 
bureaucracy, which is inevitable when the details of legislation are largely influenced by 
departmental officials, and they mark the approximation of liberal aims to those of the 
labour party and the socialists. 
The significance of the events would not have been lost on the policemen 
themselves. They had in 1890 and 1909 by exerting proxy and indirect pressure 
obtained significant improvements in their pay and conditions of service. What, 
some might have wondered, could be achieved by more direct means. 
Parliament 
In theory there was no question that could not be asked of the Home Secretary 
about the deployment, management and cost of the force. From 1868, the 
79 Matthew, H. C. G., *Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Politics of Mid Victorian Budgets", Historical 
Journal, 1979, pp. 615-643. A further example of a new openness to incurring expenditure is the 
appointment and findings of the Departmental Committee on the Accommodation of the 
Metropolitan Police, 1904. (Printed but not published. ) The Committee was chaired by Troup and 
recommended a revised system of rent allowances and standards for a quarters building 
programme. 
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Exchequer contribution was transferred from the Consolidated Fund (covered by 
the 1833 Act) to Supply and therefore subject to annual review and vote. In theory 
this strengthened the immediacy of Parliamentary oversight. 
What has already been recorded above about the proceedings on the 1833,1857 
and 1868 legislation indicates that theory and practice were not very closely 
intertwined. Whilst there certainly were questions put to the Home Secretary from 
time to time, they were usually about purely local, constituency interests (including 
the cases of particular police officers) and rarely about the Home Secretary's 
general policy - especially financial policy - in carrying out his duties which, under 
section 5 of the 1829 Act, gave him statutorily a detailed control over the 
Commissioners. 
During the period, there was only one substantial attempt to challenge the Home 
Secretary's stewardship in policy terms. This occurred during the Supply debates 
in November 1888. The timing goes a long way to explain why the attempt should 
have been made. The Commissioner, Warren, had only recently been required by 
the Home Secretary, Matthews, to resign. The previous two years had been 
particularly troubled by the social unrest originating from a severe economic 
depression, and anxious discussion in government and Parliament about the 
appropriate policing policy with which to respond. In addition, for nearly a decade, 
there had been unresolved discussion about the future of London government. 
One of the issues had been whether a new London wide authority should, like local 
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authorities elsewhere (including in the City), have responsibility for policing. During 
Gladstone's 1880-1885 ministry, Harcourt's opposition to the inclusion of the 
Metropolitan police in a new authority's powers had been one of the reasons why 
that government's local government Bill had been so delayed to the extent that 
progress became unfeasible. The ensuing Conservative government produced its 
own measure which, so far as London was concerned, kept policing entirely in the 
hands of the Home Secretary. 
In respect of both measures, the Radical elements of the Liberal party had sought 
and failed to get the Metropolitan police transferred. They still hoped to make the 
change, and therefore were anxious to make the case that municipal control would 
lead both to more satisfactory and cheaper policing in London. 80 
The Radicals' spokesman was Professor James Stuart, the MP for Hoxton, a 
pioneer of university extension courses and the first Professor of Mechanics at 
Cambridge. He was one of the leading lights in the Liberal party organisation in 
London and to that extent responsible for the early successes of the Progressives 
in the new London County Council, of which he became an alderman. 81 During the 
Supply debate on 14 November, 1888, he made a carefully scripted attack on the 
management and cost of the Metropolitan police, and followed up his attack with a 
long letter to the Daily News published on 3 December. 82 
80 See Chapter 7 below for a more extended discussion of these issues. 81 See also Appendix C for biographical note. 82 It consisted of a letter of 29 November, 1888, essentially repeating his Supply debate assertions. 
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Comparing 1878 with 1888, he claimed that although the population of London had 
increased by 23%, the number of police had increased by 34.5%, and the increase 
in cost had been 44%. Moreover, as proved by recent Parliamentary returns, the 
Metropolitan force was undoubtedly more expensive than the forces in other large 
towns, all of which were municipally controlled. Despite very favourable rating 
revaluations, it seemed likely that rate increases would be inevitable. If the force's 
increase in costs had been the same proportionately as that of the increase of 
population, there would have been a saving of a 2d rate. The police's demands 
alone were squeezing local authority reserves. Anyone taking a business view of 
the accounts 
would come to the conclusion that they were looking through a business that needed 
overhauling in the very points in which a business that was going to the bad needed 
overhauling ... There was no way out of meeting the serious financial crisis which was rapidly 
approaching, except by putting the Metropolitan Police under the control of the County 
Council. 83 
During the continuation of the debate the following day, the junior Home Office 
minister, Stuart-Wortley, made a far from circumstantial attempt to rebut Stuart's 
contentions. Stuart noted this fact, repeated and elaborated his allegations, and 
83 Hansard (Commons), 14 November, 1888, cols 1176-1183. 
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added the view that, irrespective of the need and despite the effect of revaluations, 
"they stuck to their 9d rate like limpets. "84 The government, however, won the vote. 
All this was taken very seriously by the Receiver. In a closely printed 
"Memorandum on the Growth of the Cost of the Metropolitan Police of 35 pages, 
he commented on all Stuart's allegations in great detail. His main points were that 
the period chosen by Stuart for comparison was atypical, including the year of the 
Golden Jubilee as its last year. Painstakingly, he went through every allegation 
meticulously and demonstrated its error or unfairness. With the exception of his 
assertion that the maximum rate was not always fully spent (Stuart's point was that 
it was always raised), his memorandum is persuasive on the detail. It also sought 
to maintain a particular policy proposition which it would not have been convenient 
to allege publicly, but which was designed to legitimate keeping the force out of 
municipal control: "that popular representation does not succeed in keeping down 
rates, and that the best guarantee against an undue increase in the expenditure of 
any rating authority, is to limit the income which that body can raise". He instanced 
the cases of the Board of Works, the School Boards and parochial and district 
board rates, all of which had experienced significant increases in the rate 
poundages - 73% in the case of the Board of Works over the same decade. 85 
84 lbid, Col. 1369. 
85 H045 9695/A49633/1, Memorandum on the Growth of the Cost of the Metropolitan Police, 24 
December, 1888, pp. 9-10. MEPO 5/281 contains another copy of the Memorandum together with 
comments by Lushington in a minute of 16 February, 1889, on both the Memorandum and two 
Parliamentary returns giving the costs of provincial forces. Having shown that the Metropolitan 
police did not invariably show up as the most expensive, Lushington concluded: 01 doubt if there is 
any other Rem of considerable expenditure in which comparison of the Metropolitan and Provincial 
forces can properly be made except subject to reservations so large as to nullify its value. " 
166 
Two months later within the Home Office, Lushington added his own reflections. 
He challenged the shallowness of Stuart's thinking: it was fallacious to argue that 
the only relevant criteria were population, property and area. Quite apart from the 
need to fund superannuation, it was evident that not enough had been 
devoted to providing adequate buildings for the force. Moreover, Lushington 
argued, 
The mere lapse of time, the mere march of civilization, must introduce changes, and with 
changes, expense ... A police force touches the community at so many points that its 
e)dgencies necessarily vary with the public circumstances of the day. 86 
It is clear that the material in the Receivers Memorandum was used to brief the 
author of a subsequent article in the Contemporary Review. 87 Politically, the detail 
was in the end, however, irrelevant. As Stuart pointed out in his rejoinder, In fact, if 
his [Evans'] argument is an argument worth anything, it is one against 
representative government in any sense. "88 
In the end, of course, this was the point. It was not really the detail that mattered. 
What counted was who was in control. It was all very well for Pennefather to quote 
Farrer: "The London rate payers, unlike any other ratepayers, had no voice 
whatever; and the representatives of London, in the House of Commons, were not 
86 MEPO 5/281, memorandum of 16 February, 1889. Monro was to draw on Lushington's language 
when later that year arguing for an augmentation of 1000 men. See Chapter 6. 87 See MEPO 1/65 for letter from Receiver to Lushington 20 January, 1889, seeking permission to 




Stuart, J., "The Metropolitan Police", Contemporary Review, LV, 1889, pp. 622-636. 
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strong enough, or, perhaps, intelligent enough, to look after the interests of the 
ratepayers. "89 There were limits to the continuous attention that London MPs could 
give to police matters; and it is difficult, even were it appropriate, for a national 
legislature to attempt to get into the detailed management of the force. But, if that 
were true for Parliament, might it also be true for the minister? 
That is another matter - to be dealt with in Part III below. There Chapter 6 will 
examine ministerial performance and Chapter 7 consider why the police authority 
responsibility was never in the period delegated, as it had been everywhere else in 
Great Britain including the City of London, to a local authority even after the 
creation of the London County Council in 1888. 




This Part consists of three chapters each of which approaches the control of the 
Metropolitan force from a different perspective. Thus, Chapter 5 examines how 
the regulation of individual officers' conduct was maintained, and for whose 
benefit. Conversely, although Chapter 5 seeks to register some important 
political points, Chapter 6 aims to look at the higher, more strategic issues of 
political control. Whilst the perspectives explored in Chapters 5 and 6 have 
received some attention elsewhere, Chapter 7 seeks to cover ground not 
previously tackled in earlier studies. That is, it explores why political control 
during the study period remained at national level in London rather than at local 
level as was the case everywhere else in Great Britain. 
In this Part generally, in order to explain the fuller context of events and 
developments, it is sometimes necessary rather more than in previous Parts to 
move beyond the 1860-1920 timeframe. 
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CHAPTER 6 
OPERATIONAL ANSWERABILITY: COMPLAINTS 
This chapter examines the public as opposed to the parliamentary or political 
accountability of the force in its first one hundred years. ' What recourse was 
available to private citizens who considered that they had suffered adversely 
and unfairly in some way at the hands of police officers? In addition, what does 
the response of the force and the Home Office to such complaints say about 
professional and political perspectives on these forms of accountability? 
It will be argued that developments were anything but linear, that police 
managements tendency to conflate complaints investigation with questions of 
internal discipline led to the distortion of the latter becoming dominant in the 
response to the former, and that the police authority took up no continuous 
position as having any responsibility to uphold the public interest in the quality 
or outcome of investigation. 
What follows looks first at the legal position in so far as the law intervened 
before passing on to look at practice and the impact of the various crises that 
occurred as a result of events in some particular cases. It will conclude by 
reflecting on what conclusions may be drawn from developments over the 
century as a whole. 
1 It is for this reason, therefore, that it does not deal with the 1856 Royal Commission or the 
Chester Jones Inquiry of 1912 since both looked at alleged misbehaviour of groups of police in 
specific public order situations. 
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Legallbackground 
The originating statute of 1829 was silent on individual complaints. Its focus was 
on establishing the force and the systems of political and financial control under 
which it should operate. On the other hand, the practice was adopted from the 
outset of ensuring that officers were individually identifiable: in accordance with 
the best practice amongst the London forces they replaced 2, their divisional 
letters and personal numbers were placed visibly on their uniforms. They wore a 
uniform, they were part of a "force", but they were individually accountable. 
Moreover, the law was not silent for long. Section 10 of the Police Offices 
(London) Act, 1833, provided for a summary procedure where any officer (that 
is, in the Metropolitan and the then still extant magisterial forces), if convicted by 
two magistrates of disobedience to orders, neglect of duty or misconduct, could 
be fined up to El 0 or up to three months imprisonment in lieu. The provision 
was contained in the routine, renewable time-limited legislation that governed 
the Police Offices originally established in 1792. The fact that it was new 
received no comment at any stage of the Bill's proceedings. 
Essentially the same provision was re-enacted as section 14 of the 
3 Metropolitan Police Act, 1839, which, on the principle of separating the 
judicial and executive functions of the London stipendiaries, amalgamated the 
2 Reynolds, EA, Before the Bobbies: The Night Watch and Police Reform in MetrOPOfitan 
London, 1720-1830, Stanford (California), 1998, p. 151. 3 The offence was more concisely defined as Oany neglect or violation of duty" but the penalties 
remained the same. 
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remaining magisterial forces with the Metropolitan force. There were identical 
provisions in the 1839 and 1847 Acts applying respectively to the county and 
borough forces. With the exception of some variation of offence definition and 
punishment in the latter forces as a result of the Municipal Corporations Act, 
1882, these statutory provisions remained intact until repealed by the Police 
Act, 1964. The sole other statutory intervention were the limited requirements in 
the Police Regulations, 1920, about the recording of complaints and outcomes. 
They did not extend or direct remedies. 
Metropolitan practice 
It is much easier to discern what the Metropolitan force said that it did than to 
see what it actually did. Recorded discussion is confined mostly to claims 
before committees and the events of particularly notorious cases. There are no 
continuous, detailed records except for the bare outcomes of discipline 
proceedings which themselves do not specify how or by whom charges were 
initiated. For the first few years returns to the Home Office did not even 
particularise the nature of the alleged disciplinary offences until the Home Office 
insisted. 4 The continuous record of correspondence between the Home Office 
and the force exists only for the first eleven years. One divisional register alone 
5 
seems to survive, and that from the 1840s. 
4 The Commissioners initially resisted the requirement for reasons that were not recorded. See 
HO 61/9, letter of 30 July, 1833. They gradually deteriorated into very perfunctory descriptions 
describing the offence category rather than the circumstances e. g. HO 61/25, Rowan to Home 
Office 10 January, 1840. 
5 See HO 61 for the 1829-39 correspondence and MEPO 4/6, a surviving register for H Division. 
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The fact that the disciplinary records do not reflect a complainant perspective is 
itself no doubt significant: the imposition of discipline was a matter internal to 
the force, regardless of how the relevant facts came to light. It is possible in 
some cases to infer that there was a complainant outside the force. For 
example, where an officer was dismissed for cohabiting with a female who was 
not his wife, or for ill-treating his wife, the identity of the informant/complainant 
may be imagined. 6 
Public positions were impeccable. In their evidence before the 1834 Select 
Committee, Rowan and Mayne - in what read very much as orchestrated 
exchanges - stressed the priority they gave to dealing with complaints to the 
extent of devoting 4-5 hours a day dealing with them (though most arose 
internally), and the superiority of their procedures over what had existed before. 
They also went out of their way to welcome s. 10 of the 1833 Act to the point of 
stating a preference for it on the grounds that it would "prevent any insinuations 
as to the bias that may be supposed to exist in our minds". The fact that the 
statutory remedy meant complainants did not have to go to the bother of 
invariably travelling to Scotland Yard to lay their complaint was 
also mentioned. 7 The Select Committee was impressed: 
they think it but due to the Commissioners that they appear to have given the Public 
every facility in their power for the reception and investigation of complaints against the 
persons under their government. The course therefore now open to the Public ... is either 
HO 61/10, Mayne to Home Office 10 August, 1833; Rowan to Home Office 22 November, 
1833. 
7 1834 Committee, Evidence at Q 4252 and Q 6284. 
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by application to the Magistrates or to the Commissioners; and it appears from the 
evidence of the Commissioners.. that the necessary inquiries may be made under their 
direction through the Superintendents of the respective districts. 8 
The Select Committee also observed that it hoped that the magistrates would 
exercise their power always so far as possible "in communication" with the 
Commissioners. 
The early records allow some glimpses of what these claims meant in practice 
at a time when the force was still establishing itself and it was not immediately 
clear that it would be both politically and financially viable. Moreover, there was 
a considerable turnover in the force. 9 
Significantly, even in all those circumstances, the Home Office did not see itself 
as a court of appeal from the Commissioners. From the earliest times, 
there was a reluctance by the Home Office to become involved in determining 
complaints or interfering in the Commissioners' disciplinary decisions. Thus, 
although the Ead of K(innoul invited Peel in the summer of 1830 to dismiss two 
constables for allegedly lying in their testimony against one of his servants, Peel 
stood by the Commissioners who had refused to dismiss the officers merely on 
8 1834 Committee, Report, p. 9. 9 HO 61/3 -'Return of Dismissals and Resignations 29 September 1829- 24 July 1831" dated 
27 July, 1831 showed that a total of 3235 had left the force, of whom 1111 had resigned and 
2124 had been dismissed. For the longer period September 1829-May 1839 dismissals 
constituted 5150 as against 6458 resignations, a total turnover of 11,895 including 287 deaths - HO 61/23. The total of dismissals continued for long to be a substantial proportion of all 
removals for whatever cause from the force. For example, during the two decades 1859-1878, 
the number of dismissals (i. e. the sum of requirements to resign and dismissals) as a proportion 
of all departures ran at never less than one fifth, reached nearly one half in the middle years 
and was running at over one third at the end: 1879 Report, Table of Removals. 
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the Earl's say so. Instead, the Commissioners had offered to hear the complaint 
but in the presence of the officers. Kinnoul did not take up the offer but instead 
returned to the charge to ask whether the officers had been punished. He was 
told it was a matter for the Commissioners. 10 The Commissioners also 
withstood pressure a few years later from the Earl of Lucan infuriated by the 
way the police had dealt with an errant drover whose misbehaviour meant that 
prize animals belonging to the Earl had lost their slot at a Smithfield auction. 
Although the Commissioners dealt with the case entirely by themselves, they 
took care to report it fully to the Home Office. " 
Social or political class in those two cases conferred no advantage, though it 
was otherwise for Mrs Edwards. In her instance, the Commissioners reported of 
her detention overnight after being arrested outside the Haymarket theatre that 
"in consequence of the inquiry which was made into the mode of life and 
general character of Mrs Edwards, it was considered by the Commissioners 
that she was not entitled to any apology from the police constable. 02 After the 
change of government, Melbourne maintained Peel's policy of non- 
interference. 13 
1() HO 61/2, letters of 18,24 and 30 August and of 4 September, 1830. The Commissioners 
believed that the servant had in fact sought to interfere in an arrest and had assaulted the 
officers. The draft for the final reply appears to have been in Peel's own hand. " Letter of 5 March, 1833, on HO 61/8. 12 lbid, letter of 2 September, 1830. The police had been moving people on outside the theatre 
because of robberies of theatre goers. Conversely, the Home Office response to the professor 
who objected at the end of the century to the way he had been treated by the police with too 
little deference illustrates something of the degree of social change over the intervening period 
viz he was told: OThe police can make no distinction of persons. ' HO 45/971 1/A51190, letter of 
28 November, 1895. 
13 HO 61/3 - case of ex-PS Hatfield's appeal of 1 July, 1831 against his dismissal. 
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For the 1829-1840 period there is scattered evidence of hardening practice. 
First, the Home Office remained reluctant to become involved in the details of 
complaints. This became a settled habit more than an invariable practice. In the 
ordinary case, it would seek simply to refer the correspondence to the 
Commissioners in a situation where correspondents rarely approached the 
Home Office. The latter had no capacity for instituting its own inquiries 
independently of the Commissioners and, under the legislation, it was the 
Commissioners who were the disciplinary authority. All efforts by dismissed 
officers to appeal to the Home Secretary against Commissioners' decisions 
were rejected as a matter of course - even in the Ruth Morris case (see below) 
where a new Home Secretary had an opportunity to reverse what he may have 
privately regarded as the perverse decision of his predecessor. 
Secondly, however, the Home Office did become involved with the 
determination of cases when the magistrates had convicted an officer under the 
section 10 procedure of the 1833 Act and as continued in section 14 of the 1839 
Act. It was settled in correspondence with the Commissioners in 1834 that there 
should be a presumption in favour of dismissing the officer unless the 
Commissioners or the magistrate recommended otherwise. This rule was 
reaffirmed in 1843 except that the magistrate was not to be invited to give an 
opinion as to retention. 14 
The Home Office was not normally involved in cases where section 14 
14 HO 45/9358/31331, letters of 13 October, 1834 and 13 June, 1843. 
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prosecutions failed, and the Commissioners reported the outcome of an 1835 
case only because the Home Office had been applied to originally by the 
complainant, a Mr Goodlad, who alleged that a Superintendent and an 
Inspector had compounded a felony. The magistrates, although they found the 
charges were not proved, opined that there were sufficient grounds for bringing 
them. The Home Office, though normally claiming that it was not the disciplinary 
or appellate authority, directed that the two officers be cautioned "as the 
magistrates' opinion does not entirely relieve them from all blame on this 
occasion. "'5 
The Ruth Morris case concerned the complaint of the prisoner that, whilst in 
custody, she had been raped by the station Inspector, Squire Wovenden. The 
Superintendent, Lazenby, rather than recording the charge first sought - as he 
understood he was required to do - the directions of the Commissioners. Morris 
was a young woman who had in June 1834 been arrested for attempting when 
drunk to bilk her cabman, though she had apparently offered in front of a tipsy 
and appreciative assembly of onlookers to pay him in kind. Confined overnight, 
she was brought before the magistrate the following morning and ordered to 
pay up. Wovenden was a man of 48 who had served throughout the Peninsular 
campaign, sustaining wounds in 1813, and who, as sergeant major of the 34 th 
Regiment, had been recommended for a commission not granted only because 
of the ending of hostilities. He was married with seven children, one of whom 
was a constable in the force. Inquiry by the Commissioners established to their 
15 HO 61/15, minute on Rowan's letter of 5 December, 1835. 
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satisfaction that rape could not have occurred as alleged, amongst other 
reasons because the cell bench was too narrow to have made congress 
possible. They noted also that Morris made no charge when brought before the 
magistrate the morning after the alleged rape. 
The Home Secretary was Duncannon, a Whig, who, despite a stay in office of 
only five months entirely during a Parliamentary recess, is one of the select 
band of candidates vying for the title of worst occupant ever of his office from its 
inception in 1782. He took a stand hostile to the force, and engaged one of its 
jealous critics, Roe, the Bow Street magistrate, to investigate the allegations. 
Roe committed Wovenden to Newgate, sought to conduct his inquiries in 
camera, made various highly prejudicial statements in public, and ultimately 
persuaded a reluctant Morris to sign the charge. It was thrown out by the Grand 
Jury and Wovenden released. 
Despite a 26 page letter of explanation and defence from the Commissioners, 
and though he had some difficulty in adducing his grounds, Duncannon 
persisted: Wovenden was to be dismissed in effect because he had forfeited 
(whether reasonably or not) Duncannon's confidence; and, as to the 
Superintendent, Duncannon took his stand ultimately on the failure of Lazenby 
to record the charge in the first place, and the fact that the public had to be 
assured that police behaviour was beyond reproach. In their final letter on the 
affair, the COMmissioners in effect both rebuked Duncannon and held out a 
threat of their resignation on the grounds 
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that, if their authority over the numerous body of the police entrusted to their immediate 
charge should in any degree be impaired, or the respect for the Commissioners, so 
necessary for maintaining the organisation of the police Force, be at all shaken, it will 
become extremely difficult if not impossible, for them to carry on the service with credit 
to themselves or advantage to the public. 18 
Duncannon's successor, Goulburn, though a Tory, declined when invited to 
interfere with his decisions. The lack of any enforceable standards of procedural 
justice supported the whims of elite rule which were not to be challenged. 
There appear to be only two sources of continuous evidence of complaints 
administration in the early experience of the force, both themselves limited to 
fairly short periods. The first relates to investigations initiated by the 
Commissioners themselves in response to newspaper reports and may be 
found in the Metropolitan police museum. 17 The material shows acute sensitivity 
to press comment on the part of the Commissioners. The most frequent cuttings 
are from the Weekly Dispatch, the most persistent source of criticism and which 
remained implacably hostile to the force. Amongst other things, it regularly 
referred to officers as "police-soldiers". Superintendents did not always wait for 
a Commissioner inquiry to volunteer their own version of events as soon as a 
hostile piece appeared. Thus, Superintendent Carden of S Division discounted 
'a HO 61/13, letter of 13 November, 1834. A full narrative account of the affair is contained in 
Reith, C., British Police and the Democratic Idea/, 1943. 17 The papers are maintained in six bound folders at the Museum store in Charlton, London - hereafter referred to as CF i. e. Charlton Folders. They consist of original, unregistered letters 
and press cuttings starting in September 1829 and concluding in June 1836. The cuttings include favourable as well as unfavourable press comment. The material was not listed In Bridgeman, 1. and Emsley, C., A Guide to the Archives of Police Forces in England and Wales, Police History Society, Monograph No 2,1989, because purchased subsequently. 
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allegations of excessive drilling, assuming the story had been leaked "by some 
individual of the Somertown detachment7.18 The Weekly Dispatch did not 
confine itself to alleged police abuse of authority: it revealed - and relished, no 
doubt - moral turpitude. 19 
The Commissioners did not invariably support their officers or Superintendents, 
but sought to get at and weigh the evidence in each case.. The Weekly 
Dispatch claimed that no action had been taken when a woman had been ill- 
used. The Superintendent claimed that a woman was given no opportunity to 
identify an assailant because she was too drunk to do so. Rowan commented: 
"This report is not satisfactory. Let the woman in question be found out if 
possible and let it be stated why inquiry was not instituted when the woman 
came to the Watch house or a report made to the Commissioners at that 
time P20 The fact than an officer was defended by his Superintendent for using 
abusive language towards a woman and her daughter did not prevent the officer 
being summoned to Scotland Yard to be cautioned and assigned to another 
Division . 
21A Dispatch report that two officers had been detected in plain clothes 
at a meeting about police failure to deal With prostitution was found to be true 
and the Superintendent reprimanded for allowing police attendance when there 
had been positive instructions that they should not - shades no doubt of Popay 
18 CF, memorandum of 20 June, 1831. 
19 Weeldy Dispatch, 8 February, 1835, alleged infidelity on the part of a constable whose wife's 
own previous infidelity with another constable had resulted in that officer being dismissed. The 
allegation was found to be true, and the new offender allowed to resign. '0 CF, Superintendent Murray's report of 27 February, 1832. 21 CF, minute of 2 January, 1833, by Rowan concerning PC Powers. 
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and the police spies case - do So. 22 An allegation that two constables extorted 
money from a sea captain for damage to a hat after he had already been fined 
for assault, was investigated at Rowan's direction. The allegation was sustained 
and the officers dismissed. 23 
Even though it was apparent that nothing appeared capable of persuading the 
Dispatch to desist from its interminable campaign, the Commissioners stuck 
doggedly to investigating the papers allegations on their merits. The 
Commissioners' acknowledgement of the influence of the press at a time of 
limited popular representation (even after 1832) in Parliament is a significant 
indicator of the extent to which elite domination of opinion was far from 
unchallenged. The role of the press in these cases is also significant in seeming 
to demonstrate a lack of popular belief in, or ready acceptance of, the efficacy 
of complaining directly to the force's management itself. In their early struggle to 
establish the force, such considerations may have been influential with the 
Commissioners. However, if so, they seem nowhere to have articulated that 
view. Instead, there is only the evidence of Mayne's exasperation with the 
Weekly Dispatch in response to yet another unfounded allegation, this time 
about the supposed harassment of an omnibus driver. Responding to whether 
22 CF. WeekJy Dispatch report of 22 February, 1835, and Rowan's minute of 25 February. 
Popay was the police officer who had attended political meetings incognito, and whose conduct 
had been condemned by a Parliamentary Committee in 1833 as intolerable spying. See Report 
from the Select Committee on the Petition of FrederickYoung and Others, PP 1833, Vol 13. 
Observers have commonly considered (for example, Palmer, S. H., Police and Protest in 
England and Ireland 1780-185Q Cambridge, 1988, pp. 312-3) that the Committees strictures 
unconscionably delayed the formation of a Detective Department at Scoband Yard until 1842. 
Granted that detective workwas nonetheless undertaken in the interim, the better interpretation 
may be that the explicit formation of a Detective department was delayed. 23 CF, Superintendent Menzies! report of 9 April, 1834, and Rowan's minute of the same date. 
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the fact that the magistrate in the case had made no complaint of the police 
might be brought home to the newspaper, Mayne observed: 
Commissioner cannot sanction any communication with the Editor of the Dispatch. The 
paper is the receptacle of slanderous and false attacks on Police, and offers have been 
from time to time made to disprove many and no willingness has been shown to get at 
the truth. 24 
The second source relates to a surviving Divisional complaints register. The rule 
was that complaints and their outcome had to be entered in a book kept for the 
purpose. The sole apparently surviving register is for the years 1843-6 for H 
25 Division, the area that included Bethnal Green and Spitalfields. It records both 
general and individual complaints. What it demonstrates is the direct, personal 
involvement of the Commissioners. When the Superintendent reported of a 
complaint from a long-established stallholder in Bethnal Green that a rival stall 
run by the wife of PS Teakle was not interfered with in any way by the officer, 
Rowan was damning: "Mr Pierse's report is unsatisfactory in every way - what 
is done by a policeman's Wife in this way is done by himself. The shop must be 
discontinued. Acquaint the writer that such shall be the case. n26 in January 
1843, faced with discrepant accounts about the availability of a PC to take an 
alleged felonious servant in charge, Rowan sent the Superintendent and the 
beat officer to see the complainant, a Mr Fuller, to go over the matter. The 
Superintendent reported that Fuller was not only satisfied but also "felt much 
24 CF, Mayne commenting on Dispatch report of 27 September, 1835. 25 MEPO 4/6. 
28 Minute of 6 December, 1843 on MEPO 4/6. Al the incidents and quotations that follow in this 
paragraph come from the same source. 
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obliged to the Commissioner for the attention paid to his complaint". However, 
in February, Fuller returned to an aspect of his complaint causing Rowan to 
observe "It would not appear by the letter that the writer was so well satisfied on 
the last occasion as the Superintendent stated in his report. " 
In May 1844, whilst Rowan advised a dissatisfied complainant in one case to go 
to the magistrate to make a charge which the Commissioners would facilitate by 
making the officers available, in another - domestic dispute - case, Rowan 
minuted: "I do not think this is a case which we should give the magistrate the 
trouble of hearing. Superintendent to acquaint complainant that the 
Commissioners cannot interfere! PC Brown, however, although cleared by 
Rowan of a complaint alleging theft, was nonetheless required in February 1845 
to resign on the grounds that he was unsuitable to the service. In May 1845, 
Mary Driscoll complained that a PC had refused to arrest both her husband 
when he had assaulted her and her brother in law, who had called her a whore. 
(She had sought to extract them from a public house. ) She alleged that the PC 
had said to her "You dirty little faggot. You are drunk and worse than them. Go 
home or I will lock you up. " She asked for the case to go before the magistrate. 
It did and was dismissed. Another case in August went before the magistrate at 
the insistence of two PCs when, without their insistence, Rowan would not have 
put it forward. The charges were dismissed. 
A general complaint from the Spitalfields Vestry in May 1846 about undetected 
burglaries was taken very seriously by Mayne. He declined to take the 
exculpatory report from the Superintendent at face value, observing that the 
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police were not free from blame. The reply to the vestry reassured that the 
police would give special attention in future. The Superintendent was instructed 
to caution officers to do their duty, Mayne observing: "I regret to find that so 
many cases have occurred which tend to prove the inefficiency of the police. " 
Procedural and practice developments 
In so far as it may be typical, the H DiVision Register shows the complaints 
process operating at both the individual and the management level. Procedure 
became further formalised over time. The consolidated General Regulations 
and Police Orders of 1862 laid down the duties of the Divisional Superintendent 
in relation to complaints. 27 He had to report all complaints immediately to the 
Commissioner and, if the offence was of a serious nature, he could suspend the 
officer and take whatever other precautions seemed necessary. He could settle 
complaints "of such lighter description as he is allowed by the Commissionerg, 
and was to report facts and decision the following morning to the Commissioner 
for his approval. 
In the same way, he had to report complaints of misconduct referred to a 
magistrate. Any officer disciplined by the Superintendent could appeal to the 
Commissioner who would go over the case afresh. Various subsidiary Orders 
issued from time to time specified handling details. For example, statements 
were to be taken down in writing at once in the station at which the complainant 
appeared irrespective of the station to which the complained of officer belonged; 
27 General Regulations, Instructions, and Orders Ibr the Government and Guidance of the Metropolitan Police Force, 1862, p. 33. 
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and Superintendents were to ascertain at the beginning whether complainants 
were willing to go before a magistrate, and officers in such cases to be brought 
before the Commissioners only after the proceedings had been concluded. 28 
At another level, Commissioners issued hortatory memoranda about behaviour. 
Mayne deprecated crass language: 
... the police are to be reminded that the use of any uncivil or jeering language by them 
on duty is a serious offence contrary to the whole tenor of the orders given for their 
guidance ... all directions are to be given in a mild and firm manner, such conduct by the 
Police is best calculated to ensure obedience to the regulations to be enforced. 29 
Superintendents were enjoined to visit courts to hear officers give evidence and 
"if any have a tendency to overstate or misrepresent they are to be cautioned 
and instructed, or if necessary reported to the Commissioner. "30 Before the 
Departmental Committee of 1868, Mayne made it clear that he continued to rely 
on section 14 of the 1839 Act in complaints cases where complainants wanted 
to take matters to a magistrate. Though the internal inquiry took place in such 
28 lbid, Orders of 18 August and 29 September, 1843. 29 MEPO 7/34, Order of 1 March, 1855. Mayne cautioned again - Order of 7 May, 1856 - about the use of intemperate language which, when attending an evening party, he had heard used to 
a cab driver. 
30 lbid, Memorandum of 25 January, 1866. 
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cases, there was no resort to internal disciplinary proceedings. 31 
Henderson looked to the new rank of District Superintendent established from 
1869 (the rank later entitled Chief Constable from 1886) to have special regard 
to complaints. After some years experience, he thought that they had done 
much to improve the tone of the Force: I am sure it pleases a great many 
ff P32 people to be waited upon by a gentleman instead of by an o Icer in uniform. 
Warren in the 1880s reinforced the complaints system by insisting on early 
responses from Superintendents to his inquiries, giving power to Chief 
Constables to dispose of complaints subject to their submitting exceptional 
cases, and maldng it clear that - having seen examples of inadequate 
investigations - he expected Chief Constables and Superintendents to ensure 
that full investigations were made in every case. 33 There were annual orders 
about drinldng on duty with threats of dismissal. Commissioners struggled 
throughout the nineteenth century with this problem, settling towards the end for 
a strict tariff which, unvaryingly applied, made the punishments more certain 
and in that way influenced behaviours themselves changing for other reasons 
as the years wore on. 34 
31 1868 Report, Evidence, p. 9. This seems to mean that Mayne took the court proceedings as 
conclusive for all purposes, whereas modern practice contemplates disciplinary proceedings for 
any matters not essentially the same as any criminal offence alleged against an officer. In other 
words, section 14 was cast in such wide terms that, should a prosecution fail, further 
proceedings were precluded. No explanation for the repeal of section 14 appears to have been 
offered during the proceedings of the Police Act 1964 other than to imply its obsolescence. It 
appears quite possible, however, that one reason for its failing into disuse may have been its 
? reclusive effecL 2 1879 Report, Evidence, Q 5227. The head of the Executive Branch, however, was not 
impressed: *They never find out anything or rarely. ' - Evidence Q 3573. 33 MEPO 7/34, memoranda of 10 and 19 August, 1886, and 20 and 22 July, 1887. 34 HO 45/9965/X20526 contains the reviews of 1888-9. 
186 
What survived to become the prevailing orthodoxy was a system where, if 
complainants did not take the matter to the magistrate, the Commissioners 
referred complaints to the responsible divisional Superintendent for 
investigation, and the complainants were then invited to stations to confront the 
officers complained of at a meeting chaired by the supedntendent. Where a 
criminal offence was alleged, then the officer should be charged in the normal 
way and sent before the magistrate. Evidence before the Royal Commission of 
1908 (dealt with more extensively below) indicated that identical practices were 
followed in at least the larger provincial forces but usually with direct and regular 
involvement of the Chief Constable. 35 In the Metropolitan police, the chief officer 
acted more in an appellate, confirming character as a result of the force's size. 
How this system operated from the point of view of the complainant is difficult if 
not impossible to establish. On the one hand, it could be said to be very open 
and direct. Complainants had an opportunity to put their point of view and the 
officer was challenged to justify himself under the sanction of being disciplined. 
What could be fairer than an invitation to put up or shut up? On the other hand, 
such a system must in practice have been at least as challenging, if not 
intimidatory, for the complainant. Working people particularly must have felt at a 
disadvantage. 
Some indirect confirmation of the latter view exists in two sources. The first may 
be derived from an account of police public relations in the East End of London 
35 1908 Royal Commission, Cd 4260, evidence of Chief Constables of Leeds and Liverpool, 
especially at QQ 39311 and 39629. 
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from a Toynbee Trust study commissioned in 1904/05. The author, Hugh 
Gamon, lived for a year in the East End concentrating principally on the work of 
the police courts, that is, those presided over by stipendiary magistrates. A 
recent Oxford graduate, Gamon in the opening chapter of his account used 
careful, moderate but in fact all the more damning language about police/public 
relations in its 46 pages. Stressing the good, he the more effectively excoriated 
the bad, that is the venal, boozy, conniving bullies: 
The police down East are no longer the servants of the community. They are masters; 
at the best Idndly champions, at the worst tyrants. It is natural enough. They are a well- 
paid body of men, and in the social scale as high or as higher than most of those with 
whom they come into daily contacL They could scarcely be expected to simulate the 
humility that befits inferiors. 38 
Gamon thought transfer to the LCC might help because 
... the people would feel that, through their representatives, they themselves had 
control and would have a greater assurance that their complaints would be heard, and 
proper inquiries made; and the police would gain a larger measure of confidence and 
sympathy. 3" 
The second source is the series of articles published in the Times following the 
Report of the 1906 Royal Commission. Whilst the whole sweep of the articles 
was to second the clean bill of health that the Commission had given to the 
36 Gamon, H. R. P., The London Pofice Court Today and Tomorrow, Dent, 1907, pp. 234. See 
also biographical note at Appendix C. 37 lbid, p. 45. 
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force, the article's author nuanced his approach by making it clear in a number 
of ways that his own praise was accorded to the existing force rather than what 
it in some respects had been: 
Twenty years ago it was the rule for a constable on the beat to perform his duties much 
more according to his individual taste and experience than he could safely do now. A 
complaint against him at the station would, of course, have been noted and, if serious, 
dealt with by the officer in charge, but the esprit de corps which has already been 
mentioned, and which must be, and ought to be, a strong force in police organisation, 
assumed proportions then which gave cause to many people to believe that policemen 
were a sort of secret brotherhood sworn by oath to hold one another blameless before 
the world. Any complaint or even request for information from an officer in charge at a 
station, had to be made with careful and calculated deference by ordinary people ... An 
appeal [to the Commissioner] indeed, then as now, was never made in vain if the 
accusation put forward were a true bill. But in the olden time the Commissioner was like 
the ancient gods, so far beyond the ken of ordinary mortals and policemen that his 
hand, though it was heavy on evildoers when it descended, did not often make its 
appearance. ' 
The fact that evidence to the 1906 Commission discussed how the 
confrontations should be controlled gives clues to the character at least of some 
of the occasions. So, too, does the Commissioner's memorandum of 15 July 
38 Times, 25 December, 1908. 
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1899 deprecating the putting of irrelevant or insulting questions at 
confrontation. 39 
Exceptional cases 
The ordinary run of complaints case seems to have attracted little public 
attention. However, there were three rashes of cases in the 1880s, 1900s and 
the 1920s which attracted a great deal. 
Miss Cass 
Elizabeth Cass, a milliner originating from Stockton, was arrested on Jubilee 
night 1887 in Regent Street by PC Endacott and charged with soliciting. At 
Marlborough Street the following day she asserted amongst other things that 
Endacott could not have seen her on earlier occasions, as he claimed, because 
she had only been in London for three weeks. Her employer, Mrs Bowden, 
corroborated her claims that she was an entirely respectable person. In 
dismissing the charge, the stipendiary, Newton, cautioned her in widely reported 
language that, if she was an honest girl, she should not walk in Regent Street at 
night for, if she did, next time she was brought before him, she would be sent to 
prison or fined. 
39 MEPO 7/135. If the case later narrated by Harry Daley as occurring in the late 1920s when at 
the Hammersmith station (*mildly and cosily corrupf) was at all typical, nothing much had 
perhaps changed. Operating a police parking scam at the Olympia motor show, Daley was 
alleged by a member of the public to have accepted money from a motorist to extricate him from 
the too close parking to which he had by police action been consigned in the first place. The 
complainant attended the station by invitation and was then bullied and bamboozled by the Sub 
Divisional Inspector, keen amongst other things to defend his part of the scam's perquisites. 
Daley, H., This Smag Cloud, Weidenfeld, 1986, Chapter 15. 
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Questions were tabled in the Commons and the adjournment moved on 5 July, 
1887, urging inquiries into Newton and the PCs conduct. The lead in the 
proceedings was taken by a Radical banister MP, Atherley-Jones. 40 The Home 
Secretary, Matthews, explained the current procedures but failed to resist 
pressure for an ad hoc inquiry following a division narrowly lost by the 
government. The inquiry was undertaken by the Commissioner sitting with a 
legal assessor in public with all the parties represented. It was unavoidably 
inconclusive. Endacott was charged with perjury and acquitted. Newton was 
reprimanded - privately. The Lord Chancellor, who should have known better, 
interviewed Cass himself and confessed himself impressed by her. The Home 
Office Permanent Undersecretary, Lushington, despaired. 
Apart from the incapacity of Matthews and the undiscriminating excitability of a 
Commons fully conscious of, and glad to play upon, Matthews' incapacity, the 
Cass case demonstrated nothing except the soundness of the principle (never 
mind the practice) of the existing procedures. As Howard Vincent, MP and 
former head of the Metropolitan CID pointed out during the Commissioners 
abortive inquiry, it was not clear why the case had not been referred to the 
Treasury Solicitor so that he might decide whether Endacott should be 
prosecuted. As he directed Endacotfs acquittal on the pedury charge, the trial 
judge, Stephen, was scathing of the Commissioners inquiry: 
That I must say is a very inconvenient way of administering justice ... neither Parliament 
40 See Hansard, Commons, 1 July, 1887, cols. 1491-4. See also Appendix C for Nographical 
note. 
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or the administrative department should attempt to hold trials ... the course of holding a 
private inquiry, or an inquiry by a public authority, into the conduct of a man who is 
afterwards to be accused of a crime ... is greatly to be avoided ... the very fact that the 
statements were not put in seems to me conclusive proof that the investigation ought 
not to have been held at all. 41 
Pitts and Coverdale cases 
Much the same issues were raised around the same time by two other cases 
which found their way into the press though not into Parliament. In the first of 
the two, an ex-Inspector Pitts in 1885 won a libel action at Croydon Assizes 
against a young woman, Emily Mitchell (thought by police to be respectable but 
a bit simple). Pitts (a married man of 23 years service) had been dismissed 
following his written confession that he had committed indecent assault upon 
her at a police station. In the libel action (where the Treasury Solicitor, who 
believing the defendant, funded her counsel), the jury accepted Pitts' claim that 
he had been out of his mind when he made the confession which he now 
denied. After much careful deliberation, which included the Home Secretary 
consulting the Solicitor General and thought being given even at that stage to 
prosecuting the Inspector, Pitts was granted a pension after a most reluctant 
Commissioner was brought to issue the necessary certificate that Pitts had 
served with diligence and fidelity - though so certifying only up to the day before 
Pitts' alleged offence. The Parliamentary Under Secretary, Stuart Wortley, put 
his finger on the crucial failing: "I confess I always feel doubtful about these 
cases in which the decision impugned is not that of a public tribunal. " The 
41 Times, 2 November, 1887. 
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Solicitor General agreed that the case should really have been put to the courts 
in the first place. 
42 
The case of Annie Coverdale raised in 1888 in the Standard newspaper 
some time after the Cass case turned on similar issues. In this instance a young 
woman accused of being drunk and disorderly was discharged by the 
stipendiary, Baggalay, who had addressed questions about Annie's way of life 
to the arresting PC Bloy after he had stepped down. Annie's father complained 
that his daughter had had no means of clearing herself from the insinuations it 
was considered Bloy had made. The Home Office sent Baggalays notes to the 
Commissioner, Warren, for his comments. Scarred no doubt by the Cass case, 
Warren said he had no power to conduct an investigation into the conduct and 
character of the girl and sought explicit instructions "as to the form of the 
enquiry and as to the exact matters that are to be enquired into. " A later letter, 
summarising further reports he had received, observed that at the court itself 
no-one could be described as in charge of the police case. The court Inspector 
had no standing, and Baggalay had not expressed disbelief in Blo)(s evidence 
until after the case had been concluded. 43 
Common to all these cases procedurally was a confusion between the 
disciplinary and prosecutorial roles of the police. This confusion had not always 
been one attributable to the police alone. Whilst that had certainly been so in 
the Pitts case, the confusion had been wished upon them in the Cass case and 
42 HO 45/9961/X6760, minute of 13 August, 1885, and letter of 2 October, 1885. 43 HO 144/474/X17970, Warren's letters of 23 and 28 February, 1888. 
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resisted in Coverdale. The confusion was not new. In 1868, apparently, a new 
Home Secretary (Gathorne Hardy) and the new PUS he had appointed (Liddell) 
got into a situation where Liddell had tried to investigate the veracity of a 
complaint by interviewing the parties. His inquiries were inconclusive, and the 
Home Secretary had concluded that when a complaint amounted to a criminal 
charge, and where there was conflicting evidence, the Commissioner should not 
treat it as a matter of discipline nor should the matter be referred to an extra 
judicial inquiry unable to take evidence on oath or to take a final decision on the 
facts. The alleged offender should instead be put before the courts. 44 
How could the confusion have arisen? There seem to have been two causes. 
The first arose from the fact that the police were themselves for most intents 
and purposes the public prosecutors of the day. Although in law each officer 
bringing a charge was indistinguishable from a private person initiating a 
complaint before a magistrate, in practice the police service had become the 
public prosecutor in the absence of any alternative. Until 1908, the services 
offered by the Treasury Solicitor and the Director of Public Prosecutions in his 
first incarnation were confined in practice to certain limited categories of case, 
and they were not conceived of as occupying any general advisory function. 
The second cause stemmed from the force's internal imperatives of maintaining 
its own discipline. The number of forced removals from the force alone showed 
how seriously this function was taken. There was clearly a preoccupation with 
" HO 144/17753/114A, undated memorandum under cover of a letter of 6 June, 1928, from 
Home Office to Law Officers' Department. The Home Office witness, Troup, giving evidence to 
the 1908 Royal Commission was aware of the 1868 case. 
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considering in any case the potential disciplinary consequences of any 
misdemeanour, and it seems that these considerations tended to drive out at 
times the public interest in staging prosecution. Moreover, this preoccupation 
overlooked the benefit even to the force itself of prosecution which was 
precisely that voiced by Stuart Wortley in 1885. This was that it conferred 
closure: a public tribunal with adequate powers to compel witnesses and secure 
sworn testimony was in a position to make judgments that stuck and could not 
be impeached. The fact that such a benefit was overlooked at times illustrates 
the extent to which the management of the force had become inward looking 
and incapable of considering interests other than its own. There seems to have 
been no concept of the legitimacy of a separate complainant/consumer 
dimension. The use of section14 of the 1839 Act seems to have decayed to one 
where the police cited it as something for complainants alone to use. 
In so far as this was true, it cast no credit on the Home Office. The Department 
had as little to do With complaints and discipline as it could, and did not 
conceive itself as having a duty to champion the otherwise un or under- 
represented complainants. As the 1880s cases show, the Home Office became 
involved at all only when it could not avoid it. There seem to have been only two 
recorded, spontaneous initiatives in the second half of the century. The first was 
its insistence in 1877 that the Commissioner should report all cases where he 
intended to dismiss men who had 15 years' service, the length of time which 
then qualified men for pension . 
45 And the second concerned the inquiry in 1891 
45 HO 45/9438/65235, minutes of June and July 1877. Henderson's return of 18 July, 1877 for the years 1874-6 listed a total of 9 such dismissals adetails of which will I think shew the Secretary of State that the punishment awarded was inevitable! 
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by Lushington, the Permanent Under Secretary, about the circumstances in 
which Wontners, the Commissioners solicitors, had been employed to defend 
officers in court actions. The Commissioners meticulous reply showed that 
there had been 39 cases during 1887-1891, and that Wontners had been 
engaged solely where cases had arisen from some act or alleged act done in 
the performance of duty. With evident relief, Lushington concluded that the 
response was satisfactory "I mean that the HO does not appear to have 
indiscriminately defended Police Constables. "46 
The Royal Commission of 1906-8 
Many of these issues came to a head in the work of this Commission. Its 
immediate origins lay in a series of allegations of police misbehaviour made in 
the Commons starting on 30 April 1906 and culminating in a statement by the 
Prime Minister on 14 May 1906 that there would be a Royal Commission to 
investigate the allegations supported by a Bill to give it the powers - essentially 
those of a court - to do so. The original allegations concerned two men arrested 
on Boat Race night for being drunk and disorderly and taken to Vine Street. To 
these were added allegations that the police had wrongfully arrested a Mme 
D'Angely who was acquitted of soliciting. Her successful defence had been that 
she had been merely awaiting her husband, which gentleman had supported 
her version. The acquittal meant that, although the police wanted a review, the 
allegations against the police could not be reviewed in a court. 
48 HO 45/9726/A52548, Commissioner's letter of 19 March, 1891, and minute of I May, 1891. It 
was, of course, the difficulty of explaining why police authorities stood behind officers in such 
cases that was the immediate precipitating factor behind the decision in 1959 to set up the 
Willink Royal Commission - see the debate on Garratt v. Eastmond, Hansard, Commons, 18 November, 1959, cols. 1239-1303. 
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Before the announcement of the inquiry, the Home Secretary (Herbert 
Gladstone) consulted the Lord Chancellor (Loreburn) as to its optimum form. In 
a thoughtful manuscript letter of three foolscap pages, Loreburn reviewed the 
options. Noting that the police wanted an inquiry so that "the public confidence 
should be restored to them"; he counselled resort to a general inquiry of some 
sort to uavoid the creation of a most mischievous precedent of giving practically 
an appeal to some authority outside of the law from some decision of a Court". 
He advised strongly against a committee of the Commons ("a most unjudicial 
body"), and that the defect of a departmental committee was that it had no 
power to administer oaths. That left a Royal Commission but one supported, 
like the Royal Commission on Trade with South Africa set up in 1905, with a 
special act of Parliament. Lorebum was fully aware of the Cass case: "Nothing 
could be more regrettable in all ways than what was then done, even if it had 
been true that the magistrate was open to criticism, and I trust it will never be 
thought of again. "47 
The Royal Commission was set up with effect from 26 May 1906 and reported 
on 19 June 1908.48 All its members were lawyers, and its chairman, D. Brynmor 
Jones, like some of the other members, was an MP. Apart from two sittings in 
camera, its other 64 sittings were all in public. It advertised for complaints and 
saw 292 witnesses. In its report it effectively ruled out examining general 
complaints where it took the view that the witnesses had no credibility. In all the 
47 BL, Add Mss 46018, lefter of 12 May, 1906. 48 Report of the Royal Commission on the Duties of the Metropolitan Police, Cd 4156; evidence Cd 4260 and 4261. 
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other cases it covered the ground in great detail, and found mostly, though not 
invariably, for the police. 
The report has sometimes been regarded as a whitewash. 49 It did not rule out 
corruption in relation to bookmakers but ruled out systematic extortion from 
prostitutes. Otherwise, the Report certainly cleared the force's general conduct 
handsomely, and to the great relief of the Home Office. Gladstone's letter to the 
force was warmly welcomed by the Commissioner, Henry: "It would not be 
possible to employ more generous terms to express the very favourable opinion 
you have formed of the efficiency and character of the Force. " He asked for 
permission to read out the letter to the Superintendents after publication of the 
Report but not otherwise to publish the letter. 50 Not only was the letter not 
published, there was at no time any reference to the Commission in Police 
Orders or the Commissioners Annual Report. 
An American observer of the European police scene in 1915, Raymond 
Fosdick, put much weight on the Commission's findings, and particulady the 
evidence from the National Vigilance Association and the Commissioner that 
49 For example, by James Timewell whose Police and Public Vigilance Society was represented 
before the Commission and who published a pamphlet (Royal Commission upon the Duties of 
the Metropolitan Police: Suppressed Evidence) in 1911 criticising its findings as fatally biased in 
favour of the police. More recently, in his Policing Morals, 1994, at p. 140, Stefan Petrow 
assumes from Brynmor Jones! letter of 5 November, 1907 to Gladstone (BL Add Mss 46064) 
that a whitewash was deliberately intended and encompassed. The letter is equally open to the 
interpretation that the writerwas responding to a normal ministerial enquiry about progress 
where the subjects of the inquiry had expressed anxiety about an apparent lack of urgency in 
the Commission- *The report is indeed a stiff job. Every case requires careful thinking over. I am 
sorry that there is some unrest in the force. The evening papers have much to answer for.. I 
shall do all I can to hasten the publication of the Report but in view of possible attack it is very 
necessary to weigh every phrase. ' As ever in such instances, it depends where the observer 
starts from. 
50 BL Add Mss 46065, letter of 24 June, 1908. 
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there was no evidence of police blackmail of prostitutes . 
51 Nowhere in a 
somewhat tortured discussion of what he described as the question of police 
"integrity" - and where no doubt he wished to contrast the situation abroad with 
that at home - did Fosdick review procedural questions, such as the avenues 
for complaint and redress. By concentrating on larger, and vaguer, cultural 
phenomena - "rigid class distinctions" and the belief that the European police 
were inherently less open to temptation because they were "not called upon to 
enforce standards of conduct which do not meet with general public approval" - 
Fosdick allowed himself to settle comfortably for the urotten apple" theory. 
Listing recent European corruption cases (including in Manchester and 
Carlisle), he concluded: 
It is important to remember, however, that these instances are individual and 
exceptional. They by no means represent typical or general conditions. They are 
incidental to the employment of large groups of men in responsible positions. r2 
In fact, the Report of the Royal Commission was something less than a total 
exoneration of the force if its meticulous review of the individual cases is alone 
considered. 53 As Atherley-Jones (the very MP who had carried the Adjournment 
against the government in the Cass case in 1887) pointed out in the scrappy 
Commons discussion, the force had been found wanting in nearly half of the 19 
5' Fosdick, R. B., European Police Systems, Century, New York, 1915, Chapter X, pp. 372-3. 
Writing in 1882, on the other hand, Ballantine claimed to have witnessed such transactions: 
Ballantine, W., Some Experiences of a Barrister's Life, Bentley, 1882, p. 276. Perhaps they 
really had disappeared in the intervening 40 years, that is if they had not been figments of 
Ballantines - admittedly hostile - imagination in the first place. 52 Fosdick, R. B., op. cit., p. 376. 53 It was not true that, as Troup, the Permanent Under Secretary claimed to the Home Secretary 
'The result is a complete vindication of the Metropolitan Police* - HO 45/105231140292, minute 
of 22 June, 1908. 
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individual cases. 54 One of them, the Gamble case, revealed a serious assault 
on the complainant who suffered prolonged hospitalisation and a damaged 
urethra. The fact that the complainant did not come forward until discovered by 
the agent of the Police and Public Vigilance Society illustrates perhaps the 
confidence of ordinary working people in contemporary procedures. That 
fisticuffs between officers and civilians were expected as routine by supervising 
officers in the Whitechapel of the day could speak volumes of conditions on the 
street and the force's use of violence. 55 
Whatever the view that now may be taken about the Commission's treatment of 
the individual cases, what also has to be considered is what it said about the 
system of complaints investigation. The Home Office witnesses took the view 
that the Home Office was an executive rather than a legal office with no powers 
to compel testimony. The Home Office PUS, Chalmers (a lawyer and former 
judge), doubted whether the Home Secretary had power to dismiss a 
Metropolitan officer rather than, or in addition to, the Commissioner's powers. 
The complainants remedy was therefore via the courts rather than the minister. 
The Assistant Secretary, Troup (and Chalmers' successor), explained "... we do 
not consider the Home Office the disciplinary authority... and that if anybody 
came to the Home Office and said 'I have a complaint against a police 
54 Hansard, Commons, 29 July, 1908, Coll 1593. 55 The case is dealt with at pp. 388-410 of Vol. 1, Cd 4156. It receives particularly cavalier 
treatment at p. 229 in Fido M. and Skinner K, The Offidal Encyclopaedia of Scotland Yard, 
Virgin, 1999, though they report the subsequent conviction and imprisonment of the constable 
and sergeant involved. Tom Divall's breezy account of a pretty physical early career towards the 
end of the nineteenth century received rather queasy endorsement in the MP's Foreword In the 
year another Royal Commission reported - Divall, T., Scoundrels and Scallywags, Benn, 1929. The MP was Hayes, the former police union official. 
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constable' the natural or ordinary thing would be to tell him to go to Scotland 
Yard. "56Troup said that the Home Office had received 14 complaints about the 
force in 1904,20 in 1905, and 34 in 1906.57 
In a contemporaneous return initiated by Howard Vincent for each of the years 
1903-05, a total of 378,000 arrests over the three years had resulted in only 78 
not being justified, of which 67 of the 78 had in fact been refused at the station 
in the first place. Legal proceedings had been taken by private persons against 
12 constables. Four of these cases had resulted in adverse findings: 
respectively, damages of one farthing each to pay own costs; damages of one 
shilling but no costs; E20 damages and costs (constable right to use truncheon 
but used it more than necessary); and one fine of 40/- or one month's 
imprisonment. 58 
On the questions of general procedure, the Report agreed that the Home Office 
could do no more than refer complaints it received to the Commissioner. 
However, it recommended an important procedural change which was made 
possible by a quite separate initiative. This was the recreation on a new basis of 
the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). When the necessary legislation - 
Prosecution of Offenders (Amendment) Bill - was introduced by the Attorney 
General in March 1908, no mention was made of its possible relevance to 
58 Report of the Royal Commissfon, op. cit., Vol III, Evidence, Cd 4261, QQ47714' 47718 et 
seq., and 48164. 57 Ibid, Q 48155. 
58 PP 1906 Vol. XCIX Return dated 13 June, 1906, to an Address of 15 May, 1906, by Sir 
Howard Vincent. Apart from this return and Lushington's 1891 concern about the use of public 
money to defend actions against officers, there seems to be no record of how often 
complainants pursued redress by civil actions. 
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complaints. Its rationale, rather, was tied entirely to the fact that the recently 
established Court of Criminal Appeal required all criminal appeals to be 
defended by the DPP and it had thus become necessary to separate the office 
once more from that of the Treasury Solicitor. 59Concern from the Parliamentary 
Opposition was limited solely to the expense of the change. 
Nonetheless, the revival of the DPP gave the Royal Commission an opportunity 
to engage an independent prosecuting authority which had not been previously 
available in the same way. One of the great problems confronting the 
construction of a manifestly independent system had always been the fact that, 
in the absence of a public prosecution system, the police had gradually 
assumed that responsibility. Whilst the recreation of the DPP did not establish a 
thoroughgoing public system in England and Wales, it did in principle provide a 
public function capable of offering an independent review. How satisfactorily it 
did that in practice was, of course, another matter. 
Moreover, the Royal Commission did not stop there. Although it made much of 
the testimony before the 1834 Select Committee and printed material from 
the 1834 Committee's Report, it did not support stark reliance on the 
mechanism of section 14 of the 1839 Act where members of the public were left 
unaided to take their cases to a magistrate: 
We do not think that the mere fact that a complainant may take legal proceedings if he 
r'a Hansard, Commons, 24 March, 1908, cols 1239-40. Proceedings in the Lords were, apart from a brief explanation by the Lord Chancellor, entirely formal. 
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chooses should be a bar to his complaint being fully investigated and its truth decided 
by a Police inquiry. The remedy by civil action against one in the position of an ordinary 
constable is not effective, and the application for a summons in the Police Court entails 
expense, trouble and delay from which people naturally shrink. It seems to us, seeing 
that the Police are invested with large powers which may cause injury to private 
persons unless exercised properly and in good faith, that anyone who thinks 
themselves aggrieved by an abuse of those powers ought to have the right without 
embarking on litigation in the Courts to have such alleged misuse of power fully inquired 
into by the Chief Commissioner or a competent officer acting on his behalf. If during the 
course of an Inquiry it appears that the alleged misconduct amounts to a criminal 
charge and the evidence is conflicting, we think the Inquiry should be suspended and 
the facts should be reported to the Chief Commissioner, who should place them before 
the Director of Public Prosecutions. If no action thereon is taken by the Director of 
Public Prosecutions, the Inquiry should be subsequently continued and completed. 80 
They went on further to recommend that the inquiries should be undertaken by 
an officer from a different Division who should report his findings with the 
evidence. Though they thought the confrontational procedure should be 
retained, they wanted to see the whole system under a senior officer -a 
recommendation acted on in 1909 by the Act which permitted the appointment 
of a fourth Assistant Commissioner. It was this officer who normally presided 
over the Boards of Discipline first established only in early 19086, in place of a 
system where one of the Assistant Commissioners sat alone. The original 
Police Order of 1908 became elaborated by steps which tried to guard against 
collusion between officers and added to procedural formality amongst other 
60 PP 1908, Vol. L, Cd 4156, p. 143. "' MEPO 7/70, Police Order of 8 February, 1908. An earlier recommendation by the 1879 
Departmental Committee had not been acted upon. 
203 
things to protect the position of the officer in the event of later legal 
proceedings. As in 1834, the formal position by 1910 was impeccable: 
The investigation must be conducted with impartiality and with forebearance towards 
the complainant. The object to be aimed at in the arrangements made should be to 
satisfy the complainant and the general public that complaints are fully and fairly 
investigated. 62 
The Home Secretary, Churchill, challenged the discipline system but only from 
the point of view of asking whether it should not be more formal like the Army 
system. In a magisterial reply, Henry explained that the most severe sanction 
available was dismissal and a system which maintained discipline in a force of 
19,000 men at the cost in 1910 of dismissing 19 and reducing 7 others in rank 
had some advantages over the judicialised military system which, of course, 
possessed full criminal jurisdiction. Churchill did not press the point. 63 
It was not until 1919 that a uniform code of discipline for the whole police 
service became prescribed statutorily. This formalised Metropolitan practice 
which continued, if the disciplined officer insisted, to give a right of appeal 
against any punishment up to the Commissioner personally. But even the 
statutory system conferred no special judicial powers, though it did require the 
registration of complaints and the outcomes of disciplinary proceedings. " 
02 HO 45/10540/156320, Metropolitan Police General Orders, Paragraph 58, under cover of 
Commissioner Henry's memorandum of 10 October, 1910. e3 lbid, Henry to Troup, 27 March, 1911. 
"S& RO 1920, No 1484, Paragraphs 13 and 15, and 25 and 26. 
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Later developments 
This meant that there remained an incompletely structured interaction between 
disciplinary and court procedures. Two subsequent cases and a further Royal 
Commission illustrated why. The two cases were those respectively of Major 
Sheppard and Irene Savidge. Both resulted in tribunals under the provisions of 
the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 because dissatisfaction remained 
after acquittals and there was no other established way of reviewing the 
proceedings. In the Sheppard case, an officer defended himself successfully at 
the Old Bailey in 1924 when accused of defrauding a prostitute but had been 
subjected, it was alleged, to unnecessarily prolonged detention at Vine Street 
police station and elsewhere after he had voluntarily surrendered himself. The 
inquiry was undertaken by a Silk who was also an MP. His six page report was 
damning ".. the convenience of the police must not stand in the way of the liberty 
of the prisoner. " He noted also considerable apparent confusion amongst the 
police themselves about what exactly their powers were. 65 
The case of Irene Savidge is, of course, the better known. A charge of public 
indecency in Hyde Park against her and a former MP, Sir Leo Money, was 
dismissed by the magistrate at Marlborough Street in May 1928 but great 
exception was taken to the way in which an officer, Chief Inspector Collins, 
acting on behalf of the DPP, intemogated Savidge when pursuing the possibility 
of charging with perjury the two constables who brought the original case. The 
three man 1921 Act tribunal split: the majority exonerated Collins; the minority 
esAffest of Major R. O. Sheppard DSORAOa Report by the Rt HonJ. F. P. Rawlinson KC IVIP of Enquiry held under the Tribunals of Enquiry (Evidence) Act 1921. PP 19244, Vol. XV, Cmd 
2497. 
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of one (Lees-Smith, MP) judged Collins to be a liar inspired to exculpate the 
constables by bamboozling Savidge into a statement which effectively made 
proceedings for pedury impossible. The minority report -a remarkably clear- 
eyed and principled documentw - went on to raise fifteen substantial questions 
about law and procedure that the writer thought flowed from the events. 67 The 
governments response was to set up a Royal Commission essentially to 
consider those questions. 
One of the fifteen questions was "Should the DPP be furnished with a staff that 
will enable him, when deciding the question of a prosecution for an offence in 
which police officers are concerned, to conduct his inquiries and take proofs 
without depending on the police for assistance? " This was not in fact the first 
time that the possibility of independent investigation had been raised by an MP. 
In the debate on the 1908 Royal Commission Report, Athedey-Jones had 
pressed the same point only to be brushed aside by the Home Secretary, 
Gladstone. 68 In its Report of 1929, the Royal Commission gave the suggestion 
no more room than Gladstone: 
This suggestion is based on the assumption that the police cannot be trusted when it is 
a matter of prosecuting one of their own Force. No evidence has been submitted in 
support of this assumption, which in our view is disproved by the particulars furnished to 
68 Albert Lieck, who was the Clerk at the original hearing, attended the tribunal and was 
impressed by Lees-Smith's performance. See Lleck, A, Bow Street Worid, 1938, p. 214. 67 Report of the Tribunal in regard to the interrogation by the police of Miss Savidge, Cmd 3147, 
PIP 1928, Vol IX. 
m Hansard, Commons, 29 July, 1908, cols 1592-1605. Atherley-Jones was also highly critical of 
the Home Office: '... the Home Office, whose duty was to protect and vindicate the public, 
abrogated its duty and handed it over to one it was supposed to supervise, and the entire 
investigation was left to the Chief Commissioner! 
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us of cases in which prosecutions of Policemen have been instituted in recent years 
and in which the investigations have all been carded out by the Police themselves. We 
prefer to continue to trust the Police, in the belief that, having responsibility for their own 
discipline, they will discharge it more faithfully in the absence of interference from some 
outside authority. A divided responsibility is always weak. 
They went on, however, to recommend some handling improvements in relation 
to informing the public of outcomes and the strengthening of senior officer 
supervision. They also recommended that the Home Secretary should be given 
power to set up an inquiry into police discipline or administration with powers to 
take evidence on oath. 69The last recommendation, as with so many from this 
Commission, was not acted upon. 
Overview 
From the beginning, it is evident that police and the public! s perspectives on 
complaints were not identical. For officialdom, procedurally complaints and 
discipline were irrevocably intertwined: complaints, indeed, were discipline so to 
speak. As the Home Office memorandum to the 1929 Royal Commission put it: 
The object of the Chief Officer of Police in the investigation of ... complaints, and his 
primary responsibility, are to maintain the efficiency and good discipline of his force, 
rather than to provide redress for persons who have, or think they have, a grievance. 
Incidentally, the latter purpose as well as the former may be served, and to this extent 
the procedure supplements the right possessed by every citizen to seek in the courts 
69 Report of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure, Cmd 3297, PP 1929, Vol. IX, paras 283,284 and 291. 
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any remedy or redress the law allows if he considers he has suffered in person, 
property or reputation by any act or omission of a member of a police force. 70 
For the bona fide public complainant whose encounter was likely to be a one off 
experience, the requirement was both unstructured and uninstructed. The 
object sought varied on an extensive continuum. At one end, all that was 
desired was some kind of just satisfaction of a wrong righted, without 
necessarily wishing to initiate or to become involved in a formal, judicialised 
process. At the other, perhaps more sophisticated, extreme was a 
determination and the resources to press for redress if need be in the criminal 
or civil courts. Finally, the whole aura of formality was reinforced to some extent 
by the very ambiguity of the term ucomplaint": in ordinary judicial usage it meant 
the act that initiated the court process, and this meaning would have been ever- 
present in the minds of police officials. 
This was no doubt one of the factors that contributed to the formality that 
seems to have accompanied complaint consideration from the outset - that and 
the fact that the inescapable intertwining with disciplinary consideration 
necessarily implied something more than a weightless administrative process. If 
an officer was in jeopardy of losing his job, possibly even his liberty, then 
contemporary standards of procedural fairness became engaged. Curiously, it 
was the Home Secretarys violation as the Commissioners saw it of such - at 
the time not too exacting - standards that nearly provoked their resignation in 
1834 over the Ruth Morris case. But the people in the best position to insist on 
70 HO 45/25860/526251/19, memorandum of 5 October, 1928. 
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high standards of procedural formality in their own interests were, of course, 
those involved in the processes continuously, that is to say police officers 
themselves. The pressure from them is detectable in police journalism from its 
inception and became institutionalised in the form of police unionism sanctioned 
from 1918. 
The result was that the police acquired a right to independent review of 
discipline before the public, except where the latter took cases to the courts, 
and that way acquired independent review of their complaints . 
71 What killed 
confrontation was not public withdrawal but, as the Commissioner explained to 
the Willink Royal Commission at the beginning of the 1960s, the desire to 
protect the rights of police officers and keep the way open to disciplinary 
sanctions. 72Neither a confrontation procedure nor the sort of tribunal 
recommended by the 1929 Royal Commission was satisfactory because, 
without some harsh inroad into the protection granted to a defendant under the 
discipline regulations, further disciplinary action would be impossible. For very 
similar reasons, the Willink Royal Commission rejected the forms of 
independent review suggested to it on the grounds that"the appearance of 
greater justice to the public is liable to be bought at the expense of the police. "73 
71 Significantly, the Howard League in its evidence to the 1929 Royal Commission urged that dissatisfied complainants should be given a right of appeal to a tribunal on the model of the 
police discipline appeals tribunal set up by the Police (Appeals) Act, 1927. See HO 
45/25860/526251. 
72 Royal Commission on the Police (Final Report), 1962, Cmnd 1728; Evidence, Memorandum 
ýy Metropolitan Commissioner, para 74, p. 1163. 73 lbid, Report, para 430. 
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At the same time, it should not be overlooked that this ever-present procedural 
formality was accompanied by what would nowadays be called a management 
perspective. That is, complaints could be seen as a significant barometer of 
public satisfaction, and give opportunities to respond and to correct. This seems 
certainly to have been the case for the early Commissioners, concerned as they 
were to bolster their creation's legitimacy. It was also grasped by Henderson 
(1869-86) in what he looked for in his District Superintendents and by Henry 
(Commissioner 1903-18), though greatly misliked by his successor but one, 
Horwood (1920-8), who used his Annual Report for 1922 to attack "the less 
reputable journals" for making allegations of corruption and then refusing to 
reveal their sources. 74 It transpired he also actually prevented the kind of sting 
operation that was alone likely to - and eventually did - produce positive results 
in an area like the Public Carriage Office. 75 
Finally, however, to concentrate on procedures alone is like describing 
Parliament without the politics. Policing in London remained an intensely 
political business. That is why the executive continued to keep direct control 
and why the elder Gladstone did not in the end use his generally 
unchallengeable authority in his second ministry to force the Home Secretary to 
give up the Metropolitan police to municipal control. From towards the end of 
74 Commissioners Annual Report, 1922, Cmd 1904, p. 3. 75 H045/25425/440186, letter of 23.7.1929 from Elliot (Assistant Commissioner) to Home Office. 
It was suspected that police at vehicle testing stations were taking backhanders from applicants. 
(On a visit, Elliot had been tipped a florin by an applicant mistaking his function and standing. ) 
Horwood in an official Yard minute had said that unless a correspondent identified himself, his 
allegations should not be investigated. Horwood's successor, Byng, took a different view. 
Wensley (one of the most senior detectives) was brought in; traps were set, convictions 
followed. In his memoirs, Wensley makes no mention of the case. The only police corruption he 
appears to contemplate is that of the over-zealous and unscrupulous detective officer - Wensley, F. P., Detective Days, Cassell, 1931, pp. 281-2. 
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the nineteenth century there can be detected language used to refer to the 
Metropolitan police as an imperial force and as somehow representative of the 
good order and government conferred by the United Kingdom on a// its 
territories. It followed that in political representation its reputation had always to 
be restored and the public reassured. State officers exercising a command 
authority had necessarily to be represented as men of reliable public-spirited 
capacity who could be trusted. How else could the Empire be run? 
The consciousness of being engaged in such endeavours comes over clearly in 
the 1908 and 1929 Royal Commissions. In the first case, a fairly large number 
of individual cases were meticulously examined and, although by no means all 
left the police without blemish and some general corruption was acknowledged 
to exist, the public was nonetheless reassured in ringing tones that all was well 
as a whole. In much the same way, despite a long run of allegations of 
corruption, the police had been loyal during the General Strike and the 
chairman of the 1929 Royal Commission made it clear from the beginning that 
he knew his duty: 
... our main effort must be to find means of restoring that mutual confidence [between 
police and public] which has been so striking and happy a feature of our national 
organisation, and in the absence of which the very bases of our social fabric will be 
undermined and even gravely imperilled ... law-abiding citizens, who are the vast 
majority, do not wish to see the Police discredited. The criminal classes no doubt would 
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like nothing better, but it certainly will not be the purpose of this Commission to play into 
their handS. 70 
Of course, this has to modem ears an unbearably self-satisfied and patronising 
tone. It was also no doubt associated with a not unfriendly but also none too 
patient paternalism of the sort that that can be heard in the evidence of the 
Chief Constable of Liverpool to the 1908 Royal Commission: 
I find, especially among the lower orders, all they want is an opportunity of making their 
complaint, and even if they are told they are not believed they have some satisfaction. " 
Conclusions 
The temptation to moralise on the subject of complaints, granted particularly its 
modem salience in police/public relations, may be thought difficult to resist. The 
haphazard, almost casual, development of what remained unsatisfactory 
arrangements by the end of the period suggests an insensitivity to public 
feelings and the public interest that would not nowadays be entertained. 
Putting any anachronistic indignation aside, however, there are perhaps two 
dimensions that might be singled out. They are how the relatively inchoate 
arrangements for prosecution affected questions of police discipline, and the 
extent to which conditions of limited democracy affected political perceptions. 
The former concerns largely technical and legal issues, and the latter wholly 
political questions. 
76 Royal Commission Report (1929), Cmd 3297, Chairman's inaugural statement, p. 126. 77 Royal CO mmission (1908), Evidence, Cd 4261, Q 39637. 
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As to the first dimension, it is evident that prosecution and discipline became 
greatly confused in a situation where the police by default in fact took over the 
public prosecuting role. Resort to section 14 of the 1839 Act - never exactly 
friendly to the complainant - had plainly atrophied by the turn of the century. The 
creation of the Director of Public Prosecutions in 1878 did not, initially, end that 
confusion. The different muddles over the Pitts and Cass cases both make the 
same point: police thinking in practice conflated the two responsibilities, and as 
a result left little room for management manoeuvre or the complainant 
perspective. 78 Whilst Commissioners did appear to manoeuvre flexibly and with 
considerable determination into the 1840s, this personal involvement could not 
survive the sheer growth in the size of the force -a point made forcefully to 
Mayne by an MP in 1853 . 
79 And the fact is that the small tier of senior officers 
from Chief Constable upwards never re-established the same degree of 
oversight in later years. As Gamon pointed out: 
Largely ex-commissioned officers of the army, they are of a different cast of thought and 
complexion from [the constable]. Questions of high policy and discipline are submitted 
to them; but their presence is not very real to the ordinary P. C. It is to the 
superintendent and the inspectors that he looks up. 80 
As to the second, political dimension, the attitudes of the Home Office and 
78 For an account of how and why such confusions persisted up to the present and with what 
result, see Smith, G., Tolice Complaints and Criminal Prosecutions% Modem Law Review, 
2001, pp. 372-392. 79 CF CRL 3126, letter of 23 May 1853 from Sir R. Inglis MP to Mayne. 80 Gamon, op. cit, p. 16. 
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police and Royal commissioners do not suggest people impelled to be eager 
rooters out of iniquity. Henderson's satisfaction with the tone that the District 
Superintendents had brought was a satisfaction entirely with the way their 
attendance on respectable complainants helped to resolve matters. Both 
Warren and Horwood sought to ignore anonymous complaints. There was not 
any, let alone any significant, Parliamentary pressure to oblige the Home 
Secretary to press the Commissioner on the implementation of force policy. 
Very few complaints were received in the Home Office, and it chose to take a 
limited view of what its role in such matters should be. 81 One stipendiary, Cluer, 
was alone amongst his bretheren in alleging weak and collusive management: 
... instead of people being... dismissed for serious misconduct they are merely 
transferred to other divisions and allowed to see if they can delude another magistrate 
instead of the one who found them out-Anything that could raise the standard of truth 
telling, accuracy and a sense of their duty towards the public, from the Commissioner 
downwards, I think is the only comment I can suggest that would assist the organisation 
and working of the police force but that is a very important point. 82 
81 See evidence of the Permanent Under Secretary, Chalmers, to the 1908 Royal Commission. 
He maintained that the Home Office was purely an executive rather than a legal office. It had no 
powers to compel, and all investigations had to be made through the Commissioner. The 
dissatisfied complainant's remedies lay through the courts e. g. in actions for pedury or civil 
damages. See exchanges in Cd 4261 from Q 47718. 82 [bid, Q 44985. 
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In principle, force policy in respect of investigation could not be faulted. General 
Orders said all the right things about getting to the truth, but not everyone was 
convinced that police investigators actually got there reliably and often enough. 
James Timewell of the Police and Public Vigilance Society was humoured by 
the 1908 Royal Commission but not won over 
Yet few as the investigated cases are, it would be difficult for an impartial person to read 
the two volumes of evidence ... without realising that, so far as the police authorities are 
concerned, the foundations of our national glory may be destroyed, morality become a 
by-word and justice laughed to derision if only certain classes of the public, who really 
count, can be further deluded so that the reputation of the Metropolitan Police force can, 
by any means, be publicly maintained. 83 
Effective political citizenship in a society which in 1908 still denied the vote to 
half the adult population because of their gender and still withheld it from many 
other adults was a limited force. Those who did have political influence were not 
going to press too far routinely in the case of the very agency they saw as the 
key to maintaining a public order they regarded as more fragile than is the 
instinctive case now. In that sense, the handling of complaints may be seen as 
highly sensitive to the extent to which different social groups become securely 
incorporated into the political society. The process (for example, the Stephen 
Lawrence case84) is a continuing one, and some consciousness of it may have 
been why Henry did not publish to the force or otherwise make public use of the 
83 Timewell, op. cft., p. 6. 84 The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. Report of an Inquiry by Sir WIliam Macpherson of ClunY, CM 
4262,1999. 
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Home Secretarys effusive congratulatory letter on publication of the 1908 Royal 
Commission's Report. From that perspective, it is perhaps easier to understand 
both why the police monopoly of the investigation of complaints lasted for so 
long and why, in the recent form of the Independent Commission for the 




The said justices may from time to tine, subject to the approbation of one of His Majestys 
principal Secretaries of State, frame such orders and regulations as they shall deem expedient 
relative to the general government of the men to be appointed members of the police force under 
this A&, the places of their residence; the classification, rank, and particular service of the several 
members; their distribution and inspection; the description of arms, accoutrements, and other 
necessaries to be ftýrnished to them; and which of them shall be provided with horses for the 
performance of their duty; and all such other orders and regulations, relative to the said police 
force, as the said justices shall from time to time deem expedient for preventing neglect or abuse, 
and for rendering such force efrderd in the discharge of all its duties; and the said justices may at 
any time suspend or dismiss from his employment any man belonging to the said police whom 
they shag think remiss or negligent in the discharge of his duty, or otherwise unfit for the same; 
and when any man shag be so dismissed, or cease to belong to the said police force, all powers 
vested in him as a constable by virtue of this Act shall immediately cease and determine. (Section 
5, Metropolitan Police Act, 1829) 
This chapter investigates the legal basis of the relationship between 
government and the Metropolitan police at a political level, and how it operated 
in practice. Eadier chapters have examined the significance of Home Office 
appointment practices in the case of the most senior officers, and the history of 
funding. Both of those perspectives reflect individually on aspects of the higher 
aconstitutional* issues that this chapter seeks more synoptically to explore. 
It vAll be argued that the appearance of continuous control by a senior Cabinet 
minister was for most purposes a fiction; that the Commissioner had greater 
autonomy than the Chairman of the Prisons Board although the latter had a 
larger responsibility; but that certain kinds of crisis were capable of engaging 
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the undivided attention not only of the Home Secretary but that of the Prime 
Minister too. The absence in London until after 1888 of any directly elected local 
government agency as a credible alternative to direct control by the executive 
meant that there was no challenge to Home Secretary control for the first 60 
years. And after that, although as Chapter 7 explains, there were some 
aspirations to local authority control, in fact no political groupings emerged that 
were able to change the situation. 
Examining the relationships requires looking at both the formal and informal 
aspects, especially at those moments when the relationship was most tested by 
particular events. In effect, this means paying attention to public crises because 
they posed the greatest difficulties to police and politicians. However, those 
crises themselves need to be placed in the context of normal expectations so 
that how the balance of responsibility and accountability was struck in crisis 
may be judged more securely within the wider context. 
The law 
During the whole period there was no material change in what the law laid 
down. The Metropolitan Police Acts of 1829 and 1839 continued to express the 
statutory position. Although there were a number of subsequent statutes, none 
trenched on the original settlement. Indeed, it could be argued that the 1839 Act 
did nothing to alter the political settlement inherent in the 1829 Act though it did, 
of course, by distinguishing between the executive and the judicial functions of 
the London stipendiary magistracy, change the status of Rowan and Mayne and 
mark this fact by henceforward styling them mcommissioners of police". Later 
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statutes (there were 24 altogether during 1829-1912) dealt, for example, with 
finance, the rank structure above Superintendent and the legal status of the 
Receiver, but none revisited the 1829 settlement. 
The core of that settlement was that the force was a body directed by the 
Commissioners with its officers answerable to the courts but all under the 
control of the executive. As can be seen from the quotation at the head of this 
chapter, section 5 of the 1829 Act put matters very comprehensively. Section 12 
made it clear that the Commissioners had no role in determining pay or 
rewards, though they were given the power of certifying expenses in certain 
circumstances. 
What the Act did not do was lay down the executive's duties to the force. 
Indeed, it implicitly suggested that the Secretary of State's role was entirely 
passive. That is, whilst he responded to and judged the initiatives of others, he 
did not himself take the lead. Thus, although his power was in a number of 
ways absolute (for example, he could advise the Crown summarily to dismiss 
the Commissioners), he could not - statutorily at least - oblige the 
Commissioners to submit orders even if they could make none without his 
approval. In particular, the statute gave the Secretary of State no apparent 
authority to give directions in operational matters. On the face of it, section 5 
seems entirely concerned with administrative matters - significant, vital even for 
the force, but still not issues comprehending operational command. 
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On the other hand, of course, all that this legalistic observation does is 
immediately draw attention to the question of how did the relationship work in 
practice. The short answer is that it flourished for so long as Commissioners 
retained the confidence of a Home Secretary who, whatever his personal 
qualities, enjoyed Parliamentary security. (It was irrelevant whether the Home 
Secretary retained the confidence of Commissioners. ) And the reason for this 
situation was that, in the end, the political process demanded the appearance of 
a final, accountable authority that could be manifested only in the person of the 
Home Secretary. 
How this operated, and how it was recognised as working, are vital questions. It 
has been maintained elsewhere that in the Home Office' the permanent officials 
became dominant in the relationship between executive bodies and ministers. 
The situation of the Metropolitan police was not dissimilar from that of the 
Prison Commission from 1878, that is a large, autonomous body functioning 
Within the criminal jusfice system, ultimately controlled by the Home Secretary. 
Its senior police and civilian officers were, for example, treated as members of 
the Home Office, and appeared in the published Home Office Usts with Home 
Office headquarters staff, factory inspectors, London magistrates' courts' clerks, 
and Prison Commission staff. Even though the buildings from which they 
operated changed location, the Metropolitan police headquarters throughout the 
period was merely a short walk in Whitehall from the Home Office. 
1 McConville, S., English Local Prisons 1860-1900, Routledge, 1995, Chapter 12. 
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There were, however, some important differences. First, although there was 
some confusion over the issue until the 1870s, Metropolitan police staff were 
not civil servants. The constables held a personal, legal office under the crown. 
The Commissioners and Assistant Commissioners held statutory offices and 
were all (until 1972) also magistrates. The civilian staffs held office under 
statute and not under the Crown. Prison Commission staff, on the other hand, 
clearly were civil servants, that is, they were servants of the Secretary of State 
and paid entirely from funds voted by Parliament. Indeed, it had been the 
specific purpose of the Prisons Act 1877 to nationalise the local prison system, 
amalgamate it Wth the convict prisons and, as a result, make Parliament 
responsible for the whole cost. One of the outcomes was that, although the 
Permanent Under Secretary could act on the Home Secretar)(s behalf and was 
the latter's senior official adviser on police matters within the Home Office, he 
was not the superior of the Commissioner in the way that, ultimately, he was in 
the case of the Chairman of the Prison Commission. He could not, in other 
words, give orders on his own authority to Commissioners of Police. It followed 
that other civil servants in the Home Office were in the same position. 
Conversely, it meant that Commissioners could be overruled by the Home 
Secretary alone, and that, if they wished, Commissioners could, however 
unreasonably, insist on submitting questions to the Home Secretary personally 
for decision. 
Finally, however, there are two glosses it is necessary to bear in mind. First, 
although with modem eyes section 5 of the 1829 Act may now be read as 
conveying administrative powers only, it has to be seen alongside a 
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contemporary acceptance of the Secretary of State acting, and being expected 
to act, spontaneously in an executive capacity which it was unnecessary to 
express on the face of the statute. Roles and functions, which have 
subsequently become more distinguished and discrete, should not be 
anachronistically anticipated. 2 
The second gloss concerns the role of the Receiver. It will be recalled from 
Chapter 3 above that, on the face of things, he was merely the accountant and 
the functionary who, for want of any viable alternative, substituted for a local 
authority capable of giving financial and logistical support to the force. He 
existed because of what has been noted as a "shortage of agency"3 in the early 
modem state. His role was precedented in the Acts which had since 1792 
established the stipendiary Police Offices in London, and it was repeated in the 
temporary Acts which, because of local and relatively short-lived crises, in 1839 
established forces in Birmingham, Bolton and Manchester. 
Although the legislation was silent on the matter, the Receiver began 
increasingly and explicitly to be called upon - Villingly enough - to act as the 
guardian of the Home Secretary's interests in the force, and in ways that were 
bound to have more than financial implications. This meant that, although Home 
Office officials could not command Commissioners, they were able to challenge 
them because the undertakings of Scotland Yard became transparent - to 
2 The situation is discussed at greater length in Lustgarten, L, The Governance of Police, 
Sweet and Maxwell, 1986, pp. 34-6, relying much on Plehwe, R., 'Police and Government: The 
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolie, Public Lam 1974, pp. 316-335. 3 Prest J. Liberty and Locality, Clarendon, Oxford, 1990, p. 3. 
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Home Office officials if to no-one else. The corollary was that Commissioners, 
although they seemed able to tolerate the appointment of Home Office officials 
like Anderson, Thomson and Elliot as Assistant Commissioners who were 
clearly subordinate to them, continued to fret at the Receiver's role and - from 
even before the arrival of civil servants in their own headquarters - sought from 
time to time to establish themselves as complete masters, as they saw it, in 
their own household. Whether individual Commissioners took active steps 
depended, of course, on personality (theirs and Receivers'), incident, and 
opportunity. 
Home Secretaries 
The origin and character of Commissioners and the next most senior officers 
has been explored in Chapter I above. To approach an understanding of the 
dynamics of their relationship with the political heads of the Department, it is 
necessary also to consider the nature of successive Home Secretaries and, 
above all, the experience they brought to their duties. 
Taking in each case for 1860-1920 the whole duration of their several 
appointments, 22 men held the office on separate occasions between 1859 and 
1922. The average length of occupancy was 32 months, rather closer perhaps 
to current durations than might be casually expected. However, that bare 
average is by no means the whole story. For example, although Spencer 
Walpole held office for only 10 months July 1866-May 1867, he had by then 
been Home Secretary twice previously - in 1852 and 1858-9 (12 months). Even 
longer service on one occasion might overlay considerably greater previous 
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experience. George Grey, Home Secretary 1861-6, had also occupied the office 
1846-52 and 1855-58, that is, for a total of nearly 14 of the 21 years 1846-67. 
Such length of service was highly unusual, and was sufficiently rare to catch out 
the normally canny Mayne who, banking partly no doubt on the customary rate 
of Home Secretary turnover, took advantage of a heavily qualified arrangement 
reached with George Grey only to find him still in post when Mayne's version of 
the arrangement was later challenged. 4 
Moreover, although they may not have been what Lord (Roy) Jenldns has called 
"recidivist" Home Secretaries, a number had had experience as the 
Parliamentary Under Secretary in the Home Office. Gathorne Hardy, Bruce, 
Cross, Ridley, Herbert Gladstone and Samuel (that is, more than a quarter of 
the total) had all had that experience. 5 Lastly, it is relevant to record that one 
Parliamentary Under Secretary - Stuart-Wortley - not only served an unusually 
long tour during 1886-92 but had also had previous experience in the role 
shortly beforehand during 1885-6 for a little under 8 months. 
Finally, it would be misleading to concentrate wholly on Home Office 
experience. Rarely was a Home Secretary a complete stranger to office even if 
it had been elsewhere. Both Comewall Lewis and Lowe had been Chancellors 
4 *This I never saw before' - Minute by Grey on a memorandum of 5 January, 1850, by Mayne 
describing the division of duties between himself and the other Commissioner, Hay, appointed 
to replace Rowan. (HO 45/3324. ) Since 1848, Mayne had been campaigning to become the 
Commissioner in sole command even if the law were unchanged - as it was eventually in 1856 
following Hays death in 1855. 
5 In a memoir, Bruce records that one of the immediate pleasures of his own appointment was 
receiving a visit from his much revered former chief, George Grey. Bruce, H. A, Letters of the Rt 
Hon Henry Austin Bruce GCB, Lord Aberdare of Dufftyn, Oxford, 1902, p. 259. 
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of the Exchequer, Childers had held both the Services' posts, and Akers- 
Douglas and Herbert Gladstone had been chief whips as well as having had 
other ministerial experience, Gladstone also as his fathers private secretary. In 
addition, whilst an absence of ministerial experience was viewed as a handicap 
in the case of Matthews (1886-92), it was no evident handicap in the case of his 
successor, Asquith. Nor was a legal qualification a prerequisite or - Matthews 
again -a guarantee of success. 
Padiament 
Parliament had a much more significant role in relation to the Metropolitan 
police than in the case of the other forces in Great Britain. The provincial police 
legislation delegated local control to the local authorities of the day, subject to 
limited rule-maldng powers given to the Home Secretary. Throughout the 
period, there were in effect two distinct forms of local control: in the boroughs, 
the chief officer was subject to the orders of the watch committees, whereas in 
the shires the chief constables had more managerial and operational autonomy. 
Efforts to consolidate arrangements on the shire model in the 1856 
Constabulary Bill were unsuccessful, and the dichotomy persisted until the 
Police Act 1964. 
In London, however, statutory and therefore Parliamentary control continued 
throughout the period to be of a wholly different order of detail. The numbers of 
the most senior officers and their pay was specified in statute. It therefore took 
statutes to create two posts for Assistant Commissioners (and thriftily abolish 
the post of Inspecting Superintendent created in 1839) in 1856, and to establish 
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additional single posts in 1884, and 1909. Part of Howard Vincent's difficulties 
during his headship of the newly created CID during 1878-83 was that, although 
styled "Director of Criminal Investigations", he was in law neither a constable, 
nor a magistrate, nor any kind of statutory officer. This situation was remedied 
only after his departure by the 1884 Act that enabled his post to be occupied by 
an Assistant Commissioner. Moreover, the Treasury subvention from 1833 
meant that, not only was the Home Secretary required under the 1829 Act to 
seek Treasury approval for certain kinds of expenditure, but Parliament had 
also from the late 1850s to approve Supply. In addition, of course, the Home 
Secretary was directly answerable to Parliament at any time for his stewardship 
of the force. 
It was this last point that was routinely urged as demonstrating that there was 
no accountability deficit in respect of the force. It was maintained that 
municipalisation (see Chapter 7 below) was not a necessary prerequisite of 
accountability when the Home Secretary himself could be brought to the House. 
Indeed, it could be and was argued that municipalisation would diminish 
accountability because it would substitute a weaker and less satisfactory form. 
Harcourt's inability to conceive how a Home Secretary could - above all during 
a Fenian bombing campaign - give up his role and still be accountable for 
police performance was one of the principal reasons why London local 
government reform was so delayed in Gladstone's second Ministry, and why 
when it came the Bill left London policing alone. It was a Conservative 
government that established a council for London in the end, and - 
unsurprisingly -a council with no police responsibilities, though it did take over 
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some of the "local authodt)(' functions (for example, for smoke abatement and 
common lodging houses) hitherto managed by the Metropolitan police in default 
of any acceptable alternative local agency for London at the material times. 
The view that Parliamentary accountability was superior to a local form did not 
go unchallenged. It was an aAorn of the principal municipal campaigners from 
the 1860s that a new London authority should have control over policing6, and 
this case was accepted in principle by Gladstone. In fact, it is possible to argue 
that the superiority of Parliamentary accountability was never entirely accepted. 
Chapter 4 has recorded how the introduction of the Treasury subvention in 1833 
was seen by some at the time not as an act of government generosity but as a 
stratagem for buying continued acquiescence in direct rule by the executive. As 
noted in the same Chapter, whilst it is true that there was ultimate Parliamentary 
control, it was not available in a form which was, or could be, exercised in any 
continuous way at the level of maldng the Home Secretary's stewardship truly 
accountable. In theory, it therefore followed from this that, if the Home Secretary 
did not make the Commissioner accountable to him in practice as well as in law, 
then the Commissioner was accountable to no-one. 
The Home Secretary was unquestionably a senior and highly influential figure 
throughout the period. But there was a paradox about his position so far as 
oversight of an executive organisation was concerned. This stemmed from the 
fact that the very diversity and ubiquity of the responsibilities that made him 
a Firth J. F. B., Municipal London, Longmans, 1876, was probably the most complete statement 
of case by one of the most persistent campaigners for change. 
227 
such a significant figure led also to endless but fundamentally discontinuous 
absorption in an extraordinarily Wide range of issues. This problem of distraction 
illustrated, of course, a great if undeclared truth, that is the impracticability of the 
Home Secretary giving anything like the degree of attention to the detail of the 
management of the force hypothesised in the 1829 and 1839 Acts. Except in 
the kind of crisis where he had time for nothing else, he was bound to be 
looking elsewhere. And if this was true for the Home Secretary, it was true also 
for Parliament. Neither the Minister nor Parliament was fitted to discharge the 
management oversight functions which developed as the force itself grew in 
response to the rapid urbanisation and population growth of the area it served. 
Whereas it was possible to regard effective oversight on this model as feasible 
in 1829 for a force of 800 (and it is plain that Home Secretaries, including Peel, 
experimented in London With models of executive control in the 1820s where 
the conductor of the patrolling forces was William Day, an official in the Home 
Officeý, it increasingly required collusive fiction to accept it as adequate from 
the 1860s. 
Routine 
Ordinary business was conducted by correspondence. For 1829-1840 the 
exchanges appear to have survived ihtact. 8 Letters were despatched under the 
signature of the Commissioners and the Receiver, and replies were sent signed 
by the Permanent Under Secretary. Very occasionally the papers contain notes 
of a less formal kind from the chief clerks respectively of the Commissioners 
See generally HO 61/1. 8 HO 61/1-28. 
228 
and the Receiver, but in no case did they deal with substantive business. Even 
more rarely is there any evidence that the Home Secretary himself became 
involved. Typically, in the early days the correspondence concerned the taking 
of leases on property, the grant of contracts for clothing and so on, exceptional 
monetary awards of some kind to officers, and such matters as the approval of 
the appointment of divisional surgeons and of individual constables in the form 
of a list of names submitted weekly. The comprehensive requirement of section 
5 meant that there was almost no matter involving the management of the force 
that could not spawn correspondence with the Home Office. 
The Home Secretary personally approved - though in what appears to have 
been by means of formality only - the issue of the quarterly rate warrants. 
Unusual delay in reply or the temporary disappearance of the relevant papers 
usually signified something more directly involving, for example in the run up to 
the 1833 Act which resolved the financial crisis of that year and established the 
precedent of state subvention. No office diaries of the period survive, and it is 
therefore impossible to be sure how frequently Commissioners met the Home 
Secretary, or to what extent such meetings were placed on a regular basis. The 
papers very occasionally mention a meeting for a particular purpose, and it 
appears that Cross held regular meetings in the late 1870s with the 
Commissioner and the Receiver as a way of clearing up matters not suitable for 
correspondence alone9. On the other hand, Graham in 1845 told the House of 
Commons that he had never met the Receiver. 10 
9 HO 4519755/A60557, Cross to Liddell 19 June, 1879. 10 Hansard, Commons, 21 July, 1845, Col. 805. 
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The degree of personal contact must have depended considerably in practice 
on how individual ministers preferred to do business, the extent to which events 
required urgent consultation, and the character of the personal relationship. Of 
Hardy, it was said by his son that Mayne was "an old friend of my fathers 
family, and had held his new Chief as a child upon his knees". " Bruce 
apparently regarded his appointee, Henderson, as a personal friend 12 , and so 
13 did Childers ("an old friend") who dismissed him. It seems likely that 
relationships in this case as With social behaviour generally became less 
unbending in the later nineteenth century and beyond. Herbert Gladstone's 
correspondence is, for example, peppered With notes from Henry reporting on 
particular assignments that had taken him out of London. It has also to be borne 
in mind that Commissioners were public figures participating, like Ministers, in 
all kinds of public events (for example around the Palaces and the diplomatic 
community), and there would have been chance meetings in addition to more 
formal occasions. 
It is equally unclear how well Home Office officials and Scotland Yard staff were 
acquainted. Granted their close physical proximity and the need to be in touch 
virtually daily, it must be reasonable to assume that they would have got to 
know each other very well indeed. The tone of the informal letters from the 
earliest days is friendly. Fry, one of the Commissioners senior clerks, had no 
Gathorne-Hardy, the Hon. E. (ed. ), Gathome Hardy, l't Earl of Cranbrook A Memoir with 
Extracts from His Diary and Correspondence, Long mans, 1910, Vol 1, p. 217. 12 Bruce, op. cit. p. 265. 13 Childers, S., Life and Correspondence of the Rt Hon Hugh C. E. Childers, 1901, Vol. 11, p. 241. 
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hesitation, for example, in calling on the Private Secretary, Mitford, in the 1880s 
to express anxiety about whether he could expect to be appointed Chief Clerk 
to the Commissioner on the demise of the holder of that office. 14 Starting from 
1883 Receivers would have been particularly well known to senior officials in 
the Home Office as former and, in effect, continuing colleagues. 
Except in the surviving letter books (which themselves do not record every 
exchange) the routine correspondence from 1840 is not preserved. 
Nonetheless, if not on a continuous basis, the archives are plentiful. The 
evidence suggests that routine correspondence in fact continued if at an 
increasingly humble level. Mayne's attempt in 1848-9 to agree some reduction 
in the amount of routine exchange revealed differences of view between, on the 
one hand, his disbelief in the utility of iterative and unchallenged exchanges 
and, on the other, the Home Office's attachment to the preservation of a record 
of proper diligence to mark the continuing exercise of the section 5 powers. " in 
the 1880s a new Receiver, Pennefather, tried without success - even though he 
was a former Home Office official - to get the Home Office to agree that 
exchanges might be reduced in the Receivers case. 16 Some of the low level, 
14 *SaW Mitford (HO) who promised to speak to Sir W Harcourt about my promotion. " Entry for 
18 March, 1881, in Diary for 1881, CF65.84. Fry (the father of the athlete C. B. Fry) was 
promoted to Chief Clerk in the Commissioners office with effect from I August, 1880, - Home 
Office letter of 13 May, 1881, on MEPO 2182. 15 Letters of 27July, 1848 and 3 December, 1849, on H045 9473/A48043B, and an undated 
memorandum by Redgrave upon which the latter reply was based. 18 Pennefather, formerly a longstanding Home Office official, tried with both Harcourt and Cross 
to substitute general for detailed authorities but, despite support from the Permanent Under 
Secretary, neither could be brought to agree. See letters of 12 May, 1884, and 18 July, 1885, on 
HO 45/9643. 
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routine correspondence has survived from the end of the nineteenth centUry17, 
and there is the amazement recorded in his memoirs by Macready on 
discovering in 1918 "the pre-Victorian methods then still in force". For example, 
every one of the most junior promotions was solemnly recorded and 
despatched still for Home Office approval, and so were all cases where 
following a constable's conviction it was nonetheless desired to retain him in the 
force. "3 This situation suggests not only a high level of bureaucratic inertia, but 
also a remarkable degree of self-delusion in the Home Office that exchanges in 
that kind of detailed form served usefully to maintain ministers' statutory 
position. 
The evidence from crisis management 
The papers concerning crisis management are of a quite different character and 
reflect discrete episodes rather than immemorial routine. What follows 
concentrates on the responses to the Hyde Park disorders 1866-7, the 
Clerkenwell explosion in 1867, the corruption trial of a number of detectives in 
1877, the Pall Mall dot of 1886, problems of threatening assembly in Trafalgar 
Square in the following few years, and the controversy over the planned Roman 
Catholic procession from Westminster Cathedral in 1908. 
17 HO 148/1 -a letter book for the first half of 1899. It records a great deal of miscellaneous business, for example, formal approvals for tenders, small amendments to General Orders, 
a at , 
ppointment of police surgeons, dismissals, temporary employments, compens ion ft &c. I Macready, op. cit, pp. 318-320. The first was justified as flowing from the provisions of the 
1829 Act, and the second by reference to a Home Office letter of Octoberl 832 -"On inquiry of the Home Office I found that its oldest inhabitant was unaware of the existence of the letter, and 
nobody wanted anything to do with it. ' 
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i The Hyde Park disorders 18664867 
These events took place during the Derby/Disraeli Conservative ministry formed 
following the resignation on 26 June 1866 of the Liberal government then 
headed by Lord John Russell. 19 They involved how to respond to large political 
meetings at a time of considerable political excitement. The dominant issue - 
and the one over which the Russell ministry had resigned when its franchise Bill 
was defeated - was the extension of the electoral franchise; and the eventual 
outcome there was the Reform Act of 1867. For the first time since the Chartist 
agitations in the 1840s the government was faced in the form of the Reform 
League with a large, organised, popular political movement in the capital. 
Moreover, it did so at a time not only when the law on rights of assembly in the 
Royal parks remained unclear and uncodified but one also where there was no 
established political or cultural understanding about the proper limits of popular 
political agitation. In addition, there was a shortage of public spaces outside 
Trafalgar Square and the Royal parks large enough to accommodate large 
political demonstrations. Kennington, for example, which had been used by the 
Chartists in 1848, was no longer available. 
The dots that had occurred in and around Hyde Park on a succession of 
summer weekends in 1855 in protest against Lord Robert Grosvenor's Bill 
designed to curtail Sunday retailing had not been understood as raising similar 
issues of political principle: they had been perceived, rather, as unruly and 
19 Smith, P. T., Policing Victorian London, Greenwood, Westport, Connecticut 1985, contains 
the fullest accessible description of public order issues and events in the Victorian period. 
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regrettably uncontrolled disorders. The subsequent Royal Commission 20 had 
been established to deal with complaints about police conduct and had offered 
no conclusive opinions on the law. Nor did the subsequent "Garibaldi" 
disturbances in Hyde Park during 1862-4 lead to any development of law or 
principled practice. 
The minister With prime responsibility was, of course, the Home Secretary, 
Spencer Honatio Walpole 21 . His was not, however, sole responsibility: 
the 
Commissioner for Works was responsible for the Royal parks. Walpole, formerly 
a chancery lawyer, had been Home Secretary for 10 months in 1852, and for 12 
months 1858-9. On the face of it, he should have been well-equipped to 
respond. However, on the particular ground chosen by the League, he found 
himself in a difficulty. Following a successful and orderly meeting in Trafalgar 
Square on 2 July which Mayne had first thought to ban 22 , the Reform 
League 
(led by Edmund Beales, a Radical banister) wanted to hold a large 
demonstration with bands and banners in Hyde Park to manifest the strength of 
feeling behind the movement for Parliamentary reform. 
In the wake of the 1855 events, the government had sought the advice of the 
Law Officers. Their opinion of 1856 made it clear that so far as the Royal parks 
were concerned, the government possessed only the civil powers available to 
20 Report on the Alleged Disturbances of the Public Peace in Hyde Park on Sunday 1 July, 
1855, PP 1856, VOI. XXIII. 
21 See Appendix C for biographical note. 22 'The assembly was, at first forbidden by the police; btA the interval, between the resignation 
of one ministry and the formation of another, was not favourable for the exercise of authority. * 
Walpole, S., The History of Twenty-Five Years, Longmans, 1910, Vol. 11, p. 170. 
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any landlord to proceed against individuals under the law of trespass. To be 
operative, these limited powers required evidence of prior or current actual 
misbehaviour and could be enforced solely on an individual basis. In other 
words, they were useless to prevent a mass demonstration taking place but 
might be available to deal with disorder once it had broken out. 
How to handle the proposed demonstration was discussed in Cabinet where 
Walpole was equipped with a formula drafted by Henry Thring23 , his legal 
adviser, and based on the 1856 Opinion. Walpole's son 24 maintains that his 
father was overruled. Whereas the Home Secretary had thought the best 
course was to have permitted the demonstrators to have entered the Park and 
to disperse them only in the event of disorder, the Cabinet settled for the option 
of closing the Park, and an order to that effect was signed by the Commissioner 
for Works. 
It is not recorded what Mayne thought of this stratagem. It is known that he 
deployed over 1600 officers (including 60 mounted) at or in the Park, and 
instructed his men not to interfere with the meeting itself or to arrest anyone 
other than for a specific offence. 25 Baulked of admission, and probably contrary 
to the plans of the organisers, elements in the crowd tore down an estimated 
1400 yards of the Park railings. Their entry into the Park precipitated scenes of 
23 See Appendix C for biographical note. 24 Spencer Walpole - see Appendix C for biographical note. 25 MEPO 7/17, Police Order of 21 July, 1866. This Order also quotes the Commissioners public 
Notice which sought, by resort to assertive bluff, to discourage attendance but in the event 
probably did more to advertise the occasion. The instructions to his men reflected, of course, 
the real position, that is that the meeting itself was not unlawful. 
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violent disorder where the police, despite freely wielding their truncheons, were 
unable to gain control without the assistance of the military. The disorders 
continued outside the Park and during the next day. Well over 200 police 
officers were injured, nearly 50 seriously. Mayne, who unusually had attended 
at the Park rather than stayed at the Yard to direct operations, was himself 
injured . 
26 The government looked both foolish and weak, especially as the 
disorders spread beyond the Park. 
Moreover, this poor view of the government's action was intensified by an 
episode where, following a meeting between Walpole and the League on 25 
July, it looked as though Walpole had capitulated to the League by conceding 
that there should be a League meeting in the Park on the understanding that 
the League accepted responsibility for maintaining order and the government 
would withdraw police and troopS. 27 The League promulgated a further meeting 
on 30 July in terms that implied they had government sanction. Walpole's denial 
- supported by Holyoake28, who had attended the meeting on 25 July - seemed 
a protestation from weakness, even when backed up by a government ban and 
the League's withdrawal to meet instead at the Agricultural Hall in Islington. 
These events were of immediate interest to Parliament. On the day after the 
main episode, the Prime Minister, Derby, maintained in fairly restrained 
28 See MEPO 7/27 for Police orders of 17 and 18 August, 1866, which respectively listed 
gratuities for all participating officers, and additional gratuities from public subscription for those 
pured or rendered unfit for duty. 
It was even suggested that Walpole had wept with relief at the Leagues agreeing to assume 
the responsibility, thereby acquiring the soubriquet OWeeping Walpole. 28 See Appendix C for biographical note. 
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exchanges in the House of Lords that the Crown had an undoubted right to 
prevent the Parks being diverted from their proper purpose "to objects which 
may interfere with the enjoyment and recreation of the people. " He expressed 
"full confidence ... in the judgement and discretion of Sir Richard Mayne". 
29 
Walpole had a rougher ride in the Commons where Ayrton, the Radical MP for 
Tower Hamlets, immediately put his finger on the uncertain state of the law of 
assembly: 
This country can only be governed in accordance with the national sense of right and 
justice. To appeal to force, and not to have considered and examined this question - 
not to have met the people on the ground of right - appears to me a most deplorable 
error, and to have led very much to the consequences that have ensued. 30 
In defending himself and the government, Walpole not only quoted from the 
published Report of the 1855 Royal Commission but gave the entirety of the 
Law Officers' Opinion of 1856. Doggedly, he asserted that the Parks should not 
be used for political meetings and that it had been right to close the gates. 31 
Except for a typically principled intervention by Walpole's immediate 
predecessor, Sir George Grey, discussion continued predictably on party lines. 
On 26 July, however, Walpole was able to establish that he had not caved in to 
the League. In turn the League, admitted there had been misunderstanding and 
abandoned their intention to return to the Park on 30 July. Walpole's 
performance in Cabinet did not impress his colleague, Gathorne Hardy, who 
29 Hansard, Lords, 24 July, 1866, cols. 1371 and 1374. 30 Hansard, Commons, 24 July, 1866, col. 1390. 
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confided to his diary of the discussions on 27-29 July that "Walpole was not 
P32 decisive & seemed confused... 
The issue was revived the following Spring when the League wished to 
influence the franchise Bill. In the intervening period, nothing had been done to 
clarify the law. The government, although it had contemplated legislation, held 
its hand on the basis of leaving the way free for the League to test the legality of 
the governments position in the courts. In turn, however, the League had taken 
no such steps, Beales later claiming that it had not been possible to identify a 
basis for doing so. 
Accordingly, when the League in 1867 announced its intention of holding a 
meeting in the Park on 6 May, the government's position was no better in 
principle than in 1866. Moreover, it made it worse by introducing a Bill which 
made Parks meetings illegal without prior permission - thus publishing their 
belief that there was no sufficient, current power. Of the cabinet discussion on 
28 April to decide how to respond, Gathome Hardy observed: 
We had a long discussion. Mayne and the Law Officers were there. I never saw 
Walpole in such a way. He would suggest nothing of any kind. However, we came to a 
conclusion ... 
33 
The conclusion was that, while no steps would be taken to close the Park to the 
31 lbid, Col. 1391-1398. 32 Johnson, N. E., op. cit., p. 21. 33 lbid, p. 37. 
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League, a notice drafted by Thring and signed by Walpole should endeavour to 
discourage people from attending. This was a bluff - and it was called, despite 
the deployment of well over 4000 police and the calling out of more than 12,000 
special constables. 34A very large number- some estimates put it at 200,000 - 
of people assembled in the Park and completed an entirely orderly meeting. 
The government had made fools of themselves. Walpole resigned but was 
retained in the cabinet without portfolio. 
Tending his father's memory, Spencer Walpole included the episode in one of 
his general histories and composed his father's entry in the Dictionaly of 
National Biography. In the latter, the son - who had been his fathers private 
secretary at the Home Office - maintained that "Walpole's attitude was much 
misunderstood and misrepresented". In the former, he quoted from a letter he 
had received from Thring: 
Mr Walpole was made the scapegoat: whereas the real cause was the folly of Lord 
Derby and those who thought that a mere collection of enthusiasts was a felonious 
assembly, and that they could be repelled by merely closing the gates of the park35 
In addition the son claimed that in 1867, if the decision had been left to his 
father, he would have preferred to acquiesce in a demonstration that the 
government had no power to prevent. But this filial piety never supplanted 
Russell's public judgement at the time: 
34 See MEPO 7/29 for the Police Order for 6 May 1867 which detailed a total of 4398 officers, 
including 182 mounted. Of the total, 1058 were posted in the Park and the remainder in the 
enVirons or in readiness at police stations. 35 Walpole, S., op. cit, pp. 174-5. 
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... I entirely agree ... that a more amiable, and a more honourable man never entered 
the public service. I cannot, however, say that I regret he should leave the Home 
Department; for I think that of all the departments of the public service the office for 
which he is least fifted is that of Home Secretary. 38 
Privately, Gathome Hardy agreed With both Russell and the son : 
He is a good just man but unfit for the troublous times into which he has been cast but 
37 the Cabinet are responsible for what has been done as well as he... 
Unlike some of the other illustrations that follow, the Hyde Park confrontations 
were as much caused by the governments own actions as wished upon them 
unexpectedly out of the blue. There is no record of Mayne's views on the 
situations with which he had to deal, but the operational commanders need for 
clear, lawful and practicable directions was not met on these occasions. Even if 
the son's account is accepted, then it is evident that the father failed to carry the 
course he felt right and allowed himself to be overbome by colleagues who did 
not have to render immediate accountability. On that basis, he rightly paid the 
political price, and the mitigation of his sentence - remaining ignominiously in 
36 Hansard, Lords, 9 May. 1867, col. 228. 37 Johnson, N. E., op. cit., entry for 9 May, 1867, at p. 39. 
240 
the cabinet - merely reflected both the guilt of his colleagues and his own 
incapacity. 38 
H The Clerkenwell Explosion 
Although what transpired to be accurate intelligence had been passed from 
Dublin to the Metropolitan police, the lafter failed to prevent a Fenian rescue 
attempt designed to liberate compatriots from the Clerkenwell prison. On Friday 
13 December, 1867, an explosive device blew down a portion of the prison wall 
and, although it failed to effect the rescue of any pdsoners, killed four innocent 
by-passers and injured forty others in addition to causing a great amount of 
collateral physical damage. The result was panic as the metropolis reacted to 
the existence of a threat to which it was wholly unaccustomed. Gossip raged 
and the police were inundated with information to all of which attention had to 
be given but most of which was useless. Fortunately for the Home Secretary, 
Gathorne Hardy, who had been in office since May 1867 following the 
resignation of the hapless Walpole, Parliament was not sifting. However, the 
incompetence he was obliged later to describe to the Commons meant that the 
delay did not heal the sting of humiliating failure. 39 
38 Nearly fifty years later, Walpol&s reputation had not recovered: "Walpole did not make a good 
Home Secretary. Very few men do. He was too weak, and his very virtues told against his 
successful tenure of that office. He lacked firmness, energy and decision and, notably at the 
time of the Hyde Park riots, he was singularly unequal to the crisis. ' Philips, F. C., My Varied 
Life, Eveleigh Nash, 1914, p. 244. 39 Hansard, Commons, 9 March, 1868, cols. 1215-1218. 
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His fury does not have to be imagined: he confided it to his diary - "Strict inquiry 
is needed ... More detective force and sldll is imperatively needed. *40 Lord Derby, 
the Prime Minister, was even more condemning: 
... I find it difficult to come to any other conclusion than that there has been great 
remissness, or great incapacity, on the part of our Police authorities. It is not very much 
to the credit of our detective system that the first intelligence of a conspiracy which must 
have been known to many persons should have come to us from Ireland. But the 
information which we thus received was so full and accurate that, if properly acted 
upon, it should have been impossible to carry out the design. 41 
The day before, an exasperated Disraeli had written to Derby: 
It is my opinion that nothing effective can be done, in any way, in these dangers if we 
don't get rid of Mayne. I have spoken to Hardy who says he 'wishes to God he would 
resign'; but surely, when even the safety of the State is at stake, there ought to be no 
false delicacy on the point? 42 
Mayne, by then 71 years old, was not in fact required to resign. Many years 
later, Robert Anderson claimed that Hardy had refused Mayne's resignation and 
that Liddell had said: "We told him that he had made a- fool of himself, but 
we meant to pull him through; we weren't going to throw him over after his long 
public service. "43Whatever the reason, and it must have been a close run 
40 Johnson, Nancy E., op. cit., entry for 15 December 1867, at p. 57. 41 Gathorne-Hardy, E., (ed. ), Gathome Hardy, First Eart of Cranbrook., A Memoir with Extracts 
from his Diary and Correspondence, Longmans, 1910, Vol. 1, letter of 15 December, 1867, p. 
222-3. 
42 Monypenny, W. F., and Bucide, G. E., The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield, Murray, 1929, Vol. 2, p. 307. 43 Anderson, R., op. cit., p. 20. 
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thing. Mayne stayed even though the Queen later inquired of Hardy whether 
"Mayne was not paSS6". 44 
Part of Hardy's embarrassment was occasioned by the fact that Disraeli 
(Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader in the Commons) took the lead - 
mindful no doubt of how poor a figure the ministry had cut over the Hyde Park 
disorders in 1866 and earlier in 1867. Having visited the Clerkenwell scene with 
his Permanent Under Secretary, Liddell, on Sunday 15 December, and called in 
at St Bartholomews Hospital, Hardy repaired to Downing Street where he found 
Disraeli in discussion with Colonel Feilding, the officer in charge in Dublin of 
Irish military intelligence. 45Moreover, at Cabinet on the evening of 19 
December, Hardy was piqued to discover that Disraeli was privy to intelligence 
(an alleged planned attack on the Bank of England) which had not been given 
to Hardy: "I was not told. At this moment personal feelings must be put aside 
but I feel a want of fair treatment about Feilding and this matter. "46 
The Cabinet decided against seeking greater powers (for example, the 
suspension of habeas corpus) from Parliament, but endorsed an addition of 
1000 extra officers "to diminish the pressure upon the regular force" and, as 
44 Johnson, Nancy, E., op. cit., entry for 8 July, 1868, at p. 79. (The Queen was, however, 
generous in her tribute to Mayne following his death in December 1868 - Grey to Bruce 28 December, 1868, Bucide, G. E. The Letters of Queen Victoria, 1862-1878, Vol. 1, p. 541. ) 45 See biographical note at Appendix C. Feilding developed strong views about how government 
intelligence should be organised - see the copy of his letter of 15 December, 1867, to Disraeli 
on HO 45/9699/A50123B. 
4" Johnson, op. cit, p. 58. 
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predicted in Hardys diary, an inquiry into the Metropolitan police was set Up. 47 
Established on 8 February 1868, it reported on 8 May on terms of reference set 
out by Hardy: 
I think it desirable when the police force is being so largely increased, to inquire into its 
control, its government and its several divisions, the duties discharged by the Assistant 
Commissioners, and how far their time is occupied in clerical work the advisability of 
appointing persons of higher position and education as officers between the 
superintendents and the Assistant Commissioners and the Chief Commissioner. It is 
difficult to come to conclusions without more knowledge on these points, and I think it 
will be more rapidly acquired by an inquiry within the office. 48 
The inquiry was chaired by the Parliamentary Under Secretary, Sir James 
Fergusson, and the members were Henry Thring, Parliament Counsel in the 
Home Office (essentially both Legal Adviser to the Department and the drafter 
of its legislation), and George Everest, the Clerk for Criminal Business - in effect 
the most senior official after Liddell responsible for police matters. The inquiry 
proceeded principally by hearing oral evidence, all of which was taken down 
and printed verbatim. Neither the evidence nor the report was made public, 
though the decisions taken as a result eventually were. With a few exceptions - 
the Commissioner of the City police, the chief surgeon, a retired Inspector - all 
the witnesses were serving members of the force. There were, of course, no 
47 Derby reported all the measures to the Queen on 19 December, 1867, in a letter which followed the three hour Cabinet meeting at which Hardy had felt so discomforted. Derby did not 
spare the force: "... they are not equal to the present extraordinary demand .... 0 Buckle, G. E, op. cit '. p. 481. 48 HO 45/A49463/2. 
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representative structures at the time, and it has therefore to be assumed that all 
the police Witnesses (serving and retired) were nominated by the senior 
management of the force if not the Commissioner himself. Mayne, by then aged 
70, gave evidence first and was followed by the other serving officers in strict 
hierarchical order. 
The growth of the force up to the time of the inquiry is laid out at Figure 1 
above. Mayne, battered by the events of 1866-7 hardly his fault but now 
confronted with failings for which his force was incontestably to blame, was 
shrewd enough to see which way the wind was blowing: 
I quite feel that the force is getting beyond management or control under the present 
arrangement. 
49 
Ministers had quite evidently decided that the organisation structure was 
inadequate. Fergusson put the point directly to Mayne: 
My presupposition in asking you these questions was this, you begin with a force of the 
strength of a regiment, it has grown into the strength of a Division, but you are still 
working it as a regiment and has led you to ask for additional officers, has arisen from 
the impossibility of working the division as a regiment. 
Mayne: I quite agree to that. 50 
49 1868 Report, Evidence 1868, p. 37. 50 Idem. 
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Indeed, Mayne had in a timely letter of 6 February proposed that the post of 
Inspecting Superintendent introduced in 1839 and abolished in 1856 should be 
revived but with two appointees rather than one. In his oral evidence he raised 
the figure to four. 
Determining that the apex of the force should be reinforced was one thing, but 
deciding how and by what sort of person was another. Not surprisingly, 
witnesses divided on the issue. The Superintendents saw no need for 
functionaries between them and their existing seniors. What would importees 
know of police duty and how successfully and willingly would they adapt to it? 5' 
But in fact there were some surprises in that neither the Assistant 
Commissioners nor all the Superintendents were of one mind. The Chief 
Superintendent, Robert Walker, who had joined the force in 1838 and had some 
claims to superior education, believed that there should be a tier of superior 
officers between the Superintendents (who were on a par with company 
sergeant majors) and Assistant Commissioners. As already noted in the 
discussion in Chapter 1 above about appointments, the different positions taken 
by the two Assistant Commissioners, Harris and Labalmondiere, on this 
question may be understood as stemming from differently developed views 
about the nature of the police occupation. 
The inquiry was entirely unaccompanied by any extended public discussion, 
51 lbid, evidence of Superintendent Hannant, p. 259. 
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and there was certainly no consultation of any kind with the ratepayers or the 
larger public. 52After the Committee had reported but before conclusions upon 
its recommendations had been announced, a well-informed pamphlet was 
published in 1868 over the pseudonym "Custos". 53 It adhered closely but less 
dogmatically to the lines of Hards's thinking, including to his preference for a 
better drilled force so that numbers of men might be deployed with greater 
efficiency and control than was normally observable. In the minds of the writer 
as of others was not only Clerkenwell but also the performance of the police 
during the Hyde Park reform riots in 1866. The great growth of London and the 
resulting extension of the police responsibility required more close 
superintendence and control than in a situation where divisions were 
... left with no supervision but that of 2_ne_Superintendent who cannot 
be supposed to 
possess any higher qualification for a position of commanding authority than is 
possessed of a Sedeant Major and who is certainly not regarded by the public as 
occupying a higher grade. 54 
To a casual modem reader, all this may perhaps be dismissed as an exhibition 
of outdated social snobbery and middle class place hunting. Such easy 
dimissiveness would, however, be misplaced. What was involved at a deeper 
level was the issue of how and where, in a somewhat less than democratic but 
increasingly populous society, authority should be seen to be located. Harris 
52 There was extensive newspaper vilification of Mayne, but that was, of course, a different 
matter-see Browne, D. G., op. cit, pp. 148-151. 53 OCustos", The Police of the Metropolis in 1868, Ridgway, 1868. 
54 lbid, p. 21. 
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clung to the more traditional view that acknowledged social status brought its 
own guarantees - the purchase view, if you like, of officer accomplishment. 
Labalmondiere, on the other hand, identified an alternative model which 
attributed authority to professional knowledge and expertise acquired in the 
practice of the occupation. Of course, Superintendents and other ranks 
supported this view partly or even largely out of self-interest, but in no case was 
it articulated in a form which was then effective in challenging status arguments. 
In 1868 it did not win the day, and "Custos" proved to be the sharper observer. 
He argued that the Superintendent from the ranks was likely to be the target of 
insinuations that he is not altogether beyond the reach of influences which would never 
be referred to as likely to sway the judgement of a person in the position of a 
Commissioned officer of the Queen. 
So long, in fact, as the distinctions of class among Englishmen continue to be strongly 
marked, these considerations will retain their force, and as it would be unwise to 
attempt to ignore their existence, is it prudent to allow them to be, in any degree, the 
means of impeding the usefulness of the Metropolitan Police Force, on the full efficiency 
of which such vital interests depend? 55 
This was the approach that the Committee endorsed in its report of May 1868. 
Its principal organisational recommendations were: 
The division of the police area into four districts under the command of the 
Commissioner and four district assistants, the districts to be the normal area in which 
subordinate officers and constables would serve; 
55 lbid, p. 22. 
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The assistants each to be provided with a house in their district as their headquarters, 
and to deal Wth all complaints and other routine business both to give a more speedy 
response to complaints and to relieve Superintendents from the need to attend so 
frequently at Scotland Yard; 
In appointing district officers preference should be given to military or naval officers; 
The two Assistant Commissioners to remain at headquarters to help the Commissioner, 
in time perhaps reducing to one post from two. 
The Committee prefaced its recommendations with a declaration of fiscal 
rectitude: 
The Committee, in maldng their recommendations, have constantly borne in mind the 
fact that the sources of income applicable to the support of the police arise in the main 
from parochial taxation. 
They have therefore to say what in their opinion is the best mode of conducing to the 
efficiency of the police, with the least increase of expense, not to decide what the police 
service might become if a large sum of money could be applied to its maintenance. 68 
Explicitly recognising the extent to which its freedom of financial manoeuvre had 
been pre-empted by the decision to augment the force by 1000 in large part 
for a weekly rest day - at a cost, the Committee estimated, of E90,000 a year - 
the Committee was understandably careful to rein itself in. It therefore tended 
56 1868 Committee, Report, p. 16. 
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thriftily to concentrate on recommendations that did not involve significant 
expenditure. Thus, it rarely ventured away from largely costless organisational 
recommendations, one of which, for example, contemplated that the "police 
force should be placed by Act of Parliament absolutely under the control of the 
Secretary of State, and that the names of the officers of police should not 
appear in Acts of Parliament". 57 Also included in the recommendations was 
support for an enlarged central detective department to be given divisional 
status and the appointment of plain-clothes officers as detectives in every 
division under local control. No general pay increase was recommended, 
though there was some twealdng of scales for Sergeants and above, and 
important recommendations were directed to improving conditions of service, 
for example as to provided quarters (which the Committee foresaw would 
require legislation as to borrowing powers). 
In the Home Office, distraction recurred. After a general election, the 
Conservative, Hardy, was replaced on 9 December 1868 by the Liberal, Bruce. 
Mayne died later the same month on 26 December and there was a short 
interregnum during which Labalmondiere was acting Commissioner until the 
appointment of Henderson. Appointments to the four district superintendent 
posts were duly made but without clear definifion of their roles and this left them 
unprotected both from below (the Superintendents) and from above (the 
Assistant Commissioners). No legislation was introduced as the Committee had 
recommended, though Henderson's new broom swept away some of the more 
57 Ibid, p. 12 -A rather delphic recommendation which in its last part seems to have been 
designed to give the Home Secretary a free hand in determining and changing the entire rank 
and organisation structure of the force. It was never acted upon. 
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unnecessary and trivial restrictions for constables, addressed the remaining 
reccommenclations and, initially, moved to institute a weekly rest day. 
Henderson, though he undoubtedly had the support of the Home Secretary, 
Bruce, who had appointed him, was operating in the dark according to an 
agenda that neither he nor the minister had themselves set down. A new 
Commissioner faced the composed ranks of the Superintendents on the one 
hand and the Assistant Commissioners on the other, each of whom had their 
own fish to fry and none of whom brought entirely open minds to the creation of 
the new management tier. The new District Superintendents were themselves 
unable to force the position since, with the exception of Walker, they were tyros 
so far as the force was concerned, and Walker - even if he had been able to 
muster the requisite personal authority (his former colleagues regarded him as 
an office wallah rather than an operational commander) - could hardly have 
compensated for the lack of clarity and determination over the way the new 
arrangements were introduced. For his part, the Home Secretary was in no 
position to grasp let alone confront the difficulties, and his officials (including the 
Permanent Under Secretary) could neither direct nor substitute themselves for 
the Commissioner. In other words, everything conceming the higher direction of 
the force turned on the Commissioner personally and, after a brief burst of 
hyperactivity as it responded to the Clerkenwell crisis, the Home Office fell back 
into its customary passivity. 
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III The trial of the detectives 
The Home Office was stirred from this next follomfing the discovery that the 
Detective Department had been penetrated, and some of its senior officers 
corrupted, by criminals engaged in a series of lucrative turf frauds. The head of 
the Department, Superintendent Williamson, had to suffer the indignity of 
overseeing the arrest of three of his four Chief Inspectors. It was an enormous 
scandal which produced a protracted Old Bailey trial58, and the Home Office's 
response was not one but in fact three inquiries, two of which only were 
completed. 
The first was directed at the detective system. It was appointed in August 1877, 
and reported January 1878. Chaired by the Parliamentary Under Secretary, 
Selwin-lbbetson, (who had been in post since February 1874) its members were 
Feilding, the officer consulted by Disraeli in 1867, and two QCs - Overend and 
Maule. 59 The proceedings were again recorded, confidential, and unpublished. 
The inquiry discovered not only that the central detective department had been 
under a system of espionage by thieves, but also that the divisional detective 
system inaugurated on the recommendation of the 1868 Committee was 
unsatisfactory. 60 The two species of detectives were organisationally distinct 
and, moreover, in opposition to each other. The recommendations concentrated 
on welding the two into a single unit, separate from and superior in pay, 
58 See the account in Dilnot, G., (ed. ), The Trial of the Detectives, Bles, 1928. 59 For Feilding, see Appendix C. W. Overend (1809-1884) and J. B. Maule (1817-1889) were 
both very experienced criminal and public law practitioners, the lafter becoming DPP 1880-84. 
Overend had chaired the Bradfield Reservoir inquiry of 1864 and the Sheffield trade outrages 
in uiry in 1867. 
609 
... said to be the least educated and the least intelligent men in the force" - 1878 Report, p. 45. 
252 
allowances and so on to the uniformed service, and under a senior officer - "an 
Assistant Commissioner, who should be a lawyer having magisterial 
experience ... ranking next to the Chief Commissioner, and having charge of the 
whole force in his absence". 
The second was an indirect consequence of the first. In the May following the 
detective committee's report, various "memorials" (that is, petitions) about their 
conditions of service were submitted through the Superintendents to the 
Commissioner by men in the uniformed service. The Commissioner in turn 
forwarded them to the Home Secretary and he effectively turned the issues over 
to a committee for adjudication. Appointed on 7 August 1878 and reporting in 
May 1879, the committee consisted of the new Parliamentary Under Secretary, 
Matthew White Ridley, and - again - Maule. As on the previous occasion, the 
secretary was Dunbar, the oral headngs were recorded but neither they nor the 
recommendations were published. 
This was a far more wide-ranging and intrusive inquiry than that of 1877-8. It 
looked not only at pay (in an interim report) and pensions but also at the 
organisation structure at the top of the force. On pay, whilst it recommended no 
general increase, it dealt with the more obvious anomalies arising from the 
previous committee's partiality to the detectives. On pensions, it recommended 
increasing access to benefits in return for a1% increase in contributions from 
the current 2.5%. As to organisation, although it rejected actual decentralisation, 
it otherwise supported the District Superintendent system and recommended 
that they should be rebadged as "district commissioners" with enhanced powers 
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of discipline and responsibility for Oversight of the divisional superintendents: 
"They should be gentlemen of good social standing, and should, as a general 
rule, be officers who have seen service in the army or navy. , 61 At the next level 
up, the Committee thought that the post of Legal Adviser should be abolished 
and the role subsumed into that of one of the two Assistant Commissioners, 
provided he were suitably qualified. 62Moreover, the Committee wanted to see 
clearer definition of the senior roles, and between the functions of the civilian 
and police clerical staffs in the Commissioners own office. 
Although the report chose its language carefully, the record of the oral evidence 
showed a great deal of discontent and backbiting. The District Superintendents 
felt under-employed and unsupported by the Commissioner. The Divisional 
Superintendents depicted them as professionally useless and, therefore, 
supererogatory. The Commissioner voiced no enthusiasm for their role, and 
recommended at best further gradual extension. The two Assistant 
Commissioners were at loggerheads. Alternating headquarters and field duties 
month and month about between them, they were described as administering 
61 1879 Report, p. 82. 62 The post had been introduced in 1874 to give the Commissioner access to the kind of 
immediate legal advice which his predecessor, Mayne, had embodied in his person. The 
appointee, J. H. Davis, had been a stipendiary magistrate in Sheffield, and in 1877 had been 
given direct, temporary responsibility for detectives as an immediate response to the turf fraud 
scandal. He had argued before the Committee that neither his own nor Howard Vincent's 
appointment -following the 1878 Committeds recommendation - as Director of Criminal Investigations was compatible with the Police Acts. 
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the force on different principles, with each undoing the work of the other when 
he had the opportunity. Whereas Harris was the apostle of uthorough" (and 
disliked), Labalmondiere was regarded by Harris (and Pearson, Harris's 
principal supporter amongst the District Superintendents) as far too lenient with 
the men though apparently liked and admired by them and listened to by the 
Commissioner. 63 In addition, Henderson himself was criticised as idle and 
indecisive. In his own office, the civilian clerks voiced contempt and 
apprehension in equal measure in relation to the encroachments over the years 
by police clerks on what had originally been their sole preserve. 64 
This dispiriting disarray made change both imperative and slowed its delivery. 
Whereas the Detective Committee's Report was implemented in April 1878, just 
over two months following completion, the Ridley Report remained the subject 
of considerable negotiation until the promulgation of the resulting Police Order 
on 16 December 1881. The outcome bore more relation to expediency and 
Henderson's wishes than to the 1879 recommendations. By reason of the death 
of one of the District Superintendents, Baynes, the retirement of Harris and the 
promotion into his place of Pearson, it became possible to settle for a unified 
chain of command where the two remaining District Superintendents reported 
63 'The most able gentleman under that roof '- Thomas Kittle, retired Superintendent and 
effectively spokesman for the Superintendents, 1878 Report, Evidence, Q 2995. 'How it 
happened that Colonel Labalmondiere did not succeed Sir Richard in the Commissionership I 
never heard. I only know that the whole of the police were disappointed by his non- 
appointment. w Cavanagh, T. A. Scotland Yard Past and Present, Benn, 1892: p. 80. Cavanagh 
had joined the force in 1855, worked mostly at headquarters, and retired as an Inspector. 64 Of Henderson - 'He has no strength of character. It is a painful thing to say. *: Kittle, 1878 
Report, Evidence, Q 2995. See also evidence of E. G. May, Chief Clerk, at Q 3799. A decade 
later, Harcourt offered a different view. "It is said that Sir Edmund Henderson was not sufficiently 
vigorous and active. But there are other merits than vigour and activity., - Hansard, Commons, 
14 December, 1888, col. 1166. 
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for denominated Divisions to a particular Assistant Commissioner, each of 
whom undertook prescribed subject responsibilities as opposed to participating 
in the old free for all. The "problem" of the status in law of the Director of the 
CID was resolved following Vincent's resignation in 1884 by means of the 
Metropolitan Police Act of 1884 which permitted the appointment of an 
additional, third, Assistant Commissioner. Coincident on Labalmondiere's 
retirement that year, the outcome was an Assistant Commissioner over the CID 
(Monro), and a new colleague (Bruce, a barrister) for Pearson in the 1881 
arrangement. The ambiguous status, as he felt it, of the Legal Adviser was 
resolved by his death in office in 1887, and the fact that he was not replaced. 
Part of the delay - not epic by Home Office standards - was caused by an 
intervening election and the anival in Apdl 1880 of a new Home Secretary, 
Harcourt, and a new junior minister, Arthur Peel. This would have caused all the 
delay consequent on the need for new ministers to familiarise themselves With 
their responsibilities and to take their own measure of the personalities involved. 
The internal affairs of the Metropolitan police would not have been a high 
priority, especially in regard to an unpublished report of an internal committee 
set up by a previous government. What had been urgent in 1877-8 was the 
need to address the problem of confidence in relation to the central detectives. 
That crisis surmounted, ministerial attention wandered, and there was no way 
even ardent officials (and there is no evidence that they were ardent) could 
have promoted the organisational agenda. Only another crisis could do that. 
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The third, and uncompleted, inquiry touched on a further dimension of the 
relationship between the Home Office and the Commissioner. Whereas the first 
two inquiries principally concemed the intemal organisation of the force, the 
third - The Metropolitan Accounts Commission - looked at the relationships 
between the Commissioner and the Receiver. As explained at Chapter 3 above, 
it did not report. It originated in the Commissioners criticisms of how the 
Receiver carried out his functions. Chapter 3 sets out the detail of the 
exchanges and explains why this particular interface remained such a long 
running point of argument. In 1878 the issues were not fought to a conclusion 
though, as will be explained below, they were acutely relevant during Warren's 
tenure in 1886-8. 
1v The Pall Mail Riot 1886 
On 8 February 1886 part of a crowd of unemployed men who had been 
attending Trafalgar Square meetings roamed the streets between the Square 
and Hyde Park attacking various premises, including Oxford Street shops and 
Pall Mail clubs. Robert Walker, aged 74, as a District Superintendent the senior 
officer present in Trafalgar Square and wearing civilian clothes since there was 
no provision for his rank to wear police uniform of any description, was helpless 
to stop his pocket being picked. The police failed to prevent the disorder and 
only with difficulty, and after some mishaps, finally controlled the situation. 
Shopkeepers'and many others panicked as a result of so unprecedented an 
experience that was backed by all the social and psychological uncertainties of 
a severe economic recession. 
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For the Home Secretary, Childers, the riot coincided with his first effective day 
in office, and in a Department of which he had no previous experience. He 
recorded his dismay and incredulity. 65 Clearly, he was expected to act and 
quickly to restore fragile confidence. His response was to set up a committee of 
which he was chairman and whose members included senior cross party 
representation, the foremost soldier of the day (Wolsey), and the Home Office 
Legal Adviser (Pemberton) as an assessor. The report was concluded (with a 
haste that might now seem unseemly) on 22 February and was damning: 
It is, in our opinion, a matter of grave consideration, whether the numbers of officers of 
superior rank and education, or of experience in the habit of command, is sufficient for 
the numerous duties of an important nature which from time to time devolve upon the 
police when collected in large numbers. There seems to be want of initiative on the part 
of the superintendents and inspectors. 
Another of the Report' s conclusions was that "the administration and 
organisation of the Metropolitan Police Force require to be thoroughly 
investigated; and we hope that this investigation will take place without delay". 66 
Henderson resigned and was replaced by a serving Major-General, Charles 
Warren. 
The pace of the subsequent inquiry into the administration and organisation of 
the force flagged a little in comparison since its seven page Report was not 
65 Childers, op. cit, p. 239, letter of 12 February to Francis Childers, and Hansard, Commons, 18 
February, 1886, cols. 594-606. 66 Report of the Committee on Disturbances (Metropolis), C 4665,22 February, 1886, 
paragraphs 45 and 49. 
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completed until July 1886.67 Childers was again chairman but, apart from 
Pemberton who now became a full member, was assisted by a different cast 
that included the new Commissioner. For the latter, this arrangement had the 
great merit that he was able to influence the recommendations for whose 
implementation he would be responsible. (It also allowed him to put down a 
public marker for an increase in force strength, though the committee declined 
to reach a conclusion on the point. ) The recommendations included that, to 
counter excessive centralisation, the four district posts should be revived but 
under the title "chief constable" and that there should also be some assistant 
chief constable posts in addition. The mounted branch was to be reinforced by 
almost 20% and the telegraph system further improved. Showing the marks of 
its origins in the February events, the Report also concluded: 
We consider that the primary responsibility of immediately dealing with all states of 
disturbance, tumults, or outbreaks, must rest with the Chief Commissioner, and his 
assistants, but it is our opinion that in all cases of abnormal or grave character the 
Home Office should be promptly informed of circumstances as they occur, in order that 
the Secretary of State may be in a position to act in any mafterwhich might demand his 
interference. 
It is the custom of the Chief Commissioner if he anticipates disturbance, tumult, or 
outbreak to inform the Secretary of State, and if necessary to submit for his information 
details of the police arrangements. We think it would be well in order to avoid in the 
future any uncertainty as to the exact relations between the Home Office and Scotland 
67 Report of the Committee on the Administration and Organisation of the Metropolitan Police 
Force, 1886, C 4894. 
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Yard, if the Secretary of State were to issue a Memorandum clearly establishing what is 
now only unwriften law. 68 
Although this read like the smack of firm government, the conclusion begged 
some questions. Chief of these was exactly what kind of steps were thought to 
be open to the Home Secretary when he was put in a "position to act in any 
manner which might demand his interferenc4e? In the middle of a dot, he could 
hardly in practice assume operational command or replace the Commissioner 
or the officer in charge on the spot. The implications, if there were any identified 
at the time, were not spelled out. It is difficult in practice to see that this ringing 
statement suggesting an important change of procedure and operational 
authority really changed anything. If it came, for example, to calling in the 
military, the Home Secretary would have to be consulted in any case. As to the 
rest, it was already true that the graver the situation, the closer the 
Commissioner and the Home Secretary would have to consult over the scale 
and character of the response. 
If the statement did not mean what it seemed to say, why was it there? There 
are two likely answers. The first is that it was - like the whole exercise of the 
two reports that were both published documents, unlike those in the previous 
two decades -a political and public response intended to reassure. The dots 
were a great calamity at the heart of a supposedly pacific and benevolent 
empire. The government wished to reassert the appearance of control: this 
68 lbid, p. 5. 
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meant swift action to condemn the past, to remove and replace the culprits, and 
to lay down - or appear to lay down -a pattern for amended conduct. 
The second possible answer is to be found in Childers' background. As already 
noted, Childers had no experience of the Home Office69, but he did have 
considerable - six years - experience in the service Departments. Instinctively. 
and above all with Warren at his side, he would have thought the service 
analogy as apt for control as for command. The overall conduct of a campaign 
had, of course, to receive initial political backing and have that backing 
maintained. Plans and officers might be changed and replaced during the 
course of hostilities, though it was not practicable (and invariably unwise) to 
interfere once forces were committed to a particular engagement. In the context 
of civil order, it is likely that Childers equated the Hot With the campaign and 
thus sought conveniently to imply an opportunity for ministerial intervention that 
did not, and could not, obtain. 70 What mattered above all was to demonstrate at 
least purported authority. For Childers, the confusion was never tested by 
events since he was out of office in less than six months. For Warren, it was 
another story. 
eg A point he offered in his own favour during his Parliamentary statement - Hansard, 
Commons, 18 February, 1886, col. 599. 
70 Lushington advised strongly, and at length, against confusing the functions: MTo make the 
Secretary of State responsible is, therefore, to ease of responsibility the officer who is 
competent, and to cast it on one who is incompetent, with the result to the public that might be 
imagined ... The Secretary of State ought to stand quite clear. 
It was for that reason that I 
yesterday expressed the hope that the Police Orders would not again be revised at the Home 
Office! Letter of 21 February, 1886, in Childers, op. cit., pp. 243-4. 
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v 1886-89: Events and the balance of power 
This relatively short period proved to be an exceptionally testing time. As an 
economic recession continued, forms of public protest multiplied and in ways 
not hitherto experienced by the force or fully considered by the law. As 
explained above, the contested arrest of a young woman, Miss Cass, became a 
great cause c6ldbre, and demonstrated amongst other things defects in how 
complaints against the police were handled. The horrific Ripper murders 
provided real life sensation that fed some of the deepest urban neuroses of the 
times . 
71 Although they perhaps did not deserve all the obloquy they received for 
their efforts to respond, neither Warren nor the Home Secretary, Henry 
Matthews, were well fitted to cope. Warren, a career soldier who returned to 
soldiering after his resignation in 1888, regarded his role as that of a military 
commander, was impatient of restraint and unaccustomed to the rule of law. 
Matthews, appointed by Salisbury on the recommendation of Randolph 
Churchill on the grounds of his skills as an advocate, had no executive 
experience whatsoever. He also exhibited a preference for argument over 
decision characteristic of some of the members of his profession, though not at 
all, it has to be said, of his immediate successor, Asquith. 
So far as the relationship with the Home Office was concerned, Warren did not 
like what he found and questioned it root and branch. He was impatient of 
anyone interposed between himself and the Home Secretary, and considered 
7' See, for example, Curtis Jr., L. P., Jadc the Ripper and the London Press, Yale University 
Press, 2001, for a recent discussion of some of these issues. 
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that all advice to the latter as to the force should come from, or be routed 
through (that is, even if from Lushington), himself. He was intolerant of Monro's 
relationship with the Home Office, and the latter - not an easy man either - 
resigned in August 1888. Warren chafed particularly at the role of the Receiver, 
and criticised the handling of the estimates, the cash balances and many of the 
requirements of the Finance Regulations. He wanted the Surveyor and the 
Storekeeper to report to him rather than the Receiver. Attempts were made to 
mollify and accommodate him, including at a senior political level. 72 For his part, 
Matthews even conceded an inquiry into the whole system of financial controlý" 
As a demonstration of its impartiality, it was chaired by Childers and included as 
members the Parliamentary Under Secretary, Stuart-Wortley, a senior Treasury 
official, the War Office Accountant-General, and the Chairman of the Prison 
Commission, Ducane. It never reported because Warren resigned before it 
completed its work. 
In the public realm, there were from late 1887 repeated difficulties about how to 
72 The former Home Secretary, Gathorne Hardy, recorded a conversation with the Prime 
Minister and the Lord Chancellor after a City dinner on 15 March, 1888, about O... Matthews- 
Warren who do not agree. The latter resigned but Smith [Leader of the Commons] got him to 
take back his resignation though he has little hope of ensuring harmony. Warren has the police 
with him and the trade public but no doubt is fractious. Matthews has I fear been wanting in tact 
and judgement and is too much led by Lushington. ' Johnson, Nancy E., op. cit., p. 697. 73 See HO 45146998/34 for the only papers that seem to survive, and HO 45/49602 for 
Lushington's memorandum of 4 December, 1888, commenting on the Committee's deliberations 
and the issues in general. In the former, a memorandum prepared in July 1888 but not certainly 
submitted to the Committee refers to Warren's 'intolerably overbearing manner'. 
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deal with public order problems in Trafalgar Square. 74 As in the case of Hyde 
Park twenty years before, the legal position was particularly inchoate in respect 
of how far the police might take preventive measures anticipating disorder 
before there was evidence that it had occurred. Matthews' proper scruples were 
transmitted through the medium of his particular personality, antipathetic to that 
of Warren and, of course, vice versa. Into this rich stew was stirred Lushington, 
a highly intelligent, very experienced and forceful workaholic whose role 
became to hold the ring but whose personality was ill-suited to the occasion. 75 
The tensions became unmanageable, and the crisis came when Warren 
published an article in Murray's Magazine implicitly criticising the Home 
Secretary. 76 Reminded that he should have observed an administrative 
instruction to have sought prior approval for publication, Warren resigned on 13 
November 1888. 
This act occasioned one of the few extended discussions in Parliament about 
the nature of the respective responsibilities of the Commissioner and the Home 
Secretary. It occurred the following day during a Commons Supply debate. The 
main contribution was made by Harcourt, Home Secretary 1880-85. In a long 
and eloquent speech largely supportive of Matthews, Harcourt spelled out the 
principal features of the relationship, summarising it as follows: 
74 For a thorough and fair rninded account of a complex situation, see Bailey, V., "The 
Metropolitan Police, the Home Office and the Threat of outcast London' at pp. 94-125 of Bailey, 
V., (ed. ) Policing and Punishment in Nineteenth Century Britain, Croorn Helm, 1981. 75 Implying that Lushington, unlike his predecessor, Liddell, was more inclined to apply blisters 
than plasters, Robert Anderson opined *With his many excellent qualities Godfrey Lushington's 
intervention and influence as Under Secretary were generally provocative, and his manner 
irritating. ' - Anderson, R., The Lighter Side of My Official Life, Hodder, 1910, p. 131. However, 
Anderson had his own crotchets against Lushington and is not to be regarded as an entirely 
reliable witness. 
76 OThe Police of the Metropolis", Muffay's Magazine, November 1888, pp. 592-4. 
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The man who is responsible to the House for the police is and ought to be, the 
Secretary of State, and the Commissioner of Police is no more independent of the 
authority of the Secretary of State than the Under Secretary of State for the Home 
Department. It is a matter entirely at the discretion of the Secretary how far the principle 
of responsible authority should interfere with Executive office, and the less any 
interference happens the better. 77 
Matthews gratefully concurred, adding as to the controversy over the control of 
public meetings: 
All that Her Majesty's Government had endeavoured to do was to see that the right of 
public meeting was not exercised so as to infringe the rights, the comfort, and the 
convenience of peaceable inhabitants.... Sir Charles Warren's resignation had been 
accepted because the Government felt it was absolutely necessary to uphold and 
enforce the principles which the Rt Hon Gentleman had laid down in terms of perfect 
propriety - that in the ulti mate resort it must be the Secretary of State who was 
responsible for the action of the Metropolitan Police. 78 
Although Warren's replacement, Monro, lasted no longer and resigned in 1890 
ostensibly over police pensions issues, the handling of his 1889 request for 
more men throws particularly interesting light on the Commissioners 
relationship with the Home Secretary. Monro first made his case in July 1889. 
77 Hansard, Commons, 14 November, 1888, cols. 1162-3. 78 Ibid, cols. 1172-3. Thisjointly articulated statement of the position was not contested then or 
at any other time in the period of this study. It was also accepted in a later, leading study. See Marshall, G., Police and Government; The Status and Accoountability of the English Constable, 
Methuen, 1965, pp. 29-32. 
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He referred to what he claimed was a favourable reaction to his latest published 
Annual Report: 
It is dear that the public are perfectly willing to increase their contribution to secure 
more extended Police protection, and that being so the only objection which has 
hitherto stood in the way of augmentation to the Force has practically been 
removed ... The public recognise the validity of the grounds upon which the demand has 
been brought forward... " 
But things were not that simple. Tripp, the finance officer in the Home Office, 
minuted not unsympathetically that London's population had increased by over 
a million in the period1878-1889, though the force itself had grown by 17% 
during 1883-8. The Receiver pointed out that the pensions deficit was already 
running at El 40,000 a year and, the Government Actuary advised, was likely to 
rise by another El 00,000 a year by the end of the 1 890s. Ministers agreed that 
the questions of augmentation and pensions would be best settled 
simultaneously since ministers could hardly ask Parliament for the money for 
augmentation only to return almost immediately after to ask for pension funding 
as well. Monro was accordingly told to wait until the autumn. 
Monro waited only till September to return to the charge, and then used ever 
more pressing, almost excitable, language: 
I can assure the Secretary of State that if the strain upon the Force be continued, as it 
is not unlikely to be, the Police work of the Metropolis cannot be performed with 
'79 HO 4519707/A50657/1, letter of 24 July, 1889. 
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efficiency; and I trust I may be relieved from responsibility for shortcomings which under 
such circumstances must be inevitable. 80 
There followed various further exchanges. In the absence of the Receiver and 
Lushington on leave, Monro was offered a temporary augmentation of 100 
funded by halting building work. Monro then asked for another 400 for 6 
months, and then a week later refused - to Lushington's puzzlement - any 
temporary augmentation until the larger question was settled. Finally, following 
an interview with the Home Secretary on 19 October, Monro submitted on 23 
October a nine page printed memorandum stating his full case for an extra 1000 
men. 81 Dwelling on the unique circumstances of London, Monro emphasised 
how frequently he had had to withdraw men from ordinary duty to staff special 
events - 1940 times involving 58,709 men between I January and 30 October, 
1889. This harassed the men and denuded local cover. Because of the 
pensions cost, he maintained that the force received less proportionately from 
the rates than in 1829. A barrage of claimed press support consisted of 23 
press cuttings, including from provincial papers and Punch. Monro's main point 
was "Hitherto the pressing wants of the Police as regards numbers have been 
met by a policy of makeshift. " 
The fundamental question concemed how was the Home Office to assess such 
a request? Neither it nor the Receiver could go behind the Commissioners 
arithmetic. The Receiver could state the condition of the Fund, but was not in a 
80 HO 45/9707/A50657/4, letter of 10 September, 1889. 81 HO 45/9707/A50657/5-9. An alarmed Receiver telegraphed at one stage from Strokestown, 
Roscommon, when on holiday - see /5. 
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position to do more. H. M. Inspectors of Constabulary under the 1856 Act had no 
remit in respect of the Metropolitan police, nor had they any sufficient 
experience which would qualify them to opine if asked. No-one considered 
turning to some alternative, disinterested source: they were not then to be found 
even if it had been thought proper to involve them. 
In a characteristically long memorandum (18 printed pages) to the Home 
Secretary, Lushington wrestled with the issues. He swiftly disposed of Monro's 
populism: "No doubt the Force is deservedly a popular body, but I can attach 
little value to this chorus of the Press", going on to point out that the writers had 
no concern for cost or understanding of how legislation, once introduced, might 
fare adversely in Parliament. After a thorough analysis of the statistical and 
other data, and mindful also no doubt that it would be undesirable for the Home 
Secretary to have another Commissioner resign too soon, he concluded: 
But the sufficiency or otherwise of Police Protection is a practical question not 
demonstrable from statistics or comparisons. Mr Monro entertains a decided opinion 
that there is a necessity for a permanent augmentation of 1,000 men and strongly urges 
that it should be authorised. As head of the force, familiar with its daily operations and 
responsible for its efficiency, he, of all others, is most competent to form a judgement, 
and it is with much diffidence that any layman should question the result at which he 
has arrived .... I could not therefore go to the length of saying that I am convinced that 
the augmentation at least to the extent asked for is absolutely indispensable. The 
practical conclusion would seem to be that unless the Parliamentary difficulties are 
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greater than I estimate then Mr Monro should receive the augmentation which he asks 
of 1,000 men. 82 
In other words, provided a request were not clean contrary to commonsense, in 
augmentations the Commissioner was ultimately the judge of his own cause. In 
the sense voiced by a former Board of Trade Permanent Under Secretary 
(Farrer) to the Ridley Commission (1887-90) when speaking about Treasury 
control, Home Office control occupied in relation to the Metropolitan police the 
same position as the Treasury vis a vis other government Departments: 
We can check them in the big things: they may bully us in the little thingS. 83 
But even Commissioners could run out of road if they pressed demands too far. 
In May 1890 -just five months after being given an extra 1000 men - Monro, 
asked for a further augmentation. This time there was no mincing of words: 
Financial considerations alone would render it all but impossible to accede to that 
request; and certainly very cogent evidence that an increase was necessary, and very 
careful consideration of that evidence would be essential preliminaries before Mr. 
Matthews could commit himself to any opinion on the subject. 84 
82 HO 45/9707/A50657/17,13 November, 1889. 
83 Quoted in Wright, M., *Treasury Control 1854-1914" in Sutherland, G. ed. Studies in the 
Growth of Nineteenth Century Government', Routedge, 1972, p. 199. 84 MEPO 21248 - Home Office letter of 24 May, 1890, referring to a memorandum from the Commissioner of the day before. The letter also rejected a claim for gratuities: M On the OP 
January last Mr. Matthews intimated that he regarded the recent large augmentation of the 
Force as a bar even to applications for gratuities; and he is much disappointed to find that you 
nevertheless think it necessary again to press upon the concession of extra pay., Monro 
resigned less than one month later. 
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vi Westminster Eucharistic procession 1908 
In the event the occasion of the procession was unremarkable. What was 
significant was the extent to which both the King and the Prime Minister became 
involved, and the fact that the Home Secretary, Herbert Gladstone, considered 
for a short period that his resignation might be in question. 
The reintroduction of the Roman Catholic hierarchy into Britain in 1851 had not 
been entirely uncontroversial. However, Roman Catholics were as entitled as 
anyone else to exercise their civil right to walk the streets in procession as they 
saw fit, a right increasingly exercised by them in London from 1893. Fortified by 
an Opinion from the Law Officers in 1898, the Metropolitan police had 
conceived it their duty simply to make whatever preparations seemed 
appropriate on public order grounds for dealing in these cases as with other 
processions. The intention of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Westminster to 
hold a procession on 13 September 1908 was, accordingly, approached in that 
spidt 
However, the matter became controversial when the Protestant Association 
claimed that the proposed procession was not only unusually large and 
prestigious (it transpired it was to include a Papal Legate and a number of other 
Cardinals) but also, because the Host was to be carried, contrary to the law as 
set out at section 26 of the Catholic Emancipation Act 1829 - and an intention 
not made known to the police. All the precedents were against interference, but 
the developments made it appear that the police were conferring official 
sanction on the arrangements. (it was known that the Commissioner, Henry, 
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was himself a Roman Catholic. ) A few days before the planned event, Troup, 
the Permanent Under Secretary, recommended Gladstone write to the 
Archbishop to dissuade him from including the host in the procession. 115 
Meanwhile, however, the Prime Ministers office had become involved, and the 
Archbishop declined to treat with anyone but the Prime Minister, Asquith - who 
had, of course, been a notable Home Secretary (and Gladstone his junior) in his 
day. The Archbishop climbed down, and the procession - without the Host - 
went off uneventfully, but Gladstone had to account to the Prime Minister for the 
turn of events, in particular why the police had not foreseen the problems. In 
addition, the King expressed displeasure at what he regarded as Gladstone's 
inadequate explanation of events: "Bearing in mind the extent to which the 
Reformation is bound up with National History, The King cannot wonder that the 
Procession thus publicly announced, with its avowed object, created a grave 
sensation amongst English Protestants. "86 
Gladstone, inclined perhaps to pettishness and self-concem, apparently 
seriously contemplated resignation. Troup was having none of that: 
It would be a disastrous thing to public life if a minister who was in no way to blame had 
to suffer because he stood by a subordinate who at worst had made an honest 
mistake. 87 
85 BL, Add Mss 45993, letter of 8 September, 1908. 88 BL, Add Mss 45985, Davidson to Gladstone, 19 September, 1908. 
87 BL, Add Mss 45993, letter of 25 September, 1908. 
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The moment had passed and Gladstone survived, amongst other things to deal 
with more ticklish issues concerning the treatment of suffragettes. The episode 
illustrates, however, how vulnerable Home Secretaries and Commissioners 
remained to unforeseeable collisions. On this occasion, there had been no 
untoward outcome and no need for sacrifice. 1886 had been very different and, 
although Harcourt and Matthews were able in 1888 to refer to Henderson's 
departure in terms respectively of "particular accident" and to his having been 
"perhaps unfairly sacrificed"88, Gladstone understood that heads could still roll if, 
for whatever reason, things went wrong. Henry, of course, suffered that fate in 
1918 as a result of the police strike. 




Municipalisation - the control of the Metropolitan police by a /ocal elected 
authority - did not come about until 2000, one hundred and seventy-one years 
after the force's foundation. London's policing arrangements were for long the 
exception: in every other part of Great Britain, including the City of London itself, 
the police were controlled by a local authority, although in the counties the 
authority had no elected members until 1888 and after that had a non-elected 
component of magistrates in the Standing Joint Committees. In Ireland, things 
were different: both forces (the Dublin Metropolitan police and the Royal Irish 
Constabulary) were directly under government control as, since 1922, in 
somewhat different configurations, they have essentially remained. 
The peculiarity of London's policing in this respect was an unchanging fact 
throughout the period of the current study. However, the apparent acceptance 
of this peculiarity requires explanation. It is also right to try to put it into the 
context of larger political and administrative considerations which themselves 
were by no means static. An institution may retain a particular character over a 
long period but the perceived justifications for its doing so do not necessarily 
themselves stay immutable. There were also consequences, it may be argued, 
for other institutions or their lack. As one historian of London government put it, 
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the establishment of the Metropolitan force in 1829 inhibited the growth of other 
municipal institutions in London: 
The very effectiveness of the centralised solution of the only problem which was 
regarded as urgent helped to postpone the general reform of metropolitan government 
by relieving the pressure at a vital spot. And when reform eventually came in 1855, it 
was farweaker than itwould have been if the question of police administration had 
remained to be dealt with in terms of local government. 1 
Indeed, there were initiatives to intensify the peculiarity by encompassing 
amalgamation of the City police with the Metropolitan force. Amalgamation was 
recommended by the 1838 Select Committee and by the 1854 Royal 
Commission .2A government 
Bi113 was tabled in 1863 as a response to the City 
force's failure to keep order and prevent crowd deaths following the progress to 
the City of the Prince of Wales and his fianc6e, Alexandra, the Danish 
4 
princess. However, that Bill was the sole government initiative on the subject. 
The Bill (which failed, embarrassingly, for hybridity) would have made no 
alteration to Home Office control. 
' Robson, W., The Government and Misgovernment of London, Allen and Unwin, 1939, pp. 52- 
3. 
2 pp 1837-8 Vol XV, and PP 1854 Vol XXVI, Report of the Royal Commission on the 
Corporation of the City of London, p. xxiv. 3 Metropolitan and City of London Police Amalgamation Bill, PP 1863, Vol. 111, p. 51. 4 See PP 1863 Vol L for the Parliamentary Returns at pages 341,345,385, and 389 dealing 
with various aspects of the events. See also MEPO 2/24 for contemporary press comment. One 
consequence of the alleged slurs cast on the City force by the Metropolitan Commissioner was 
a furious apologia penned by the City Chamberlain. See Scott, B., A Statistical Vindication of 
the City of London, or Fallacies Exploded and Figures Explained, Longmans, 1867. 
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The govemment of London 
As has already been noted above, "shortage of agency" facilitated government 
control over the new force precisely because there was no pre-existing 
metropolitan wide authority upon whom the responsibility could be conferred: 5 
Although it is true that most of the complaints from the superseded parochial 
authorities related to the expense of the new force, there were some who 
6 voiced a wish to participate in its control . 
They made no headway. Parliament 
supported the new arrangements and, apart from the special case of the City, 
gave no room to claims about the legitimacy of local authority control. 
If the policing problems of the metropolis were "solved" in 1829, the other 
problems of metropolitan governance emphatically were not. There was a long 
and messy debate about what form metropolitan institutional change should 
take and for what purposes. This discussion was punctuated by resort to 
various partial expedients, for example a short-lived Board of Health as a 
response to the cholera threat, and a tendency to thrust administrative functions 
on the Metropolitan police - the regulation of public carriage vehicles, smoke 
abatement, the cleansing of common lodging houses, and even some 
responsibilities for dangerous structures. 
5 'There was little if any political doctrine involved in the decision. It was chiefly a matter of 
expedience. ' Robson, W., op. cit, p. 52. Whilst this may be true so far as it goes, at the same 
time it is clear that the government was not averse to assuming direct control. See, for example, 
Peel to Gregory 29 May, 1829, where the former is frank: *I have completed a work which has 
given me great trouble, but which was absolutely necessary, the annihilation of the parochial 
watch of the metropolis and its environs; and have given power to the Secretary of State to 
reorganise, on a very extensive scale, a new system of police... " Parker, C. S., Sir Robert Peel, 
Vol. 2, Murray, 1899, p. 114. a See, for example, HO 61/2 for the memorandum from a Covent Garden deputation in 
November 1830 arguing that the old watch was locally and publicly accountable, and 
recommending a Central Board with elected members under a government appointed chairman. 
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The establishment of the Metropolitan Board of Works in 1855 followed the 
recommendations of the 1854 Royal Commission. Although the Commission 
had favoured Metropolitan and City police amalgamation, it did not recommend 
putting the resulting force under the Board. An indirectly elected body, the 
Board was largely preoccupied with public works programmes like the 
embankment of the Thames, though it did assume responsibility for the fire 
brigade in 1865. The Metropolitan police had been considered as a possible 
destination for the brigade (formerly a creature of the insurance companies) at a 
time when such a duality was known in a number of provincial towns. In the 
end, however, the brigade and the then separate rescue service became 
amalgamated under Board control. 
Whilst the Board addressed some of the concerns about metropolitan 
governance, it failed to deal with others. Indirect was thought to be inferior to 
direct election; the Boards' powers were too circumscribed; and, above all, no 
solution had been offered to the requirement for improved local administration 
within the metropolitan area which remained a patchwork of parishes and 
district boards devoid of any common rationale. 
Debate continued inside Parliament and without. It did not establish a 
consensus precisely because there was no self-evidently correct outcome. The 
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internal merits of various preferences became overlaid by tactical 
considerations, above all how to deal with the position of the City. Also relevant, 
of course, was the experience of the Board and the practical and financial 
difficulties it encountered. In the 1860s, several Select Committees investigated 
the situation, all of them chaired by Acton Smee Ayrton, the gifted but choleric 
MP for Tower Hamlets. 7 Outside Parliament, a vigorous battle of pamphlet and 
book developed. The future of policing was not at the centre of these 
discussions for two reasons: on the one hand, the discussions were 
preoccupied with designing a satisfactory urban architecture and, on the other, 
the most vigorous proponents of change simply took it as axiomatic that an 
elected authority would have responsibility for policing in London as was the 
established case everywhere else. 3 
The reformers tabled a series of Bills from 1867, less in any hope that they 
would become law than as a means of putting proposals forward and 
crystallising opinion. All the Bills sought to implement the principle of municipal 
control of the police, though with some variation on the detail - as well as 
7 A. S. Ayrton (1816-1886) originally practiced as a solicitor in Bombay, returning to qualify as a 
barrister in 1853. Liberal MP for Tower Hamlets 1857-1874. He attracted attention with a long 
speech on London municipal reform in 1860. Amongst other things, the speech criticized the 
continuance of the City police 6apparently for no other object but to put everything in confusion'. 
ýýansard, Commons, 24 April, 1860, col. 78. ) 
On the other hand, would be reformers did not hide their views. In the 1860s, James Beal, an 
auctioneer and land agent who was a member of the St James's Vestry, was one of the most 
prominent exponents of municipal reform in London. He told the Ayrton Committee In 1861 1 
should like the police transferred to the corporation, and not to be in the hands of the 
Government; I think it is a local not an Imperial matter. ' PP 1861, Vol. V11 I, Select Committee on 
Metropolis Local Taxation, Evidence, 13 May, 1861, Q 1221. Beal used stronger language In a 
pamphlet: 'To guard our streets and protect our property, we are dependent on an imperial 
police, having no interest in our welfare - aliens amongst us, like Austrian troops holding an Italian town. ' See p. 8 of Beal, J. 'To the editor of the Star", in Municipal Corporations for the 
Metropolis, No 14 of Political Tracts 186Z British Ubrary 8138cc7. To an extent, Beal and his 
supporters were the policy wonks of their day. In theory it was desirable to secure reform, but in 
practice it was not generally regarded as an urgent issue. 
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uncertainty of effect as a result of sometimes perfunctory drafting. Thus the very 
first Bill, the Municipal Corporations (Metropolis) Bill, 9 introduced by J. S. Mill in 
1867, kept the Commissioner of Police but had the force organised on the basis 
of the nine boroughs (not including the City) which the Bill would have 
established. The Bills of the Sessions following in 1867-8 and 1869-9 were on 
the same lineslo. As has been noted, the reformers presented a petition to the 
Home Secretary in January 1869.11 One of their leaders, the MP Charles 
Buxton, sought to give their ideas wider currency in a pamphlet in the same 
year insisting that the new municipality should have "the control over the police 
and over the whole of the administration of justice. 902 It was not a surprise, 
therefore, whereas when Mill had introduced his first Bill in 1867 he had made 
no mention of policing, in introducing his 1870 Bill Buxton was explicit: 
What was really wanted was a strong central government for the whole metropolis -a 
government that should have control over the police and the administration of justice, 
over all sanitary measures, improvement of streets and other public works, including 
sewerage, gas, bridges, gaols, workhouses, asylums and so forth. 13 
However, the position of the reformers modified almost certainly in order to 
avoid opposition to their plans for the police becoming an obstacle to securing 
any reform at all. Thus, in his magnum opus Municipal Government of 1876, 
9 Municipal Corporations (Metropolis) Bill, PIP 1867, Vol. IV, p. 447. Mill also introduced 
separately as the other part of his scheme the Metropolitan Municipal Government Bill, PP 
1867, Vol. IV, p. 207 which would have expanded the City to create an entity known as the 
county of London. 
10 PP 1867-8, Vol. 111, p. 515; PP 1868-9, Vol. IV, p. 131. 11 Emsley, C., The English Police Longman, 2 nd edn, 1996, p. 85 - in the course of a chapter 
which reviews Victorian issues of police control as a whole. 12 Buxton, C., Self-government for London: the leading ideas on which the constitution of 
London should be based. A letter to the Rt Hon H. A. Bruce, Metropolitan Municipal Association, 
1869, p. 7. 
13 Hansard, Commons, 18 May, 1870, col. 855. 
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Firth temporised. Although the Metropolitan police would have become 
answerable to a municipal "Public Justice, Police, Prisons and Licensing 
Committee", partly in recognition of the Exchequer contribution, the Home 
Secretary should be given some residual power 
It is also desirable to go somewhat further, and give the Home Office a power of giving 
orders in certain cases which should be enforced by the Chief Commissioner. If this 
were not deemed sufficient control, there seems no reason to apprehend danger from 
going still further, and giving the Home Secretary veto power upon the general 
regulations made by the Supreme Council for the management and division of the 
force. 14 
Bills introduced in 1875 and 1880 15 were bolder as to architecture (abolition of 
the City, establishment of a single county administration divided into districts 
and wards) but temporised on policing. Explaining that the promoters had 
decided also to give the government a veto on the appointment of the mayor, 
deputy mayor and judicial officers, Lord Elcho explained: 
Then, as regards the police, in the Bill as originally drawn, they were placed wholly 
under the control of the Corporation; but it was manifest that the objections urged 
against this proposal rested on sound grounds, and it was now proposed to do nothing 
at all with reference to the police, but to leave it to the Secretary of State and the House 
14 Firth, J. F. B., Municipal Government, or London Government as it is and London under a Municipal Council, Longmans, 1876. Firth (1842-1889) was a barrister and longstanding President of the Municipal Reform League. He established himself as the leading expert on London government issues, his first major publication being The Gas Supply of London, 1874. He was MP for Chelsea 1880-5, and for Dundee from 1888 until his death while climbing in the Chamonix. Elected to the LCC in 1889, he was its first Deputy Chairman and his premature death was regarded as aa real loss to the LCC in its formative period. 15 pp 1875, Vol. IV, p. 361; PP 1880, Vol, V, p. 369. 
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of Commons in Committee to decide how they would deal with the Imperial question of 
the police of this vast metropolis. 16 
Again, this concession was probably entirely tactical. In principle, it is likely that 
the promoters would have preferred municipal control but recognised that, for 
example, Bentinck's scorn in 1870 continued to speak a truth: 
he could not suppose that the hon. Gentleman [Buxton], in his most enthusiastic 
moments, ever imagined that Her Majesty's Government would relinquish control of the 
police and the administration of justice in the metropolis. 17 
Thus, in a further modification of his position, commenting on the 1880 Bill Firth 
settled for a position where 
The control of the City Police is to be given to the Municipality, and also, after a scheme 
to be settled by the Secretary of State, it is proposed to transfer to their control the 
Metropolitan Police. "' 
The Govemment Bill of 1884 
Whether the Government should relinquish control was, however, at the heart of 
the Cabinets debate about the shape of the measure on London that they were 
committed to introducing. Moreover, the prolongation of that debate so delayed 
the Bill's introduction that not only did it miss the opportunity of the 1883 
'a Hansard, Commons, 11 February, 1875, col. 237. There was no debate on the 1880 Bill 
which. like all its predecessors, made no progress. 17 Hansard, Commons, 18 May, 1870, col. 863. 18 Firth, J. F. B., A Practical Scheme of London Municipal rethrm - Being an Epitome of the 
Municipality of London Bill introduced into Parliament in 1880, London Municipal Reform 
League, 1881, p. 15. 
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Session but it was also introduced so late -8 April 1884 - in the following 
Session that there was no chance of its becoming law. 
In a scheme that was based on expanding the City corporation to create a 
directly elected authority for the whole of the Metropolitan Board of Works 
(MBW) metropolis, the policy problem that had to be resolved had three 
dimensions. First, was the City police (then controlled by the City without any 
Treasury subvention) to be amalgamated into a single force for the new 
municipality? Second, in new municipal arrangements that comprehended the 
City, could the absorption of the City police into the Metropolitan be presented 
convincingly as a Liberal measure without conceding municipal control? Third - 
a lesser, if not peripheral, problem - granted that the metropolitan municipality's 
boundaries were smaller than those of the Metropolitan police (15 miles radius 
from Charing Cross), how should the "surplus" Metropolitan police parishes be 
disposed of? 
Essentially, the debate became one between the Prime Minister, Gladstone, 
and the Home Secretary, Harcourt, who had departmental responsibility for the 
legislation. " The former took the position that, to be fully empowered, it was 
a)(iomatic that the two forces should be combined and that the proposed 
municipality should have responsibility for the police. This view was probably 
shared by a majority of the Cabinet at the outset, and it seemed, initially, not 
19 It did not help Gladstone's relations with Harcourt that the Prime Minister tried to bounce his 
Home Secretary by leaking his own preference for municipal control to a Daily News journalist in 
February 1883 and implying that that preference had become government policy. See Davis, J., 
'The Problem of London Local Government Reform', Ph D Thesis, Oxford, 1983, p. 103. 
Harcourt responded by reminding Gladstone that the matter had still to go to Cabinet - see 
letter of 24 February, 1883, BL Add Ms 44198. 
281 
one to which Harcourt was wholly averse even if he saw himself as assenting to 
a position where an amalgamated City and Metropolitan force was for a while 
administered by the Home Office and only after an interval passed to the 
municipality. However, as time went on, Harcourt - influenced especially by the 
experience of dealing with resurgent Fenianism - became increasingly adamant 
that the policing responsibility should remain with the Home Office. 
He took the issue to Cabinet in a wordy, at times bombastic, printed 
memorandum of 10 pageS. 23 There had to be a single force: it had been 
recommended by successive Parliamentary investigations; and the notion of 
keeping the Square Mile under one authority and the rest of the 15 mile radius 
under another was "too preposterous to admit of serious discussion". Much was 
made of the problem of the "surplus" parishes. Harcourt adverted to uthe sheer 
impossibility of vesting in a Popular Council the discipline and administration of 
such a force as the Metropolitan Police. " The new force could hardly assume 
responsibility for the Royal palaces, Parliament, the dockyards and the 
administration of the Contagious Diseases Acts. Fenian terrorism instanced the 
necessity for direct Executive control and action rather than relying on the due 
procedures of a Watch Committee which had to be summoned before it could 
engage and could not be entrusted with secrets. No such Committee could be 
relied upon to act impartially in cases of religious or political excitement. 
Detective work would suffer interference, and the Commissioner could be 
20 BL Add Mss 43923,0 Most Secrer memorandum, 1 March, 1883. Gladstone doggedly 
annotated his copy with marginalia refuting - sometimes a little sophistically - many of Harcourt's points, but even he gave up after page 8. 
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thrown over at the whim of a narrow majority. 
Finally, he made two political points, the first about political accountability and 
the second an appeal to authodty. As to the first of these: 
The management of the Police of 5,000,000 people is a great responsibility, and those 
who have in charge should be capable of being called to account for it. The Secretary of 
State is directly responsible to Parliament in this matter, and he can be called to 
account for his conduct at any moment. The Common Council are out of the reach of 
Parliament. They can only be held responsible to their constituents, and that, perhaps, 
at a distance of some years. The gravity of this situation cannot be overlooked. 
The appeal to authority consisted in a peroration asserting that his own opinions 
were the opinions also of Peel, Russell, Grey, and Comewall Lewis "all the 
wisest men who have made the traditions of the Home Office since the dawn of 
Political and Municipal reform. They are still strongly held by all the permanent 
officials both of the Home Office and the Police. I cannot see how I can discard 
such authority, confirmed as it is by my own experience. n2l 
21 A former Home Secretary has commented that Harcourt 'fancying himself as a Fouch6" here 
showed uan imperfect grasp of the difference between operational and administrative control". 
The meaning of this Delphic intended putdown is not clear, and may be thought to show a want 
of sympathy from one who 90 years later wrestled with not dissimilar problems, introducing 
svVingeing terrorism legislation of his own. On the other hand, it is true that Harcourt allowed a 
penchant for easy rhetoric to run away with him to the point, at times, of being ridiculous. See 
Jenkins, R., Gladstone, Macmillan, 1995, p. 486. An account of the episode from the Harcourt 
side may be found at Gardiner, A. G., The Life of Sir William Harcourt, Constable, 1923, Vol. 11, 
pp. 482-5. It is also relevant that Gladstone's Private Secretary had no doubt that the majority of 
the Cabinet sided with Harcourt. See BahIman, D. W. R., (ed. ), Diary of Sir Edward Walter 
Hamilton, 188M5, Oxford University Press, 1972, entries for 31 March, 1883, and 12 April, 
1883, at pp. 414 and 421. 
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in correspondence Gladstone attempted to persuade on merits and cajole as to 
means. As to the latter, for example, might not the Bill include a commitment to 
reviewing after some defined interval following the creation of the new 
municipality whether policing should be transferred to it? Harcourt argued that 
such a device conceded the principle and, until resolved, would hobble practice. 
The Home Secretary had to have control over all the police; there could be no 
equivocation. 22 
This also meant that there would be no element of municipal control; and, 
moreover, such element as there had been would be abolished. Gladstone was 
clear that that position was incompatible with the objects of the proposed 
legislation: 
It is my opinion (valeat quantum) that no amount of high arguing by the Cabinet will 
avail to carry through the present House of Commons a plan of Municipal Reform for 
London which shall unite the three conditions of a. One Municipality for the whole. b. 
Permanent State Police for the [whole] Municipality generally. c. Extinction of the 
Municipal Control over the City Police. 23 
The upshot was a Bi1124 that, apart from according the normal Treasury policing 
subvention to the City, was otherwise silent about policing, an outcome assisted 
by the fact that the then most avid MP proponent of municipal reform, Firth 25 1 
22 See especially Gladstone to Harcourt 5 April, 1883, and Harcourt to Gladstone 6 April, 1883, 
BL Add Mss 44198. 
23 Gladstone to Harcourt, 18 May, 1883, in Matthew, H. C. G. (ed), The Gladstone Diaries, Vol. X, 
1990, pp. 448-9. 24 For the politics of the Bill generally, see Davis, J., Reforming London: The London 
Govemment Problem 1855-1900, Oxford, 1988, Chapter 3. 
25 J. F. B. Firth, MP for Chelsea 1880-5, and the author of Municipal London, 1876. 
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confessed that he did not in fact have strong feelings on the issue. The Bill 
would therefore have left the City and Metropolitan forces as they were. 
Whereas Harcourt, when introducing the Bill on 8 April, refrained from 
mentioning police at all, his opponents when they got their chance on Second 
Reading three months later 26 were not diverted by his silence. Ritchi627, his 
Opposition counterpart, specifically instanced the omission of the police as 
evidence that the government thereby acknowledged the impossibility of their 
own project "by not conferring on the Board many of the powers which it was 
hoped by those who were mainly instrumental in raising the question would be 
vested in the new Municipality. n28 Whereas Firth declared tactfully that he 
uwould be glad to see such control in the hands of the Municipality; but they 
must move on this matter by steps"29, others spoke to support the City and to 
denigrate the possibility of municipal control of the Metropolitan police. 30 After 
three days of Second Reading debate on 3,4 and 8 July, the government 
withdrew the Bill on 10 July and made no further attempt to revive the project in 
a situation where they had given priority to franchise reform. 
From his point onwards the reformers suffered from a situation where it could 
be alleged by their opponents (that is, the City and their Conservative allies) 
that even the reformers' most likely Parliamentary champion - the Liberal party 
- did not support them as to municipalisation of the Metropolitan police. Even 
more, therefore, did this cause reformers to soft-pedal the proposal, especially 
28 The delay was occasioned by the decision to finish the franchise Bill's stages first. 27 Charles Thomson Ritchie (1838-1906) -see Appendix C. 28 Hansard, Commons, 3 July, 1884, col. 1951. 29 Hansard, Commons, 3 July, 1884, col. 1962. 30 For example, see Hansard, Commons, 4 July, 1884, col. 61, and 8 July, 1884, cols. 518,531 
and 564. 
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in a situation where there was no uniformity even on the architecture of 
proposed reform. Accordingly, when a deputation went to see the Home 
Secretary and the President of the Local Government Board in December 1886, 
no-one mentioned policing. 31 
Local Govemment Bill 
The reform that did eventuate was the Conservative scheme of the Local 
Government Act 1888 which, in addition to inaugurating elected councils for the 
counties, also created a directly elected body for London. One of the few points 
this scheme shared with the 1884 project was its silence on policing. 
This was not, however, for want of trying. During the Committee stage of the 
1888 Bill, James Stuart, the Radical member for Hoxton and longstanding 
Parliamentary critic of Home Office administration of the Metropolitan police, 
tabled an amendment to the effect that the new London council should have the 
same police powers as boroughs under the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882. 
The debate that then ensued took place, it has to be remembered, in a climate 
where recollections of the Pall Mall dot, the Cass case and Bloody Sunday in 
Trafalgar Square were still fresh. 
31 Municipal Government of the Metropolis, Proceedings of a Conference of Local Authorities on 
the subject of the Reform of Local Government, December 1886. This initiative began in 
response to City proposals ventured in 1885 following the failure of the 1884 Bill. The pamphlet 
describes discussions between the delegates, some of whom came from Vestries and Boards 
acting only in their personal capacity, over the period leading up to the delegation. Whilst a 
majority appears to have favoured gradualist policies for the absorption of the Metropolitan 
police, this view was not reflected in the resolution intended for, but not actually tabled with, 
Ministers. 
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In an artful, low-key and conciliatory presentation, Stuart contrasted the 
omission of policing from the London settlement with the fact that in every other 
case the function was a local authority one - the natural level where the 
business could be despatched without encroachment on Parliamentary time. As 
to detail, he would be prepared to see the City force left alone, and a separate 
force established for the protection of Royal Palaces and public buildings. Much 
was made of the contentions that municipal management would be cheaper and 
that "it was in the highest degree desirable to secure sympathy between the 
government of the police and the people, so that the people might have 
confidence in the administration of the law". 32 Firth and Buxton offered sterling 
support, Firth maintaining that Home Office control was simply an expedient 
necessitated in 1829 by the absence of any competent, pre-existing local 
authority. Then there was militarisation: 
The London policeman was not now a civil officer, but the force had developed a semi- 
military character. London policemen were under the control of a military man; they 
lived in lodgings to a certain extent isolated from the rest of the population; they were 
subjected to drill, and revolvers had been placed in the hands of some of them. 33 
The only former Home Secretary who spoke - Childers, who had had the 
experience of being in office during the 1886 Pall Mall dots - supported the 
principle of municipalisation but thought "there must be a body of police 
responsible to the Minister for certain Imperial purposes". The reformers' case 
32 Hansard, Commons, 12 July, 1888, cols. 1102-1119. 33 lbid, cols. 1125-6. 
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was not, however, helped by support also from Cunninghame Graham, who 
represented a constituency - North-West Lanark - exceedingly remote from the 
metropolis as well as a range of opinions generally regarded as especially outrd 
for their times. Nor did the absence - naturally commented upon by 
Government Members - of both Gladstone and Harcourt from attendance at, let 
alone participation in, the debate assist the cause. 
Some of Stuarts opponents concentrated parficulady on public order fears: 
... to place an army of 14,000 police under the control of an elected 
Council of 140 
members was ... preposterous ... The control of the Metropolitan 
Police must always be in 
the hands of the Imperial Executive because London was the seat of Government ... if 
they [Stuart and his supporters) had had control of the Metropolitan Police, London 
would still be trembling under the tyranny of the rioters in Trafalgar Square. 34 
The Home Secretary, Matthews, on the other hand, did not resort to scare- 
mongering: he refuted the degree of exceptionalism in the Bill (Croydon and 
West Ham had been created boroughs but without 1882 Act powers, and 
Washington and Pads were examples of capital cities where there were 
government police forces); maintained that, granted the force's imperial 
functions and high pension costs, Home Office administration was not 
extravagant; and pointed out that the Commons was vigilant - almost too 
vigilant - in bringing the Home Secretary to account over the force . 
35 The 
34 lbid, AA. Baumann, MP for Camberwell, cols. 1120-1121. 35 lbid, cols. 1127-1132. 
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President of the Local Government Board, Ritchie, excoriated the notion that 
there should be two forces under different control in one city, and roundly 
asserted in his peroration that 
the Government would be lacking in their duty if they were to take such a stupendous 
step as to hand over this I mperial force, this army of men, to the control of any Local 
Authority whatever. 36 
The amendment was lost by a majodty of 70 
The London County Council (LCC) 
From the first Council of 1889 to 1907, the LCC, was dominated by the 
"Progressives", a Wide coalition stretching from Liberal Imperialists at one 
extreme to proto-socialists at the other. That LCC control should be extended to 
the Metropolitan police was a policy favoured by predominantly left-wing 
elements. However, such a change required legislation and this remedy could 
be provided only by a Parliament dominated in turn for most of the equivalent 
period by Conservatives. 
The first legislative moves were made by London Liberals in Parliament. 
Without real hope of making progress, they tabled a Metropolitan Police Bill in 
1889 to effect the change. Future Commissioners would be appointed by the 
36 lbid, cols. 1141 and 1147. 
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LCC with power also to fix salaries and duties. Within the first six months, 
Middlesex, and the Croydon and West Ham Boroughs would be permitted to opt 
out and assume policing responsibilities under the relevant county and borough 
Acts. The "surplus" parishes and their police officers would go to their 
respective county forces. There were provisions for the transfer of property and 
arbitration; accounts would no longer be presented to Parliament; and the LCC 
would be empowered to delegate its new functions to a committee. The bare 15 
clauses did not constitute a satisfactorily complete scheme: their object was 
plainly just to assert an outline claim and gather allies from the promised opt- 
outs. Identical Bills were introduced in 1890-1 and 1894.37 
The Bills did not provoke great excitement in the Home Office. On the first, 
Troup minuted: 
It is not I presume necessary to discuss this Bill seriously but it will be useful, in any 
discussion as to the control of the Metropolitan Police that may arise on the Estimates, 
to have a definite proposal from Professor Stuart and his friends of what they would do 
with the Metropolitan Police. 38 
37 PP 1889, Vol. V1, p. 429; PIP 1890-1, Vol. VIII, p. 615; and PP 1894 Vol. VII, p. 597. 
38 HO 45/981 IIB6895, minute of 8 July, 1889. Arrangements were made to block the 1890 Bill - 
HO 45/981 1/B6895A and C- but, like the 1894 Bill - it was dropped. When invited to comment 
on the 1894 Bill (identical to its predecessors), the Commissioner asked to be excused from 
doing so: 'Having regard ... to the crude and very 
incomplete character of the provisions, I trust 
that the Secretary of State may be pleased to spare me from the invidious task of criticizing it., - 
letter of 20 April, 1894, on HO 45/9699/A50123B/3. 
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The issue was raised also, of course, within the LCC itself. Very early in the 
new authoritys life, a motion was tabled by J -W. Benn, the member 
for East 
Finsbury. 39 The motion maintained that it was 
necessary and expedient that it [the Council] should, in common with all other municipal 
bodies in the United Kingdom, have control of its own police; and that a Special 
Committee be appointed to advise the Council as the best means of carrying the 
foregoing into effect, and also as to the desirability of constituting a force of Imperial 
police for the protection of national buildings, and for other such purposes. 
40 
Benn's seconder "thought the backbone of municipal reform was the control of 
the police". However, the motion was lost to an amendment by Thomas Farrer 
which asserted the principle of transfer without seeking to press the matter. One 
speaker thought the authority was not competent to assume the responsibility. 
Another appealed to the authority of Gladstone quoting from an East End 
speech of typical equivocation in December 1888: 
For instance, with regard to that important question of the metropolitan police, I am by 
no means certain that it would be necessary, or even prudent, for London, at the first 
moment after a great municipality had been constructed, to take over the management 
of the police. These are questions of adjustment and detail and I have spoken only of 
39 'John Benn, publisher, Liberal IVIP, teetotaler, social reformer and ardent Nonconformist, was 
one of the most representative figures of the Progressive majority' - Pennybacker, S., "The 
Millenium by return of post: Reconsidering London Progressivism 1889-1907' in Feldman, D. 
and Stedman Jones, G., Metropolis London: Histories and Representations since 180a 
Routledge, 1989, p131. 
40 Saunders, W., History of the First London County Council, National Press Agency, 1892, p. 
67. The motion was debated on 9 and 11 April 1889. (An attempt to raise the issue again at the 
time of the controversy over police pensions in 1890 was turned down by the LCC Chairman - 
p. 310. ) 
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the outline; but though I will not say of all these questions our prevailing opinions are 
right or wrong, every one of them is ripe for discussion. 41 
Characteristically, Howard Vincent, now a member of the LCC as well as a 
Sheffield MP, ponderously deployed the authority of his inside knowledge from 
his period as Director of Criminal Investigations 1878-1884 to decry the whole 
project. The Metropolitan Police District was considerably larger than the LCC 
area and an LCC takeover would leave one million people outside the Council's 
area. It was most unlikely that Parliament would hand over the police when the 
LCC was already so overwhelmed with business: 
He submitted, with all respect to this Council, that it was immature and undignified for 
them to be wasting their time in considering matters which were not definitely within 
their province. The constabulary was not ... under the control of a select few, but was 
strictly under the control of the Imperial Parliament and the Imperial legislature. 42 
Debate continued outside the LCC and in the periodicals of the day. The first 
salvo was fired in the Contemporary Review by H. Evans, a former employee of 
the Receiver and no doubt to an extent briefed from that source as well as from 
his own knowledge. 43 He took the Imperial high ground: "The orderly 
government of London is, indeed, far more a matter of imperial than of local 
concern. " Structurally, the LCC comprised only one sixth of the Metropolitan 
Police District and no-one had explained how all the other business of the force 
41 lbid, p. 71. 
42 Idem, p. 70. See also the Standard of 12 April, 1889, which reported Vincent's remarks more 
colourfully: OThey were making themselves ridiculous by crying out for some new toy, and by 
striving for possession and control of the most complicated machinery under the British Crown., 43 Evans, H., *The LCC and the Police", Contemporary Review, Vol. LV, 1889, pp. 445-461. 
292 
would be carried on. Claiming that Stuarts case depended on the assertions 
that LCC control would mean less tyranny and less expense, he set out to 
demolish both. Having raised the spectre of an irresponsible LCC opposed to 
the government of the day and which might have permitted Trafalgar Square 
meetings in 1887, Evans lauded the status quo: 
The present system, under which the officer responsible for the Metropolitan Police is a 
Cabinet Minister directly answerable to Parliament, seems to afford, on constitutional 
grounds, by far the best protection against oppression or a tyrannical exercise of their 
powers by the police. 
Acknowledging that there had been an increase in expenditure, Evans argued 
Stuart was wrong to put it at 44% over the decade 1877/8 - 1887/8. By the 
doubtful expedient of arguing that pension costs should be excluded, Evans 
managed to claim that the increase was only 28% and that the force was not 
dearer than provincial equivalents. 
Stuart responded in the next edition of the same periodical. 44 He attacked 
Evans for trying to frighten people with "bogies" and claiming in effect that the 
r4l 
police were a body for the protection of the government from its own citizens: 
uln fact, if his argument is an argument worth anything, it is one against 
representative government in any sense. " The Imperial" argument was a 
baseless anachronism. Expenditure had been disproportionate, and the 
44 Stuart J., 'The Metropolitan Police', Contemporary Review, Vol. LV, 1889, pp. 622-636. 
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Metropolitan police was the sole example of where rates could be levied without 
any responsibility to the ratepayer. It was no answer that matters could be 
raised in Parliament because the London members could always be voted down 
by everyone else. 
The LCC was powerless itself to secure transfer and, whatever the stripe of 
government, there was no ministerial enthusiasm to help them out. On 
occasion, the behaviour of at least some LCC members seemed to justify the 
stereotypes of Harcourts 1883 memorandum. The conviction of strikers for 
assaulting blacklegs cluring the gasworkers' sbike of 1891 moved some LCC 
members to press for the reprimand of the stipendiary magistrate involved and 
the stopping of his pension. The 7-imes was quick to draw the moral: 
We may dimly imagine what sort of discipline would be maintained by a Chief 
Commissioner who knew that every action would be judged on political grounds and 
censured whenever it failed to please the anarchic spirits of the Holborn Liberal and 
Radical Association. 45 
The issue was debated in the LCC also in 1894. A debate over two days was 
reported as a lacklustre affair ending in a majority of 46. Amongst other things, 
members were told by the Deputy Chairman that the LCC could run the police 
more cheaply than government. 46No new ground was broken. 
45 Times, 26 October, 1891 
46 Times, 31 January and 7 February, 1894. 
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In an extension of the debate in the periodicals, C. A. Whitmore, one of the 
leading "Moderates" (that is, Conservatives) on the LCC (and the MP for 
Chelsea) had rehearsed the arguments for leaving things as they were in the 
National Review the year before. 47 Reminding his readers of the 1884 Bill and 
the subsequent failure of Gladstone and Harcourt to support the Stuart 
amendment to the 1888 Bill, Whitmore did not shrink from the bogey tactic: 
... there are contingencies, which we all hope may never arise, 
but which cannot be 
ignored, the bare possibility of which should make any prudent citizen peremptorily 
refuse to hand over the control of the Police to the County Council. It is a disciplined 
force of some 14,000 men. At any moment of unhappy civil discord such a force in the 
Capital must be under the immediate control of the Queen's Government. No other 
authority, howsoever stable or business-like, could be safely trusted with such a force. 48 
The Home Office papers do not record any evident alarm or anxiety in 
government about these proceedings. When, for example, the Clerk to the LCC 
forwarded the 1894 resolution, the papers were simply endorsed "Put up", that 
is for no action. 49However, they do record attempts to dust off the case for the 
status quo. In 1899 officials revised a memorandum originating from the late 
1880s during the time of Charles Warren as Commissioner. 
Entitled "The Special 'Imperial' nature of the Metropolitan Police", it claimed that 
the original imperial role had been lost sight of when the special 1833 Treasury 
contribution was rolled up into the Exchequer grant system inaugurated for all 
47 Whitmore, C. A., Tonservatives and the London County Council% National Review, Vol. XXI, 
1893, pp. 175-186. 48 lbid, pp. 178-9. 
49 See LCC letter of 9 May, 1894 on HO 45/10425/A50123/5. 
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forces from 1857. Imperial functions included the protection of the Sovereign, 
Parliament, Government, and the Royal Parks, and the investigation of all 
crimes against the Sovereign and Government. In addition, it acted as a reserve 
to local forces on special occasions, and protected provincial and foreign 
visitors. This material was largely confirmed, though Troup, the senior official 
concerned, thought it prudent to omit the passage "Hence the Metropolitan 
Police is far larger in proportion to population and more expensive in proportion 
to rateable value than the police of any other town... " The file also recorded 
Warren's opinion that "Imperial" costs amounted to about one ninth of the 
whole. ' 
Whilst there was no Parliamentary discussion of the Bills or otherwise of the 
issue, there was a Parliamentary paper in 1892 which surveyed policing 
arrangements in the capitals of the USA and the major European countries. It is 
not clear what spurred the exercise which was executed meticulously but with 
no evident haste over 1889-1892. With the exception of Rome, all other capitals 
had special arrangements though of considerable variety, including funding 
arrangements. The tendency of these findings would have been to vindicate the 
uniqueness of the London arrangements in the minds of those aware of the 
reports. 51 
50 HO 45/10425/A50123/lA- The same line was taken in the Home Office evidence to the 
Departmental Committee on Local Taxation. See Final Report, Cd 7316, PP 1914 Vol. A, 
Appx. XV of April 1912. 
51 PP. 189Z Vol. L>O(IX,, Reports from HM's Representatives in the US, France, Prussia, 
Austria, Italy and Spain on the control and organisation of the police in the capitals and 
provinces of those countries, C 6749. 
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With the end of Progressive rule in 1907, there was no prospect of transfer of 
control for so long as the Municipal Reformers were in office, a period that 
ended only in 1934. Had the Progressives been successful in securing transfer 
when they originally requested, it is a moot point whether they would have faced 
the ratepayer revolt of 1907 sooner. As one observer has pointed out, the 1907 
defeat showed: 
how close an active, high-spending urban authority stood to the margins of ratepayer 
tolerance ... If the costs of education Ocrushedo the Council after 1904 ... the LCC was 
perhaps lucky to be spared water purchase and police control. 52 
For the rest of the period of this study there was never any serious prospect that 
London policing arrangements would be changed. Whilst the Lords veto would 
have been an ever present if rarely mentioned fact until the Parliament Act 
1911, its disappearance made no material difference since municipalisation 
never became part of any government party's programme. There seems to be 
no surviving official record shovAng continuing consideration of the subject in 
either the Home Office or the Metropolitan police. The traumas of the police 
strikes 1918-1919 and the General Strike of 1926 together almost certainly put 
an end for decades to the notion of transfer to the LCC. 
On a different plane but also part of the political climate in a different way was 
the policy and fiscal revolt in some London boroughs known in its most extreme 
52 Davis, J., 'The Progressive Council 1889-1907' in Saint, A., (ed), Politics and the People of 
London: The LCC 188,9-1965, Hambledon, 1989, pp. 27-48. 
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form as "Poplarism". This originated in Poplar following the council elections of 
1919 which gave the borough its first Labour majority. Whilst part of Poplarism 
was concerned with offering favourable employment conditions to council 
workers and more generous allowances to the unemployed, the fiscal part 
concerned a refusal to levy rates (precepts) for other authorities when growing 
unemployment imposed severe burdens - and priorities - on the local councils 
responsible for raising the money for the local Boards of Guardians. At a time 
when only limited equalisation schemes were in place and local authorities 
remained responsible for poor relief, disadvantaged boroughs like Poplar 
confronted a situation where, under a predominantly localised taxation system, 
the poor virtually paid for the poor. Deciding to levy only council and poor rates 
from April 1921, the Borough Council determined to decline to rate for all 
precepts, that is for the LCC, the Metropolitan Asylums Board, the Metropolitan 
Water Board and the Metropolitan police. (In addition, Poplar initially witheld 
over E25,000 it had already collected for the January instalment of the police 
rate. )53 The decision was clearly illegal, and the LCC (then under Conservative 
control) commenced legal proceedings. There followed a long saga during 
which thirty councillors were imprisoned for almost six weeks but at the end of 
which legislation was introduced to improve equalisation - the London 
Authorities (Financial Provisions) Act 1921. Later still, responsibility for poor 
relief was removed to county level with effect from 1 April, 1930 under the Local 
Government Act, 1929. 
53 See Branson, N., Poplarism 1919-1925, Lawrence and Wishart, 1979, for a fuller account. 
Also comprehensive, if drier, is Keith-Lucas, B., oPopladsm*, Public Law, 1962, pp. 52-80. The 
E25,000 was paid over in January - see Receiver's letter of 6 June, 1921, on HO 45/11010/310440. 
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The Metropolitan police rate had been only one target amongst others in these 
campaigns, and the Receiver was not a party to the application for mandamuS54 
embarked upon by the LCC and the Metropolitan Asylums Board. There is no 
evidence from the accounts of events written by those closest to them that there 
was any specific animus against the police. The Town Clerk told the Receiver 
that the Council's action was not against any of the precept increases but, 
rather, a protest against the governments inaction in respect of the Poplar 
unemployed scheme, the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund and the 
equalisation of the rates. 55 This emphasises the point made elsewhere that 
there was much that was specifically local to Poplarism: "... their great victory 
set no national precedent. The East End was no microcosm but only Lansbury's 
home ground. "56 Nonetheless, the threat to the finances of the police that 
Poplarism implied would have been another factor - as much perhaps in 
relation to how local authority control would be managed generally - in further 
distancing the prospect of any government voluntarily relishing any form of 
municipalisation. It certainly concerned Herbert Morrison who was engaged on 
making the Labour party electable in London: "Morrison argued that the 
electorate would never trust authorities which spent the ratepayers' money so 
recklessly and displayed such contempt for constitutional behaviour. "57 
54 The High Court writ which, if issued, compelled a public authority to undertake a legal duty it 
was judged it had failed to discharge. In addition, the Cabinet's Home Affairs Committee agreed 
on 17 August, 1921, that the Home Secretary should not move to enforce police rate collection 
against Poplar by means of appointing occasional overseers, the only means then available 
under the law -see HO 45/1101013104401107. 55 Receiver to Home Office 24 March, 1921, on HO 45/11010/310440. 
58 Schneer, op. cit, p. 66. 
57 Donoughue B. and Jones G. W., Herbert Morrison: Portrait of a Politidan, Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, 1973. As Morrison himself put it a ... the real people we were after were in the 
government rather than the LCC ... refusing the precepts would 
be to hold up such public 
services as education, school meals and medical treatment! Morrison, H., Herbert Morrison - 
An Autobiography, Odhams, 1960, p. 86. 
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There is also evidence that the prospect of municipalisation remained in the 
minds of officials. In the very first edition of the newly founded Police Journal of 
1928, Troup, the retired Permanent Under Secretary of the Home Office and 
who had been as an official long involved with questions of policing policy, 
contributed an article which considered local and national police administration. 
It was clearly intended as a statement of contemporary orthodoxy and a 
defence of the current order, including of the more aggressive positions 58 the 
Home Office had assumed by reason of wartime necessities and subsequent 
Desborough benediction. Troup was emphatic: 
The central government should have complete control of the police in the seat of 
government. It would be intolerable that the legislature or the executive should be at the 
mercy of a police force controlled by a municipal authority which might conceivably 
come into conflict with the national authority. 59 
He went on to argue that, although controlled by government, the Metropolitan 
police was not exempt from democratic control. Just as the force was 
answerable to the Home Secretary, so was he answerable to Parliament: 
Even in minor matters of local demands and grievances, the ninety-seven Members of 
Parliament representing areas in the Metropolitan Police District are not likely to be less 
58 Notably on the absorption by counties of the smaller borough forces, and the amalgamation 
of borough forces within conurbations. See Troup, C. E., 'Police Administration, Local and 
National", in Police Joumal, Vol. 1,1928, pp 17-1 B. 59 Ibid. P. 7. Twenty years before Troup had described such an eventuality as a Odisaster, - see his letter of 22 December, 1909, to the Treasury on HO 45/24567/174442. 
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careful of the interests of their constituents than would be members of any municipal 
council. 60 
So far, so defensive: the heavy artillery was reserved for a straw man: 
No-one could wish to exchange it [the system] for the American style of unrestricted 
local autonomy. That would mean the loss of all attempt at effective co-operation and 
consistent procedure. It would also mean breaking up the Metropolitan police into a 
dozen forces under separate local authorities with enormous loss of efficiency, and it 
would compel the Government to secure its own safety and independence either by 
military force or by providing a special police, expensive, without local duties, 
superfluous in ordinary times and probably inefficient to meet a great emergency. el 
The straw man was duly pulverised. No-one had, however, made the 
suggestion Troup was so anxious to demolish. In practice, it may be taken that 
Troup's aim was simply to try to find ways to re-legitimate an arrangement 
commenced in very different circumstances nearly 100 years before. Some of 
his arguments were better than others and their reception would at the time 
have owed more to the unspoken experience of the General Strike in 1926 than 
their intrinsic weight. 
This notion of the significance of the "imperial" dimension had, however, a long 
life. In 1950 a Times leade ý2 reflected on London government on the eve of the 
50th anniversary of the boroughs created by the Act of 1899. Pointing out that 
"0 Troup, op. cit., p. 11. 
lbid, p. 17. 
Times, 31 October, 1950. 
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the population had outgrown the original scheme's boundaries and that the 
LCC's reach was in any case limited since it did not control police, water or 
transport, it urged a review in favour of a new Greater London authority which 
could, amongst other things, control the police. Noting the leader, the Home 
Secretary, Chuter Ede, sent it to his Permanent Under Secretary, Newsam. 
Subsequent discussion amongst officials referred to older papers including the 
1889 memorandum. The general assumption was that the capital's policing had 
to be under direct political control. Newsarn minuted the Home Secretary: 
cannot conceive of a position where the central government was not in control of the 
police of the Metropolis. This seems to me to be essential in the case of all sovereign 
States, and particularly necessary in the case of a State vvith Imperial commitments. 
With typical tact and without pressing the matter further, Ede indicated that 
there was another parallel tradition: 
In my early days I was brought up to believe that the non-municipal nature of the MP 
Force [sic] was a threat to civil liberty. I have no doubt this was an inheritance from the 
Radical hatred of Wellington and from the Chartist antagonism to a State Police 
Force. '3 
Of interest, too, is the fact that the LCC's most famous early leader, Morrison, 
did not press the matter even though he had opposed continuing Home Office 
63 HO 287/24, both minutes of 9 November, 1950. 
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control on the same principle that he had argued in 1918 should apply to all 
local services that were centrally administered. 641-ater, writing both before and 
after he had been Home Secretary in the wartime coalition, Morrison reviewed 
the question of government control: 
For many years this situation led to a demand on the part of Liberals and Labour people 
that the Metropolitan police should be put under the local authorities ... but this proposal 
has never been agreed with the State and municipal opinion is divided on the 
matter ... the desirability of the Government in the capital city having an efficient police 
force at its command is a consideration which cannot be dismissed out of hand; and 
since the Labour Party has been in office as a government, I rather think that Labour 
opinion may have been modified on the point. 85 
Labour had, indeed, been in office as a government and was in such office at 
the time he wrote. His readers in 1949 would also have recalled that Labour, 
albeit as a minority government, had been in office twice before. On neither 
occasion, despite a Labour Party Conference motion of 1919 66 , had it raised 
the issue of municipalisation. It had also, of course, refused to reinstate officers 
dismissed as a result of the second police strike. Morrison's triumphalist 
pamphlet of 1934 recording the activities of the first four months of Labour LCC 
64 Donoughue B. and Jones, G. W. , op. cit. , see reference to article in London Labour Chronicle, October, 1918, at Note 6 to p. 115. 65 Morrison, H., How London is Governed, Revd. ed., 1949, pp 124-5. This wording remained 
unchanged from that in the original edition of 1935. See How Greater London is Govemed, Lovat, Dickson and Thompson, 1935, pp. 125-6. "o The unanimous motion asserted that Labour was opposed to special bodies for special 
services 'because they complicate London government, lead to poor citizenship, and keep great 
public services out of the direct control of the electorate. ' See quotation in Gillespie, J., 'Municipalism, Monopoly and Management: The Demise of'Socialism in One County' 1918- 1933", p. 109 in Saint, A (ed), Politics and the People of London; The LCC 1889-1965, Hambledon, 1989. 
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control in 1934 romped through the card of Labour's doings but at no point 
alluded to policing. 67 
On the other hand, the argument did not entirely go away. For most 
Conservative politicians it was enough to condemn municipalisation on the 
grounds that, even at the height of Mrs Thatcher's electoral fortunes, it would 
have led inevitably to permanent Labour control. Indeed, it is likely that the 
revival of the case for municipalisation by Livingstone's Greater London Council 
in the 198Os68was one factor contributing to that authority's abolition in 1986. 
The prospect of municipalisation never disappeared entirely for another 
fundamental reason: even at their best, and with possibly only one exception, 
Troup's arguments were conditional not absolute. That is, they were in fact 
based on an unspoken assumption that, if the fears they conjured could be laid 
to rest, then municipal isatio n could become a viable option in London. That is in 
fact what happened by the last years of the 20th century. 
By then most of the specialist functions that Scotland Yard had run for the 
benefit of the police service as a whole had been moved out to other statutory 
agencies. The Yard had also lost to the Security Service its functions in relation 
to Irish terrorism. Detective operations cutting across more than one force had 
for some time been regionalised in crime squads; all the Yard's national 
67 Morrison, H., London under Socialist Rule, Labour Party, 1934. it is, of course, unlikely that 
either of the minority Labour governments between the Wars (Morrison was a member of the 
second 1929-31) would have been able to sustain the necessary legislation to transfer 
responsibility for the police and all the other centrally controlled services. 6" See, for example, A New Police Authority for London: A Consultation Paper on Democratic 
Control of the Police in London, GLC, 1983. 
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intelligence as opposed to London intelligence work went into the National 
Cdminal Intelligence Service founded in 1992; and in 1998 the crime squads 
themselves were amalgamated into the National Cdme Squad. In addition, the 
Cdminal Records Office became a national agency outside the Yard. Police 
finance and contr-ol had become increasingly orchestrated from the Home Office 
under statutory schemes which had eclipsed the old 1829 forms and their 
rationale. The Receiver was no longer needed as a spy in the Commissioners 
camp following his integration from 1968 into more sophisticated and 
increasingly transparent management procedures within the force. The fact that 
Conservative Home Secretades became as a result more relaxed about 
municipal isation and themselves moved to set up an arm's length Police 
Committee reporting to them was a reflection of the cumulative impact of these 
changes and the fact that they had removed most if not all the political charge 
still remaining in the prospect of municipalisation in London. It is true, of course, 
that the content of what municipalisation then implied was less, but London was 
not alone in that respect. 
The one argument Troup offered that possibly was not conditional in the same 
sense as the rest was the "imperial" argument, still trotted out in 1950. But that 
depended on there being an imperium to be imperial about. Long before 2000 
the imperial argument had not so much lost its force as disappeared entirely. 
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In the sense that 1829 may be seen as an act of centralisation within London, it 
was the progressive centralisation of the rest of the police service in England 
and Wales on the Home Secretary in the last third of the twentieth century that 
paved the way for the change. 69Frorn 1829 the Home Secretarys relationship 
with the force was exceptional. By the end of the next century it had become, 
unspoken, the norm. From that point of view, municipalisation in London was 
therefore simply a recognition of what had changed outside London. In other 
words, municipalisation was conceded only when it had become devoid of any 
content desired by central government and that government felt confident that it 
could exercise control without having also to accept the immediate political 
responsibility. 
69 Moreover, change in policing arrangements has to be understood in the context of changes between central and local government overall. As has been pointed out *By the end of the twentieth century, local authorities had been transformed essentially into agencies of the central government. ' Loughlin, M., "The Demise of Local Government' in Bogdanor, V., (ed. ), The British Constitution in the Twentieth Centuty, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 553. 
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PART IV: RETROSPECT 
CHAPTER8 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter reflects on the principal findings of a study whose main object 
has been to put the politics back into accounts of London policing. 
Whilst the fact that it was Britain's largest force has always given the 
Metropolitan police a special interest, its closeness to Westminster and the 
direct involvement of a senior Cabinet minister in its management makes it 
unique. The latter is a consideration insufficiently emphasised by Critchley 
(who was concentrating on the provincial forces) and misunderstood and 
misrepresented by Reith and Ascoli who could only see it as a vexatious 
impediment to untrammelled Commissioner control. 1 Even so, it has to be 
borne in mind that, whilst a solely police perspective has value when looking 
at the force's development, that development itself has to be seen against a 
background of larger movements in the character of the British state. 
The experience of the force in that respect is illuminating. Devoid of any 
settled cadre of ready made professionals available for the senior posts, 
Home Secretades turned to existing, arguably cognate professions. Whereas 
in 1829 to 1856 this could only mean resort to the army and the bar, the 
appointment of Harris in 1856 and the District Superintendent appointments of 
I See, for example, Ascoli, op. cft., p. 129. 
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Howard and Walker in 1869 showed the first glimmerings of recognition being 
accorded to a nascent police professionalism. 
However, there was no steady, linear progression in that regard. Walker was 
not regarded as a success, and his unhappy experience in the Pall Mail dot of 
1886 made him look ridiculous. Indeed, the result was a reaction at Chief 
Constable level in favour of armed service officers which lasted (with the 
exceptions of Williamson and Macnaghten) until 1918. Even though 
appointments at Assistant Commissioner level included a number of civilians, 
appointments at all levels displayed a crucial common characteristic: they 
went overwhelmingly to men already socialised into the ways of political 
control, either directly by virtue of their employment experience or indirectly by 
reason of their profession or social background. 
Even Howard Vincent, presented above as a risky appointment, was a risk 
only in the sense that he was recruited for a high profile, novel role without 
evident qualifying experience. In the sense of his background and 
understanding, he was no risk at all. His appointment is remarkable also for 
being a case where he made a reputatior? in his role rather than brought a 
reputation, however modest, to his function - the very reason why others were 
judged qualified. 
2 Gladstone's Private Secretary's view of the parvenu Vincent is reflected in his recording that 
Harcourt's wish that Vincent receive the CB was"out of all question*. See entry for 29 August 
1883 in Bahiman, D. W. R., (ed. ), Diary of Sir Edward Walter Hamilton, 1880-1885, Oxford 
University Press, 1972, p. 477. Vincent was well known to Hamilton because the former was 
responsible for Gladstone's police protection. 
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The Metropolitan police civil staff also reveal aspects of the British state's slow 
transformation of its civic institutions from a cosy oligarchic playground to a 
more meritocratic form. In this case, however, the transformation was 
accompanied by labour market changes which saw status changes hostile to 
formerly privileged positions. The persistence in the Yard's civil staff of a 
patronage system well beyond its termination in the sponsoring government 
department shows how the winds of bureaucratic change did not blow keenly 
or searchingly in the remoter parts of bureaucracy. That the ending of the 
patronage appointment of civilian clerks at Scotland Yard took an initiative 
from the Commissioner- Edward Henry in 1907 - rather than from the Home 
Office is an interesting comment on the evolution of bureaucratic norms. 
Whereas officials in the Home Office seemed keen enough to advance their 
own statUS3, they were not over-diligent in extending professional endeavour 
elsewhere in areas clearly subject to their influence. 
Of all the civil staff, John Wray stands out as one whose trajectory exemplifies 
(though not fully completed in his case) the movement from loosely regulated 
Office holders with plural interests to more minutely accountable, full-time 
officials. Whilst acting as Receiver from 1829, Wray had two other, 
simultaneous occupations - he ran a life insurance business and practised at 
the Parliamentary bar. He can be seen operating entrepreneurially in areas 
still in his day largely unregulated. Although there was much Parliamentary 
indignation about his operations in 1845, Wray merely exploited procedural 
lacunae for which Parliament itself was responsible. Similarly, life insurance 
3 See Pellew, J., op. cit., p. 60 for the Home Office First Division's remonstrance in 1894. 
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was a largely unregulated business, and one in which he persisted even 
following the Home Secretarys reprimand of 1845. 
He was not the last entrepreneur. Howard Vincent may also be seen in the 
same light, with the difference that he was unquestionably a full-time official. 
His entrepreneurship was of another Kind: he sought to develop and 
exploit his office, and establish himself in metropolitan political life. 4 The 
personal outcome was marriage to an heiress at St Peters, Eaton Square, 
and a solid Sheffield seat in Parliament which he occupied until his death, 
surviving even the Conservative meltdown of 1906. 
The forms of financial control also illustrate how limited were the aspirations of 
government for much of the period. Where rates remained the principal form 
of personal taxation, local pressure on revenue was powerfully persistent. The 
absence of municipal control in London did not free the Home Secretary to 
allow the police to levy what they liked. On the contrary, the rates were 
subjected to a form of capping which allowed them to grow with the growth of 
rateable values but no more. This was not even indexation because the rate 
of increase was tied to the physical and population growth of London, and this 
slowed towards the end of the period. Demand - amongst other things from 
the police themselves over pensions and rest days - did not, however, follow 
4 See Littlechild's account of Vincent's expansion of function to include cases where no 
complaint had been made - Littlechild, J. G., Reminiscences of Chief Inspector Littlechild, Leadenhall, 2nd Edn., 1894, p. 14. Until the Home Office realised in 1883 what he intended, 
Vincent's reform of the Police Gazette had been based on entirely commercial principles - 
see HO 45/9618/Al4252. As to politics, Vincent used his position in effect industriously to 
socialise. As his biographers put it, 0 ... now that Vincent had acquired an honourable and solid position, he found the doors of Society flung invitingly open. 0 Jeyes, S. H. and How, F. D., The 
Life of Sir Howard Vincent, Allen, 1912, p. 130. It may be inferred that he used retailing 
knowledge gained from his responsibility for Gladstone's protection to ingratiate himself with 
social contacts - see St. Helier, Lady, Memories of Fifty Years, Arnold, 1909, p. 250. 
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suit, and the cap was raised minimally as a result both by the clumsy indirect 
expedients of 1888-90 and, more directly, by the Act of 1911. 
It is possible to represent this experience as merely the product of negligent or 
mean officials and ministers. 5 Looking back from more generous times, 
sympathetic souls might agree. They would, however, be mistaken: the 
Metropolitan police were not singled out for special parsimony. They merely 
experienced the consequences of funding policies that impacted impartially 
across government and were visited with similar effect (with some mitigation 
in the case of the City of London police) on all other forces. There was no 
welfare state in the period, although the end of it saw what could be 
subsequently recognised as new patterns of social spending on the basis of 
new sources of revenue. Receivers and Home Office officials were merely the 
conduits of fiscal policy, not its determinants. 
The differentiation of policing functions evolved spontaneously with little 
government direction or leadership. A meagre Home Office staff in the 
Criminal Department laboured in a modest structure which lumped policing 
responsibilities in London - one of the Home Secretary's most direct 
responsibilities -together with provincial policing and all other criminal 
business. The latter included a range of judicial appointments, the operation of 
the criminal courts, the prerogative of mercy, and criminal law and procedure. 
It is not surprising that there were so many distractions for officials and 
For example, Ascoli, op. cit. p60, and pp. 152-3, in addition top. 188 already cited above. 
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ministers: it is surprising only that the Metropolitan police received sometimes 
any attention at all. 
Relations between the Home Office and the Commissioner were never 
determined by technical, legal requirements alone. Nor was the Metropolitan 
police ever in practice the sub-department of the Home Office suggested by 
the inclusion of its staff in the Home Office list. There were practical limits to 
the Home Office's abilities to control the force whose size from inception 
eclipsed the size of the organisms upon whose model the 1829 Act was 
based. Seven stipendiary courts and handfuls of magisterial officers were in 
no way comparable with what the force quickly became. The Home Office 
tried to make the best of things in the context of the governing legislation and 
the absence of any alternative model. Hence its routine insistence on the 
modalities and, in its appointments practices, the appearance as opposed to 
the substance of control. Its increasing resort from Henderson's time to the 
Receiver as a surrogate was in implicit recognition of its own incapacity. 
To an extent, therefore, there was pretence and hypocrisy. Yet, if political 
control was not asserted continuously, in crisis it brooked no opposition - and 
took no prisoners. The Hyde Park troubles of 1866/67 finished Walpole's 
careerjust as the Pall Mall dots of 1886 finished Henderson's. Matthews 
teetered vertiginously more than once during 1886-92 but managed to avoid 
falling, though at the cost of two Commissioners. Henry paid the price of his 
own and the Home Office's failure to respond effectively to nascent unionism 
in the force. 
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No-one could describe the system of financial control as optimal, yet in its 
imperfect way it avoided ratepayer dominance, on the one hand, and 
ratepayer rape on the other. Whereas the system's statutory cap had been 
originally proffered as a device to make government control palatable, it 
became a device for controlling the Commissioner rather than the Home 
Secretary. Such things had not been, could not have been, foreseen. In the 
same way, by 1920 the force had accumulated a series of national functions 
both as a result of the specialisation natural to its size and because the Home 
Secretary was freer to permit or introduce innovation in the metropolis than he 
was anywhere else. 
One of the striking features in retrospect is how relatively insensitive the 
political culture appears to have been to the experience of "ordinary" people at 
the hands of the force. Parliament was quick enough to demand explanations 
of public order failures - Hyde Park, Trafalgar Square - but, if anything, the 
handling of the complaints of individuals seemed to deteriorate after the 
interventionist activities of Rowan and, at least in his earliest phase, Mayne. 
The apparent absence of records of direct Commissioner interest in individual 
cases after the 1840s plus the well-researched conclusions of Gamon in 
1907 and the writer of the Times' articles following the publication of the 
Royal Commission report in 1908 suggest a certain systemic 
unresponsiveness. The attitude of the Home Office during the 1929 Royal 
Commission seems consistent with the drift of these earlier findings. The fact 
that the force tended to view complaints as primarily raising questions of 
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internal discipline showed both a distinctly inward-looWing attitude and one 
that assumed that the management of the force should be the sole judge of 
outcome. 
Writing shortly after the establishment of the Independent Police Complaints 
Commission, it would be too easy to rush to condemn the inadequacy of 
earlier performance when our own age has struggled to reach a universally 
accepted settlement. The question, rather, is why did the individual 
complainant appear to enjoy so low a priority? 
There are a number of possible reasons. First, as already observed, although 
there were procedures, they were entirely under the control of, or dominated 
by, the police themselves. Civil court remedies were not easily used when 
there was no access to legal aid. In addition, unrepresented complainants 
were unlikely to expect a comfortable run in magistrates' courts. Arguably, the 
first Commissioners were so active because they were programmed to 
minimise any justifiable OPPOsition to the very continuance of the force. 
Secondly, again as hazarded at a number of points above, most of the force's 
growth took place at a time of limited popular government. Where people were 
not thought fit to have the franchise, they were incapable of forcing their 
claims on the political process. Moreover, even when the franchise was 
widened, aristocratic forms and attitudes persisted. Though by no means 
necessarily contemptuous of their less well-endowed compatriots, an instinct 
to support the force was a natural reflex for many Parliamentarians and it was 
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also an instinct hostile to investigative machinery of any novel kind 
unwelcome to the police. 
Thirdly, an important dimension of difference from today was simply society's 
own inexperience in dealing with so relatively large and powerful an institution 
as the Metropolitan police. There were no rules inherited from the past and 
no very obvious guides to the future. As the Cass case demonstrated, 
responses tended to be made up reactively as people went along. As in so 
many other parts of the government machine, the British state muddled 
unheroically through. 
Much the same can be said for the organisational development of a force 
where, apart from chroniclers like David Ascoli, historians have concentrated 
on the circumstances leading to its formation rather than what happened 
thereafter. Whilst the growth of government in the period has been much 
pondered, studies have rarely sought to concentrate on the police experience 
from this perspective or seek to contextualise that experience with 
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observations on govemment elsewhere. 6A debate which floudshed in the 
1960s and 1970s seems to have run out of steam: there is only perhaps so 
much that can be said about Benthamism, Chadwick and Dicey. Recognising 
in the end the non-linear pragmatism of govemment intervention, the pursuit 
of models and revolutions has tailed away. In addition, as Martin Wiener has 
pointed oue, such approaches have lost favour as the objects of their study 
have lost lustre in a changed political climate. 
At all levels, with the exception of the founding and growth of the CID, the 
force experienced very little organisational change. What occurred was wholly 
internal and not far-reaching. The number of Divisions grew (mostly to include 
the government dockyards) and the subordinate rank structure underwent 
some differentiation especially at Inspector level. At no point, however, was 
the Superintendent rank eclipsed: Superintendents, promoted from the ranks, 
remained the unchallenged Divisional commanders and, despite Macready's 
two promotions to Chief Constable, the ultimate career aspiration of the 
a See, for example, MacDonagh, 0., A Pattern of Government Growth 1800-186Q 
MacGibbon and Kee, 1961, which developed and responded to criticisms of his original article 
uThe Nineteenth-century Revolution in Government: A Reappraisal% Histotical Journal, 1958, 
pp. 52-67; Cromwell, V., "Interpretations of Nineteenth-Century Administration: An Analysis", 
Victorian Studies, March, 1966, pp. 245-255; Parris, H., Constitutional Bureaucracy, Allen and 
Unwin, 1969, which developed much of his earlier writing, including his critique - "The Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Government: A Reappraisal Reappraised", Historical 
Journal, 1960, pp. 17-37 - of MacDonagh's thesis of growth in its original form; Sutherland, G., *Recent Trends in Administrative History" in Victotian Studies, 1970, pp. 408-411; 
Sutherland, G., (ed. ), Studies in the Growth of Nineteenth Century Government, Routledge, 
1972; Cromwell, V., Revolution or Evolution: British Government in the Nineteenth Century, 
Longman, 1977; Cromwell, V. and others, Aspects of Government in Nineteenth Century 
Britain, Irish University Press, 1978. On the other hand, in his later work - Eady Victorian Government 1830-1670, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1977, Ch. 9- Oliver MacDonagh did 
consider policing developments. Similarly, Jill Pellew looked at such developments from the 
point of view of specialisation and professional isation - see her'Law and order: expertise and the Victorian Home Office" in MacLeod, R., Government and Expertise: Specialists, 
administrators and professiornsals, 1860-1919, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 59-72. 7 Wiener, M. J., uThe Unloved State: Twentieth-Century Politics in the Writing of Nineteenth- Century History", Journal of British Studies, 1994, pp. 283-308. 
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constable. Much of the change at headquarters was the result of managing a 
larger force and in response to the growing pressures to bureaucratise 
criminal justice controls in, for example, record keeping and, especially from 
1856, statistical reporting. Published annual Commissioner reports 
commenced only in 1869, and were heavily statistical in content. 
In the direction of the force, the Commissioner diarchy of 1829-1855 was 
replaced by Assistant Commissioner diarchy until 1881. A third Assistant 
Commissioner was not appointed until 1884 and a fourth until 1909. Apart 
from the emergence of a Deputy Commissioner post, the rank structure at the 
top remained unchanged until the last decades of the twentieth century-8 
The need for legislation to create such posts was certainly an inhibition, but 
there was little appreciation - no-one had, after all, dealt with a similar, 
large 
organisation before - that one of the effects of maintaining a very restricted 
senior cadre was to lessen its ability to exert an adequate control over the 
conduct and culture of the force. In his own way, Howard Vincent grasped this 
and responded by means of his Police Code. First published in 18819, it 
continued even after his death in 1907 up to the 17 th and final edition in 1931. 
Part accessible source on relevant police law, and part hortatory conduct 
manual, Vincent saw the Code as remedying the deficiencies of the old official 
Instruction Book. He regarded the latter as narrowly hierarchical and 
descriptive in its approach to police duties and bereft of much real, practical 
help to officers on the ground. From 1882 to the first appearance of the 
8 It is remarkable, for example, that the organisation structure of 1915 shown at p. 15 above 
would have been recognisable and little changed 50 years later. 0 Vincent C. E. H., A Police Code and Manual of Criminal Law, Cassell, 1881. 
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Judges' Rules in 1912, the Code -with its inclusion of some advice by a 
celebrated judge (Henry Hawkins, later Lord Brampton') - was the sole 
source of authoritative judicial guidance to the police on interrogation. " 
Whilst there is a risk of failing into the trap of anachronism, there are some 
further points to make about the organisational development of the force. 
First, the steady growth over the period at the bottom of the pyramid 
concealed the extent to which the problems of managing the force were 
changing. As turnover stabilised, control was not a matter of rough and ready 
discipline and energetic policies of dismissal, but (using admittedly modem 
terms) of enforcing management norms throughout the organisation. The very 
senior officers became ever more dependent on the Superintendents and the 
Superintendents tended, as Rowan well knew in the 1840s, to transmit 
convenient truth. The situation was not improved when Henderson ceased to 
12 have regular Commissioner meetings with the Superintendents. As Gamon 
observed in 1907 when the Royal Commission was still sifting, the senior 
officers were remote figures who did not feature in the lives of the lower ranks. 
Macready, who instituted a practice of seeing all men of Sergeant and above 
on their retirement, encountered two Inspectors of thirty-five years' service 
who had never spoken to a Commissioner. Concluding that this emphasised 
the extent to which the Commissioner was a "kind of 'veiled prophet to the 
Majority of his men", the experience moved him "to recast the duties of the 
10 See Harris, R., The Reminiscences of Sir Henry Hawkins, Arnold, 1904, for Hawkjnsý 
career. 
11 The evolution of the Criminal Investigation Department is the subject of a separate article. 
See Morris, R. M., O'Crime does not pay: Thinking again about detectives in the first century of 
the Metropolitan police% Ashgate, forthcoming. 12 Labalmondiere: 21 think that was a mistake. 0 - 1879 Committee, Evidence, Q 4440. 
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Chief Constables so that they might serve as my eyes and ears amongst the 
force". 13 
Overall, it is difficult to avoid concluding that in many respects the force was in 
effect allowed to run itself. This was not a disaster. The force was not sealed 
off against all outside influences. Although military to some exten in 
character, it was not an alien, occupying force. It was open to the scrutiny of 
the press and the invigilation of the courts, especially the stipendiary 
magistrates in the central areas. Parliament could also be stirred on occasion 
to raise issues with the Home Secretary. It became accepted as a fixture of 
metropolitan life and, as the notion of London as an imperial city grew, so the 
force became regarded as part of the imperial furniture - indulgently 
represented in Punch, the mirror of comfortable and pleased with itself 
England. 14 
These developments were not challenged by Home Office officials or 
ministers. Most of the more subtle developments in the force's character were 
unseen or, if seen, not recognised in terms of the concepts then available to 
comprehend or act upon them. Above all, there was no incentive to get too 
far under the skin of an organisation which was thought to deliver what was 
required of it without too much fuss. Putting the force under local authority 
13 Macready, N., op. cit., p. 323. Whether the Chief Constables were in fact any more effective 
in respect of a larger force than their predecessors, the District Superintendents, who 
appeared before the 1879 inquiry no-one has, or perhaps could have, assessed. However, no 
doubt the initiative will have helped Macready to feel better about the situation. Perhaps more 
important was his practice of increasing his own visibility to the force. The Metropolitan police 
may not have been militarised, but intelligent soldiers still had things to teach it 14 See P ul ling, C., Mr Punch and the Police, Butterworth, 1964. 
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control was no more on the govemments agenda in 1920 than it had been in 
1829. 
Anderson writing in 1910 may have exaggerated to say that the motto of the 
Department in the late 1860s was "to do as little as possible, and to do it as 
15 quietly as possible". But it has to be noted that Guillemard, writing in 1937, 
remembered the motto when he joined the Home Office in 1886 as "Live and 
let die". '6 Scott, writing a generation later of what he found on entering the 
Home Office in 1911, was politer "Laws had to be admi. nistered, but the 
department intervened only when it must, and then did so with reluctance. 07 
Although writing at very different times, they all presented a similar, enduring 
state of affairs: it was the same passive incrementalism that represented the 
norm in the Home Office's dealings with the Metropolitan police throughout 
the period of this study. 
is Anderson, R., op. cit., p. 42. 16 Guillemard, L., Trivial Fond Records, Methuen, 1937, p. 14. 17 Scott, H., Your Obedient Servant, Deutsch, 1959, p. 24. 
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APPENDIX A 
MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS 1860-1920 
Secretaries of State for the Home Department 
Date of appointment 
George Cornewall Lewis 18 June 1859 
George Greyn 23 July 1861 
Spencer Horatio Walpolen 6 July 1866 
Gathorne Hardy 17 May 1867 
Henry Austin Bruce 9 December 1868 
Robert Lowe 9 August 1873 
Richard Assheton Cross 21 February 1874 
William Vernon Harcourt 23 April 1880 
Richard Assheton Crosso 24 June 1885 
Hugh CE Childers 6 February 1886 
, 
Henry Matthews 3 August 1886 
Herbert H Asquith 18 August 1892 
Matthew White Ridley 29 June 1895 
Charles Thomson Ritchie 12 November 1900 
Aretas Akers-Douglas 11 August 1902 
Herbert John Gladstone 11 December 1905 
Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill 19 February 1910 
Reginald McKenna 24 October 1911 
John Simon 27 May 1915 
Herbert Louis Samuel 12 January 1916 
George Cave 11 December 1916 
Edward Shortt 14 January 1919 - 
25 October 1922 
aDenotes former service as Secretary of State 
Parliamentary Under Secretaries of State 
George Clive 18 June 1859 
Henry Austin Bruce* 14 November 1862 
Thomas George Baring 25 April 1864 
Edward H Knatchbull-Hugesson I August 1866 
Somerset Richard Lowry 10 July 1866 
James Fergusson 1 August 1867 
Edward H Knatchbull-Hugesson 10 December 1868 
George John Shaw-Lefevre 11 January 1871 
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Henry Selfe Page Winterbotham 17 March 1871 
Henry Selwin Ibbetson 25 February 1874 
Matthew White Ridley* 6 April 1878 
Arthur Peel 23 April 1880 
Leonard H Courtney 1 January 1881 
Archibald Philip Primrose 8 August 1881 
John T. Hibbert 7 June 1883 
Henry H Fowler 12 December 1884 
Charles B Stuart-Wortley 30 June 1885 
Henry Broadhurst 6 February 1886 
Charles B Stuart-Wortley 4 August 1886 
Herbert John Gladstone* 19 August 1892 
George WE Russell 12 March 1894 
Jesse Collings 3 July 1895 
Thomas Horatio AE Cochrane 11 August 1902 
Herbert Louis Samuele 12 December 1905 
Charles Frederick Gurney Masterman 8 July 1909 
Ellis Jones Griffith 17 February 1912 
Cecil Harmsworth 4 February 1915 
William Brace 31 May 1915 
Hamar Greenwood 14 January 1919 
John Lawrence Baird 10 July 1919 - 
1 November 1922 
0 Subsequently Secretades of State 
Permanent Under Secretaries of State 
Horatio Waddington 15 May 1848 
Adolphus Liddell 14 August 1867 
Godfrey Lushington 25 July 1885 
Kenelm Edward Digby 7 January 1895 
Mackenzie Dalzell Chalmers 9 September 1903 
Edward Troup I Februaryl 908 - 
13 March 1922 







7 July 1829 - 26 December 1868 
30 December 1868 - 12 February 1869 [Acting] 
13 February 1869 - 26 March 1886 
29 March 1886 -1 December 1888 
3 December 1888 - 21 June 1890 
23 June 1890 -4 March 1903 
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Edward Henry 5 March 1903 -2 September 1918 
Nevil Macready 3 September 1918 -14 April 1920 
William Horwood 20 April 1920 -7 November 1928 
















3 March 1856 -1 December 1884 
3 March 1856 - 30 June 1881 
1 July 1881 - 30 May 1890 
8 July 1884 - 31 August 1888 
11 December 1884 - 31 March 1914 
1 September 1888 - 30 May 1901 
23 June 1890 - 29 September 1902 
31 May 1901 -4 March 1903 
30 September 1902 - 31 October 1918 
19 March 1903 - 12 June 1913 
1 December 1909 - 12 January 1914 
23 June 1913 - 30 November 1921 
29 January 1914 - 28 January 1931 
1 April 1914 - 31 October 1931 
1 November 1918 - 19 April 1920 
0 CE Howard Vincent was Director of Criminal Investigation 3 March 1878 - 14 June 1884 at the 
level, but without the status in law, of Assistant Commissioner. 
Chief Constables * 
Henry Baynes 1 May 1869 -1 May 1881 
Charles Howard 25 February 1869 - 22 June 1890 
RLO Pearson 25 February 1869 - 30 June 1881 
Robert Walker 25 February 1869 -6 March 1886 
Adolphus Williamson 8 July 1886 -9 December 1889 
WA Roberts 15 July 1886 - 28 October 1895 
WE Gilbert 18 August 1886 - 31 December 1906 
Bolton Monsell 18 August 1886 - 28 February 1910 AC Knollys 26 June 1890 - 24 September 1890 GH Dean 6 October 1890 - 18 August 1910 
Melville Macnaghten 16 December 1890 - 18 March 1903 
FS Bullock 17 March 1903 - 30 November 1909 EHT Parsons 14 October 1903 - 31 October 1918 AHM Edwards 2 November 1906 - 14 November 1912 Trevor Bigham 4 December 1909 - 28 January 1914 EM Lafone 1 March 1910 - 30 April 1926 GL Craik 17 November 1910 -1 October 1914 SW Douglas 17 December 1910 -7 December 1914 
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MH Tomlin 5 December 1912 - 14 January 1932 
James Olive 1 October 1918 - 20 April 1920 
William Horwood 28 October 1918 - 31 October 1918 
HD Morgan 16 March 1919 -7 February 1932 
James Billings 27 April 1920 - 30 September 1927 
0 Between 25 February 1869 and 22 October 1886 the rank was oDistrict Superintendent' 
Receivers for the Metropolitan Police District 
John Wray 7 July 1829 - 30 April 1860 
Maurice Drummond 1 May 1860 - 31 August 1883 
Richard Pennefather 1 September 1883 - 31 December 1909 
George Henry Tripp 1 January 1910 - 31 December 1918 
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AKERS-DOUGLAS, Aretas (1851-1926) 
s. o Anglican 'squarson" from a long line of slave owners in St Kitts. Educ. Eton and University 
College, Oxford. Barrister 1875, though never practised. Received a major inheritance in 1875. 
Incorporated into Kent Tory politics by Marquess of Anglesey, another major Kent landowner 
and formerly Disraeli's political manager. MP for E Kent from 1880. Career principally as a very 
successful Chief Whip 1885-95.15t Cmr of Works 1895-1902. Home Secretary 1902-05. 
Survived landslide election 1905. Coronation peer 1911 as Viscount Chilston. 
ANDERSON, Robert (1841-1916) 
Born Dublin, so Crown Solicitor for Dublin. Educated TCD: BA 1862; LL D 1875. Practised at 
Dublin bar, becoming involved in Fenian cases from 1865. Attached to HO as adviser on 
political crime from 1868. Ran Fenian spy Le Caron for 20 years. Secretary Royal Commissions 
on Railway Accidents (1874-7) and Loss of Life at Sea (1884-7). Secretary of Prison 
Commission 1877 and appointed Asst Commissioner and Head of CID, Metropolitan Police, 
1888, retiring 1901 when appointed KCB. Underwent an acceptance experience at hands of an 
American evangelist 1860 and had 18 religious books published in addition to Sidelights on the 
Home Rule Movement, 1906, Criminals and Crime, 1907, and - for which much criticized in Parliament - The Lighter Side of My Official Life, 1910. 
ANDERSON, William George (1804-1897) 
2nd so James Anderson, senior clerk, GPO. Clerk, Navy Office, 1825; Admiralty, 1832 (where 
recruited and became prot6g6 of James Graham - see below); Paymaster General's Office, 1838; Asst Paymaster General, 1841; Auditor Duchy of Cornwall and Member of Prince of 
Wales'Council, 1851-91; Treasury, 1854 (thought to have been recruited by Gladstone, and 
rose to be Principal Clerk, Finance Division); Assistant Comptroller and Auditor General, 1867, 
until retirement on full pay 1873. KCB 1870. 
ASQUITH, Herbert Henry (1852-1928) 
Educ City of London School; Balliol College, Oxford. 1st Class degree, Presdt Oxford Union. 
Barrister 1876. MP for East Fife 1886-1918 and for Paisley 1920-24. Came to public 
prominence as junior counsel for Parnell during Parnell Commission hearings 1888-9. QC 1890. 
Home Secretary 1892-95. Chancellor of the Exchequer 1905-8. Prime Minister 1908-16. 
Earldom 1925. 
ATHERLEY-JONES, L. A. (1851-1929) 
s. o. Ernest Jones, Chartist leader. Had met Marx, Engels, Mazzini and Fergus O'Connor as a 
child. Educated Manchester G. S. (where supported reprieves for the Fenian "Manchester 
Martyrs'). and Brasenose, Oxford, where his room was ragged after speaking up for the I rish 
rebels in College debating society. Barrister, N. Circuit; briefed frequently by miners' 
organizations in N. E. England. MP for N. W. Durham 1885. Known as the'Member for Miss 
Cass' after defeating H MG over the case in an adjournment debate in 1887. Recorder of 
Newcastle on Tyne 1906. Judge of the City of London Court and Commissioner for Assize at 
the Old Bailey 1914. Said of himself: OSo far as my party was concerned, I was more or less an 
Ishmaelite 
... * See bibliography for his autobiography. 
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AYRTON, Acton Smee (1816-1886) 
s. o. barrister in Bombay, and himself practised there as a solicitor returning to UK 1850 'With a 
moderate fortune*. Barrister 1853 with intention of entering politics. Radical Liberal MP for 
Tower Hamlets 1857-1874. Made notable 1860 Commons speech in favour of reform of 
London government. Chaired sundry Commons Select Committees on London government 
problems. Parly Secretary to Treasury 1868. First Commissioner of Works 1869-73 when his 
brusque manner led him into rows and made enemies. Judge Advocate General 1874 but lost 
seat that year and never re-entered Parliament 
BIGHAM, Hon Sir (Frank) Trevor R (1876-1954) 
2nd S01 St Visct Mersey. Educ Eton, Magdalen Coll, Oxford. Barrister Middle Temple 1901. M. 
1s' Frances Leonora (d 1927) 2 nd do John L. Tomlin, 2 daus; 2nd Edith Ellen [PA to 
Commissioner], d0 Lt Col David Drysdale. CC Met Police 1909; Assistant Commissioner 1914- 
1931; Deputy Commissioner 1931-4. 
BRADFORD, Edward Ridley Colborne (1836-1911) 
so Anglican cleric. Mother was d of Henry Colborne Ridley, younger bro of Sir Matthew White 
Ridley, 3rd Bart., (and was therefore related to successor as 4"' Bart Sir MatthewWhite Ridley, 
Home Secretary 1895-1900 - see below). Educated Marlborough. Entered military service EIC 1853 in 2nd Madras Lt Cavalry. Served Persian campaign, 1857, and Mutiny, 1858.1st Central 
India Horse 185M9. Political assistant Malwa 1860 and in sundry other states. Lost arm when 
mauled by a tiger, 1863. Capt 1865; Major 1873. General Superintendent of operations for the 
suppression of Thugee and Dacoity. Responsible for relations with Rajput chiefs, 1878. 
Resident First Class and Agent for Rajputana. Lt Col 1879; Col 1884. GCB and KCSI, 1885. 
Secretary, Political and Secret Depts, India Office, 1887. ADC to The Queen 1889-93. 
Commissioner of Police, 1890. GCVO, 1902. Baronet, 1902. Retired, 1903. 
BRUCE, AJexander Carmichael (1850-1926) 
5ý s. o. Anglican Canon. Educated Brasenose. Barrister, 1875, NE Circuit. Assistant 
Commissioner 1884-1914. Knighted 1903. 
BRUCE, Henry Austin (1815-1895) 
s-o- Glamorgan landowner. Educ Swansea Grammar School. Barrister 1837. Stipendiary for 
Merthyr and Aberdare 1847-52. MP from 1852. Parly Under Secretary, Home Office, 1862-64; 
and Home Secretary 1868-73. Created Lord Aberdare 1873. 
BYRNE, William P. (1859-1935) 
Educ St Cuthbert's, Ushaw, and London University. Post Office 1881, Home Office 1884. 
Assistant Under Secretary 1908. Chairman Board of Control 1913. 
CAVE, George (1856-1928) 
s-o. MP. Educ Caen, Merchant Taylors and St John's College, Oxford. Barrister 1880 and QC 
1904. Participated in local government and became Deputy Chairman, Surrey County Council. 
Chairman Surrey QS 1894-1911. MP for Kingston 1906-1918. Solicitor General 1915. Home 
Secretary 1916-19. Lord of Appeal 1918, then Lord Chancellor 1922-1928. 
CHALMERS, MacKenzie Dalzell (1847-1927) 
s. o. Anglican cleric. Educated King's College, London, and Trinity College, Oxford. Barrister 
1869. ICS 1869-72. Revising barrister 1881. Standing counsel to Board of Trade from 1882. 
County Court judge, Birmingham, 1884-1886. Involved variously in enterprises of legal 
codification. Legal member of Viceroy's Council 1886-1889. Asst Parliamentary Counsel 1899. 
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First Parliamentary Counsel 1902-03. PUS Home Office 1903-08. 
CHILDERS, Hugh Culling Eardley (1827-1896) 
Liberal MP Pontefract, 1860-86. Financial Secretary, Treasury, 1865-6; First Lord Admiralty, 
1868-71; Chancellor Duchy of Lancaster, 1872-3; Secretary of State for War, 1880-82; 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1882-85; Home Secretary, 1886. 
CHURCHILL, Winston Spencer Leonard (1874-1965) 
s-o. Lord Randolph Churchill. Educ Harrow and Sandhurst. Commissioned 4 th Hussars 1895. 
Present at Omdurman 1898 with 21't Lancers. Adventures in S Africa 1900. MP (C) for Oldham 
1900. Sympathised with Boers and crossed Floor to become a Liberal 1904. Parly USofS 
Colonial Office 1906; Presdt Board of Trade 1908; Home Secretary 1910; First Lord Admiralty 
1911; Chancellor Duchy of Lancaster 1915; CO 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers 1915; Minister of 
Munitions 1917; SofS for War 1918; Colonial Office 1920. Lost seat 1922. MID (C) for Epping 
1924 and Chancellor of the Exchequer 1924-29. First Lord Admiralty 1939; Prime Minister 
1940-45 and 1951-55. 
CROSS, Richard Assheton (1823-1914) 
Educ Rugby and Trinity College, Cambridge. Presdt of Union. Barrister 1849 and practised 
successfully on the N. Circuit. MP 1857-52 Preston, resigning to run family bank and take part 
in local government. MP 1868 for S. W. Lancs. Without any previous ministerial experience 
Home Secretary in 1874-80 and generally judged a success, dealing with difficult liquor 
licensing, housing, factories and employment legislation. Home Secretary 1885-6; SofS for India 
1886-92; Lord Privy Seal 1895-1900. Retired 1902. 
DRUMMOND, Maurice (1827-1891) 
2nd so Charles Drummond. Married 1847 Hon Adelaide Lister, d 2nd Baron Riddlesdale, and 
stepdaughter of Lord John Russell, twice Prime Minister. (Also related by marriage to Harcourt 
- see below. ) Junior Clerk, Treasury, 1843; Assistant Clerk, 1852; Second Clerk, 1856; Private 
Secretary to G Cornewall Lewis, Chancellor of the Exchequer 1857-58, and Home 
Secretary`1858-59. Receiver of the Metropolitan Police 1860-83. Related to the Drummond 
banking family. 
ELLIOT, Frank Leonard Dumbell (1874-1939) 
s. o. Lt Governor Bengal. Educ Eton Entered Home Office from Open Competition 1898. 
Private secretary to Parly USofS. Assistant Commissioner Metropolitan police 1914-31. 
EVEREST, George (1805-1885) 
b. Bodmin. Clerk Home Office 1827as Assistant Clerk and then from 1847 Clerk for Criminal 
Business. Retired on abolition of office 1876. CB 1877. Son became Receiver's Chief Clerk and 
retired 1913. 
FARRER, Thomas Henry (1919-1899) 
s, o solicitor, Lincolns Inn. Educated Eton, Balliol College, Oxford. Barrister 1844. Joined Board 
of Trade 1848, working principally on marine matters until PUS 1865-1886. Member LCC 1889- 
1898, for nearly 2 years Vice Chairman. Created peer 1893. 
FEILDING, William Henry Adelbert (1836-1895) 
5th so 7th Ead of Denbigh. Ensign 62nd Regt 1852; Lt 1853; Lt Coldstreams 1854; Major 1875; 
on half pay from 1877. AAG, Dublin District, 1864-69. Engaged in anti-Fenian intelligence in Ireland and, after the Clerkenwell explosion in 1867, attached to the Home Office for "special 
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services! ' in a group Wth a Capt Whelan, 8th Regt, and Robert Anderson (see above), 
disbanded in April 1868. Member of HO Metropolitan Police Committee on Detectives, 11878. 
Brig-General, Aldershot 1883-6; Inspector General Recruiting HQ Army 1894. Died of cholera at 
British Legation, Bangkok. 
FERGUSSON, Sir James (1832-1907) 
Born Edinburgh. 6th Bt Educated Rugby, University College, Oxford. Inherited approx 21,000 
acres. Lt Grenadiers 1851; Captain 1854. Served Crimean War, and wounded at Inkerman. MP 
1854 and retired Army 1856. Parly US India Office 1860-7, HO 1867-8 (chaired Metropolitan 
Police Committee), and FO 1886-91; Lt Gov S Australia 1868; New Zealand 1873-5; Bombay 
1880-5. Postmaster General 1891-2. 
FIRTH, John Firth Bottomley. (1842-1889) 
Born Huddersfield. Barrister 1866. Longstanding President of the Municipal Reform League 
from 1873. Established himself as the leading expert on London government issues, his first 
major publication being The Gas Supply of London, 1874. He was MP for Chelsea 1880-5, and 
for Dundee from 1888 until his death while climbing in the Chamonix. Elected to the LCC in 
1889, he was its first Deputy Chairman and his premature death regarded as a real loss to the 
LCC in its formative period. 
FISHER, John William (1787-1876) 
MRCS 1809; FRCS 1836. Practised from 21 Argyll Street. Surgeon to Bow Street Patrol 1821, 
to Metropolitan police 1829-65, and Superintending Surgeon from 1830. Knighted 1858. 
GAMON, Hugh Reece Percival (1880-1953) 
s. o. Chester solicitor. Educated Harrow and Exeter, Oxford. 1't Class Mods. and Lit. Hum. 
Barrister Middle Temple 1906. Northern Circuit - Liverpool and Chancery Bar. County Court 
Judge in York 1936. Chairman York Council of Social Service. Wrote The London Police Court 
- Today and Tomoffow, Dent, 1907 following a commission from the Toynbee Trust and living 
for over 12 months in the East End frequenting the Police Courts. 
GATHORNE HARDY, Gathorne (1814-1906) 
3'd s. o. John Hardy, proprietor of Low Moor ironworks, MP for Bradford, and Judge of the Duchy 
of Lancaster Court, Pontefract. Educ Shrewsbury and Oriel College, Oxford. Barrister 1840, N. 
Circuit. MP Leominster 1856-1865, and for Oxford 1865-1878. Parly LlSofS Home Office 1858- 
9. Presdt Poor Law Board 1866; Home Secretary 1866-8; SofS for War 1874-8; SofS for India 
1878-1880; Lord President 1886-92. Viscount Cranbrook 1878; Ead of Cranbrook 1892. Retd 
from active politics in 1895. 
GLADSTONE, Herbert John (1854-1930) 
Ygst s. o. WE Gladstone and born in Downing Street whilst father Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
Educ Eton, University College, Oxford. MP Leeds 1885-1910. Parly USofS Home Office, 1892- 
4. Chief Liberal Whip from 1899. Home Secretary 1905-09, during when the Home Office had 
22 Bills. 1910 made a peer and Ist Gov Gen of S Africa 1910-14. 
GRAHAM, James Robert George (1792-1861) 
Educated Westminster, and Christ Church, Oxford (left 1812 without a degree). Succeeded to 
baronetcy and estates 1824 in Cumberland. MP 1820-21, and from 1826 to death in various 
seats changing from Whig to Peelite Tory. First Lord Admiralty 1830 as a Whig where 
introduced modern accounting systems and acquired reputation as a competent administrator. 
Tory Home Secretary 1841-6. Want of conciliatory skills contributed to the Disruption of 1843 in 
the Scottish Kirk. Suffered from 1844 letter opening furore. Influential and most senior Peelite 
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after Peel's death in 1850 but declined leadership of the group. Returned to the Admiralty 1852- 
55. 
GREY, George (1799-1882) 
Gdson of 16t Earl Grey. Educ Oriel College, Oxford, graduating 1st class. Called to the Bar 
1826. MP for Devonport 1832-47, North Northumberland 1847-52, and Morpeth 1853-74. 
Succeeded as 2nd baronet 1828. Home Secretary 1846 and for most of ensuing 20 years. Had 
a reputation for sound judgement and skill in dealing with detailed business. 
HARCOURT, William George Granville Venables Vernon (1827-1904) 
(known as William Vernon) 
s. o. Anglican clergyman, grandson of Archb of York. Educ Trinity College, Cambridge. Barrister 
1854. Engaged at bar and in political journalism. MP Oxford 1868-80, Derby 1880-85, 
Monmouth West 1895-1904. Solicitor General 1873-4. Home Secretary 1880-85. Chancellor of 
the Exchequer 1886, and 1892-5. Leader of Commons 1894-95 and of Liberal party 1896-98. 
HARRIS, William Charles (1809-1887) 
Ensign 68th Regt 1830. Sold out as Captain 1838. Chief Constable, Hampshire, 1843-56. 
Assistant Commissioner 1856-81. Published A Manual of Drill for County and District 
Constables 1862. 
HAY, William (1782-1855) 
Ensign 52nd Regt and served with them and 12th Lt Dragoons from Torres Vedras in 1810 until 
after Waterloo. ADC to Dalhousie in America for 9 years and sold out 1829. First Inspecting 
Superintendent under Metropolitan Police Act 1839. Commissioner 1850 in succession to 
Rowan (and described as the "Military' Commissioner by the Times obituary). 
HENDERSON, Edmund Yeamans Walcott (1821-1896) 
s. o. Vice Admiral. Educ Bruton and RMA, Woolwich. Commissioned Royal Engineers 1838. 
Served Canada 183945 and subsequently. Appointed Controller of convicts Western Australia 
1850. Chairman of Directors of Convict Prisons England and Wales 1863, Surveyor General 
and Inspector General of Military Prisons. Commissioner of Metropolitan police 1869-1886. KCB 
1878. 
HENRY, Edward Richard (1850-1931) 
so RC medical practitioner from Mayo. Educated St Edmund's College, Ware, and University 
College, London, whence by examination to the ICS. Inspector General, Bengal Police, 1891. 
Published Classification and Use of Fingerprints in 1900. Assistant Commissioner 1901. 
Commissioner 1903. KCVO 1906; KCB 1910; GCVO 1911. Baronet 1918 on resignation in 
wake of police strike. 
HOLYOAKE, George Jacob (1817-1906) 
Born Birmingham and apprenticed as a tinsmith. A self-improver who went through Chartist 
(present at Bull Ring dots 1839), Owenite and co-operative (presided at opening of Toad Lane, 
Rochdale, shop 1843) development with strong rationalistic flavour. Imprisoned for blasphemy 
in 1842, and credited with coining the word "secularism". Involved in radical publishing and non- 
violent political agitation. A principled and respected figure who benefited from 1874 from an 
annuity raised by public subscription. 
HOWARD, Andrew Charles (c 1840-1909) 
Educated privately. Served with Rattray's Sikhs during Mutiny 1858. Chief of Police Patna and 
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Monghyr Metropolitan Police. District Superintendent, Metropolitan Police 1869. Assistant 
Commissioner 1890-1902. CB 1894; Knighted 1897; KCB 1902. 
KNO)ý Ralph Henry (1836-1913) 
Educ TCD. Entered War Office 1856. Accountant General, War Office, 1882-97. PUS 1897- 
1901. Member of HO Committee 1888 on relations between Receiver and Commissioner. 
Susequently, member of Royal Commissions on Indian Financial Relations, Civil Service 
Superannuation 1902 and Militia and Volunteers 1903. KCB 1895. PC 1903. 
LABALMONDIERE, Douglas William Parish (1815-1893) 
Educated Eton and RMC, Sandhurst, passing out with exceptional honours. Commissioned 
83rd Foot 1833. Served Canadian Rebellion 1837-8. Special duties Ireland under Poor Law 
Commissioners 1848-9. Appointed from position as half pay Captain 45th Foot serving in 
Bombay as Inspecting Superintendent 1850. Accompanied The Queen on Paris State Visit 
1855. Assistant Commissioner 1856. Acting Commissioner for three months 1868 following 
Mayne's death. CB and retired 1884. 
LEWIS, George Cornewall (1806-18630 
s. o. Thomas Frankland Lewis, Harpton Court, Radnorshire. Educ Eton, Christchurch College, 
Oxford. Barrister 1831 but poor health prevented his practising. Instead undertook commissions 
of inquiry into Irish (poor law) and Maltese affairs. Succeeded father as Poor Law Commissioner 
183947. MP for Herefordshire 1847-52. Pady USofS Home Office 1848-50. Financial Secretary 
Treasury 1850-52. Lost seat 1852 but succeeded to his fathers baronetcy and seat as MP for 
Radnor Boroughs 1855-63. Chancellor of the Exchequer 1855-58. Home Secretary 1859-61. 
Secretary for War 1861. 
LEWIS, Harvey (1812-1888) 
b. Dublin, so William Lewis. TCD BA and MA. 1838-1850 Irish Bar. 1857 Sheriff of Kildare. 
Contested Bodmin 1857 and Hull 1859. MP for Marylebone 1861-1874. Strong advocate of 
ballot and disestablishment of the Irish Church. 
LIDDELL, Hon Adolphus Freak Octavius (1818-1885) 
so 1st Lord Ravensworth. Educated Eton and Oxford. (Brother, uncle and 2 cousins in the 
Church, 2 other brothers in Army, and another was Equerry to Duchess of Gloucester and 
Groom in Waiting to The Queen. ) Fellow of All Souls. Barrister; QC 1861. Contested 
Gateshead unsuccessfully as Conservative 1852. Appointed PUS HO by Gathorne Hardy 1867. 
Retired a month before death. 
LCREBURN, Lord [Robert Threshie REID] (1846-1922) 
2 nd S. O. Sir James Reid, Dumfries. Educ Cheltenham, and Balliol College, Oxford. Barrister 
1871 and QC 1882. MP Hereford from 1880 and for Dumfries 1886-1905. Lord Chancellor 
1905-1912. 
LOWE, Robert (1811-1892) 
2 nd s. o. Anglican cleric. Educ Winchester, University College, Oxford. Remained first at Oxford 
as a university coach, and participated in the Tractarian disputes. Barrister 1842 when went to 
practice in Sydney, NSW. There he became, first, an appointed and later an elected member of the Legislative Council. Returned to UK 1850 becomirxj MP for Kidderminster in 1852. Board of 
Control 1852-5; Vice Presdt Board of Trade and Paymaster General 1855-58. MP for Caine 
1859 and Vice Presdt Board of Education 1859-64. MP for London University 1868; Chancellor 
of the Exchequer 1868-73; Home Secretary 1873-4. Created a peer 1880 as Lord Sherbrooke. 
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LUSH I NGTON, Godfrey (1832-1907) 
Educated Rugby, Balliol (Oxford). 1st in Greats and Fellow, All Souls, 1854. (S o Stephen, 
Admiralty Judge and several times Whig MP. Grandfather made a baronet for services as 
Chairman of EIC. (Twin, Vernon (1832-1912), Secretary to the Admiralty 1869-77; County Court 
Judge, 1877-1900. ) As a young man became interested in Positivism, and had a hand in 
translating Comte. Barrister whose practice included involvement in labour law. First Secretary 
1866-9 to the RC on Digest of Law 1866-70. Contested Abingdon unsuccessfully in 1868 
Election. Legal Adviser to HO 1869. Regarded in some conservative circles as of marked 
radical tendencies -a view which delayed but did not prevent his appointment as PUS HO 1885 by Cross after Prime Ministerial reservations and only after another preferred candidate 
withdrew. KCB 1892 (delayed by PM); GCMG 1899. Retired 1895. 
McKENNA, Reginald (1863-1943) 
s. o. civil servant who obtained post through intervention of Daniel O'Connor. Educ St Maio, 
Ebersdorf, King's College School; Trinity hall, Cambridge. MP N. Monmouthshire 1895-1918. 
Financial Secretary Treasury 1905. President Board of Education 1907. First Lord Admiralty 
1908. Home Secretary 1911. Chancellor of the Exchequer 1915-16. Became Chairman of the 
Midland Bank 1919. 
MACNAGHTEN, Melville Leslie (1858-1921) 
Youngest of 15 children. Father Chairman of EIC. Educated Eton. Managed family estates 
Bengal, 1873-88, where met and impressed James Monro (see below). Appointed Assistant 
Chief Constable and in same year Chief Constable, CID, Metropolitan Police 1889. Assistant 
Commissioner and Head of CID, 1903-13. Knighted 1907. 
MACREADY, Cecil Frederick Nevil (1862-1946) 
Yger s. o. Charles Macready, actor, by 2nd wife. Educ Tavistock Grammar, Cheltenham, 
Marlborough and RMA. Commissioned Gordons 1881. Served Egypt campaign where became 
Staff Lt Military Police Cairo and AJexandria from 1884. Was Asst Provost Marshall, Port 
Elizabeth during S African War. Colonel 1903. Asst Adjt General, War Office, 1907. 
Commander2n Infantry Bde 1909. Major General 1910 S Wales disturbances. Adjt General 
BEF 1914. Adjt General Army 1916 and on Army Council. Commissioner Metropolitan Police 
1918- 1920. GOC Ireland 1920-23. 
MAULE, John Blossett QC (1817-1889) 
2 nd s. o. G. Maule, Treasury Solicitor. Educ Westminster and Christchurch College, Oxford. 
Barrister 1849. Recorder Leeds 1851-1880. Director of Public Prosecutions 1880-84, Member 
Home Office Departmental Committee on Detective Police 1877-8. 
MAY, John (? - 1855) 
First Superintendent A Division, 1829. Led police contingent to Birmingham Bull Ring dots 
1839. Regarded by Commissioners as primus inter pares the Superintendents as A Division 
was established both as the elite part of the force and the locus of its operational administration. 
MAYNE, Richard (1796-1868) 
Born Dublin, 4th so Edward Mayne, Irish Judge. Educated TCD: BA 1818; MA 1821. Barrister, 
Lincoln's Inn, 1822; practised N Circuit. Appointed one of the two Commissioners of the 
Metropolitan Police 1829 and became sole Commissioner following Metropolitan Police Act 
1856. CB 1848; KCB 1851. Died in office. 
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MITFORD, Robert Sidney (1849-1931) 
Educated Merchant Taylors. 3d Class Clerk Home Office 1868. Private Secretary to Home 
Secretary in 1870 and 1873, to Parlty Under Secretary 1874, and to successive Home Secretaries 1876-82. Prisons Commissioner 1882-1909. 
MONRO, James (1838-1920) 
Born Edinburgh. Educated Universities of Edinburgh and Berlin. Bengal CS 1857 serving as 
magistrate and judge, and as Inspector General of Police. Appointed Assistant Commissioner 
1884 in charge of CID vice Howard Vincent (see below). Commissioner 1888 vice Warren (see 
below). Resigned 1890. Returned to Bengal where founded Ranaghat Medical Mission. 
MOYLAN, John Fitzgerald (1882-1967) 
Born Grenada, s. o. barrister. Educ Bedford, Queens' College, Cambridge. lt Cl Classics 
Tripos. Joined Home Office from Open Competition. Posted to S Wales 1910 to liaise between 
GOC, local policing and Home Office. Receiver 1919-1945. 
PEARSON, Richard Lyons Otway (1831-1890) 
Educated Eton and Sandhurst. Ensign 95th Regt 1847; Capt 7th Regt 1854; Lt Grenadiers 1855 
and ADC to Sir George Browne in Crimea. Present at Alma, Inkerman, Kertch and Sebastopol. 
Sold out as Lt Col 1869 and appointed one of first four District Superintendents the same year. 
Assistant Commissioner 1881 until death. CB 1887. 
PEMBERTON, Edward Leigh (1823-1910) 
Educated Eton and St John's College, Oxford. Barrister 1847. MP for East Kent 1868-85. Legal 
Under Secretary, Home Office, 1885-1894. KC13 1898. 
PENNEFATHER, Alfred Richard (1845-1918) 
s0 QC and Judge. (? b. Dublin). Educated at (un-named) private school. Recruited 1868 to new 
HO post as clerk in charge of accounts. Sent to Scotland to inquire into operation of Artizans' 
Dwellings Improvement Schemes. Negotiated with local authorities over local prisons! 
nationalization 1878 and served 1879 on committee on pay of prison officers in England and 
Scotland. On Treasury recommendation was made auditor of Royal Patriotic Fund and of 
Metropolitan Board of Works 1882. Receiver 1883 vice Drummond (see above). CI3 1896; 
knighted and retired 1909. Active evangelical Anglican layman: Member of House of Laymen, 
Canterbury Province, and of Church of England Central Board of Finance. JP, Essex, and 
member of Essex Police Joint Standing Committee. [Brother (b Dublin 1848) Vicar of Kensington 1897 till d 1917. ] 
PHILLIPPS, Samuel March (1780-1862) 
Born Uttoxeter, so landowner. Educated Charterhouse and Sidney Sussex, Cambridge - 8th Wrangler 1802. Called to Bar 1806 and though did not practise wrote Law of Evidence, 1814, a 
standard work in both England and the US - last editions 1838 and 1868 respectively. Edited State Trials 1826. Married sister of politician Charles Grant, later Lord Glenelg. PUS HO 1827. 
Retired 1848 when made Privy Counsellor. 
REDGRAVE, Samuel (1802-1876) 
Entered HO as Supplementary Clerk 1818. Assistant Keeper Criminal Register 1828. Secretary 
to Constabulary Force Commission 1836. APS Home Secretary, and PS to Parly USofSs, Fox Maule, 1839-41 and Fitzroy, 1852-5. Keeper of Criminal Register from 1841; and wrote forewords to annual statistical publications. Prepared First Edition (1852) of Some Account of 
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the Powers, Authorities and Duties of HM Principal Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, and this led him to prepare Murray's Official Handbook of Church and State. 
Principal official below PUS engaged on police matters, and took charge of new Police and 
Statistical Dept 1856. Retired 1860. Active in art circles7 arranged important exhibitions (eg 
watercolour gallery at 1862 Exhibition); collaborated with brother Richard (RA 1841; Surveyor of 
Crown Pictures 1857-80) on A Century of Artists of the English School; and published other 
works 1874 and (posthumously) 1877. 
REEVES, Charles (1815-???? ) 
Born Hampshire. Architect in partnership with HA Voysey 1847-52, and LG Butcher 1853-66. 
Architect and Surveyor to Metropolitan Police from 1843, designing 44 police stations and 
attending to dangerous structures and common lodging houses. As architect to County Courts 
from 1847, designed 64 County Courts. Most of works in Italian style. Medals in connexion with 
the 1851 and 1862 Exhibitions. 
RIDLEY, Matthew White (1842-1904) 
5'h Bart and 1ý'Visct, e. s. of e Bart. Educated Harrow, Balliol, Oxford. FrIlow of Adl Souls. 
Succeeded father in orth Northumberland constituency 1868. Parly Under Secretary Home 
Office 1878. Lost seat in 1886 but elected for Blackpool in 1886 where stayed until ennoblement 
1904. Home Secretary 1895-1900. [Related to Bradford - see above. ] 
RITCHIE. Charles Thomson (1838-1906) 
2nd s. o. of E India merchant jute spinners in Dundee. Educated City of London School whence 
to familt business. MP for Tower Hamlets 1874; St George's in the East from 1885. Financial 
Secretary Admiralty 1885-6,; presdt Local Govt Board`1886 where successful with Local Govt 
Act 1888. Out of Parlt 1892-5. Presdt Board of Trade 1895- 1900; and Home Secretary 1900- 
02. Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1902. 
ROWAN, Chades (cl782-1852) 
Born Antrim. Ensign, 1797, in 52nd Foot (in which uncle and 2 Bros also served, one of whom, 
William, 1789-1879, became a Field Marshall); Lt 1799; Capt 1803; Major 1811; Brevet Lt Col 
1812. Served Sicily 1806-7, Sweden 1808, and through much of Peninsular campaign 
(including as AAG, Light Brigade). Present notably at Busaco, Badajoz (wounded in assault), 
Salamanca, and commanded a wing of the 52nd at Waterloo (where again wounded). Left Army 
early 1820's and apparently served as a police magistrate in Ireland. With Mayne (see above) 
one of two first Commissioners of Metropolitan Police in 1829. Referred to as "Residenr' and 
"Military' Commissioner and generally regarded as the senior. Retired 1850 after a long period 
of bad health. CB 1815; KCB 1848. Died 1852. "To his skilful guidance were mainly Owing the 
speedy removal of the initial prejudices against the new police and the lasting success of the 
measure. "(DNB) 
RUGGLES-BRISE, Evelyn (1857-1935) 
Yger s. o. Sir Samnuel Ruggles-Brise, Bt, and MP, Finchingfield, Essex. Educ Eton and Balliol, 
Oxford. (2d Mods, 1877, Is Lit Hum, 1880). Entered Home Office by open competition and 
through father's acquaintance with Home Secretary (Harcourt). Private Secretary to successive 
Home Secretaries 1886 -1892 when appointed a Prison Commissioner. Chairman of Commissioners 1895-1921. 
SAMUEL Herbert (1870-1963) 
b. Liverpool, s. o. merchant banker. Educ University College School, Balliol College, Oxford. 
Unsuccessful parliamentary candidate 1895 and 1900. MP for Cleveland 1902. Parly USOfS 
Home Office 1905-9. Chancellor of Duchy of Lancaster 1909; Postmaster General 1910; President Local Government Board 1914; Postmaster General 1915; Home Secretary 1916 but 
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did not join Lloyd George'e cabinet later that year. Defeated in 'coupona election 1918.1 St High 
Commissioner Palestine 1920-25. Coal Commission 1926. MP Darwen 1929. Home Secretary 
1931-32. Lost seat 1935. Created peer 1937. 
SHOUT, Edward (1862-1935) 
2 rid s. o. Anglican cleric. Educ Durham School and Durham University. Barrister 1890 and QC 
1910. Recorder of Sunderland 1907-18. MP West Newcastle 1910-22. Chief Secretary Ireland 
1918-19. Home Secretary 1919-22 - dealing with both police strikes. President British Board of Film Censors 1929-35. 
SIMON, John Allsebrook (1873-1954) 
s. o. Congregational Minister. Educ Fettes, Wadham College, Oxford. Presdt of Oxford 
Union. 1896. Felaw of AA Souls. Barrister 1899. MP Walthamstow 1906-18, Spen Valley 1922- 
40. Solicitor General 1910-13; Attorney Geberal 1913-15; Home Secretary 1915-16; Foreign 
Secretary 1931-35; Home Secretary and Leader of the Commons 1935-37; Chancellor of the 
Exchequer 1937-40; Lord Chancellor 1940-45. Created Viscount 1940. 
STUART, James (184 3-1913) 
Born Fife, eldest s. o. nine children of mill owner of Writer stock. Educ Madras College and St 
Andrew's University. Trinity College, Cambridge 1862.3 rd Wrangler 1866 and Fellow, Involved 
1867-75 with setting up University Extension lectures (during which period he met Josephine 
Butler and joined campaign against the Contagious Diseases Acts), the early development of 
Girton and Newnham women's colleges, and instituting the Mechanical Sciences Tripos. First 
Professor of Mechanics at Cambridge 1875-90. MP Hackney 1884, Hoxton 1885-1900, 
Sunderland 1906-10. Edited Star and Moming Leader 1890-98. Alderman LCC 1889-98, then 
councillor for Hackney. Member Royal Commissions on Aged Poor, and Local Taxation. PC 
1909 but never given office. From 1898 took on management of Colman's Norwich on death of 
father-in-law. Rector of St Andrews 1898-1901. 
STUART-WORTLEY, Charles Beilby (1851-1926) 
s. o. QC and himself grandson of 1st Baron Wharricliffe. Educ Rugby and Balliol College, Oxford, 
Barrister 1876. Practised N. E. Circuit 1876-85. QC 1892. MID for Sheffield constituencies 1880- 
1916. Parly Under Secretary Home Office, 1885, and 1886-92. Ecclesiastical and Church 
Estates Commissioner 1895. Created 1 st Baron Stuart Wortley 1916. 
THOMSON, Basil (1861-1939) 
Td so Archbishop of York. Educated Eton, New College, Oxford, - though did not graduate. After an episode as an agricultural apprentice in Iowa, joined Colonial Service in Fiji and spent 
some years in sundry Pacific Dependencies, acting at one time as Prime Minister of Tonga. 
Returned UK 1894; guardian/tutor of Crown Prince of Siam and brother; barrister 1896; entered 
Prison Service 1896, governing Northampton, Cardiff, Dartmoor and Wormwood Scrubs (the 
last two both after mutinies); Secretary to Prison Commission 1906; solicited and obtained post 
of Assistant Commissioner (Crime) on Macnaghten's retirement 1913. Was effectively required 
to resign by Prime Minister 1921 when it was decided to support Commissioner Horwood's view 
that the new 1919 post of Director of Intelligence filled by Thomson should be ended and the functions revert to the Commissioner. Horwood pursued possibility of prosecuting Thomson for 
subsequent articlestbook allegedly in breach of Official Secrets Acts, but Home Secretary 
(Shortt) declined to act. Thomson (who separated from his wife in 1922) was later convicted 1925 of (consensual) indecency act with young woman in Hyde Park, 
THRING, Henry (11818-1907) 
Educ Shrewsbury and Magdalene College, Cambridge. Barrister 1845. Home Office Counsel 
1860. Member Departmental Committee on Metropolitan Police 1868. Head of Office of 
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Parliamentary Counsel established 1869. Retired and made peer 1886. 
TRIPP, (Herbert) AJker (1883-1954) 
s. o. GH Tripp below. Joined civil staff NSY 1902. Chairman Police Recruiting Board 1920-5; 
member Steering Committee on Ahens and Nationality 1925-9, and of Advisory Committee on 
Homeless Poor of London. Assistant Commissioner'B' 1932-1947 when specialized in traffic 
issues. Keen sailor and 4 of his cruising books remain in print 
TRIPP, George Henry (1860-1922) 
Educated Mercers'School. Joined Home Office as Second Divn Clerk 1878. Assistant Clerk in 
charge of Accounts 1884, and Chief Clerk 1887. Rank and precedence of Senior Clerk 1904. 
Auditor Royal Patriotic Fund 1893-8. Secretary to Committee on Metropolitan Police 
Superannuation 1889; member Committees on Prison Clerks' petitions 1902, Metropolitan 
Police Housing 1903, Education Rates 1905, and Metropolitan Police Finance 1909. Receiver 
1910 vice Pennefather (see above) and retired 1918. CB 1913. 
TROUP, (Charles) Edward (1857-1941) 
so clergyman, b Huntly, Aberdeenshire. Educ Aberdeen University; Balliol, Oxford. Joined 
Home Office as first open competition First Division recruit 1880. Barrister, Middle Temple, 
1888. Chairman Committee on Identification of Criminals 1893. Editor Judicial Statistics 1894- 
1902. Assistant Under Secretary 1903-8. Permanent Under Secretary 1908-22. KCB 1909. 
KCVO 1918. Treasurer and Fellow Kings College, London, 1922-1939. 
VINCENT, Charles Edward Howard (1849-19,08) 
so Anglican cleric. Educated Westminster (briefly), privately, and RMC, Sandhurst. 
Commissioned Royal Welch Fusiliers 1868-73. Commenced long connexion with Volunteer 
movement in 1875. (Commanded Queen's Westminsters 1884-1904). Barrister 1876 and 
qualified at Paris Facult6 cle Droit 1877. Travelled a good deal in Europe as a young man, 
including to Prussia, Poland, Russia and Turkey. In 1877 went out to Russo-Turkish War and 
wrote a well publicised article on Russian war preparations. In 1878 successfully solicited new 
post of Director of Criminal Investigations set up in wake of 1877 Detective scandal. Published 
Police Code and Manual of the Criminal Law, 1881, which remained - in subsequent editions for 
whose preparation after Vincent's death NSY assumed responsibility - in print until 1928. (The 
profits went to the Metropolitan and City Police Orphanage. ) Resigned 1884 shortly after 
marriage to a co-heiress. Conservative MP for Central Sheffield from 1885 and active in Party 
organisation. Member LCC 1889-96. Vociferous Imperialist; enthusiastic for imperial preference 
and "fair trade"; continued to travel abroad a great deal (including to S Africa during the Boer 
War); strongly associated with xenophobic (and anti-semitic) Parliamentary pressure for 
immigration control; associated also with Public Trustee and Probation of First Offenders 
legislation. Retained close interest in police affairs; founded Police Pensioners' Society', 
Chairman Committee on RIC and Dublin Police 1901. Knight 1896; KCMG 1899. 
WADDINGTON, Horatio (1799-1867) 
so Anglican cleric. Educ Charterhouse and Trinity College, Cambridge. BA, 18th Wrangler, 
1820. Barrister 1825. Recorder Lichfield and Warwick 1838-48. PUS HO 1848. Member 
Cambridge University Commission 1856, and Common Law Commission 1857. Made PC at 
retirement 1867. Died 3.10.1867. 
WALPOLE, Spencer Horatio (1806-1898) 
Educ Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge. Barrister 1831. QC 1846. Practised in Rolls court 
until 1852. MP Miclhurst 1846-56, and Cambridge University 1856-82. Home Secretary 1852, 
1858-9 and 1866-7. 
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WALPOLE, Spencer (1839-1907) 
s. o. S. H. Walpole. Educ Eton. Did not proceed to university when father left Bar for politics. 
Clerk War Office 1858. Private Secretary to father at Home Office 1858-9, to Sotheran-EstcOurt 
his fathers successor in 1859, and again to his father 1866-7. Inspector Fisheries from 1867. 
Lieutenant Governor Isle of Man 1882-1893. Secretary General Post Office 1893-9. Wrote two 
substantial political histories covering the period 1815-1880. Pleasant, competent, he owed all 
his offices to Liberal patronage. 
WARREN, Charles (1840-1927) 
s. o. Major-General. Educ Cheltenham, Sandhurst and Woolwich. Commissioned Royal 
Engineers 1857. Gibraltar survey 1859-67. Palestine survey and archaeological excavations 
1867-70. Home appointments. Settled Griq ualand/O range F. S. boundary 1876-7. Severely 
wounded Kaffir War 1877-8. Expedition in Egypt to discover fate of Prof Palmer 1882. Military 
expedition to Bechuanaland where all objectives achieved without loss of blood 1884. GCMG. 
Stands unsuccessfully for election as MP in Sheffield 1885. Head of Suakin garrison, Red sea, 
1886. Commissioner of Metropolitan police 1886-88. Commander, Singapore, 1889-1894. 
Divisional commander S African War. Settled Bechuanaland rebellion 1900. General 1904. 
Colonel Commandant Royal Engineers 1904. Keen early supporter of Scouting. Enthusiastic 
freemason. 
WILLIAMSON, Adolphus ("Dolly") (1831-1889) 
Born Hammersmith, so David Williamson late Sergeant Major RA and first Superintendent "T' 
(Hammersmith) Division, 1829. Clerk Ordnance Office, 1848; Constable 1850; Sgt Detective 
Dept 1852; Superintendent 1869; Chief Superintendent CID 1877-1886; Chief Constable, CID, 
1886 until death. 
WODEHOUSE, Frederick (1851-1934) 
Educ privately, RMA, Woolwich. RA 1870-90, Major (Afghan War 1878-80). Assistant 
Commissioner, City Police, 1890-1902, and of Metropolitan Police 1902-18. KCVO 1911, KCB 
1917. 
WRAY, John (1782-1869) 
Born Collingham, Yorks, so Colonel Wray, Chairman of Waterloo Fund. Educated Trinity 
College, Cambridge, graduating 1804. Barrister 1823. First Receiver of Metropolitan Police 
1829-1860, and from 1839 Receiver also of Metropolitan Magistrates' Courts. Active in business 
and commercial life, continuing a bar practice (which included the promotion of Private Bills) but 
- not mentioned at all in the Times notice of his death (19.2.1869) - principally as founder, Chairman and "Resident" (ie Managing) Director of the University Ufe Assurance Society from 
1825 until his retirement in 1866 when succeeded by his son. 
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